HER HONOUR: This judgment assumes familiarity with earlier judgments in relation to these proceedings, and particularly with R v Pirrello, Pirrello & D'Agostino (No. 6) [2019] NSWSC 1833; R v Pirrello, Pirrello & D'Agostino (No. 7) [2019] NSWSC 1834; R v Pirrello, Pirrello & D'Agostino (No. 9) [2019] NSWSC 1836; R v Pirrello, Pirrello & D'Agostino (No. 10) [2019] NSWSC 1837.
On 18 December 2019, during the course of the tenth week of proceedings, and two days after the jury had been asked to retire to deliberate upon its verdicts, the Court received some information from staff of the Office of the Sheriff concerning the conduct of some jurors. The information was conveyed verbally, and recounted what amounted to second, third, or fourth-hand hearsay. The Sheriff was asked to instruct jurors to put any concerns they may have had in a note to the Court. A request was also made for the Sheriff to provide a written report concerning the interaction with the jury, with information from those officers who spoke with a juror, giving as much detail as possible and recounting relevant conversation in direct speech. On receipt of the report (now MFI 78), it was provided to the parties.
The accused Joseph D'Agostino thereafter made application for the discharge of the jury. He submitted that there was cause to conclude that a combination of possible problems within the jury room - bullying, illness or discomfit, and an absence of dutiful attention to deliberations - when taken with the close proximity of the Christmas period, dictated that the whole of the jury be discharged.
The application was not supported by any other party.
Having considered the submissions of the accused I refused the application. Because of the late hour, and the need to give some further direction to the jury before allowing them to separate for the evening, my reasons for that decision were reserved until today.
The application made by Mr D'Agostino for a discharge of the jury was the third such made by him. The two earlier applications were each prompted by the discharge of a single juror: on one occasion due to illness; and on another due to a death in the juror's family.
The situation that has given rise to the present application is different to those made on 7 November 2019 and 11 December 2019, and the considerations relevant to its determination differ to some extent.
The information relevant to the application is that contained in MFI 78. From that document, it appears that there is or has been a degree of disharmony in the jury room, with complaints made by individual jurors to the Court Officer or the Sheriff of bullying and harassment. One juror complained of physical discomfit connected with a back problem, and expressed the desire to end his role as a juror. There were reports that two jurors had been heard to express an intention to "drag the trial out longer" because of the financial benefit to those individuals of receiving payment for jury service, together with the provision of lunch without charge.
It should be noted that, whilst the information contained within MFI 78 represents the best recollections of those officers who spoke to the jury or to jurors (or, indeed, to me), it is not evidence on oath from the foreperson or any other juror or court official, and there is always a need for some caution when dealing with hearsay information. It is possible that comments may be taken out of context, or a passing remark or one made in jest given more weight than it deserves.
However, taken at face value, the information is clearly a matter for concern. Jurors have a serious and solemn task, and it is the expectation of the courts that that task will be undertaken with a diligence and gravity reflective of the oath each juror took on the first day of the trial. Any suggestion that there has been a deviation from what is expected and required of the jury must be addressed. Whether it demands a discharge of the jury is another matter.
There are a number of considerations, underpinned always by the fundamental proposition that the accused is entitled to receive a fair trial in which the relevant law is correctly explained to the jury and the rules of evidence and procedure are strictly adhered to: Mraz v The Queen (1955) 93 CLR 493 at 514 per Fullagar J.
What constitutes a fair trial was described in MG v R [2007] NSWCCA 57 as an "essentially intuitive judgment". A fair trial is not required to be a perfect trial: Hamide v R [2019] NSWCCA 219 at [87] per Bell P citing R v Edwards [2009] HCA 20; 255 ALR 399 at 405 [31]; Moubarak by his tutor Coorey v Holt [2019] NSWCA 102 at [89].
Here, whilst there is cause for concern at the reported conduct of the jury, nothing in the information available to the Court has caused me to conclude that the accused cannot receive a fair trial.
In the context of a trial involving eight weeks of evidence and a week of addresses by counsel, that the jury continue in deliberation after less than four days, and do so with what may be some disharmony, is not necessarily extraordinary, and does not mandate that verdicts cannot be properly returned by it. The suggestion that some jurors may be placing their own personal interests above those of the observance of their duty to the Court is both troubling and disappointing but, even if true, it does not of itself point to a conclusion that those jurors are not able to properly considers the verdicts to be returned.
Jury irregularity most often concerns the prospect of jurors making their own (prohibited) inquiries into matters connected with the trial, or receiving some prejudicial information that should not have been received. In those cases, the question to be determined is whether there is a significant possibility that the outcome of the trial has been affected by the irregularity: R v Marsland unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, 17 July 1991 per Gleeson CJ, Lee CJ at CL, Hunt J. However, not every irregularity will so "prejudice or colour" the overall trial as to affect the verdict returned: TKWJ v The Queen (2002) 212 CLR 124 at [97] per McHugh J.
In my conclusion doing what is fair and just between the parties requires the trial to continue. Bearing in mind the possibility of giving the jury some appropriate direction about the way in which its deliberations should be conducted, I cannot conclude that the matters reported of the jury's conduct do or may so colour the trial proceedings as to give rise to an unfair trial and a miscarriage of justice.
It is significant in that regard that neither of the co-accused has made an application for the jury to be discharged.
Each of the co-accused is entitled to their verdict in my view. Francesco Pirrello and Michael Pirrello have been subject to these proceedings for three years. Each has been subject to bail conditions, an imposition upon the liberty of men presumed to be innocent of the charge each faces. Each, being a man of good character, has endured what I do not doubt has been the very considerable stress of outstanding criminal proceedings against him over those three years and, in the last ten weeks, the acute stress and anxiety of facing trial. The financial burden of these proceedings on them must be very great indeed, both in funding legal representation, and in the costs to them of being unable to attend upon their fishing business for an extended period.
I do not conclude that the jury cannot discharge its function impartially and based only upon consideration of the evidence. I do not conclude that the information received is such as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension that the jury cannot so act. On that basis, and having regard to the stage of the proceedings, the application for the jury's discharge was refused.
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Amendments
07 November 2024 - Typographical amendment to coversheet.
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Decision last updated: 07 November 2024