CRIME - SENTENCE - cause grievous bodily harm with intent to cause grievous bodily harm
intimidate with intent to cause fear of physical harm
contravene a prohibition in an apprehended domestic violence order.
Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW): s33(1)(b)
Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW): ss 13(1) and 14(1).
Cases Cited: Bugmy v R (2013) 249 CLR 571
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Catchwords
CRIME - SENTENCE - cause grievous bodily harm with intent to cause grievous bodily harmintimidate with intent to cause fear of physical harmcontravene a prohibition in an apprehended domestic violence order.
Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW): s33(1)(b)Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW): ss 13(1) and 14(1).
Cases Cited: Bugmy v R (2013) 249 CLR 571DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa [2010] NSWCCA 194R v Edigarov [2001] NSWCCA 436Yaman v R [2020] NSWCCA 239
Category: Sentence
Parties: Rex (Crown)
Judgment (2 paragraphs)
[1]
Judgment
Mr Ireton (a pseudonym), on 30 October 2023, you were arraigned before a jury panel in waiting on an indictment which contained three Counts.
The first Count was that, on 24 February 2022, you caused grievous bodily harm to your wife, Susan Ireton (a pseudonym), with the intention of murdering her.
The second Count (which was in the alternative to the first) was that, on 24 February 2022, you caused grievous bodily harm to Mrs Ireton with the intention of causing her grievous bodily harm.
The third Count was that, on 24 February 2022, you intimidated your son (Daniel Ireton - a pseudonym) with the intention of causing Daniel to fear physical harm to his mother (Mrs Ireton) with whom Daniel had a domestic relationship.
Upon your arraignment, you pleaded not guilty to each Count.
At the conclusion of the trial which commenced with that arraignment, the jury found you not guilty of the first Count, but guilty of the second and third Counts.
You appear for sentence today in relation to the two offences of which the jury found you guilty.
The offence of causing grievous bodily harm with intent to cause grievous bodily harm involves a contravention of s33(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The maximum penalty for that offence is imprisonment for 25 years. There is a standard non-parole period of 7 years imprisonment.
The offence of intimidation involves a contravention of s13(1) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW). The maximum penalty for this offence is imprisonment for 5 years. There is no standard non-parole period.
In addition to these two offences, you have consented to this Court sentencing you for one matter on a section 166 certificate to which you have pleaded guilty, and that is an offence of contravening a prohibition or restraint in an apprehended domestic violence order. This (third) offence involves a contravention of s14(1) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act. The maximum penalty for this offence is imprisonment for 2 years.
In this sentencing exercise, any contested asserted fact against your interests needs to be proved by the Crown beyond reasonable doubt; and any contested asserted fact in mitigation needs to be proved by you on the balance of probabilities.
Applying those two standards, the facts surrounding the three offences are as follows.
In 2005, you and Mrs Ireton married in Sri Lanka.
You and she came to Australia in 2012, having previously lived in both Sri Lanka and India.
By 2016, you, Mrs Ireton, and your two sons (Daniel, who was then aged 15; and Henry (a pseudonym), who was then aged 11) were living in the Sydney suburb of Girraween.
At some point in 2022, difficulties in the marriage became significantly problematic.
Those significantly problematic difficulties arose from your unhappiness about Mrs Ireton's use of social media (in particular, TikTok), including, or resulting in, a perception or suspicion by you of her infidelity. These marital difficulties resulted in you starting to use - and abuse - alcohol. There were consequential arguments and confrontations between the two of you. (I pause to observe that I am not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that there was any reasonable basis for your perception or suspicion about your wife's infidelity.)
As a consequence of one of those confrontations, which at least involved you breaking your wife's mobile phone, the police were contacted and, on 8 February 2022, a provisional apprehended domestic violence order ('the ADVO') was put in place to protect Mrs Ireton from you. The conditions of the ADVO included that you were not to assault, threaten, harass, stalk or intimidate Mrs Ireton; you were not to damage any property in the possession of Mrs Ireton; and you were not to approach, or be in the company of, Mrs Ireton for at least 12 hours after drinking alcohol.
From the date of the ADVO, you had not stayed at the matrimonial home; however, you had visited there from time to time to see your sons and for Mrs Ireton to do your laundry and to prepare food for you.
As at 23 February 2022, you were temporarily living at premises in Pendle Hill.
On the evening of 23 February 2022, you were well affected by alcohol and in an enraged state as a result of your jealousy concerning your wife. For a protracted period of time (1 to 2 hours) outside those Pendle Hill premises, and in the immediate presence of your friend (who was commonly referred to in the trial as "Saju") you unambiguously, and repeatedly, expressed a clear intention that you were going to kill your wife that night. Saju reasonably believed that that was your intention.
At about midnight, you drove your motor vehicle to the Girraween premises where your wife and children were living. Saju had tried to stop you from doing that. When his efforts failed, Saju texted Mrs Ireton, warning her that you were coming to the house and advising her not to open the door. Saju then followed you in his own vehicle.
On your arrival at the Girraween premises, and most likely because of Saju's warning, you were unable to enter the house through the front door. You made an unsuccessful attempt to enter the house through a small window near the front door, attached to which was a flyscreen. When your efforts in this respect were unsuccessful, you smashed the large, fixed panel window near the front door and entered the premises. In doing so, you cut your leg on a shard of glass.
There was a verbal argument between you and Mrs Ireton about her (new) mobile phone, which you were determined to obtain.
Whether or not you actually had an intention to kill when you spoke to Saju, and / or continued to have that intention on your journey or on arrival, that was not your intent at the point of the argument. Your intention at that time was to cause grievous bodily harm to Mrs Ireton and to inflict humiliation upon her. In order for Mrs Ireton to be humiliated, she needed to live. Your chosen method of humiliation was to cut off her hair.
In a physical struggle between you and your wife, Mrs Ireton's head was hit against an internal wall. The result of that impact can be seen in photograph 22 of Exhibit A. As a result of that impact, Mrs Ireton fell to the floor. You then repeatedly: stomped on, and kicked her in, the head; and slammed her head and face onto the floor tiles. Then, whilst Mrs Ireton was unconscious, you cut off her hair with a kitchen knife. Before you had done this, Mrs Ireton's hair was thick and came down to at least her waist, if not further. After you cut her hair, it was approximately shoulder length. The cut hair was left by you on the kitchen bench.
Whilst Mrs Ireton was unconscious (and whether before or after you cut off her hair), you ransacked the house looking for, amongst other things, her phone and, in doing so, left a trail of blood.
You were unsuccessful in finding the phone, as a consequence of which you intimidated your son, Daniel, in the manner the subject of Count 3, to coerce that child to assist you in finding your wife's phone. Although you were ultimately unsuccessful in the search for that phone, you did retrieve, and took with you, a quantity of cash and jewellery.
In due course, Saju arrived at the premises. So concerned was he at what he could hear from within the premises, he rang another friend of yours (who was commonly referred to in the trial as "Siva") to come and assist. Siva was soon at the Girraween premises.
The arrival of Saju and Siva caused you to flee the scene - without rendering any assistance to your unconscious wife.
A 000 call was made at 12:37am on 24 February 2022 using Siva's phone. Daniel assisted with the call and spoke with the operator.
Police and ambulance attended shortly thereafter.
After the arrival of police at the Girraween premises, a crime scene warrant was obtained and crime scene officers attended to examine the scene.
Subsequent examination of a blood swab from the broken glass on the window near the front door revealed it was a DNA match for you.
DNA profiles consistent with your profile (either as the same profile or a major contributor) were also obtained from other locations throughout the house including: on the tiled foyer where Mrs Ireton was lying; the broken window; a metal cabinet in the main bedroom; the hallway near the bedroom which your sons shared; the hallway near the front door; the doorframe of the bedroom which was used as a study; as well as on the handle of a knife located in the kitchen.
At about 12:55am, paramedics arrived at the crime scene to treat Mrs Ireton. She was subsequently taken to Westmead Hospital Emergency Department arriving at 1:33am.
After you left the Girraween premises, you went to the premises where you worked at Toongabbie, arriving at about 1:10am. Your employer was present at those premises at that time. He noticed that you appeared agitated and breathing heavily. He asked you what had happened, and you told him that four men attacked you. Your employer noticed that you were bleeding at the back of your leg. When asked about this, you told your employer that you had been stabbed. Consequently, your employer drove you to the Westmead Hopistal Emergency Department.
The police subsequently attended Westmead Hospital and, after interviewing you at the hospital, at 11:15am on 24 February 2022, you were arrested.
I earlier mentioned that Mrs Ireton was taken by ambulance to the Westmead Hospital. On arrival at the Emergency Department, a primary survey was performed. Mrs Ireton was in a reduced level of consciousness. Her airway was patent, and her breathing was spontaneous, with supplemental oxygen delivered by a bag valve mask. Due to the risk of airway occlusion (which is an airway obstruction due to a reduced level of consciousness), Mrs Ireton was sedated and intubated (that is, a tube was inserted into her windpipe) after which mechanical ventilation commenced.
Mrs Ireton was observed to have significant bilateral eye swelling, including a left periorbital haematoma, a left lateral lower lip laceration approximately 10cm in length, blood around her nostrils, and a large haematoma to her right ear.
Mrs Ireton underwent a CT Trauma Pan Scan (which is a scan of the brain, chest, spine, abdomen and pelvis), and she was found to have the following injuries:
1. diffuse large circumferential superficial scalp haematomas (that is, large areas of bruising spread around the circumference of the scalp);
2. left periorbital superficial haematoma;
3. bilateral basal dependent atelectacis (that is, partial collapse of both lungs); and
4. an acute fracture of the anterior superior end plate of the L1 vertebrae, with a 15 per cent loss of anterior vertebral body height.
Mrs Ireton was transferred from the Emergency Department to the Intensive Care Unit for ongoing monitoring and management, where she remained sedated and intubated.
The laceration to Mrs Ireton's left lower lip was examined and found to have breached the dermis, epidermis, and oral mucosa. It was repaired with sutures.
On 27 February 2022, Mrs Ireton was extubated (that is, the removal of the tube from the windpipe). Following extubation, Mrs Ireton was noted to have a left side facial nerve palsy (that is, paralysis of muscles activated by the facial nerve), dysphagia (that is, difficulty swallowing), cognitive communicative disorders, and signs of cerebellar ataxia (that is, impaired coordination).
Following the cessation of her sedation, Mrs Ireton was observed to have ongoing agitation, confusion and a reduced level of consciousness.
Key indicators for the severity of a brain injury include level of consciousness, duration of loss of consciousness, and duration of post-traumatic amnesia.
Mrs Ireton was assessed by the Brain Injury Unit, and it was concluded that she had a severe traumatic brain injury based on her presenting with a Glascow Coma Score of 6 (a severe brain injury being a GCS of 8 or less), the post-traumatic amnesia testing, residual deficits of incoordination, dysphagia, cognitive communicative disorders, the left facial nerve palsy, and her reduced mobility and function. Mrs Ireton's injuries were assessed (by Dr Tan) as being consistent with the reported traumatic mechanism of injury.
On 8 March 2022, Mrs Ireton was transferred to a ward for ongoing assessment and monitoring. During her time at the ward, she made improvements from a cognitive perspective, but her physical impairments remained due to her high level of ataxia, which was secondary to her traumatic brain injury.
On 19 March 2022, Mrs Ireton was discharged from Westmead Hospital after 24 days as an inpatient. However, despite being discharged, doctors did not consider her medically fit to drive or to return to work at that time.
As at June 2023, Mrs Ireton self-reported difficulties standing and walking for more than 10 minutes, back pain, difficulties with speech, and difficulties with moving her facial muscles. Mrs Ireton sometimes experienced forgetfulness and required assistance with caring for her children and household tasks.
At the time of giving evidence in the trial, Mrs Ireton said her memory was functioning at 80 to 90 per cent, she could walk for 2 to 3 hours, her face was "Okay", and there was nothing physically or mentally stopping her from getting a job.
It is necessary for the Court to make findings concerning the objective seriousness of each of the three offences for an offence of its kind. This question is addressed by the Crown prosecutor in her helpful written submissions, and are not substantially disputed by Ms Hall of Senior Counsel who appeared for you.
Insofar as Count 2 is concerned (that is, the cause grievous bodily harm with intent to cause grievous bodily harm offence), I accept the submissions of the Crown that, relevant to the objective seriousness of this offence, are the following considerations:
1. the offence was unprovoked and arose out of a perceived belief that Mrs Ireton had committed adultery;
2. the offence was committed by you, Mrs Ireton's husband, from whom she might ordinarily expect protection;
3. the variety of actions employed by you using different parts of your body. You used your hands as well as your legs and feet in assailing Mrs Ireton whose head was hit against an internal wall prior to slamming her head into the tiles. You also stomped on and kicked Mrs Ireton in the head;
4. you targeted a vulnerable part of Mrs Ireton's body - her head - and one of the surfaces you hit her head into was very hard, namely, floor tiles;
5. Mrs Ireton was rendered unconscious and effectively became helpless;
6. you did not render any assistance to your unconscious wife at any time prior to leaving the premises;
7. it was the arrival of Saju and Siva that caused you to leave the scene. That is, it was not a voluntary cessation as a result of realisation of wrongdoing;
8. you used the opportunity to go searching for valuables, as well as Mrs Ireton's phone;
9. there was interference with Mrs Ireton's person in other ways, namely, her long hair was cut from her which had been a source of pride for her. Thus, you added humiliation to the physical abuse;
10. you smashed the window at the front of the house and entered the window, thereby injuring yourself. This method of entry shows a determination to enter and commit the offence; and
11. the injuries were of a high order. Mrs Ireton was admitted to hospital for almost 4 weeks.
I accept the Crown's submission that this offence falls within the high range of objective seriousness for an offence of its kind.
For the following reasons, I have reached a similar conclusion in relation to Count 3 (that is, the offence of intimidation in which your son Daniel was the relevant victim).
As a result of the threats made and the physical assault carried out by you, Daniel held a reasonable apprehension of serious injury to - if not the death of - his mother. By way of example, you said that you would not stop stomping on his mother's face until Daniel found his mother's phone. When Daniel begged you to stop hitting his mother's face into the tiles, you responded "I'm not going to stop until she's dead".
You carried out this offence after Daniel had come out of his bedroom and saw his mother's body lying, unconscious, on the floor. The fact that the offence was committed in those circumstances, i.e., where it would have been apparent to Daniel that his mother was helpless to defend herself, would have only served to heighten his distress.
Daniel actually feared injury to his mother. He said he was concerned for his mother's safety and wellbeing when he saw you stomping on her and kicking her. When his mother's head was being hit onto the tiles, Daniel thought this was going to hurt her - that her bones were going to break or similar - and he cried out to you to stop. When you came up to Daniel's mother with the knife, Daniel thought you were actually going to stab her (in fact, you said "I'm not going to kill her yet") and he pleaded with you not to kill her. The incident was an extremely distressing event for a 15 year old to witness between his parents. Daniel's level of distress was graphically captured in both the 000 call and in his interview with police recorded on a body worn video.
And I have also reached the same conclusion in relation to the third offence (being the offence of contravening an apprehended domestic violence order on the s166 certificate). The offences on the night of 23 / 24 February 2022 occurred some 16 days after the ADVO was issued. The various conditions of the ADVO were clearly, and substantially, breached. Aside from the very serious physical assault on your wife in the presence of your sons, you damaged property by breaking the glass window of the loungeroom. And, furthermore, you had drunk a considerable amount of alcohol immediately before arriving at your wife's premises. The degree to which you were prepared to breach the ADVO elevates the objective seriousness of the offence. The breaches show a serious disregard for Court orders.
Count 2 is additionally aggravated by the following three factors.
First, it occurred within the home of the victim (Mrs Ireton).
Secondly, it involved a grave risk of death.
Thirdly, it occurred in the presence of a child (Henry).
Count 3 is additionally aggravated by reason of the fact that it occurred in the home of the victim (Daniel).
You did not give sworn direct evidence in the sentence proceedings.
Rather, your further subjective circumstances were advanced through a report by Dr Dayalan (a psychiatrist), an unsworn statement from you, a number of references, certain certificates of completion, and a statement purportedly prepared by, or on behalf of, both Daniel and Mrs Ireton.
As I have already said, you were born in Sri Lanka in 1985. At that time, that country was notoriously the subject of considerable civil disorder and violence.
Your father was a member of a Tamil (militant) group with the result that he and your family were the subject of aggression and violence from the Sri Lankan army.
Dr Dayalan, in his report, graphically sets out the physical and emotional traumas you and your family endured as a result of that conflict. He has also set out in detail the internal violence within the family which your father inflicted on his wife and six children.
Your childhood, being marked by extensive and prolonged traumatic experiences, was a profoundly dysfunctional one within the meaning of Bugmy v R (2013) 249 CLR 571; thereby reducing the moral culpability of your offending.
Traumatic experiences were not limited to your childhood. As an adult living in Sri Lanaka, you also were subjected to torture in an army camp and sustained significant physical injuries - although there is no evidence that they are ongoing.
Because your father abandoned his family and left Sri Lanka in the mid-1990s, you assumed responsibility for looking after your mother and siblings (one of whom suffered from severe and permanent brain damage as a result of the violence inflicted on him by your father).
You left school at about 10 to 12 years of age and have been in continuous employment since that time - doing various unskilled labouring jobs as a child; and working as a skilled and highly respected mechanic in adulthood.
After you and Mrs Ireton (and your two sons) came to Australia in 2012, you worked long hours to support not only your wife and children, but also so as to be able to send some money periodically to your mother and siblings who continued to live in a refugee camp in India when you came to Australia.
I am satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that, at the time of your offending, you were suffering from chronic and fluctuating PTSD as a result of the traumatic experiences you had endured before coming to Australia.
There are, however, five observations which I wish to make about that condition.
First, I am not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that that PTSD was directly causally connected to your offending. The highest that Dr Dayalan was able to say was that people "…with PTSD are predisposed to emotional and behavioural dysregulation in the context of heightened stress and exposure to reminders of past traumas"; and that "…the stressful nature of [your] circumstances [i.e., the strain in your relationship with your wife, your interaction with police and being subsequently subjected to the ADVO, and the (limited - my word) restricted access to your children] contributed to the dysregulation in [your] emotions and behaviour exhibited at the time of the offences".
Secondly, notwithstanding that it was not directly causally connected to your offending, it remains a relevant consideration so as to somewhat reduce the significance of general deterrence as explained in DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa [2010] NSWCCA 194.
Thirdly, general deterrence, although slightly reduced, remains a significant sentencing consideration.
Fourthly, your effectively untreated post-traumatic stress disorder significantly engages the need to protect the community.
In the context of domestic violence crimes, the Court of Criminal Appeal has given firm guidance to sentencing judges. A number of relevant authorities were included in the Crown's written submissions on sentence. The application of those principles was not disputed on your behalf by Ms Hall SC. For my purposes today, two are particularly apposite.
In R v Edigarov [2001] NSWCCA 436, at [47] Wood CJ at CL (Studdert and Bell JJ agreeing) said:
"…violent attacks in domestic settings must be treated with real seriousness. Regrettably, that form of conduct involves aggression by men who are physically stronger than their victims and who are often in a position economically, or otherwise, to enforce their silence and their acceptance of such conduct. In truth such conduct is brutal, cowardly and inexcusable, and the Courts have a duty to ensure that it is adequately punished, and that sentences are handed out which have a strong element of personal and general deterrence".
In Yaman v R [2020] NSWCCA 239, Wilson J (Fullerton and Ierace JJ agreeing) stated:
"[131] General deterrence had a significant role to play. Offences committed by (mostly) men who, like the applicant, refuse to accept that a partner or former partner is entitled to a life of her own choosing, must be dealt with sternly by the Courts, to mark society's strong disapprobation of such conduct, and to reinforce the right of women to live unmolested by a former partner. Offences involving domestic violence are frequently committed, and the criminal justice system must play a part in protecting those who have been or may be victims of it.
…
[135] The right of all women to determine their own path in life must be protected and upheld by the Courts. Where a woman's right is ignored or disregarded by an offender, that right must be vindicated, including by punitive and strongly deterrent sentences where necessary".
Fifthly, specific deterrence is fully engaged.
As I have observed above, there is no evidence that you suffer from any significant physical disabilities. Nor do you have any issues with illegal drugs or any long-term issue with alcohol.
In addition to general and specific deterrence, and the need to protect the community, another important sentencing consideration is the rehabilitation of an offender.
Remorse is an important factor in considering an offender's prospects of rehabilitation. It is an issue on which you have the onus of proof on the balance of probabilities. In considering whether you have discharged that onus, I have had regard to the following matters.
First, you did not give sworn evidence of your remorse.
Secondly, at about 10:42am on 24 February 2022, you rang your friend Saju from the hospital. You told Saju that you were at the hospital Emergency Ward. You and Saju discussed Mrs Ireton's condition. As a result of a previous conversation which Saju's wife had with hospital staff, Saju told you that Mrs Ireton was in hospital and that she had 50/50 chance (of survival). Your response was "let her die". I note that the 000 call was made at 12:37am on 24 February 2022 and that this call between you and Saju was made at 10:42am on that day. Your statement "let her die" was, therefore, made at least 10 hours after you attacked Mrs Ireton. This is not addressed by Dr Dayalan. I am not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that it was made as a consequence of your post-traumatic stress disorder.
Thirdly, the various accounts which you gave to witnesses and the police concerning the events of that evening at your home, including that Mrs Ireton sent people to kill you, and that she had stabbed you in the leg at the Girraween premises, were not true - and I am satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, you knew they were not true. I also note that, although evidence was given in the trial before the jury about your perception or suspicion of your wife's infidelity, you told Dr Dayalan, for the preparation of his report, that you did not have that perception or suspicion. I am not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that that was a truthful statement by you.
Fourthly, I consequently regard with considerable scepticism your second-hand expressions of remorse to Dr Dayalan and your unsworn letter which has been placed in evidence. In particular, I have noted that, in your letter, you seem to suggest in the second substantive paragraph on page 2 that the offending arose spontaneously during an argument with your wife. This is no consistent with the facts as I have found them.
Of course, you are not to be punished for exercising your right to a trial.
I am, therefore, not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that you are genuinely remorseful - as opposed to feeling sorry for the position in which you find yourself.
I have noted that you have no prior offences recorded against you.
I have noted your good work history.
I have noted the references from your employer and the prison Chaplain.
I have noted Dr Dayalan's qualified opinion concerning treatment for your PTSD.
I have noted the "significant and conflicting emotions" towards you from Mrs Ireton and Daniel.
In result, I have concluded that your prospects for rehabilitation are guarded.
No sentence for any of the three offences other than full-time custody is appropriate.
I intend imposing an aggregate sentence, the start date of which will be the date of your arrest, 25 February 2022.
In relation to the indicative sentences underlying the ultimate aggregate sentence, there will be an agreed 10 per cent discount for each of those indicative offences.
Further, in relation to those indicative sentences, there should not be total concurrency for any offence. There should be a slight accumulation between Count 2 and the s166 matter; and there should more meaningful accumulation between those two offences and Count 3.
In relation to Count 2, except for the discount of 10 per cent, the indicative sentence would have been imprisonment for 12 years. After the discount, the indicative sentence is imprisonment for 10 years 9 months. The indicative non-parole period is 8 years.
In relation to Count 3, except for the discount of 10 per cent, the indicative sentence would have been imprisonment for 4 years. After the discount, the indicative sentence is imprisonment for 3 years 7 months.
In relation to the s166 certificate matter, except for the discount of 10 per cent, the indicative sentence would have been imprisonment for 1 year 6 months. After the discount, the indicative sentence is imprisonment for 1 year 4 months.
I therefore impose an aggregate term of imprisonment for 13 years 6 months.
I decline to make a finding of special circumstances, notwithstanding that this is your first time in custody. You are not a young offender. Your prospects of rehabilitation would not be enhanced by a longer period on parole. And your experience in custody to date does not suggest that, because of your PTSD, imprisonment will be more onerous for you.
I therefore fix a non-parole period of 10 years to date from 25 February 2022, and which will expire on 24 February 2032.
I fix a balance of 3 years 6 months to date from 25 February 2032, and which will expire on 24 August 2035.
Because of the length of the term of imprisonment I have imposed, I am satisfied, pursuant to s39(2) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act, that the making of a further final apprehended violence order (to that which was made by the Parramatta Local Court on 28 November 2023) is not required.
[2]
DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.
Decision last updated: 29 April 2024