The primary judge's findings on the fee conditions and Deed of Release
42 The primary judge concluded that at the time the HRNSW made the decision to impose the fee conditions, it intended and understood that TAB and the NSW on-course bookmakers would be "economically insulated" from the burden of the fee through three "agreements, arrangements or understandings". Specifically the primary judge found (at [65]) that RNSW had:
(a) reached an agreement, arrangement or understanding with the TAB that it would have refunded to it the full amount of the race fields fee it was obliged to pay under the terms of any approval granted to it;
(b) reached an agreement, arrangement or understanding with New South Wales on-course bookmakers such that the overwhelming majority of them would be insulated entirely from the effect of the fee by a combination of the operation of:
(i) the imposition of an apparently equal threshold of $5 million of turnover; and
(ii) a rebate to them constituted by a reduction in fees paid by them to racing clubs which would be paid for by RNSW out of the proceeds of the 1.5% fee;
(c) reached an agreement, arrangement or understanding with the racing clubs that they would reduce the levies imposed by them upon on-course bookmakers and, in return, RNSW would fund the ensuing reduction in their income out of the proceeds of the race fields fee.
43 The evidence which led the primary judge to conclude that there existed an agreement, arrangement or understanding between RNSW and TAB pursuant to which RNSW would refund the fee to TAB was set out at [66] to [69] of his reasons. It can be summarised as follows:
(a) the report of RNSW's CEO to the Board of RNSW at its meeting of 18 June 2008, indicated that it expected that any fees imposed under the RA Act and Regulation "would be offset by compensation required to be paid to NSW TAB by the racing industry under cl 8 of the RDA …".
(b) the fee condition on turnover was suggested by Tabcorp to the Board of HRNSW in November 2007 as a means "to ensure that all competitors pay a fair price for the racing products".
(c) TAB and RNSW share a common commercial interest under the RDA in ensuring TAB's revenues are protected.
(d) pursuant to the Deed of Release, TAB received from RNSW the same amount it paid pursuant to the fee.
(e) RNSW intended the Deed of Release to be a "template" for the following year.
44 The primary judge did not accept that the Deed of Release was "precisely what it seems to be" (at [67]). His Honour concluded that the board papers of RNSW for the meeting of 18 June 2008 did not indicate that there was in fact a "complex commercial dispute" between RNSW and TAB. On the contrary, his Honour was of the view that the board papers evinced an understanding on the part of RNSW that it would not receive any money from TAB because of the effect of cl 8 of the RDA.
45 It is convenient to note here that the NSW racing authorities contend that it was no part of Sportsbet's case that the Deed of Release between TAB and the NSW racing authorities was anything other than a genuine settlement of a claim under the RDA which reflected an entitlement in TAB to use race field information which predated the scheme erected under the 2006 amendments to the RA Act. On this basis the NSW racing authorities contend that the primary judge erred in regarding the Deed of Release as part of an attempt to disguise the commercial reality that TAB was to be quarantined from the fee.
46 As has been noted, prior to the scheme on-course bookmakers in New South Wales paid a fee of 1% of their turnover to the racing clubs where they stand to ply their trade at race meetings. The primary judge inferred that the Board of RNSW understood that most NSW oncourse bookmakers would not meet the threshold amount of $5 million turnover under the Standard Conditions, and would therefore be excluded from the effect of the fee. In particular, the primary judge referred to the report of the CEO provided to the Board on 18 June 2008 which stated:
[RNSW's] fee structure is predicated on the assumption that NSW thoroughbred racing clubs will rebate or eliminate their turnover fee to NSW bookmakers who pay the race field levy to Racing NSW. This will require agreement with the clubs. It is understood that the clubs have indicated that they would agree to such a reduction but that agreement has not yet been documented.
47 The primary judge found that, in the result, almost no NSW on-course bookmakers were in fact affected by the fee (at [76] - [78]):
The consequence of the clubs' agreement to reduce their fees together with the $5 million threshold ultimately resulted in a state of affairs where no bookmaker was worse off as a result of the 1.5% race fields fee unless his or her turnover was more than $11.7 million, at least in the case of metropolitan bookmakers. Certainly, this is what RNSW told the racing press as is shown by one of its background briefing notes formulated for the Daily Telegraph.
The actual agreement in the case of the metropolitan clubs was that their levies would be reduced from 1% of turnover to 0.33% on the first $5 million and zero thereafter. Again, that is known because of RNSW's background briefing paper to the Daily Telegraph which said just that. The precise agreement in the case of the provincial clubs is less clear. A report tabled by Mr V'landys to the board members at the 21 May 2007 meeting suggested that the provincial clubs levied a fee of 0.5% on on-course bookmakers. I am unable to determine the final fee reduction agreed to by the provincial clubs. However, whatever it was the bottom line effect was clear and, I infer, was the one contemplated by Mr V'landys, namely, the insulation of the on-course bookmakers from the fee.
… The number of New South Wales bookmakers paying the fee, therefore, is negligible (in the vicinity of 1%) as is further the number of New South Wales bookmakers who are worse off under the new scheme.
48 The primary judge inferred that RNSW had reached an agreement with the racing clubs to compensate them for the reduction in their levies out of the race field fee. The absence of any reference to this arrangement in RNSW's documents after 21 May 2007 was said by his Honour to reflect a deliberate policy of not referring to the compensation arrangement. His Honour was in no doubt that the compensation arrangement remained in play for two reasons (at [81]):
First, it is now obvious that RNSW, although no longer referring to the reduction in the clubs' levies in its internal correspondence, was orally informing the industry of the undertaking. There is little doubt about this because its statements to that effect are recorded in third party documents. Secondly, because it has in fact paid the clubs moneys from the proceeds of the fees in circumstances which make no sense unless such a compensatory arrangement is in place.
49 In relation to the position of NSW on-course bookmakers, the primary judge concluded at [90]-[91]:
My conclusions therefore are:
1. RNSW intended that almost all of New South Wales' on-course bookmakers would not be economically affected by the fee and that this would be achieved through the $5 million threshold and by the simultaneous reduction by the clubs in their levies;
2. RNSW agreed or arranged with the clubs that it would compensate them for the loss of their revenues arising from that reduction out of the proceeds of the race fields fee;
3. RNSW has done so; and
4. RNSW intends to do so in the future.
I have wondered whether the documentary records is not perhaps also consistent with some other less adverse conclusion, but the other theories are simply less plausible. For example, I cannot accept any of the following:
(a) that the threshold was driven by desire to keep administration costs down. I reject this for six reasons. First, no evidence was advanced to support it and it was ultimately no more than assertion from the bar table. Secondly, the fee foregone on $5 million of turnover is $75,000 (1.5%) and I cannot accept that the administration costs involved in processing an application for an approval, by any stretch of even the most fertile imagination, can approach figures in that vicinity. Thirdly, it is evident that a much lower threshold of $250,000 was earlier contemplated which makes it difficult to accept that the fee could be about administration costs without some evidence explaining why a twentyfold increase occurred. Fourthly, the actual cost of collecting the fees was reported in RNSW's 2009 Annual Report, which was in evidence and was modest at $36,641. Fifthly, if the measure were truly about administration costs it would not operate as a threshold; rather, the fee would not become payable until the $5 million level was reached, but, once reached, the fee would be due on the whole amount. Sixthly, all operators are in any event required to lodge applications even if the amount of their turnover is below the threshold so that the suggested administration saving appears illusory. There may be answers to some of these matters. No evidence was called to provide those answers;
(b) that the thresholds were selected to catch the large operators but to leave the smaller ones alone regardless of their location. It was said, for example, that the percentage of interstate bookmakers who were over the threshold was roughly the same as the percentage of New South Wales bookmakers over the threshold. That submission rested upon an argument that there were only 182 licensed bookmakers in New South Wales which I have rejected finding instead, based on RNSW's annual report, that there are 213. That conclusion damages the arithmetic upon which the argument is premised. Quite apart from that problem, however, the argument is detached from the documentary record which shows, rather, an anxiety to protect the position of New South Wales' bookmakers to the extent of even going so far as to put in place a compensatory arrangement. Further, there is no evidence - rather than submission - to support it. The numbers do not reveal a similar breakdown between interstate and out-of-State operators. But even if they did that fact would not prove that RNSW was seeking to achieve that end. Coincidence of outcome does not dictate coincidence of purpose;
(c) the clubs were mistaken in thinking that RNSW had agreed that they should be reimbursed. One could not embark upon that view without someone giving evidence from RNSW to contradict what appears to have been the understanding of the clubs.
50 The primary judge reached similar conclusions in respect of HRNSW. His Honour inferred from the minutes of the Board (see at [96]-[98]):
First, that the board was aware that no on-course bookmaker would pay the fee and that the TAB would be insulated from the fee too. Secondly, in that regard, HRNSW was doing what RNSW had down[sic], that is, essentially rendering on-course bookmakers immune from the effects of the fee.
51 Although the primary judge concluded that the subjective intention of individual actors has no direct role to play in the determination of this case, his Honour made findings that each of the NSW racing authorities and the State of New South Wales were parties to a common intention to engage in discriminatory protectionism. His Honour's conclusions in this regard are set out in the following passage at [44] - [46] of his reasons:
Nevertheless, to the extent that it might be relevant, I conclude that each of the State of New South Wales, RNSW and HRNSW intended to engage in discriminatory protectionism. Insofar as RNSW and HRNSW are concerned, I draw this conclusion because:
(a) their members either wished to prevent revenue leakage or to impose an equalising burden on free riders;
(b) an intention to prevent leakage away from a local trader to out-of-State traders is an intention to engage in conduct barred by the High Court's decision in Fox v Robbins (1909) 8 CLR 115; and
(c) an intention to level the playing field and to ensure that the interstate free riders pay their way is also a protectionist intention. I discuss this further below. In short, whilst there is support in the United States' authorities for the permissibility of State equalisation arrangements of the present kind, the decision of the High Court in Bath v Alston Holdings Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 411 is emphatically against their validity in this country. In Australia, at least, a desire to level the playing field by imposing equal burdens on interstate free riders is an established species of protectionism.
Had it been necessary to decide whether RNSW and HRNSW intended to prevent revenue leakage or to catch free riders I would have preferred the former conclusion. The consequence of the RDA was to connect the commercial fortunes of the TAB to those of the racing industry. Revenue which migrated from the TAB, in a real sense, migrated from RNSW and HRNSW. Such bottom line concerns are much more likely to have been in contemplation by those running the industry than highminded worries that other people were not paying their share. I prefer this inference because it is more consistent with the commercial realities of the situation…The only … concern which makes any sense is the one suggested by following the flow of revenue, that is, the maintenance of the TAB's revenues by protecting it from competition from interstate traders. I so conclude. I may more readily draw that inference where no witness was called for RNSW or HRNSW to give evidence about this matter.
In the case of New South Wales, I conclude from the Minister's second reading speech on the introduction of the Racing Administration Amendment Act 2006 on 20 October 2006 that the State's expressed concern was to address the problem of free riders all of whom, it was known, were interstate traders. For the reasons already given I would conclude, if it were relevant, that this was a protectionist purpose.
52 The primary judge concluded that other inferences that might be drawn from the evidence were not plausible and that he could "more confidently" draw the inference that he did in circumstances where RNSW did not call any witness to provide any support for its asserted case (see at [92]). His Honour had earlier noted (at [68]):
that the conclusion that Sportsbet contends for involves, implicitly, the proposition that RNSW has engaged in behaviour to generate the appearance of having a commercial dispute when, in truth, one does not really exist. That implicit inference is properly to be regarded as a grave conclusion to which the provisions of s 140(2)(c) of the Evidence Act 1995 apply. The significance of that is, of course, the need to take account of the gravity of the conclusion in drawing the relevant inferences. I do so.
53 It is convenient to note here that, on the appeal, Sportsbet disclaimed reliance on the contention attributed to it by the primary judge in the preceding paragraph. It did seek, however, to rely upon the primary judge's findings of fact in relation to the practical effects of the fee (at [101]-[104]):
When RNSW decided on 18 June 2008 to impose the 1.5% fee subject to the $5 million threshold (and again when it endorsed the same decision on 25 July 2008) it intended and understood that:
1. The TAB would be economically insulated from the fee by RNSW refunding any fees paid by the TAB back to it.
2. Almost all New South Wales on-course bookmakers would be economically insulated from the fee by:
(i) the imposition of a $5 million "fee-free" threshold; and
(ii) procuring the agreement of the racing clubs to reduce their own levies with the accompanying understating that the resulting diminished revenues caused by such a reduction would be funded by RNSW out of moneys obtained by it from the fee.
Once those understandings and intentions of RNSW are brought to account it is obvious that it would be blinkered and artificial to regard the imposition of the fee condition by RNSW in isolation. To the contrary, the imposition of the fee condition was part of a package of measures whose evident purpose was to ensure that the TAB and the New South Wales on-course bookmakers were substantially not affected by the fee. I do not think that the fee could have gone ahead without these ancillary arrangements and they are, in that circumstance, to be regarded as an inseverable block of measures, cut from the same fabric and travelling together.
So viewed, it is plain that the practical operation of the fee condition must be taken to include the practical operation of the arrangements and understandings of which it formed but an integer.
I reach the same conclusion in the case of HRNSW's fee condition. In its case, it understood and intended that neither the TAB nor New South Wales on-course bookmakers would be economically affected by the fee. As with RNSW that intention and those arrangements forms part of the decision to impose the fee and to consider its practical operation in isolation and without regard to those arrangements would be unrealistic. Together they form an inseverable whole.
54 The primary judge concluded at [120] that the arrangement which he had found to have been made was "inherently protectionist". In this regard, his Honour said at [116]-[119]:
…Sportsbet alleged that in their legal or practical operation the fee conditions imposed a burden or disadvantage on trade and intercourse between the States and the Territories which was not imposed on intrastate commerce of the same kind. That allegation was in paragraph 90(b) of the pleadings. The disadvantage, which was set out at paragraph 85(b) of the pleadings (and especially the corresponding particulars) was, putting it shortly, that the TAB and the New South Wales on-course bookmakers would be relieved of the burden of the fee.
I begin by observing that I have found the factual foundation for this case to be abundantly proved. The practical operation of the fee conditions imposed upon Sportsbet's approvals were, for the reasons I have already given, such as to protect almost all the New South Wales operators, and in particular, the one having a 95% share of the market - the TAB - from the economic burden of the fee.
There is no doubt that where a State exposes interstate trade to an impost to which intrastate trade is not exposed that the measure will, generally speaking, infringe s 92. Thus in Fox v Robbins 8 CLR 115 a Western Australian measure imposing a licence fee of £2 on the sale of wine made from fruit grown in Western Australia but £50 on the sale of wine made from intrastate fruit was held to breach s 92 without any further inquiry. Fox v Robbins 8 CLR 115 itself was cited with apparent approval in Bath v Alston Holdings 165 CLR at 429 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ.
That is precisely what has occurred in this case. No doubt, unlike the fee in Fox v Robbins 8 CLR 115, the present fees are not so crassly explicit as to distinguish between interstate and intrastate traders. But it has long been established - it is common sense - that the guarantee in s 92 is concerned with substance and not form. Hence, a measure may infringe s 92 even if it otherwise appears apparently neutral should it transpire that in its practical operation, its effect constitutes a discriminatory protectionist measure: Bath v Alston Holdings 165 CLR at 426; Cole v Whitfield 165 CLRat 408; Castlemaine Tooheys (1990) 169 CLR 436at 466-467 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ; Betfair 234 CLR at 481[118].
55 The primary judge rejected the argument put by the NSW racing authorities that it had not been established as a fact that the scheme operates to discriminate against interstate trade. In this regard, his Honour said at [124]-[127]:
It is, no doubt, to be accepted that a plaintiff in a practical operation case must prove the fact of discriminatory protectionism. In many cases, this may involve complex questions of fact: Sportodds 133 FCRat 77 [32]. The facts of the three cases relied upon by RNSW and HRNSW bear this out. In Castlemaine Tooheys 169 CLR 436 the impugned measure was the fixing of a 15 cent refundable deposit on non-refillable beer bottles. In Sportodds 133 FCR 63 the impugned measure was the obligation of a bookmaker to be present on a racecourse in New South Wales. In Barnes 65 NSWLR 331 the impugned provision was a New South Wales requirement that tow truck operators be licensed.
In each of those cases some proof was required to make out the discriminatory burdens. In Castlemaine Tooheys 169 CLR 436 it was an agreed fact that the 15 cent deposit requirement for non-refillable bottles imposed a competitive disadvantage. In both Sportodds 133 FCR 63 and Barnes 65 NSWLR 331 the parties relying on s 92 failed to prove that they were affected - there was no evidence of the costs on the difficulties of complying with the requirement to operate from a New South Wales racecourse and one could not, without more, simply assume that it was a disadvantage: so too in Barnes 65 NSWLR 331 no attempt was made to show that the costs of complying with the New South Wales licensing regime imposed on the Queensland operator had any discernable disadvantage. In the same class can be placed my conclusions in Betfair Pty Ltd v Racing New South Wales [2010] FCA 603 where I have held that it is not sufficient merely for Betfair to allege that the fee affects it more than the TAB. It must also show that the discrimination is protectionist.
This case is quite different. Here the identified practical effect is the fact that Sportsbet has to pay a substantial impost from which its intrastate competitors have been released. The discriminatory and protectionist nature of that is at once apparent and, in my opinion, not seriously contestable. Put another way, Sportsbet has proven that it bears a burden - the fee - which intrastate operators substantially do not. Discriminatory protectionism is established. For clarity, I do not think that the dictum in Sportodds 133 FCR at 77 [34] provides support for the proposition that unless a legislative instrument, standing alone, can be shown to have the practical effect of discriminatory protectionism a case cannot be made out. This would frustrate the purpose of s 92: see Cole v Whitfield 165 CLR at 391:
The purpose of the section is clear enough: to create a free trade area throughout the Commonwealth and to deny Commonwealth and States alike a power to prevent or obstruct the free movement of people, goods and communication across State boundaries. (emphasis added).
Thus, if the totality of the legislative or executive actions infringes s 92, the case law merely requires that the evidentiary requirement of discriminatory protectionism be discharged. In this case, such a requirement has unequivocally been discharged.
56 It should be noted that his Honour proceeded on the basis that "Sportsbet has to pay a substantial impost from which its intrastate competitors have been released". On the appeal, it is said by the NSW racing authorities that this view was not open to his Honour.
57 The primary judge went on to conclude, principally on the authority of the decision of the High Court in Bath v Alston Holdings Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 411, that the imposition of the fee as part of the race field information regime did not merely ensure that interstate and intrastate wagering operators made a uniform non-protectionist contribution to the support of racing in New South Wales, but was a measure apt to protect intrastate traders from interstate competition. His Honour said at [129]-[135]:
At the heart of the respondents' case was the proposition that prior to the introduction of the fee a number of operators were making a contribution to the industry and that the fee, properly understood, did no more than ensure that those who were not making such a contribution but who were nevertheless making money from New South Wales' races - free riders if you will - should do so. It could not be protectionist to bring about a result which simply levelled the playing field and put everyone on the same footing.
Such a proposition might well be arguable in the United States as an exception to the operation of the Dormant Commerce Clause. In Hinson v Lott 75 US (8 Wallace) 148 (1868) the Supreme Court upheld a law imposing a 50 cent per gallon tax on out-of-State liquor because there was already such a tax on in-State liquor. That decision supports the availability of regimes which place interstate and intrastate on the same footing. Such arrangements are sometimes referred to as equalization or compensation taxes.
The principle that State equalisation taxes may in some circumstances be valid has been pursued in the United States authorities although it has been limited somewhat: see Armco Inc v Hardesty 467 US 638 at 642-643 (1984); Fulton Corp v Faulkner 516 US 325 at 331-333, 338-344 (1996); Maryland v Louisiana 451 US 725 at 759 (1981); Oregon Waste Systems Inc v Department of Environmental Quality of Oregon 511 US 93 at 102-105 (1994); Tyler Pipe Industries Inc v Washington State Department of Revenue 483 US 232 at 242-244 (1987). The doctrine is usefully described, together with its limitations, in: L H Tribe, American Constitutional Law (3rd ed, 2000) s6.19, pp 1127-1132. In the United States, much time has been spent analysing whether measures imposed at different levels of the supply chain can fall within the doctrine and much debate about economic equivalence has been engendered thereby: cf Professor Hellerstein's interesting article: "Complementary Taxes as a Defense to Unconstitutional State Tax Discrimination" (1986) 39 Tax Lawyer 405.
In Australia, however, this approach has been eschewed and questions of economic equivalence do not arise. Bath v Alston Holdings 165 CLR 411 involved a Victorian tax imposed upon tobacco retailers on tobacco purchased interstate which had the effect of ensuring that all tobacco sold in Victoria ended up having the same amount of tax paid on it regardless of its origin; in short an equalisation tax. The Solicitor-General for Victoria referred to Hinson v Lott 75 US (8 Wallace) 148 in argument (165 CLR at 418). The Court, however, did not embrace such an approach. Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ said (165 CLR at 427):
The fact that taxes paid by a wholesaler in one State are higher than the taxes paid by a wholesaler in a second State may provide an inducement for the first State to protect local goods and local wholesalers by the imposition of an "equalizing" tax upon its retailers in respect of their purchases of products from that other State. The most that such notions of economic equalization can do, however, is to provide some local justification for the imposition of a protectionist tax in respect of interstate goods at the later retail stage of distribution. They do not alter the character of the tax as such or remove it from the ambit of s 92. Indeed, to hold that a law which protects local goods by imposing a discriminatory tax on interstate goods at the retail level is consistent with s 92 because the law equalizes in favour of the local goods an advantage which the interstate goods enjoy in their State of origin in the course of manufacture or distribution would be to disregard the critical constitutional purpose which the section is designed to serve.
Further, their Honours emphatically rejected the notion that s 92 was infringed if the effect was merely that cost was passed on to consumers (further 165 CLR at 427):
Nor is the protectionist character of the ad valorem tax on retailers calculated by reference to their interstate purchases removed by treating it as "equivalent" to the ad valorem tax imposed upon wholesalers in respect of their sales of local goods or by saying that both taxes are properly to be seen as being, "in substance", taxes on goods.
For that reason the invocation of the notion that the fee was constitutional because it simply made everyone pay the same must fail. Where the playing field is levelled by taxing interstate traders to bring their expenses up to the level of those of intrastate traders, such a burden is protectionist. For similar reasons resort by the respondents to the argument that the fee ensured that every dollar of punter expenditure would result in collection of the fee is quite unsound (even if it had been proved) as the second passage just quoted from Bath v Alston Holdings 165 CLR at 427shows.
New South Wales contended that it must be entitled to remove burdens which in-State operators were burdened by and that so much could not be a breach of s 92. This is, of course, entirely correct but it is also not what has happened. Whatever the TAB's pre-existing burdens were under New South Wales law or the RDA they still exist. What has happened, rather, is that a new burden has been created and imposed on all traders with the in-State traders then being relieved from the new burden. In terms of practical operation both the TAB and almost all New South Wales on-course bookmakers have been relieved in substance of the obligation to pay a fee which has been imposed upon interstate trade. Once that is appreciated it can be seen that the contention that the State's power to remove burdens imposed upon its own traders has somehow been called into question does not arise. No doubt, if the State wished it could remove all relevant burdens currently imposed on wagering operators in New South Wales. But the burden which has been removed is not the pre-existing burden (for example, the 19.11% betting tax on totalizator receipts imposed by ss 8 and 9 Betting Tax Act 2001 (NSW) or the approximately $200 million per year paid under the RDA) but instead the new burden of the 1.5% turnover fee.
58 It can be seen from the last sentence in this excerpt from the reasons of the primary judge that the essence of his Honour's decision was that intrastate traders such as TAB were, in truth, not earlier obliged to pay the fee. It is this reasoning which the NSW racing authorities argue cannot be sustained.