R v Pavlou

Judgment 1HOEBEN CJ at CL: I agree with Adams J. 2ADAMS J: Introduction 3On 16 May 2014 the respondent was sentenced on two counts of supplying a large commercial quantity of a prohibited drug contrary to s 25(2) of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW), which prescribes in each case a maximum term of imprisonment for life with a standard non-parole period of 15 years. The first count involved the supply on 16 November 2012 of 4.785 kg of 3,4-MDMA and the second count the supply on 13 December 2012 of 4.818 kg of amphetamine. On each charge he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 6 years and 9 months with a non-parole period of 4 years, the first sentence commencing on 17 February 2014 and the second commencing on 17 February 2015, resulting in an overall sentence of 7 years and 9 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 5 years. The starting point in each case was a sentence of 9 years imprisonment, reduced by 25% for his pleas of guilty. The Crown appeals on the following grounds - 1. His Honour fell into error by imposing sentences with an insufficient level of accumulation; 2. His Honour erred in categorising the offences as "about midway between the midrange and the least degree of objective seriousness"; 3. The sentence for count 1 is manifestly inadequate; and 4. The total sentence is manifestly inadequate. Facts 4These were not in dispute. The following account is largely taken from the sentencing judge's summary of the agreed statement of facts. 5On 16 November 2012 police became aware that the respondent had come into possession of 20,000 MDMA tablets and that a runner was coming from Melbourne to pick them up. The package of drugs was placed under the passenger seat by the respondent who had unsuccessfully attempted to conceal it in the panelling. The runner arrived and was given the keys to the car and then left. He was intercepted by police, who discovered the drugs. The MDMA tablets weighed 4.785 kg with 31.5% purity. The respondent, however, was not located until 13 December 2012 when a vehicle he was driving was stopped by police. He was arrested and, on a search of the vehicle, a tool box was found containing 1.0888 kg of methylamphetamine of 66.5% purity and 3.37 kg of liquid methylamphetamine of 54% purity. Although the agreed facts refer to the location of methylamphetamine powder and methylamphetamine oil in the vehicle being driven by the respondent on 13 December 2013, the analyst's certificate disclosed that the relevant drug was amphetamine, as, indeed, specified in the relevant Court Attendance Notice. As it seems to me, nothing turns on this. It is evident that amphetamine is an extremely dangerous drug.) Notes relating to the manufacture of methylamphetamine including quantities, percentages and purity were found near his wallet in the car. When he was interviewed, the respondent denied knowing anything about the drugs which were found and said he had not been involved in any drug supply activities. Depending on a retail or wholesale price, all of the drugs are valued at between $700,000 to $1.3 million. Initially, he was remanded in custody but was eventually granted bail on 11 March 2013, having spent 89 days in custody. Subjective circumstances 6The respondent was almost 35 years of age at the date of the offence with a minimal criminal record said by the sentencing judge to be "of no relevance to the present offences". 7The respondent's evidence in the sentence proceedings, supported to some extent by his wife, is that in July 2012 when he returned from holiday in Greece he was not employed and recommenced his prior heroin and methylamphetamine habit. However, because his wife controlled the family finances, he had no cash and so bought his drugs on credit, a debt reaching about $2,800 when he was approached by three men with whom he had been dealing for some time who told him, in effect, that the debt would be cleared if he did "a few jobs". When he tried to deflect them by promising to pay the money, this offer was not accepted. They threatened the life of members of his family if he went to the police. He said that he was "panicky" and high on drugs when he undertook the first offence. The second offence occurred when the same criminals took his father's utility and drove him north, blindfolding him, ending up on a rural property where he used drugs for a couple of days with another person until he was told to drive the vehicle to Sydney. He said he was "off his head" on drugs. 8The respondent's wife confirmed, amongst other things, that he came home from the first meeting with a black eye. At the sentencing hearing a number of reports were tendered. The first of these was from Ms Thawhida Rangiah, a registered psychologist to whom the respondent had been referred in mid-April 2013 for assessment and treatment of his mental health. It is unnecessary to detail his personal history, his family relationships were unexceptional. However, he had significant problems in high school when he became involved with what he described as "the wrong group". He had no interest in school work and truanted on one occasion for 30 days. By the time he was 14 he began to use drugs recreationally, use which continued into adulthood, starting to use ecstasy and speed from about the age of 18 and, from the age of 29 he started to use heroin as well, moving on to ice. He continued, indeed, to use heroin and ice whilst he was on remand. When he obtained bail he said he stopped using drugs, self-medicating with alcohol which he was able to control. Ms Rangiah assessed him as suffering from acute stress disorder with high level anxiety and depressed mood which was managed reasonably well until he was informed by police of a phone call threatening his life (which I discuss later) inducing extremely severe depression requiring anti-anxiety and anti-depressant medication to deal with what was called "an acute mental health decline with suicidality". His mental health was volatile and medication needed to be adjusted several times. Ms Rangiah reported that the respondent assumed full responsibility for his current situation and realised that this was what eventually happens in the drug milieu. 9The respondent was also seen by Mr Borenstein, a clinical psychologist who assessed him for intellectual functioning on 17 April 2014. The test results showed that the respondent's verbal intelligence was in the borderline range and performance intelligence in the average range. Compared to age-related peers, the respondent's verbal skills are in the bottom 4th percentile, that is, 96% of his age-related peers perform better on verbal reasoning/communication compared to the respondent. His non-verbal abilities or practical skills are average. Overall, the respondent's level of function is in the low average range, that is the 12th percentile compared to age-related peers. Put otherwise, 88% of the respondent's age-related peers perform better on intelligence and problem solving tasks compared to him. He demonstrated an adequate reading ability. Dr Jonathan Adams, a forensic psychiatrist examined the respondent while he was on bail. Passing over his personal history, to which sufficient reference has already been made, Dr Adams noted in the context of his mental state examination, that the applicant's account of events was easy to follow, there was no evidence of thought disorder or delusional beliefs; he endorsed occasional ruminating negative cognitions but there was no evidence of significant depressive cognitions. As to his insight, Dr Adams thought he appeared to appreciate the relationship between stressors and his deteriorating mood state and was aware of the pathological basis of his mood change. The respondent noted the deleterious impact of his longstanding illicit substance and alcohol use and expressed his wish to remain abstinent in the future. He noted the benefits of psychiatric medication and psychological therapy and wished to remain compliant. Overall, in Dr Adams' opinion, his level of insight was reasonable. As to the respondent's mental state at the time of the offences - "Mr Pavlou conveyed how his mental state deteriorated from October 2012 onwards, precipitated by being threatened to engage in criminal activity. Mr Pavlou described how his ensuing low, anxious and fearful mental state was set in the context of his continuing polysubstance dependence, which in my view worsened his mental state further. Mr Pavlou recounted how he felt unable to manage his circumstances in any way other than engaging in the offending behaviour, which is perhaps understandable given his history of impaired problem solving skills, together with the reported severity of the threat. Mr Pavlou related his use of illicit substances on the day of each offence, which from a psychiatric perspective likely further impaired his already compromised decision-making capacity and consequential thinking." 10The sentencing judge referred to these reports in his remarks, quoting extensively from that of Dr Adams. 11I have mentioned police information given to the respondent on his release on bail that he was at serious risk of harm. The sentencing judge accepted that on 20 June 2013 the respondent was assaulted with an angle grinder suffering a number of injuries including a substantial laceration to his nose. The respondent said that this was done by persons in his drug milieu as a warning not to provide any information to police. His Honour noted that, in fact, the respondent has not done so "perhaps understandably". Discussion 12The sentencing judge referred to a number of authorities dealing with the way in which duress can be taken into account on sentence where it does not constitute a defence to the charge. His Honour concluded - "On balance I would find that some duress was operating on Mr Pavlou, but that does not explain why he did not go immediately to the police, particularly when one considers that his criminality was going to jump from being a very minor offender, some years before these offences, to committing offences that carry the maximum penalty known to the law in New South Wales for any offence, including murder". His Honour regarded the assault on 20 June 2013 as supporting the respondent's evidence about threats. No complaint is made as to the way in which his Honour took this aspect into account. 13The sentencing judge concluded that the respondent was not suffering from a mental illness or an intellectual handicap, although he was not someone "who has a great capacity to think through decisions that he has made". His Honour did not think that a custodial sentence was likely to weigh any more heavily on him than other prisoners or that there was still not the need for specific deterrence. His Honour did not think that the respondent's mental health had contributed materially to the commission of his offences although it might explain his failure to take other appropriate action such as informing the authorities. He accepted that the respondent was remorseful, that he had a large supportive family and was otherwise well thought of as a person and as a worker. His record did not disentitle him to leniency. He thought that, if the respondent could continue his present regime of counselling and medication, he had good prospects of rehabilitation and was unlikely to reoffend. His Honour accepted that the respondent might be at risk in custody and that this was likely to make it more onerous for him. As is evident, his Honour found special circumstances justified a variation in the statutory ratio stipulated in s 44 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW). 14The sentencing judge referred to the standard non-parole period and the requirement to give it the significance explained in Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; 244 CLR 120; 212 A Crim R 254. Because of the particular contention relating to the sentencing judge's assessment of objective seriousness, it is, I think, relevant to note the following observations (omitting references) - "[27] Section 54B(2) and s 54B(3) oblige the court to take into account the full range of factors in determining the appropriate sentence for the offence. In so doing, the court is mindful of two legislative guideposts: the maximum sentence and the standard non-parole period. The latter requires that content be given to its specification as "the non-parole period for an offence in the middle of the range of objective seriousness" ... Meaningful content cannot be given to the concept by taking into account characteristics of the offender. The objective seriousness of an offence is to be assessed without reference to matters personal to a particular offender or class of offenders. It is to be determined wholly by reference to the nature of the offending. ... [31] The maximum penalty for a statutory offence serves as an indication of the relative seriousness of the offence ... An increase in the maximum penalty for an offence is an indication that sentences for that offence should be increased. It appears that for most, if not all, Div 1A offences, the standard non-parole period exceeds the mean non-parole period for the offence recorded in the statistics kept by the Judicial Commission of New South Wales in the period before the enactment of Div 1A. As the Court of Criminal Appeal correctly pointed out in Way, it is necessary to treat this circumstance with care ... The standard non-parole period represents the non-parole period for an hypothetical offence in the middle of the range of objective seriousness without regard to the range of factors, both aggravating and mitigating, that bear relevantly on sentencing in an individual case...." 15In R v Way [2004] NSWCCA 131; (2004) 60 NSWLR 168 the court discussed the concept of objective seriousness at [79] [ff]. In the present context, the following seems particularly relevant - "[86] Some of the relevant circumstances which can be said "objectively" to affect the "seriousness" of the offence will be personal to the offender at the time of the offence but become relevant because of their causal connection with its commission. This would extend to matters of motivation (for example duress, provocation, robbery to feed a drug addiction), mental state (for example, intention is more serious than recklessness), and mental illness, or intellectual disability, where that is causally related to the commission of the offence, in so far as the offender's capacity to reason, or to appreciate fully the rightness or wrongness of a particular act, or to exercise appropriate powers of control has been affected ..." 16The sentencing judge said, in connection with this aspect - "I would regard this offending as below the midrange of objective seriousness about midway between the midrange and the least degree of objective seriousness." 17It seems to me that his Honour meant by this description to refer to all of the objective circumstances of the case which, considering the respondent's motive involved duress, also included that matter. Whether this reasoning quite conforms to the above cited passage from Muldrock is not altogether easy to determine but, to my mind, this is of no present relevance. I simply refer to the issue to explain my understanding of this passage in his Honour's remarks on sentence. 18Dealing first with the submission that the sentences were insufficiently accumulated, the Crown submitted that each offence was very serious in its own right and involved quantities 9.5 times the large commercial amount of MDMA and 5 times the large commercial amount of amphetamine. They were of a relatively high purity and it was agreed they could be sold for a substantial sum. I should interpolate that I do not think that any additional insight is gained into seriousness by dividing the quantity of drugs found by the lowest quantity in the particular category. This adds no further information than the quantity itself. It is obvious that, by and large, the greater the quantity, the graver the seriousness of the offence, but there is no mere arithmetical correlation here. The Crown prosecutor also submitted that, whilst it is difficult to make a precise assessment of the respondent's role, the listening device material tendered on the sentence proceedings demonstrated that he was "heavily involved in wholesale drug supply that included interstate aspects". It had been submitted by the Crown prosecutor at first instance that the sentencing judge would not accept the respondent's evidence about how he came to be involved in the offences, submitting that the listening device transcript was strong evidence that this involvement was not unwilling but, in fact, enthusiastic. Whilst some parts of the conversation are capable of supporting this submission, the sentencing judge accepted the respondent's evidence about duress and accepted the involvement of the respondent as sufficiently described in the agreed facts. Furthermore, except in the sense that he was, in substance, a volunteer who had fabricated his account of how he came to be involved (which was denied), it was not put to the respondent either in cross-examination or, for that matter, in submissions to the sentencing judge that he was "heavily involved in whole-sale drug supply" to any degree greater than that described in the agreed statement of facts. The sentencing judge had the benefit of seeing and hearing the respondent and, in light of the way the matter was conducted before his Honour, I do not think it is appropriate to re-evaluate the respondent's role on the appeal. 19The Crown prosecutor emphasised in this Court, as well, the fact that the two offences were committed a month apart and involve different prohibited drugs. So far as accumulation is concerned, that is, to my mind, merely another way of considering whether the overall sentence reflected the total criminality involved in the offences, a matter which I will deal with in connection with ground 4. 20So far as the sentencing judge's categorisation of the objective seriousness of the offences is concerned, the Crown prosecutor submitted in this Court that they should have been categorised as no less than "just below the midrange of seriousness". In this respect we were taken to a number of decisions in this Court. First was R v MacDonnell [2002] NSWCA 34; 128 A Crim R 44, which was a Crown appeal before the commencement of the amendments relating to standard non-parole periods. The Crown appealed from the inadequacy of the sentence imposed for supplying a large commercial quantity of heroin of 9 years with a non-parole period 4 years and 6 months, supplying a large commercial quantity of methylamphetamine, 7 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years and supplying cocaine, a fixed term of 2 years. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently on the basis that each offence was part of one continuous exercise, so that the effective overall sentence was 9 years with a non-parole period of 4 years and 6 months. In dealing with the question of inadequacy, Wood CJ at CL (with whom Sully and Dowd JJ agreed) noted that, not only were the quantities substantial, over 3100 g of heroin and 9000 g of methylamphetamine, but the former was 83% pure whilst the latter was above average purity. Furthermore, the heroin and amphetamine offences did not relate solely to drugs found at the time of the respondent's arrest but also to occasions of supply over an extensive period covered by listening device tapes and even longer so that the respondent was a party to a venture "of considerable proportions and one in which he occupied a significant role". The Court held that the 25% discount given for the late plea of guilty was inappropriate, and reduced that discount to 10% but allowed a further discount for assistance, resulting in a total discount of 40%. In the result, therefore, in respect of the methylamphetamine count, the respondent was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 5 years and, in respect of the heroin count, to imprisonment for 9 years with a non-parole period of 5 years, effectively a total sentence of 11 years with a non-parole period of 7 years. The starting point for the sentences, therefore, was about 13 years for the former offence and 15 years for the latter. He had a number of prior convictions including one for supplying heroin in 1993. His subjective circumstances may be described as not markedly dissimilar to the respondent's but the objective seriousness of his offence greatly exceeded that of the respondent here, not only because of the number and nature of the supplies with which he was involved but also because no element of duress was present. For what it is worth, the accumulation was 2 years. I do not think that this case provides any useful information except that it indicates (which is at all events obvious) that the respondent's sentences here could have been more severe without exceeding the appropriate discretionary range. 21In R v Kazzi [2008] NSWCCA 77 the Crown appealed from an overall sentence of 8 years, with fixed terms and non-parole periods totalling 6 years, imposed for seven counts of supplying indictable, commercial or large commercial quantities of prohibited drugs, including one count of supplying a large commercial quantity of methylamphetamine (2.892 kg). Although the combined discount of 30% for the respondent's pleas of guilty and assistance were "generous", it was held to be within the sentencing judge's discretion and not varied. The Court accepted as open the sentencing judge's categorisation of the offence generally as being "just below" the middle of the range of objective seriousness but concluded that his Honour failed to take into account, having made this finding, the standard non-parole periods applicable to the offences. The sentencing judge had found that the respondent was "clearly nearer the top [of the drug hierarchy] than the bottom". The sentence relating to the methylamphetamine was increased to 10 years with a non-parole period of 6 years and 6 months. The starting point was about 14 years. He had only a minor criminal history. Again, the circumstances of the respondent's offences differ markedly from those of the respondent here. I would note, also, that if it was reasonable to regard the objective seriousness of Kazzi's offences as just below the midrange of objective seriousness, it is not at all obvious that, in the respondent's case, the sentencing judge erred in his evaluation. 22Lastly, the Crown pointed to XX v R [2009] NSWCCA 115; 195 A Crim R 38 where the offender had pleaded guilty to a number of counts, including one of supplying a large commercial quantity of methylamphetamine (3.165 kg) and one of supplying a large commercial quantity of MDMA (7.5 kg). A number of offences were taken into account in sentencing him for the latter offence, including possession of a pistol, ammunition and a taser gun. In respect of the drug offences the offender was sentenced to 7 years with a non-parole period of 5 years, wholly concurrent. This reflected a total discount for plea and assistance of 60%. The sentencing judge assessed the methylamphetamine offence as in the midrange and the MDMA offence as just above the midrange of seriousness. The respondent was found to be involved as a principal in a substantial supply business. On appeal, this characterisation was accepted. The respondent was described in the Court of Criminal Appeal as "a supplier at a midlevel in the hierarchy". In respect of the methylamphetamine offence, the Court of Criminal Appeal substituted a sentence of 7 years with a non-parole period of 2 years (varying its accumulation on one of the other counts) and, in respect of the MDMA offence, substituted a sentence of 8 years and 9 months with a non-parole period of 6 years and 7 months. Again, I do not see this case as offering any real assistance in the present appeal. I note, moreover, that the judge's characterisation of objective seriousness in the context of much more serious offending than that of the present respondent does not suggest that the sentencing judge's categorisation erred. 23In my view, the Crown's submission in respect of objective seriousness should be rejected. 24So far as the argument in respect of the manifest inadequacy of the sentence for count 1 is concerned, the Crown points to the proportions by which the quantities involved in each offence exceeded the large commercial quantity for that drug. Since the MDMA was 9.5 times this quantity and the amphetamine was almost 5 times the quantity, it is submitted that, this alone, indicated that the sentence on count 1 should have been greater than the sentence for count 2. The prosecutor relied on DAB v R; NJB v R [2010] NSWCCA 275 as, at least, an example of where such reasoning was applied. DAB had pleaded guilty to supplying a large commercial quantity of MDMA and of manufacturing the same quantity of the same drug and was sentenced in relation to each of the counts to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 12 years with non-parole periods of 8 years, in respect of the supply offence taking into account an additional offence of money laundering, described by Simpson J (with whom Macfarlan JA and Hall J agreed) as "itself a serious offence of its kind". Significantly different quantities of drugs were involved in the offences of supply and manufacture. The large commercial quantity is 500 g for each offence, the supply involving just over 9 kg of tablets, whilst the manufacture involved just under 3 kg. Simpson J concluded that the starting point of the sentences ought to have reflected a different level of criminality as indicated by these quantities, there being no other basis of differentiation in respect of the objective gravity of the offences or his personal circumstances. Her Honour noted, also, that the sentence for the supply offence included the offence taken into account on the form 1, commenting "the sentence in respect of the manufacturing count ought to have been less, if only for that reason." 25In R v Glynatsis [2013] NSWCCA 131, an insider trading case, where it was accepted by Hoeben CJ at CL (Rothman and McCallum JJ agreeing) that the most significant indicator of the extent of criminality, as between the investment made and the profit obtained, was the former factor as indicating "the size of the transaction and the best way of assessing that is by reference to the amount of money invested, or placed at risk" (at [54]). However, his Honour rejected the submission that the sentencing judge's determination of the terms of imprisonment (there being multiple counts) was "unsatisfactory in that he did not indicate the basis on which he imposed... identical... [terms] of imprisonment in respect of a number of pairs of counts where the investment in one was almost 9 times that involved in the other with very much greater profit yields as well." Similar comparisons arose in respect of the other counts. His Honour said - [63] The Crown's criticism of the sentencing judge's approach on this basis is misconceived. It involves an application of mathematical precision to what is a discretionary decision based on an intuitive synthesis of all the relevant factors to which his Honour referred. It is contrary to remarks in Pearce ... Given the similarity in the steps taken by the respondent in relation to each offence, it was well open to the sentencing judge to structure the sentences as he did. [64] The Crown submitted that it was difficult to discern the basis upon which his Honour determined which sentences were to be concurrent and which were to be cumulative. Once again, this was a discretionary exercise on the part of his Honour which was open to him because of the similar nature of the offending. 26It seems to me that the Crown prosecutor's argument is fundamentally flawed. First of all, if the sentence on count 1 is, as it were, the marker, there are good reasons for thinking that count 2 was more serious than the quantity of amphetamine involved, if for no other reason than it was the second offence. Otherwise, if the sentence on count 2 were the marker, then the sentence on count 1 would be too heavy. Furthermore, as Mr Johnston, counsel for the respondent pointed out, although the MDMA was indeed about 9 times the large commercial quantity of 500 g, its purity was only 31.5% whereas, though the amount of amphetamine was just over 4.5 times the commercial quantity of 1 kg, its purity was approximately double, ranging from 54% to 66.5%. 27I now come to what is, in my opinion, the substantive ground of appeal, namely that the total sentence is manifestly inadequate. The Crown attached a schedule of decisions of this Court most of which were sentence appeals which had been dismissed. It must follow, of course, that aside from any other indication in the judgments, the sentences were those imposed in the District Court although, of course, this is not to suggest at all that they are not informative. During argument I pointed out to Counsel for the Crown that it is not very helpful to have an undigested list of cases attached to submissions which are said to reflect sentencing patterns. I pointed out that this was little more than a submission that, whilst Counsel would not construct an argument out of the cases, somehow, the Court should. That is, of course, not appropriate. I agree that the information in the summaries makes them more informative than simply looking at the JIRS charts but, aside from indicating a general trend in sentencing, they do not offer any real assistance. I note, in particular, that many of the quantities are greater than those involved here: in many the level of involvement was greater and none mention any issue of duress or limited intellectual capacity similar to that of the respondent. Whilst it is true that most of the sentences appear to be greater than those imposed on the respondent, a distinct number are less. In the end, the Crown relied specifically on the cases to which I have already referred and there is no need to discuss them further. 28For his part, Mr Johnston took us to four cases involving participation in supply of MDMA by one way or another. The first of these is R v Opa [2004] NSWCCA 464. The offender pleaded guilty to participating in the supply of 3.1 kg of MDMA, a large commercial quantity. He was sentenced to a term of 8 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 6 years. He had a substantial role in an enterprise of drug supply, although he was not the principal. He was given a discount in the order of 15% but this was increased to 20% by the Court when it resentenced the offender. In allowing the appeal R S Hulme J (with whom Giles JA and Lavine J agreed) held that the appropriate starting point was 12 years imprisonment, which he then reduced by 20% for the applicant's plea, yielding 9.6 years and then discounting by a further 41% for assistance to the authorities, ended with a head sentence of 5 years and 8 months, with a non-parole period of 4 years and 3 months. 29In Nassif [2005] NSWCCA 38 the appellant pleaded guilty to the offence of attempting to receive for supply about 123.5 kg of MDMA, obviously a large commercial quantity. He had two prior convictions involving the supply of drugs. This was described as a commercial dealing in which the offender was to be a wholesale dealer. Allowing a 25% discount for his plea, the offender was sentenced to 6 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 3 years. At the time of the offence he was subject to a s 9 bond. His appeal on the ground of manifest excess was dismissed. 30Lastly, we were taken to R v Choi [2010] NSWCCA 318. The Crown appealed against a sentence imposed on the offender for knowingly taking part in the supply of a large commercial quantity of MDMA in respect of which, having served approximately 6 and a half months of pre-sentence custody, he was sentenced to a further term of 17 months 15 days, execution of the sentence being suspended, this reflecting overall a sentence of imprisonment for 2 years. The substance of the offence was that the offender agreed with his co-offender to supply 30,000 ecstasy tablets, weighing about 5.9 kg. The applicant had a strong subjective case. His sentence was discounted by 50% for his plea of guilty and assistance to authorities. Hulme J (with whom Giles JA and Hislop J agreed) concluded that the objective seriousness of the offence "fell at about the middle of the lower half of the range". The sentence was increased to one of 4 years 6 months after a discount of 50% from a starting point of 9 years, with a non-parole period of 2 years 6 months. Conclusion 31This Court has repeatedly emphasised the evaluative character of assessments of objective seriousness and the wide discretion posed in sentencing judges when determining the appropriate sentence resulting from the instinctive synthesis of all the relevant circumstances and it is not necessary to set out those authorities. 32As I have already indicated, there are no patent errors in the sentencing judge's reasoning. The comparative cases to which we have been taken demonstrate a range of sentences suggesting that the respondent's sentence was lenient but far from demonstrating that the sentences were manifestly inadequate or that the overall sentence was manifestly inadequate. It is trite that it is not sufficient to justify interference with the sentence imposed at first instance that this Court would have imposed a heavier sentence. Accordingly, I propose that the appeal be dismissed. 33R A HULME J: I agree with Adams J.