Grounds 3 and 4
34 It is not in doubt that a denial of procedural fairness by the Tribunal is capable of constituting jurisdictional error: Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82. An unreasonable refusal to adjourn can constitute procedural unfairness: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597 at [40].
35 The obligations imposed by s 353 on the Tribunal, when carrying out its functions under the Migration Act, to pursue the objective of providing a mechanism of review that is fair, just, economical, informal and quick, and, when reviewing a decision, to act according to substantial justice and the merits of the case, are not merely aspirational exhortations. They are substantive requirements that the Tribunal must obey: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2012) 202 FCR 387 at [18]-[20].
36 In the present case the appellant submits that the only issue for the Tribunal was whether to grant a further extension of time to allow the appellant to provide a relevant skills assessment. He submits that what was relevant in that regard was not so much that he had been given an "extended" period of time to provide the assessment, but rather the nature of the opportunity he had had to obtain that assessment and the explanation he had given for not having achieved a successful assessment.
37 In this connection the appellant submits that the NAATI test is conducted considerably less frequently than other tests of English language proficiency and the results take considerably longer to be notified. Moreover, he submits that his ability to avail himself of the opportunity to sit for the NAATI tests had been affected by illness. He submits that the Tribunal's reasoning did not take account of these matters.
38 The appellant submits that it was unreasonable for the Tribunal to proceed to make its decision on 7 October 2011 knowing that:
the only reason the appellant would be denied the visa was the absence of a skills assessment;
the skills assessment test was to be undertaken on that day; and
there was nothing more the appellant could do.
39 The appellant points to the fact that no inquiry had been made by the Tribunal in relation to that test and that no reason was advanced by the Tribunal as to why it could not afford him the benefit of the time it would take for the results of that test to be known.
40 The appellant also points to the lack of prejudice to the Minister if "an extension of time of a few weeks" were to be granted. He submits that any such prejudice is clearly outweighed by the prejudice the appellant suffered by time not being extended.
41 The appellant submits that the Tribunal's reasoning only focuses on the amount of time he had been afforded and gave no consideration to countervailing considerations, namely the "catastrophic effect" that a refusal would have for the appellant, the infrequency of the tests, and "the fact that the appellant would, either that day or within days, (successfully) sit a further skills assessment test and it would only be a relatively short period of time before the results of the October sitting would be known".
42 The appellant submits that the presiding Federal Magistrate erred in concluding that, by proceeding to give its decision on 7 October 2011, the Tribunal was not acting unreasonably and had not fallen into jurisdictional error. The appellant's submissions provide no greater elaboration of this alleged error than that given by the notice of appeal itself.
43 Although no formal application had been made by the appellant to the Tribunal for a further extension of time to enable him to satisfy the requirements of cl 485.221, it is plain from the Tribunal's statement of its findings and reasons that it was cognisant that the appellant had applied to sit again for the NAATI test and that he had provided evidence that he intended to do so on 7 October 2011. That evidence was in the form of an admission slip provided by NAATI that the appellant was a candidate for the test on that day. Thus what the Tribunal had, at the time it made its decision, was the appellant's stated intention to sit for the NAATI test on that day.
44 However, what the Tribunal also had before it was the fact that the appellant had sought, and had been granted, a number of extensions of time to enable him to satisfy the cl 485.221 requirement. The evidence shows that, in the course of the Tribunal's review, it granted the appellant four extensions of time to enable him to satisfy that requirement. The last occasion was at the hearing on 1 June 2011, even though on 4 February 2011 the Tribunal had expressly refused to grant any further extension and had advised the appellant that it may make a decision on the review without taking any further action to obtain the information it had sought from the appellant. The extension granted by the Tribunal on 1 June 2011 was to enable the appellant to obtain the results of the test he had undertaken on 18 May 2011.
45 Thus, as matters stood at the conclusion of the hearing on 1 June 2011, the appellant had had the benefit of three granted extensions of time as well as the benefit of a de facto extension between 4 February 2011 (when his fourth request for an extension was refused) and 1 June 2011 (when the hearing was held). In the latter period of time the appellant had had the opportunity to sit for two NAATI tests. He was unable to sit for one of those tests (on 30 March 2011) on the grounds of illness, but he did sit for the test on 18 May 2011, which he failed. He had also failed the NAATI tests on the two previous occasions on which he had sat for them (16 September 2009 and 17 November 2010).
46 Had those matters represented the only state of affairs as at 7 October 2011, could it be said that, by affirming the delegate's decision on that day, the Tribunal had acted unfairly or unjustly or had failed to act according to substantial justice and the merits of the case? In my view, the answer to that question must be "no".
47 Does the fact that the Tribunal was on notice that the appellant intended to sit for a further NAATI test on 7 October 2011 change the position so that it can be said that, when the Tribunal made its decision on that day with that knowledge, it acted unfairly or unjustly or failed to act according to substantial justice and the merits of the case?
48 I am not persuaded that that question should be answered favourably to the appellant by reason of that additional fact. In my view the fact that the Tribunal was on notice that the appellant intended to sit for a further NAATI test on 7 October 2011 did not significantly change the circumstances before it. All that was in prospect was that the appellant might sit for the test on 7 October 2011 and that he might pass it. However, for all the Tribunal knew, the appellant might not sit for the test on that day or, if he did, he might not pass it. Based on his previous attempts to pass the NAATI test, the appellant's prospects (assuming he did sit for the test as indicated) could not be said, at that time, to be propitious.
49 The plain fact is that the Tribunal was not under an obligation to indefinitely postpone finalisation of its review. Similarly, it was not under an obligation to postpone the finalisation of its review whenever the appellant informed it of his intention to sit for another test. If it were under such an obligation the review process could be postponed indefinitely by the expedient of the appellant simply providing the Tribunal with evidence that he had applied to sit for the test again. On the rationale of the appellant's argument he could always ask, rhetorically, what prejudice would there be to the Minister if an extension of time of a few weeks were granted compared to the prejudice to him if such an extension were not granted?
50 As at 7 October 2011 the Tribunal can be taken to have been alert to the consequences for the appellant of a refusal to grant the visa he had sought. It can also be taken to be cognisant of the relative infrequency of the NAATI assessments and the time taken for results to be notified. These were part of the appellant's particular circumstances that were before the Tribunal. Contrary to the appellant's submissions, I do not accept that these matters were not taken into account by the Tribunal when it made its decision. The Tribunal's recognition of those circumstances lies behind the particular extensions of time that the appellant had sought and that the Tribunal had granted. That recognition is captured in the Tribunal's recitation of the facts in its decision record and its finding at [20] that it had "provided the [appellant] with a generous opportunity to provide a suitable skills assessment for his nominated skilled occupation". Contrary to the suggestion implicit in the appellant's submissions, it was not for the Tribunal to make inquiries of the appellant as to whether he had been able to obtain a satisfactory assessment. Rather, it was for the appellant to satisfy the Tribunal that he had achieved a satisfactory assessment.
51 The appellant is now able to point to the fact that he did sit for the NAATI test again (albeit not on 7 October 2011 as he had indicated to the Tribunal) and that he did pass it. However, the present knowledge of that fact cannot alter the position as at 7 October 2011. That part of the appellant's submission that I have quoted in [41] above reveals this very difficulty in his main contention on this appeal: as at 7 October 2011 the Tribunal did not know that the appellant would either that day or within days successfully sit for a further skills assessment test and that that successful result would be known a relatively short period of time thereafter. Although one can have sympathy for the appellant knowing that he has now passed the NAATI test, regrettably that cannot be a proper basis for impugning the Tribunal's decision made on 7 October 2011 in the circumstances that then obtained.
52 In my view, by making its decision on 7 October 2011, the Tribunal did not fail to carry out its functions to provide a review that was fair and just. In my view the Tribunal acted according to substantial justice and the merits of the case before it. I am not persuaded therefore that the presiding Federal Magistrate erred in coming to that conclusion. In particular, it was not an error for his Honour (at [10]) to find that it was open to the Tribunal to conclude that, after the very lengthy period of time between applying for his visa and having the merits review undertaken, the appellant should have been able to provide the necessary evidence. Similarly, it was not an error for his Honour to find that the Tribunal was entitled to consider that it was subject to a requirement to provide a mechanism of review that was quick or that that requirement was as important as any of the other requirements stipulated in s 353(1) of the Migration Act.
53 Furthermore, in my view, his Honour did not err in concluding that the Tribunal did not fail to take into account the frequency of the NAATI tests. As I have noted above, the extensions of time previously granted by the Tribunal were at the appellant's request and for periods of time that he nominated in order for him to sit for those tests and to receive the results. No other conclusion is reasonably open.
54 For these reasons, grounds 3 and 4 of the appeal fail.