Should a Special Verdict be Found?
101The issue to which I now turn my attention is whether that mental illness which I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt existed, was sufficient to satisfy the legal tests to enable a special verdict to be found.
102Before I do so, I note that, had the proceedings been heard in a trial with a jury, there would have been an obligation on me to inform the jury of the legal and practical consequences of a special verdict. I bear all those matters in mind in considering my verdict in this case. In particular I note, and have regard to, the following matters:
(a)if my verdict is "not guilty by reason of mental illness", I have to decide what should then be done with the accused. If I am satisfied that neither his safety, nor the safety of any other member of the community is seriously put at risk by his release, I can order his release into the community either unconditionally or on conditions that I believe are necessary for his welfare and that of the community.
(b)if it is not appropriate to release the accused at this point in time, I can make an order that he be detained in custody until he is released by due process of law. This means not only that the accused remains in custody until a decision is made to release him, but also that he becomes a forensic patient and falls under the supervision of the Mental Health Review Tribunal.
(c)the composition and functions of the Mental Health Review Tribunal, including its obligation to review a case of a forensic patient as soon as practicable after an order is made for his detention in strict custody, its obligation to review the patient at least once every six months, and its obligation not to release a forensic patient unless it is satisfied that the safety of that person or any member of the public would not be seriously endangered by his release.
103The real issue in this trial is whether the accused has available to him the defence of mental illness. The defence is a matter for the accused to establish, not beyond reasonable doubt, but on the balance of probabilities: Mizzi v The Queen [1960] HCA 77; (1960) 105 CLR 659. If the accused does establish the defence of mental illness, then a special verdict is to be returned.
104Section 38(1) of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act provides:
"38 Special verdict
(1) If, in an indictment ..., an act ... is charged against a person as an offence and it is given in evidence on the trial of the person for the offence that the person was mentally ill, so as not to be responsible, according to law, for his ... action at the time when the act was done ..., then, if it appears to the jury before which the person is tried that the person did the act ..., but was mentally ill at the time when the person did ... the same, the jury must return a special verdict that the accused person is not guilty by reason of mental illness."
105That section, and the Act, do not provide any definition of the term "mentally ill". The meaning of that term is determined in accordance with the M'Naghten Rules: R v M'Naughten (1843) 8 ER 718 at 722:
"Every man is presumed to be sane; and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, unless the contrary is proven ...; that to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the quality and nature of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong."
106In order to persuade the Court to return a special verdict, it is necessary for Mr Lopez to persuade me, on the balance of probabilities, that at the time he killed his family, he was suffering from a mental illness, which led to a defect of reason such that he did not appreciate the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong.
107There can be little doubt in this case that Mr Lopez knew the nature and quality of the acts which he was doing to kill his family members. The evidence discloses that he took a knife, and stabbed each of his three family members intending to kill them. The number of stab wounds, and the defensive wounds sustained by two of the members of Mr Lopez's family, are an obvious indication of that which he was doing. It was a brutal, vicious, unconstrained, and ultimately fatal, assault by Mr Lopez on each of his family members.
108When asked to account for his actions, he told police, and ultimately the psychiatric experts, that he intended to kill his family members. There is simply no doubt that he knew the nature and quality of his act.
109Equally, there is no doubt, based upon the expert evidence and the observations of what he was doing and saying in the three years or so leading up to the killings, and in particular in the days and weeks before, that Mr Lopez was suffering from an undiagnosed mental illness, being paranoid schizophrenia. Paranoid schizophrenia is an illness recognised by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders - 5th Edition, and is well accepted as a mental illness.
110The question then becomes whether, even though Mr Lopez knew the nature and quality of his acts, he has persuaded me on the balance of probabilities that by reason of his mental illness that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong.
111I am abundantly satisfied that Mr Lopez did not know what he was doing was wrong. I am so satisfied because I accept the account of the police officers and others who have interviewed or spoken to Mr Lopez about what happened, who have recorded that he told them that whilst he intended to kill his family, he was doing so in order to protect them. As well, I have taken into account, and I accept, the expert evidence of Dr Furst and Professor Greenberg that such was the effect of the psychiatric disorder, that Mr Lopez did not know that what he was doing was wrong. Rather, the effect of the psychiatric disorder was that he thought that what he was doing was right.
112This issue is raised by the second part of the M'Naughten Rules. It is necessary here to remind myself of the proper direction which would in substance be given to a jury on this issue. I do so by reference to legal authority.
113In R v Porter [1933] HCA 1;(1933) 55 CLR 182 at 189-190, the test was formulated by Dixon J in the course of his summing up to a jury in these terms:
"The other head is of quite a different character, namely, that his disease or disorder or disturbance of mind was of such a character that he was unable to appreciate that the act he was doing was wrong. It is supposed that he knew he was killing, knew how he was killing and knew why he was killing, but that he was quite incapable of appreciating the wrongness of the act. That is the issue, the real question in this case. Was his state of mind of that character? I have used simple expressions, but when you are dealing with the unseen workings of the mind you have to come to close quarters with what you are speaking about, and it is very difficult to be quite clear as to what is meant in describing mental conditions. I have used the expression 'disease, disorder or disturbance of the mind.' That does not mean ... that there must be some physical deterioration of the cells of the brain ... you are dealing with a very different thing - with the understanding. It does mean that the functions of the understanding are through some cause, whether understandable or not, thrown into derangement or disorder.
Then I have used the expression 'know', 'knew that what he was doing was wrong'. We are dealing with one particular thing, the act of killing, the act of killing at a particular time, a particular individual. We are not dealing with right or wrong in the abstract. The question is whether he was able to appreciate the wrongness of the particular act he was doing at the particular time. Could this man be said to know in this sense whether his act was wrong if through a disease or defect or disorder of the mind he could not think rationally of the reasons which to ordinary people make that act right or wrong? If through the disordered condition of the mind he could not reason about the matter with a moderate degree of sense and composure it may be said that he could not know that what he was doing was wrong. What is meant by wrong? What is meant by wrong is wrong having regard to the everyday standards of reasonable people.
If you think that at the time when he administered the poison to the child he had such a mental disorder or disturbance or derangement that he was incapable of reasoning about the right or wrongness, according to ordinary standards, of the thing which he was doing, not that he reasoned wrongly, or that being a responsible person he had queer or unsound ideas, but that he was quite incapable of taking into account the considerations which go to make right or wrong, then you should find him not guilty upon the ground that he was insane at the time he committed the acts charged."
114The terms of this explanation of the second part of the M'Naughten test has been judicially approved: Stapleton v The Queen [1952] HCA 55; (1952) 86 CLR 358; Regina v Matheis (1958) 58 SR (NSW) 321 at 322 per Owen J, Street CJ and Herron J agreeing; R v Matusevich & Thompson [1976] VR 470 at 477 per Young CJ, Starke and NelsonJJ.
115It is appropriate that I regard what Dixon J said as a practical synthesis of the concepts involved, and have regard to it, in undertaking the task which follows.
116I have relied heavily on the expert opinions of Dr Furst and Professor Greenberg. Both counsel for the Crown, and senior counsel for the accused, submitted that I should accept these opinions, and hence I should be satisfied that Mr Lopez has available to him the defence of mental illness because he did not know, in all of the circumstances, that what he was doing was wrong.
117In all of the circumstances, I consider that I should accept the expert psychiatric evidence and I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that at the time he killed each of the three members of his family, the accused, Mr Lopez, did not know that what he was doing was wrong. Accordingly, he was mentally ill, and a defence under s 38 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act has been established.
118The consequence of finding in the accused's favour on the defence of mental illness is that I return a verdict of not guilty on the ground of mental illness. One possible consequence of that is that the accused could be discharged, either conditionally or unconditionally, into the community. Neither the Crown, nor senior counsel for Mr Lopez submitted that in all of the circumstances of this case, this would be appropriate. It clearly would not be appropriate.
119What will happen in this case is that the accused will be detained in custody until he is released by due process of law. In other words, he will remain in custody and be held as a forensic patient and come under the supervision of the Mental Health Review Tribunal.
120In coming to my decision as to the appropriate verdict, I have taken into account the composition and functions of that Tribunal and the fact that the accused will not be released until it is satisfied that the safety of the accused or any member of the public will not be seriously endangered by his release. His case will be reviewed by the Tribunal as soon as practicable and, if further detained, his case will be reviewed at six monthly intervals. If at some stage the accused is released, it may be on conditions that if any of those conditions are breached, or his mental condition deteriorates to a point where he may be a serious danger to others, the Tribunal may order that he be apprehended and further detained.
121My conclusions are:
(a)I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the acts of the accused Carlos Lopez on 29 July 2012 caused the death of each of Olga Novosadek, Raul Novosadek and Pablo Novosadek.
(b)I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that at the time of those killings the accused was labouring under such a defect of reason from a disease of the mind that he did not know that what he did was wrong.