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THE COURT: 1 On 5 July 2024, we delivered judgment in Raiz v Director of Professional Services Review [2024] FCAFC 91 in which we allowed an appeal from the decision of the primary judge published on 30 October 2023: Raiz v Director of Professional Service Review (No 2) FCA 1293 (PJ) dismissing the appellant's application for judicial review. 2 Before us, the appellant was aggrieved by two matters: (a) First, a decision made by the Director of Professional Services Review in March 2018 to make a referral to a Professional Services Committee pursuant to Part VAA of the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) to investigate his provision of services; and (b) Second, the conduct of a hearing by the Committee on various days in June, July and August 2019, when the appointed Chairperson was absent for the first three days of a six-day hearing following which a draft Report dated 30 September 2021 was prepared by the Committee. 3 Subsequently, the Committee prepared its final Report on 5 February 2024 but by orders made by consent on 14 February 2024, it was prevented from giving its final Report to the Determining Authority under s106L(3)(b) of the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth). 4 We allowed the appeal on the second matter and invited the parties to provide an agreed minute of proposed consequential orders or, failing agreement, their competing submissions. The parties did not reach agreement and in these reasons we resolve the competing submissions. 5 The first issue is the form of relief that should be granted. There is no dispute that a writ of certiorari should issue directed to the second respondent (the Members of the Professional Services Committee No. 1095) quashing the draft Report made on 30 September 2021 and the final Report of 5 February 2024. Before the primary judge, amongst other things, the appellant sought a declaration in his Further Amended Originating Application and Further Amended Statement of Claim that the Draft Decision of the Committee made on 30 September 2021 is void and of no effect. The practical effect of the issue of a writ of certiorari is the same. 6 What is in dispute is whether the orders made by the primary judge on 30 October 2023 should be set aside and whether a writ of mandamus should issue directed to the first respondent requiring him to reconstitute a Committee under s 95 of the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) for the purpose of investigating the referral made under s 93(1) of the Act on 9 March 2018. 7 The appellant is correct to submit that an order which sets aside the orders made by a primary judge, upon a successful appeal, is the ordinary outcome. 8 The submissions of the first respondent do not engage with that point, save through the tangential submission that we should not disturb the costs orders made by the primary judge for the reason that the point on which the appeal primarily succeeded was not argued before the primary judge. In our view it follows from our conclusion that the appeal be allowed that the orders made by the primary judge must also be set aside. How the costs of the proceeding before the primary judge should be dealt with may conveniently be the subject of a separate order. 9 Turning next to whether a writ of mandamus should issue, the first respondent submits that a consequence of the reasoning of this Court is that the Committee "is still to undertake its statutory functions" under the Act, that is to investigate whether the appellant engaged in inappropriate practice in providing the services specified in the referral. That may be accepted. 10 Next, the first respondent submits that the interests of justice require that the Committee now be differently constituted for two reasons: (a) First, adverse credibility findings were made which of itself justifies remittal to a differently constituted decision-maker; and (b) Second, one Committee member ceased to be a panel member (and thereby became ineligible to be a committee member) after delivery of the final Report. 11 We accept that it is open to this Court to make orders that the Committee be differently constituted because it has made adverse credit findings in its draft and final Reports which essentially is a matter of fairness: Northern NSW FM Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 26 FCR 39 at 42-43, Davies and Foster JJ and Comcare v Broadhurst (2011) 192 FCR 497 at [29]-[34], Downes J and [88]-[95], Tracey and Flick JJ. 12 Directions as to the constitution of a tribunal when a matter is remitted do not require a writ of mandamus and the appellant is correct to submit that the first respondent cannot be seeking a writ against herself and there is no utility in granting it where each report is quashed. 13 Further, there was no suggestion in the respondents' submissions before us that if the appeal was allowed, a writ of mandamus should issue. That, of course, does not mean that such an order should not be made. 14 On a related point, the first respondent's submissions raise whether this Court should direct that the Committee be reconstituted, in particular that the interests of justice require the differently constituted Committee now undertake the investigation into the appellant's provision of services. 15 The appellant failed in his appeal grounds which sought to challenge the decision of the first respondent of 9 March 2018, to set up the Committee and refer the investigation of him to it. As correctly submitted for the appellant, the consequences of that decision considering his success on his other grounds, were not explored upon the hearing of the appeal and it would not therefore be appropriate for this Court to intervene in a way that requires the first respondent to proceed in any particular manner. If the appellant considers that there is a proper basis for an apprehended bias application, then it will be a matter for him to make it. 16 Accordingly, we decline to order that a writ of mandamus issue. 17 The second issue concerns costs. The first respondent submits that the parties should bear their own costs of the appeal to 26 April 2024 and thereafter, the first respondent should pay the appellant's costs. The reason for drawing that distinction concerns ground seven of the amended supplementary notice of appeal which was not raised until service of the appellant's written submissions on that day. As explained in our primary reasons, we considered that grounds one and seven were dispositive of the appeal. The appellant failed on ground one. 18 The first respondent further submits that the costs order made by the primary judge should not be disturbed and that a separate costs order should be made in relation to the appellant's interlocutory application of 23 January 2024 for an injunction to restrain the Committee from continuing with its inquiry, which application was dismissed by consent on 14 February 2024 upon the undertaking of the first and the second respondents not to give the final report to the determining authority until after determination of the appeal or earlier order of the Court. The second order made on that day provided that the costs of the interlocutory application be reserved. 19 The usual rule is that costs follow the event of a successful appeal, but some other order may be made where the particular circumstances justify it. In our view the usual rule should not be departed from, save to the extent mentioned in the next paragraph. An apportioned costs order is not justified in this appeal because the order proposed would deprive the appellant of all his costs in formulating and preparing written submissions on the point on which he succeeded. Further, it is generally inappropriate to make costs orders by reference to success or failure on individual appeal grounds. It is the event of the appeal that is usually, and in this case is, dispositive having regard to the importance of the question and time spent in preparation for, and the arguments in support of and in opposition to, ground seven. 20 It is common ground that the costs order on the appeal is to operate without disturbing the costs order made by the Court on 21 May 2024 in connection with an interlocutory application by the appellant, in respect of which the appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs. 21 As to the costs before the primary judge, whilst it is true that the formulation of the arguments in support of ground seven before us differed from how they were put before the primary judge, that is not of itself a reason to deprive the appellant of his costs of the primary proceeding. The starting point is that success on an appeal ordinarily entitles the appellant to receive a costs order of the preceding below "unless there are special circumstances that warrant another order": Commissioner of Taxation v AusNet Transmission Group Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 124 at [10], Kenny, Edmunds and Greenwood JJ. 22 In the proceeding before the primary judge, the appellant contended that "without his consent, the absence of the chairperson, Dr Walker, for the first three days of the hearing rendered the Constitution of the Committee unlawful and so too the proceeding of the Committee": PJ at [116]. Although before the primary judge the basis for that submission turned on a construction argument concerned with s 96A of the Act (which operates when a Committee member is unavailable) and did not focus on the proper construction of the scheme of the Act when a Committee conducts a hearing which a member does not attend for some period, the fact is that the appellant's case has always been that the factual absence of the Chairperson for three days of the hearing resulted in legal invalidity of the proceeding. The appellant's contentions were resisted by the first respondent before the primary judge and on appeal, which compels the inference that if the argument had been cast by reference to the alternative provisions of the Act before the primary judge, it would also have been resisted. 23 Accordingly, the appellant should have his costs before the primary judge. 24 Finally, as to the interlocutory application, the orders made on 14 February 2024 reserved the costs of the application. Reserved costs follow the ultimate event of a proceeding, unless a different order is made: r 40.03 of the Federal Court Rules 2011. It follows from the above, that we see no reason to depart from the rule provision. I certify that the preceding twenty-four (24) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justices Goodman, O'Sullivan and McElwaine JJ