Sentence
57Section 3A of the C(SP)A sets out the purposes of sentencing as follows:
"(a) To ensure that the offender is adequately punished for the offence,
(b) To prevent crime by deterring the offender and other persons from committing similar offences,
(c) To protect the community from the offender,
(d) To promote the rehabilitation of the offender,
(e) To make the offender accountable for his or her actions,
(f) To denounce the conduct of the offender,
(g) To recognise the harm done to the victim of the crime and the community."
58It is clear from the guideline judgment in R v Henry, supra, and the offender accepts, that no penalty other than full time custodial sentence is appropriate here (s 5 of the Sentencing Act).
59Notwithstanding the subjective features of the offending set out above, it is clear that the aggravating features referred to above and the need for general deterrence, together with the number and seriousness of offences involved, mandate a lengthy period of imprisonment to meet the objects of sentencing set out in s 3A above.
60There is also the need for some parity in respect of sentencing in respect of Sequence 5. In respect of that offence, the co-offender, Christopher Succar, was sentenced by Judge Sides QC on 28 May 2014. His Honour found special circumstances pursuant to s 44(2) and fixed a non-parole period of two and half years and a total term of five years to commence on 7 February 2014. The Court ordered that Mr Succar's parole eligibility date was 6 August 2016. In achieving parity, the Court must have regard to all of the circumstances of the offending and the co-offender's subjective features. Each case is to be dealt with on its own facts.
61There are a number of distinguishing features in respect of the cooffender's subjective features. He had a number of medical conditions, poor educational background, limited employment opportunities and a significant criminal history consisting mainly of traffic offences, but major traffic offences which the Court held deprived him of the benefit of prior good character. The Court held that the offending was a serious example of the offence under s 97 and I agree with that.
62In sentencing the co-offender, Judge Sides QC referred to a submission made on his behalf that it was the offender here who had persuaded the co-offender to join him in committing the offence at North Richmond. However, there was no evidence about that and the Court was unable to determine who instigated the offence. Judge Sides QC therefore did not accept that the co-offender only participated in the offence because of the pressure from the offender here. No submission was made to this Court in relation to that aspect of the matter, and I have disregarded it as being relevant to sentencing the offender.
63I have had regard that the maximum penalty for each offence pursuant to s 97(2) is 25 years imprisonment. This is a guide post to be taken into account in considering all of the circumstances of the offending. I am also mindful of the principles of parity, proportionality and avoidance of double punishment referred to in Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610 at [45].
64There is no general rule as to whether sentences should be served concurrently or cumulatively, and I acknowledge that the issue is one of totality; see Cahadi v The Queen (2007) 168 A Crim R 41.
65I further find that there are special circumstances here pursuant to s 44(2) of the Sentencing Act so that the ratio of the non-parole period to any head sentence may be varied, given the offender's young age, his remorse, his intentions to return to the community with the benefit of rehabilitation and to become a constructive member of society.
66I have also taken into account the two offences of break, enter and steal pursuant to s 112(1) of the Crimes Act that the offender has admitted to and asked the Court to take into account on the Form 1 (exhibit B). I have certified that I have taken those matters into account on the Form 1.
67Of concern here is the number of offences. The Crown has submitted, and I accept, that as the offending of the offender continued, each succeeding offence calls for greater punishment than the earlier offence, to reflect the need for specific deterrence, relying on R v Smith, supra. At [66], Simpson J, (with whom Howie and Hyslop JJ agreed) said as follows:
"66 The guideline judgment promulgated in Henry ... is of four to five years head sentence, with an appropriate minimum term (depending, inter alia, upon whether or not special circumstances are found); as I have mentioned above, it incorporates some discount for a plea of guilty, although a late plea. It is also applicable where the offender is charged with a single offence. Multiplicity of offences plainly calls for a total sentence well in excess of the four to five years so promulgated. While it may be correct that each individual sentence could fall appropriately within the four to five year range, it must also be recognised that, as the offending continues, each succeeding offence calls for a greater punishment than the earlier, if only by way of personal deterrence. And to order that all sentences be served concurrently has the effect of neutralising, or at least minimising, the sentences applicable to the later offence. To sentence in that way does nothing to discourage sequential offending; indeed, it gives the appearance that once an offence has been committed, the offender has little or nothing to lose by repetition."
68In that case, the sentencing judge imposed, in respect of one offence of assault with intent to rob whilst in company, and five offences of robbery in company, pursuant to s 97(1) of the Crimes Act, together with four offences on a Form 1, a total term of imprisonment comprising a non-parole period of 2 years and 1 month and a balance of term of 1 year and 8 months. His Honour had ordered concurrent terms of imprisonment in respect of each offence. The Court of Appeal upheld the Crown Appeal on the basis of manifest inadequacy, quashed the sentence and imposed an overall non-parole period of 3 years and 9 months and an overall head sentence of 5 and a half years. Her Honour went on to state at [68] that that sentence was "barely adequate to recognise the criminality involved or the affront to the victims", however, it acknowledged well known sentencing principles applicable to successful Crown appeals and also took into account the respondent's youth and that the offences were committed over a short space of time.
69Section 53 and s 53A of the Sentencing Act provide as follows:
"S 53 Multiple sentences of imprisonment
(1) When a court imposes a sentence of imprisonment on an offender in relation to more than one offence, the court must (unless imposing an aggregate sentence of imprisonment in accordance with section 53A) comply with the requirements of this Division by imposing a separate sentence in relation to each offence.
(2) The term, and any non-parole period, set under this Division in relation to a sentence of imprisonment is not revoked or varied by a later sentence of imprisonment that the same or some other court subsequently imposes in relation to another offence.
S 53A Aggregate sentences of imprisonment
(1) A court may in sentencing an offender for more than one offence, impose an aggregate sentence of imprisonment with respect to all or any 2 or more of those offences instead of imposing a separate sentence of imprisonment for each.
(2) A court that imposes an aggregate sentence of imprisonment under this section on an offender must indicate to the offender, and make a record of, the following:
(a) The fact that an aggregate sentence is being imposed,
(b) The sentence that would have been imposed for each offence (after taking into account such matters as are relevant under Part 3 or any other provision of this Act) had separate sentences been imposed instead of an aggregate sentence.
(3) Subsection (2) does not limit any requirement that a court has, apart from that subsection, to record the reasons for its decisions.
(4) The term, and any non-parole period, set under this Division in relation to an aggregate sentence of imprisonment is not revoked or varied by a later sentence of imprisonment that the same or some other court subsequently imposes in relation another offence.
(5) An aggregate sentence of imprisonment is not invalidated by a failure to comply with this section."
70I note that any aggregate sentence must be "just and appropriate" to the totality of the offending behaviour - see Mill v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 59 at 63.
71The offences occurred over a short period of time and, with the exception of Sequence 5, involved a similar modus operandi by the offender. Having regard to the principles of sentencing referred to above and in particular those of totality and proportionality, I propose to aggregate the sentences to be imposed, having first assessed the indicative sentences to be imposed in respect of each Count. It is clear that aggregation of sentences pursuant to s 53A must reflect some accumulation of the indicative head sentences - see R v Rae [2013] NSWCCA 9.
72The Court is required to indicate the sentence that would have been imposed for each offence had separate sentences been imposed instead of an aggregate sentence. This provides transparency in the sentencing process.
73The indicative sentences that I would have imposed are as follows:
Sequence 1 - Total term of 3 years with a non-parole period of 1 year and 6 months.
Sequence 2 -Total term of 3 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 2 years
Sequence 3 - Total term of 3 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 2 years
Sequence 4 - Total term of 3 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 2 years
Sequence 5 - Total term of 4 years with a non-parole period of 2 years and 6 months
Sequence 6 - Total term of 3 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 2 years
74I have also had regard to the fact that in respect of each sequence of offences, the offences arise out of similar criminal conduct over a relatively short period of time and would otherwise warrant some partial concurrency in sentences.