Her Honour then went on to impose the sentences I indicated earlier in this judgment being a fixed term of two years for the malicious wounding and a cumulative sentence of four and a half years for the offence in the first count with a non-parole period of two years in respect of that offence.
15 The error attributed to her Honour is that she determined the total sentence first and then structured the sentences for the two offences within that sentence. It was submitted that what her Honour should have done was firstly to determine each sentence appropriate for the two offences independently, secondly to have assessed the totality of the criminality represented by the offences and thirdly to have determined the degree of concurrence or cumulation of those sentences in order to reflect her assessment of the total criminality.
16 I do not believe that the criticism is justified. I do not understand why her Honour should not be taken at her word; being that she determined the appropriate sentence for each offence and then determined the total sentence to be imposed having regard to the principle of totality. The fact that she announced what the total sentence would be before indicating how the individual sentences should be structured is not in conflict with the way that her Honour said she had determined the sentences. Pearce contains no prohibition on indicating what the total sentence should be before indicating how the individual sentences are to be structured. There is no reason not to assume that before her Honour embarked upon her sentencing remarks she would have determined what the sentence was to be both as to its individual parts and as to its total length.
17 Nor does the fact that the sentences were made wholly cumulative indicate an erroneous approach. Although the malicious wounding occurred as a result of the commission of the offence in the first count in the indictment, it was a completely separate and independent act of criminality. The applicant returned to confront Mr Frendo. He armed himself and chased him as he sought refuge in his home. He picked up the piece of pipe, broke it, and deliberately used it to wound Mr Frendo to the face. The determination of whether a sentence should be made cumulative in whole or part is a matter of sentencing discretion Hammoud (2000) 118 A Crim R 66 at [7]. There was no error in the approach her Honour took in structuring the sentence as she did.
18 The applicant is however on firmer ground in submitting that the overall sentence determined by her Honour as reflecting the criminality before her, and in particular the sentence imposed for the offence in the first count, was manifestly excessive. Her Honour indicated that she was giving the maximum discount for the utilitarian effect of the pleas of guilty: that would be twenty-five per cent. Her Honour, therefore, must have determined that the overall criminality before discount would have warranted a sentence of eight years and eight months. Notwithstanding the serious criminal conduct before her and the need for a deterrent sentence, I respectfully have formed the view that a sentence of that magnitude was not warranted. I am not persuaded, however, that this was because her Honour failed to have due regard to the applicant's aboriginality as the applicant asserts. Her Honour referred to this factor during the course of her remarks and the relevance that it had in respect of the applicant's early exposure to violence and alcohol.
19 As with all appeals based upon a ground where no specific error is identified, the Court should be careful not to attribute error simply because the Court would have imposed a lesser sentence than did the sentencing judge. Genuine respect has to be paid to the discretion residing in the sentencing judge, particularly where the judge is as experienced in the criminal law as is the judge against whom this appeal has been brought. But a ground based upon an allegation that the sentence is manifestly excessive can only be determined by a subjective reaction to the sentence imposed having regard to what statistical material might be available as to other sentences imposed for similar criminality. In the present case the material from the Judicial Commission is of limited assistance but indicates that the individual sentences imposed were towards the top of the range.
20 I note that the applicant was on bail when he committed the subject offence and that the Form 1 contains another serious example of an offence against property. The sentence imposed by her Honour had to reflect the further weight to be attributed to personal deterrence and retribution by reason of the offences taken into account, Attorney General's Application under s 37 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 No 1 of 2002 [2002] NSWCCA 518 at [42]. But one limit upon the effect to be given to such matters is the principle of totality.
21 The offence for which sentence was to be imposed was a serious one in its nature, being an aggravated offence of breaking into a private home, but it was far from the most serious kind of an offence falling within the class of offences for which a maximum sentence of 20 years is prescribed. I would have thought that it was on the lower end of criminality for offences of that class. I would not necessarily accept that such an offence is less serious simply because the offender is known by the occupants as the applicant submits, but all of the circumstances of this particular offence suggest to me that an undiscounted sentence of six years is manifestly excessive bearing in mind the fact that the sentence was to be served cumulatively with the sentence for malicious wounding and having regard to the subjective circumstances of the applicant. Of crucial importance in that regard was that he was an aboriginal man of twenty years of age serving a first sentence in an adult prison.
22 On the basis that the Court might find error and be required to re-exercise the sentencing discretion the Court received a recently prepared report of a psychologist, Peter Champion. From his assessment of the applicant Mr Champion believes that follow up to assist the applicant would include counselling and possibly residential placement for the applicant in relation to his use of alcohol, an ENT examination in respect of his hearing problems, a neurological appraisal, and his involvement in anger and stress management courses. The Court also received a number of inmate assessment reports that indicate that the applicant has been working well while in custody and has been attempting courses to obtain some skills that he might later put to use in the community. This confirms that the applicant is in need of, and could be assisted by, intensive intervention when released from prison. He should be provided with the opportunity for rehabilitation by a finding of special circumstances.
23 I propose that the application be granted and the appeal be allowed in respect of the sentence for the offence on the first count in the indictment. The sentence on that count should be quashed and in lieu the applicant be sentenced to three years imprisonment to commence on 24 February 2004 with a non-parole period of 6 months to expire on 23 August 2004 the date upon which the applicant is to be released to parole. It is to be a condition of his parole that he places himself under the supervision of the adult probation service.
24 TOBIAS JA: I agree with the orders proposed by Howie J for the reasons his Honour has given.
25 JAMES J: I also agree.
26 TOBIAS JA: The orders of the Court will therefore be as indicated by Howie J.