[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment]
The first respondent was employed by the second respondent, which hired out his labour to the appellant. The work involved removing old railway sleepers and replacing them with new sleepers. The first respondent worked as a labourer and, in particular, although not solely, a jackhammer operator. The first respondent brought proceedings against the appellant and second respondent for injuries he claimed he suffered in the course of and due to the nature and conditions of his employment.
The primary judge held that the first respondent sustained injury due to the negligence of the appellant. His Honour also entered judgment against the second respondent. The appellant appealed and the second respondent cross-appealed against the primary judge's findings of liability.
The parties raised a number of issues on the appeal and cross-appeal. In essence, the issue of whether the appellant breached its duty of care to the first respondent concerned whether the first respondent was required to work without the benefit of adequate rest breaks in circumstances where the worker with whom he was teamed did not undertake the full range of tasks involved in the removal and replacement of sleepers and, in particular, did not jackhammer. There was also an issue as to whether the risk of harm was 'not insignificant'. The second respondent also challenged whether it breached its duty of care to the first respondent. The issue on causation concerned whether the primary judge erred in accepting the evidence of one of the medical experts that the first respondent suffered an internal disc disruption, where there was conflicting evidence. The parties also challenged the primary judge's finding that the first respondent was not contributorily negligent.
Beazley ACJ (McColl and Meagher JJA agreeing) held, dismissing the appeal:
(i) The first respondent's case was based on the nature and conditions of his employment, and not on his having sustained a frank injury: [29].
(ii) The evidence did not support the inference drawn by the primary judge that the first respondent may have been called upon to perform more than his share of the work clearing away the rubble created by the jackhammering. Nor did the evidence support the inference that the first respondent would have been, at least frequently, left to his own devices to perform all of the tasks required to remove and replace the sleepers. To the extent that the primary judge based his finding that the first respondent would not have received the benefit of the breaks inherent in the system of work on these inferences, the finding was unsupported: [76]-[87].
Luxton v Vines (1952) 85 CLR 352; [1952] HCA 19; Holloway v McFeeters (1956) 94 CLR 470; [1956] HCA 25 considered.
Bradshaw v McEwans Pty Ltd (1951) 217 ALR 1 referred to.
(iii) However, the evidence did support the primary judge's finding that the appellant was negligent in failing to provide the first respondent with a safe system of work, where he was the only worker in his team of two required to jackhammer and where he undertook additional heavy lifting without assistance, which under the general de facto system of work was undertaken by two workers: [111]-[131].
TNT Australia Pty Ltd v Christie (2003) 65 NSWLR 1; [2003] NSWCA 47 considered.
(iv) The risk of personal injury through the exertion of effort and strain in the performance of repetitive heavy labouring work was not insignificant: [138]-[143].
Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; [1980] HCA 12; Shaw v Thomas [2010] NSWCA 169; South Sydney Junior Rugby League Club Ltd v Gazis [2016] NSWCA 8 considered.
Sibraa v Brown [2012] NSWCA 328; Motorcycling Events Group Australia Pty Ltd v Kelly (2013) 86 NSWLR 55; [2013] NSWCA 361; Bitupave Ltd v Pillinger (2015) 72 MVR 460; [2015] NSWCA 298; Vincent v Woolworths Ltd [2016] NSWCA 40; Gulic v Boral Transport Ltd [2016] NSWCA 269 referred to.
(v) The primary judge did not err in accepting the evidence of one of the experts that the first respondent suffered an internal disc disruption which progressed to a disc protrusion, and gave adequate reasons for doing so. Nor did the primary judge err in accepting the evidence of one of the experts that cumulative trauma could be a cause of the first respondent's injury: [179]-[192].
(vi) The primary judge did not err in finding that the first respondent was not contributorily negligent. The first respondent could not be expected to regulate his own work practices so that they were safe for him: [201]-[205], [229].
Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALR 529; [1985] HCA 34; Grills v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 72; Jurox Pty Ltd v Fullick [2016] NSWCA 180 considered.
(vii) The primary judge did not err in finding that the second respondent breached its non-delegable duty of care to the first respondent, notwithstanding that it did not devise or have direct control over the system of work under which the first respondent was required to work: [218]-[228].
Kondis v State Transport Authority (1984) 154 CLR 672; [1984] HCA 61; Lepore v State of New South Wales (2001) 52 NSWLR 420; [2001] NSWCA 112; TNT Australia Pty Ltd v Christie (2003) 65 NSWLR 1; [2003] NSWCA 47; Andar Transport Pty Ltd v Brambles Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 424; [2004] HCA 28; Cole v South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 469; [2004] HCA 29; Czatyrko v Edith Cowan University (2005) 214 ALR 349; [2005] HCA 14; Estate of the Late M T Mutton by its Executors & R W Mutton trading as Mutton Bros v Howard Haulage Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 340 considered.