23 Before referring more fully to Ciantar, we note for completeness that in this case, unlike the situation in Heyes, the applicant denied involvement in the actus reus so that we think there is much force in the respondent's submission that, on that basis alone, the present case is materially distinguishable from Heyes. In that case, Buchanan JA said[9], essentially by reference to a number of Canadian decisions, that, subject to two qualifications which are not immediately relevant, where the Crown asserts a pleaded offence and an unpleaded alternative offence '... the jury should be directed that they cannot reason that lies or flight support an inference that the accused committed a particular offence, but bear only upon the question whether the accused was implicated in unlawful conduct'. Charles JA generally agreed with that reasoning but drew a distinction[10] between the case where the accused denied any involvement in the actus reus and the case where involvement in the actus reus was admitted and the issue was relevantly limited to intent. In the former class of case, of which this case is an example, his Honour considered that post-offence conduct may be relevant to the question of consciousness of guilt. Similarly, in Ty the issue was the applicant's intent when the fatal blow was struck. In that case it was held, following Heyes, that the post-offence conduct - flight, abandonment of clothing and hiding a weapon - was irrelevant to the issues of consciousness of guilt. Thus, as we have said, an important, if not critical, aspect of both above cases was that at trial the applicant did not deny playing any part of the actus reus. By way of contrast, the applicant in this case asserted that not only did he not cause the victim's death, but claimed that he was not complicit in any action which brought that about.