29 In the present case, there was nothing to suggest that the applicant was in possession of the firearms for the purposes of trafficking in them. The applicant had acquired all of the firearms many years before in legitimate transactions and there was nothing to suggest that he intended to dispose of any of them. The sentencing judge herself was at pains to disclaim any suggestion that she thought that the applicant himself might use any of the firearms to commit a crime. The applicant had been in possession of the prohibited firearm, that is the Bentley pump action shotgun, for 25 years. He had used it for shooting ducks and had last used it 9-12 months before to shoot a snake. The firearms were kept by the applicant at a fairly remote country property about 15 kilometres from Taree, where the applicant lived alone, and, although the firearms were kept mounted on a wall in a cabin on the property instead of being locked away, I consider that her Honour overstated the risk of "anyone wishing to obtain a firearm to commit a serious crime (having) instant access to the applicant's firearms." I accept that the applicant's 15 year old son lived most of the time with his mother in Brisbane.
30 For the reasons advanced by counsel for the applicant, I consider that her Honour erred in considering that the offences to be taken into account in sentencing the applicant for the principal offence required the imposition of a significantly increased penalty for the principal offence. The failures to keep the firearms safe so that there was a risk of wrongdoers having access to them had already been taken into account by the sentencing judge as a circumstance of aggravation in assessing the objective criminality of the principal offence. The two drug offences, so far from being objectively serious, were, in my opinion, quite minor.
31 I accept that the applicant had very favourable subjective circumstances.
32 Having regard to what I consider to be a proper assessment of the objective criminality of the principal offence and of the extent to which the sentence for the principal offence could properly have been increased by reason of the offences to be taken into account and to the applicant's subjective circumstances, I consider that the sentence imposed by her Honour was manifestly excessive, that leave to appeal against sentence should be granted and that the appeal against sentence should be allowed.