RAB's Plumbing Services Pty Limited; in the matter of Elite Civil Management Pty Ltd v Elite Civil Management Pty Ltd
[2014] FCA 264
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
2014-03-20
Before
Jagot J, Flick J
Catchwords
- PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - freezing orders
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Catchwords
Judgment (22 paragraphs)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT (EX TEMPORE) 1 On 7 March 2014, there was electronically filed in this Court an Originating Process in which the First Plaintiff was named as Rab's Plumbing Services Pty Limited. Proceeding number NSD 247/2014 was allocated to this matter and was assigned to Jagot J as Docket Judge. There were a number of other plaintiffs identified in the schedule to that Originating Process. The Defendants to that proceeding were Elite Civil Management Pty Limited, Elite Civil Group Pty Limited and SSI Recruitment Pty Limited. 2 The proceeding came before Jagot J on 11 March. On that date, there was filed in Court a further Originating Process in which the Plaintiff was Sydney Trucks & Machinery Centre Pty Limited. This matter was assigned proceeding number NSD257/2014. On 11 March 2014, her Honour made orders pursuant to s 472(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), appointing provisional liquidators to each of those three companies. 3 Now before the Court is an "Interlocutory process" - and not an "Interlocutory Application" - in which the provisional liquidators are the Applicants seeking orders pursuant to Div 7.4 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (the "Federal Court Rules 2011"). That application and the supporting affidavits were filed in proceeding number NSD 247/2014. Freezing orders are sought against Mr Vince Santoro as First Respondent, Ms Rene Santoro as Second Respondent, Mr Adrian Santoro as Third Respondent and Ms Danielle Santoro as Fourth Respondent. Mr Vince Santoro is the controlling mind of each of the corporate defendants and a director of SSI Recruitment Pty Limited. Ms Rene Santoro, his wife, is a director of Elite Plant Hire Pty Limited. Mr Adrian Santoro is a director of Elite Civil Group Pty Limited. Ms Danielle Santoro is a minor and is not a director of any of the corporate defendants. 4 Leave is granted to file in Court the Interlocutory Process, together with the affidavit of Mr Daniel Friskin sworn on 19 March 2014 (together with the exhibit to that affidavit) and a further affidavit of Mr Mark Bannister sworn on 19 March 2014. Mr Bannister, it may be noted, has occupied since June 2013 the position of financial controller of the Elite Group of companies. 5 The making of an order pursuant to Div 7.4 of the Federal Court Rules involves the exercise of a discretion on the part of the Court: see Patterson v BTR Engineering (Aust) Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 319 at 321 per Gleeson CJ. The purpose of making such an order, it is well-recognised, was said by Stone J in Elderslie Finance Corporation Limited v Newpage Pty Limited [2007] FCA 61 at [14] to be to: …protect the processes of the court from abuse not to provide security for the applicant for such an order... In exercising the discretion, it must necessarily be recognised that the making of an order is "a substantial encroachment on a defendant's basic right and freedom to deal with property": see KGL Health Pty Ltd v Mechtler [2007] FCA 1410 at [12] per Tamberlin J. 6 The general principles to be applied when exercising the discretion have also been frequently canvassed and have been conveniently summarised by Kenny J in Deputy Commission of Taxation v Hua Wang Bank Berhad [2010] FCA 1014, (2010) 80 ATR 449. Her Honour was there dealing with the predecessor provision to Div 7.4, namely, order 25A of the now repealed Federal Court Rules. But, for present purposes, the Rules are in substantially the same terms. Her Honour summarised the general principles as follows: [8] In substance, O 25A re-states the current judge-made law with respect to freezing orders. A brief reference to the cases is useful to show how, and in what circumstances, the courts have previously thought it appropriate to make such an order. The cases speak of the need for the applicant to establish, first, a prima facie cause of action against the respondent, and, secondly, a "danger" or "real risk" that a judgment debt will go unsatisfied because assets are removed from the jurisdiction or disposed of in some way: see Patterson v BTR Engineering (Aust) Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 319 ('Patterson') at 321-2 per Gleeson CJ, with whom Meagher JA generally agreed; and Ninemia Maritime Corporation v Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG (The Niedersachsen) [1983] 1 WLR 1412 ('Ninemia Maritime') at 1422-3. In the latter case (at 1422), the Court of Appeal in England described the test as "whether, on the assumption that the plaintiffs have shown at least 'a good arguable case', the court concludes, on the whole of the evidence then before it, that the refusal of a Mareva injunction would involve a real risk that a judgement or award in favour of the plaintiffs would remain unsatisfied". [9] Depending on the circumstances, the interests of justice may support the grant of a freezing order to prevent the dissipation of assets pending the hearing of an action even though the risk of dissipation is less probable than not: Patterson at 325 per Gleeson CJ; Peter Biscoe, Freezing and Search Orders: Mareva and Anton Piller Orders (LexisNexis Butterworths, Australia, 2008) ('Biscoe') at p 209 [6.17], citing Patterson, Glenwood Management Group Pty Ltd v Mayo [1991] 2 VR 49 ('Glenwood') at 54, and Lifetime Investments Ltd v Commercial (Worldwide) Financial Services Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 226 at [14] per Kiefel J referring to Victoria University of Technology v Wilson [2003] VSC 299 at [36]. As Redlich J noted in the last-mentioned case (at [36]), "[w]hat must be established is a sufficient likelihood of risk which in the circumstances of a particular case justifies an asset preservation order". [10] A freezing order may be granted even though there is no evidence of the respondent's positive intention to frustrate a judgment: see National Australia Bank Ltd v Bond Brewing Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 271 at 277 per Mason CJ, Brennan and Deane JJ; Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380 at 394 [26]; Glenwood at 53 per Young CJ; and Riley McKay Pty Ltd v McKay [1982] 1 NSWLR 264 ('Riley McKay') at 276. In Riley McKay at 276, the Court of Appeal of the New South Wales Supreme Court said, and I accept, that the jurisdictional basis for relief of this kind "is directed to dispositions … which are intended to frustrate, or have the necessary effect of frustrating, the plaintiff in his attempt to seek through the court a remedy for the obligation to which he claims the defendant is subject" (emphasis added). In this case, there is no direct evidence of positive intention on the respondents' part to frustrate a judgment. Nonetheless, the Commissioner argues that there is a danger of the removal of assets from the jurisdiction, which would have the effect of frustrating any judgment; (2010) 80 ATR 449, 453. 7 It is r 7.35 which now requires, inter alia, that the Court be satisfied that the applicant has a good arguable case, and that the case is justiciable in this Court. Rule 7.35(4) refers in particular to the court being satisfied that "there is a danger that a judgment or prospective judgment will be wholly or partly unsatisfied" for one or other of a number of reasons. 8 In addition to the general principles summarised by Kenny J, reference may also be made to the following observations of Edmonds J in Curtis v NID Pty Limited [2010] FCA 1072 as to what constitutes a "good arguable case", namely: [6] Though the respondents have filed a defence in opposition to the applicant's statement of claim in the substantive proceedings, they do not dispute that he has a 'good arguable case'. The threshold is a very low one: in Ninemia Maritime Corp v Trave Schiffahrtsgesselschaft mbH und Co KG (The Niedersachsen) [1983] Com LR 234 at 235 (affirmed on appeal: [1983] 1 WLR 1412), Mustill J (as his Lordship then was) said that a good arguable case is one 'which is more than barely capable of serious argument, and yet not necessarily one the judge considers would have better than a fifty per cent chance of success'. This test has since been applied in numerous domestic cases: Errigal Ltd v Equatorial Mining Ltd [2006] NSWSC 953 (White J); Pure Logistics Pty Ltd v Scott [2007] NSWSC 595 (McDougall J); Westpac Banking Corporation v McArthur [2007] NSWSC 1347 (Barrett J). His Honour there also addressed the content of the term "danger" as follows: [9] 'Danger', however, is not defined. In some cases, judges have employed the phrase 'real risk' to identify the degree to which a plaintiff must demonstrate that a prospective judgment will go unsatisfied: see, for example, Cardile at [122] per Kirby J; Ninemia [1983] 1 WLR 1412 at 1422 per Kerr LJ. In others, it has been said that an applicant must establish 'a sufficient likelihood of risk which in the circumstances of a particular case justifies an asset preservation order': Lifetime Investments Ltd v Commercial (Worldwide) Financial Services Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 226 at [14] per Kiefel J, approving Victoria University of Technology v Wilson [2003] VSC 299 at [36] per Redlich J. There is even a third view, namely, that the plaintiff establishes 'a sufficient apprehension of dissipation of the … assets': Vaughan v Duncan [2007] NSWSC 811 at [5] per Hamilton J. [10] What is settled, however, is that solid evidence of a danger of dissipation or disposal of assets be produced. The relevant test was enunciated by Brereton J in Finn v Carelli [2007] NSWSC 261 at [4], where his Honour referred to the NSW Court of Appeal's decision in Frigo v Culhaci [1998] NSWCA 88: 'It is not necessary for an applicant to show that the respondent has a positive intention of evading a judgment, and it is sufficient to show that the course on which the respondent proposes to embark is, objectively speaking, calculated to have that effect. But as the Court of Appeal made clear in Frigo v Culhaci, an applicant must establish, by evidence and not mere assertion, that there is a real danger that by reason of the respondent absconding or otherwise dealing with assets, the applicant will not be able to have its judgment satisfied. While acknowledging that there has been much debate as to the precise degree to which that has to be shown, the Court emphasised that mere assertion that the defendant was likely to put assets beyond the plaintiff's reach was inadequate, for which the Court cited Ninemia Maritime Corp v Trave GmbH & Co Kg (The Niedersachsen) [1984] 1 All ER 298 as well as Patterson v BTR Engineering.' 9 In the application now before the court, the court can proceed upon the basis that it was appropriate for a provisional liquidator to have been appointed. The court can also proceed upon the basis that the material set forth in Mr Bannister's Affidavit and Mr Friskin's Affidavit provide a sufficiently certain factual basis for the court to be satisfied that unless the orders as sought are made, the assets of one or other of the companies now in provisional liquidation will be dissipated. There is, for example, in the Affidavit of Mr Friskin, evidence that Mr Vincent Santoro, the First Respondent, approached the Commonwealth Bank on 18 March 2014 and effected the transfer of a sum of money in excess of $30,000 from the account of Elite Civil Group Pty Limited, and that such moneys may well have been deposited to an account in the name of Ms Danielle Santoro, the Fourth Respondent. By the end of February 2014 over $130,000 had been transferred and of this amount $100,000 had been withdrawn in cash. There is also evidence given by Mr Bannister as to moneys being transferred from the account of Elite Civil Group Pty Limited and transferred into one of approximately 25 debit cards held in the name of Ms Rene Santoro, the Second Respondent between July 2012 and March 2014. There is no evidence before the court as to moneys being transferred to the benefit of the Third Respondent, Mr Adrian Santoro. Mr Anderson, who appears for the liquidators, frankly accepts that the only reason to include him is that he is a director of Elite Civil Group Pty. 10 Orders are made in the form annexed hereto. I certify that the preceding ten (10) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Flick.