Determination of Application
49I was and remain concerned at the way in which this application unfolded. The factual matters relied upon are all contained in the prosecution brief, with the additional reference in the Justice Health records to a proposed CT scan in 2001, and certain matters raised by the Accused on 26 February 2012 (having apparently been in custody on other matters since 21 June 2011). Apart from that, Dr Ashkar (who has not examined the Accused) has raised a number of suggestions for enquiry, from a psychological perspective. As I have said, Dr Nielssen does not support a partial defence of substantial mental impairment.
50I have kept in mind, as well, that this is not a case, such as R v Kennedy, where the Accused admits that he struck the fatal blow to the head of the deceased. This places some distance between the Accused and the normal scenario where substantial mental impairment is raised. Mr Carroll submits that substantial mental impairment may arise, as well, in a scenario such as this.
51I have significant misgivings as to whether the delay in the trial will furnish any further evidence which may bear upon the guilt of the Accused. However, the Accused is to stand trial for murder. Where application is made to adjourn a trial upon the basis that the defence seeks to explore an issue which may constitute a defence or partial defence at trial, then the Court should adopt a cautious approach before shutting the Accused out from taking those steps. It has been said that an accused should be given a reasonable chance to present his case, which necessarily includes a reasonable opportunity to prepare that case before being called upon to present it: R v Alexandroaia (1995) 81 A Crim R 286 at 289.
52At the same time, as also acknowledged in R v Alexandroaia at 291, there is a strong public interest in a criminal trial, once fixed for hearing upon the basis that the parties were ready to proceed, ordinarily proceeding with expedition. The Court of Criminal Appeal has observed that the significance of this consideration (expressed in R v Alexandroaia in 1995) has been reinforced by the case management provisions contained in the 2009 Amending Act: Slotboom v R [2013] NSWCCA 18 at [36].
53I am conscious that a last-minute application to vacate a trial date will have a likely adverse effect upon witnesses in the trial, and persons interested in the trial, including the family of the deceased. I am conscious, as well, of the disruptive effect upon the Court's administrative arrangements where a trial is vacated at the last minute, in the manner in which has occurred in this case. This is not a course to be taken lightly.
54However, In all the circumstances, I formed the view that the appropriate order was to vacate the trial date and an order to that effect was made on 8 November 2013.
55Before concluding this judgment, I wish to make two observations. Firstly, as I have noted, this trial is not caught by the recent provisions for mandatory defence disclosure contained in the 2013 Amending Act. Implementation of those provisions should guard against repetition of what has happened in this case. That said, this trial was subject to the case-management provisions enacted by the 2009 Amending Act. Defence compliance with those provisions, and the statutory requirement for notice where substantial mental impairment may be raised, should have seen this issue being explored by the legal representatives for the Accused at a much earlier time.
56Secondly, the fact that the Court made an order vacating the trial should not be interpreted as the Court desiring or requesting that the further enquiries foreshadowed by the legal representatives for the Accused should be undertaken. All the Court has done is provide time for this issue to be considered, by vacating the trial date.
57Following the pre-trial hearing which is to proceed today, I will make an order placing the proceedings in the next Arraignments List on 6 December 2013.