Consideration
18 In my opinion, no error in the judgment of the primary judge has been made out. I agree with the primary judge's analysis of s 66, s 494B, s 494C, s 347(1)(b)(i) of the Migration Act and regs 2.16 and 4.10(1)(a) of the Migration Regulations. Those provisions, as in force at the relevant time, are set out in the judgment of the primary judge.
19 I have on earlier occasions considered this statutory regime.
20 In SZRLH v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 384 I referred to the decision of the Full Court in NACG v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 173 where Stone J, with whom Madgwick and Dowsett JJ agreed, said:
[5] ... Under s 412(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act") an application for review of such a decision must be made within 28 days of the decision being notified. The Act and its regulations provide that if advice of a decision is posted within three days of the decision having been made then the notification of the decision is deemed to have occurred seven days after the date of the decision. In both these cases then the decision is deemed by those provisions to have been notified by 19 September or, at the very latest, 20 September 2000.
[6] ... it was accepted by the Tribunal and subsequently by the primary judge in this case that the documents were not received by the registry of the Tribunal until 9 November 2000. That date is a date which is well outside the 28 day period provided by the Act.
[7] As a result the Tribunal decided that it had no jurisdiction to review the delegate's decision. This is based on the indisputable fact that the Act does not allow for any extension or variation of the 28 day period.
I also referred to Xie v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 172 at [13] in relation to the meaning of s 494C(4). There, the Full Court stated that nothing in the section suggested that "taken to have received the document" was merely a rebuttable presumption of fact.
See also SZULH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 835.
21 Although in the present case the appellant also gave an email address to the Department, this did not mean that the Minister did not effect the giving of the letter to the appellant when it was sent by prepaid post to the last residential address provided to the Minister by the recipient for the purposes of receiving documents: see s 494B. In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Kim [2014] FCA 390; 220 FCR 494 at [34]-[47], Buchanan J held that notification of the refusal of a visa by post under s 494B(4)(c) was effective despite the applicant having provided an email address when asked whether she agreed to the Department communicating with her by fax, e-mail or other electronic means. In so stating, Buchanan J followed Haque v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 346; 221 FCR 289 at [64]. Those decisions were followed in Radzi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 626; 143 ALD 124 at [33]-[35] and, more recently, in Pathania v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1262.
22 The balance of the appellant's submissions to this Court in effect went only to the unfairness, in his case, of the statutory regime for the giving of documents by the Minister, in particular a document notifying a decision to refuse an application for a visa.
23 For completeness, I note that the appellant, to the extent to which he attempted to do so, should not be permitted to run in this Court a case on a different factual basis to that which he ran below on the footing that no "collect card" was left in his post box. This would require an examination of the facts which it is not appropriate for this Court, on appeal, to undertake. It is not necessary for me to consider whether such a case could succeed in light of the decision of the Full Court in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh [2000] FCA 377; 98 FCR 77 at [29].