Section 16A(2)(m) - Character, antecedents, age, means, and physical condition
- The offender has no criminal history and is thus a person of otherwise good character. He is presently 18 years of age and was 16 years and 5 months at the time of the offending.
- The affidavit of the offender's father sets out some of the offender's personal history [113] . The offender was 4 years of age when his parents separated. It is evident that the separation was acrimonious. The offender lived with his mother following the separation, however she later directed him to leave the family home, saying that she was unable to control him any longer. The offender then resided with his father for a period of six months, although there was tension between the offender and his father's new partner.
- In his report of 24 October 2018 [114] Dr Nielssen reported that the offender had informed him that he had "continued to feel depressed about his circumstances". However, Dr Nielssen expressed the view [115] that the offender did not meet the accepted criteria for a diagnosis of any psychiatric, developmental or mood disorder, acquired brain injury, or actual or emerging psychotic illness.
- The offender's age is of particular significance. In Khalid [116] I summarised the principles applicable to the sentencing of young offenders. I did so by reference to the judgment of McClellan CJ at CL in KT v R [117] where his Honour had made the following observations:
(i) considerations of general deterrence and principles of retribution are, in most cases, of less significance than they would be when sentencing an adult for the same offence. In recognition of the capacity for young people to reform and mould their character to conform to society's norms, considerable emphasis is placed on the need to provide an opportunity for rehabilitation (at [22]);
(ii) the law recognises the potential for the cognitive, emotional and/or psychological immaturity of a young person to contribute to their breach of the law. Accordingly, allowance will be made for an offender's youth and not just their biological age (at [23]);
(iii) where the immaturity of the offender is a significant factor in the commission of the offence, the criminality involved will be less than if the same offence was committed by an adult (at [23]);
(iv) although accepted to be of less significance than when sentencing adults, considerations of general deterrence and retribution cannot be completely ignored when sentencing young offenders. There remains a significant public interest in deterring antisocial conduct (at [24]);
(v) the emphasis given to rehabilitation rather than general deterrence and retribution when sentencing young offenders may be moderated when the young person has conducted him or herself in the way an adult might conduct him or herself, and has committed a crime of violence or considerable gravity (at [25]);
(vi) in determining whether a young offender has engaged in "adult behaviour", the Court will look to various matters including the use of weapons, planning or pre-meditation, the existence of an extensive criminal history and the nature and circumstances of the offence. Where some or all of these factors are present the need for rehabilitation of the offender may be diminished by the need to protect society (at [25]);
(vii) the weight to be given to considerations relevant to a person's youth diminishes the closer the offender approaches the age of maturity. A 'child offender' of almost eighteen years of age cannot expect to be treated substantially differently from an offender who is just over eighteen years of age. However, the younger the offender, the greater the weight to be afforded to the element of youth (at [26]).
- I went on to make the following observations [118] :
[110] In BP v R [119] Hodgson JA accepted the correctness of those principles set out by McClellan CJ in KT before emphasising that Courts should not be "over-ready" to discount the relevance of an offender's youth on the basis that the offender has engaged in adult behaviour or acted as an adult. In the same case Johnson J, having set out the principles in KT said:
[75] [T]he law recognises the potential for the cognitive, emotional and/or psychological immaturity of a young person to contribute to their breach of the law. The law considers youth and not just biological age. Where immaturity of an offender is a significant contributing factor to the commission of the offence, the criminality involved will be less than if the same offence was committed by an adult."
[111] In JM v R [120] Simpson J (as her Honour then was), having reviewed the authorities, said:
[108] It seems to me that the weight of authority is that the seriousness of an offence is relevant to the emphasis that can be given to the youth of an offender. That does not mean that youth is not an important consideration; but retribution and deterrence cannot, in a case as serious as the present, give way entirely or even substantially to the interests of rehabilitation…
[112] In R v Tran [121] Callaway JA observed that in the case of a youthful offender, rehabilitation is usually far more important than general deterrence. At the same time, his Honour emphasised that there are cases where just punishment, general deterrence, and other sentencing objectives carry at least equal importance. In Azzopardi v R it was observed that whilst, as the level of seriousness of the criminality increases there will be a corresponding reduction in the mitigatory effect of an offender's youth, it is only in the circumstances of the gravest criminal offending, and where there is no realistic prospect of rehabilitation, that the mitigatory consideration of youth is viewed as being all but extinguished. More recently in HJ v R [122] Garling J (with whom Hoeben CJ at CL and R S Hulme AJ agreed) observed:
[56] It is undoubted that the youth of an offender is a relevant factor to be considered in assessing what sentence ought be imposed. The Court makes an allowance for the youth of the offender because immaturity is usually involved. Where that immaturity is a significant contributing factor to an offence, then it may fairly be said that the criminality involved is less than it would be in the case of an adult of more mature years: R v Hearne [2001] NSWCCA 37 at [25].
- In the course of his evidence, the offender variously described himself at the time of the offending as a "young kid" [123] , a "dumb kid" [124] , a "dumb immature kid" [125] , "a little kid" [126] and "an idiot … (who) didn't understand the whole thing [127] . I am mindful of the fact that the offender is now two years older than he was at the time he was arrested. Accordingly, I must not, and I do not, view his presentation in the witness box as reflecting his level of maturity at the time of his offending. However, whilst I acknowledge the offender's age at the time of his offending, I am unable to accept the submission of senior counsel that he was a naïve 16 year old whose immaturity was a contributing factor to his offending. There is nothing in either of the reports of Dr Nielssen which might support that conclusion. Moreover, an examination of what the offender actually did tends totally against it. The offender deliberately sourced and posted extremist material which advocated violence. He sourced publications which not only advocated violence but gave instructions as to how it could be carried out. He followed those instructions to the letter. He purchased weapons which he then secreted. He carried camouflage gear. He took steps to ensure that he could not be traced. He was arrested in an area where he expected there would be appropriate targets. Conduct of that nature is, in my view, the antithesis of naivety. It reflects a considerable degree of forethought, intelligence and guile. It also reflects a deep and unstinting motivation to act upon, and put into specific effect, the irrational, immoral and heinous advice propounded in extremist propaganda issued by Islamic State. In my view, the offender's conduct belies any suggestion of naivety, immaturity or lack of intelligence. None of those characteristics played any part in his offending.
- In DPP (Cth) v MHK (A Pseudonym) [128] the Victorian Court of Appeal (Warren CJ, Weinberg and Kaye JJA) dealt with a case involving a 17 year old offender who had pleaded guilty to doing acts in preparation for a terrorist act. The Court said [129] :
As the authorities, to which we have referred, make plain, while youth is relevant in determining the weight to be given to general deterrence and denunciation in the sentencing equation, its weight is diminished, quite measurably, in cases such as this, in which a youthful offender either participates in, or plans to carry out, actions of extreme violence. The protection of our society, and the upholding of its most fundamental values, necessitate that in cases such as this the sentencing considerations of general deterrence and denunciation must be given primacy above the ameliorating effect of youth.
- Such observations are apposite in the present case. None of this is to say that the offender's age is to be disregarded. On the contrary, it is a relevant factor which must be taken into account and I have done so. However, consistent with the authorities to which I have referred, general deterrence and denunciation are to be given primacy.