On 12 June 2015 Corey Alan Breen pleaded guilty on indictment to the following two charges: first, that on 29 March 2013 he murdered Paul Edward Breen; secondly, that on the same date he murdered Felicia Crawford. In addition, pursuant to s 33 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, 1999 ("the Act") the Court has been asked to take into account a total of nine further offences ("the Form 1 offences") when sentencing the offender for the first of the principal offences. All the Form 1 offences were committed on 29 March 2013, and are connected with the principal offences in a manner which I will describe later. It is accordingly appropriate that I should take them into account on sentence.
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Background of the Offences
The following accounts of the offender's background and the events of 29 March 2013 are taken from the Agreed Facts which were tendered by the Crown on sentence.
The first victim, Paul Breen, was the offender's father. The offender, who was born on 15 August 1986, was the oldest of three children born to Paul and Debra Breen. His parents separated in about 1994, and Paul Breen later commenced a relationship with the second victim, Felicia Crawford. In 2001 they had a son, Dane. They later terminated their relationship, and in 2005 Ms Crawford had a daughter, Rachael, to another man. Later again, Paul Breen and Ms Crawford recommenced their relationship. They were living together at Killarney Heights with the two children, Dane and Rachael, at the time of these offences. Mr Breen was 54 years old when he met his untimely death, and Ms Crawford was 45.
It seems that Paul Breen had a difficult past. He had had a gambling problem and had been an alcoholic, although for 10 years before his death he had been going to Alcoholics Anonymous and had apparently been sober. He also had a history of violence towards his partners and children, including the offender.
The offender himself was working as a security guard until 2010. In September of that year he was convicted in the Gosford Local Court of assault occasioning actual bodily harm for an assault he committed in July 2009 while he was at work. As a result of this conviction he lost his security licence and suffered financial hardship. He perceived that his family did not support him through this case, and he made threats to kill various members of his family, including his grandfather, Colin Breen, and his sister Ashleigh Breen.
At that time, September 2010, the offender was living with his father and stepmother, the two victims of these offences, at their home in Playford Road Killarney Heights. A few months earlier he had met Cassandra Fenech and they commenced a relationship. In 2011 he left his father's home and moved into Ms Fenech's home in Gorokan. He became estranged from all members of his family, and told Ms Fenech that he blamed his father for everything that had gone wrong in his life.
In February 2012, after the offender had displayed worrying signs of anger, Ms Fenech drove him to Wyong Hospital where he was assessed. No acute mental health issues were discerned, nor was he diagnosed as suffering from psychosis or depression. A long history of difficulty in controlling his temper and having violent outbursts was noted, which the offender attributed to his dysfunctional upbringing. He expressed feelings of hate and anger towards his parents.
The offender was still living with Ms Fenech on 29 March 2013 when the present offences were committed.
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Events of 29 March 2013
29 March 2013 was Good Friday. In the late afternoon of that day the offender and Ms Fenech had a number of friends around to their home in Gorokan. Most of them, including the offender, were drinking alcohol. At about 6.00pm the offender and Ms Fenech had a disagreement, following which the offender assaulted her several times. This assault on Ms Fenech comprises the first of seven back up offences which are to be dismissed pursuant to s 167 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1986.
At one point the offender armed himself with a large hunting knife. The blade was 19cm long and came to a sharp point at the end. In addition, he took out and assembled a rifle which he had been keeping in a plastic case. He walked to his car with the weapons, and then went back inside the house when he realised that he had no ammunition for the rifle. While he was inside Ms Fenech took the keys from the car. She also removed two spark plug leads, rendering the car unusable. In addition, one of the guests in the house took the rifle from the offender and then concealed it.
At that point the offender left the house carrying the knife. He was trying to obtain a motor vehicle, and for that purpose he struck the window of an unattended parked car with the hunting knife, damaging but not breaking it. This constituted another of the back-up offences. More significantly, the offender started walking along the roadway in Dudley Street, wielding the knife. Ms Gabriala Virgona was driving along the road in the same direction as the offender. She stopped a few metres behind him, and he turned around and ran at her, holding the knife over his shoulder. She reversed her car, and ended up colliding with a car driven by Keith Bowden, who was on his way home from work. The offender then ran up to Mr Bowden's car and stabbed him through the open window to the right side of his face. This caused a significant facial laceration, as a result of which Mr Bowden required emergency treatment at the John Hunter Hospital in Newcastle. The armed assault on Ms Virgona and the assault and wounding of Mr Bowden constitute two of the Form 1 offences which are to be taken into account under s 33 of the Act.
Shortly afterwards the offender stole a lady's bicycle and rode it to the Lucky 7 Convenience Store at Gorokan, hoping to obtain a motor vehicle. He arrived at about 7.10pm. Mr Peter Romanos was sitting outside the store waiting for his takeaway meal. His girlfriend's car, which he had driven to the store, was the only vehicle there. The offender lunged with the knife at Mr Romanos, first towards his stomach and then towards his thigh. The knife penetrated his shorts but did not touch his skin. Mr Romanos then ran into the shop, followed by the offender, who was calling out "Give me your keys". The armed assault and attempted robbery of Mr Romanos is one of the offences to be taken into account on sentence.
One of the guests who had been at their home earlier that evening had observed some of these assaults. He went back and collected Ms Fenech, and the two of them went in search of the offender so that Ms Fenech could try to calm him down. They found him at the Lucky 7 store, where Ms Fenech ran inside calling out "Stop". The offender then hit her in the right forearm, causing her to fall against a brick wall. This assault constituted another of the back-up offences.
A nearby resident, Nicole Duncan, came to the shop to see what the noise was about. She saw the offender's assault on Ms Fenech, and asked him: "Was that necessary?" In response he verbally abused her, punched her in the head and swung the knife in her direction. She suffered from headaches for a few days, but then made a full recovery. This assault occasioning actual bodily harm constituted yet another of the back-up offences.
At that point the offender resumed his attempt to obtain Mr Romanos' car keys. He chased him around the store, yelling "Give me your fucking keys!" Mr Romanos was pushing shelves of food stock towards the offender in order to stop him, and the offender was also pushing shelves over in an endeavour to get to Mr Romanos. After this had happened for a while Mr Romanos ran through the staff door in an attempt to escape the offender. The door had no locking mechanism, so Mr Romanos had to use all his strength to hold it shut. The offender was trying to push it open. He was shouting "Open the door!" and was stabbing at the door with his knife.
Considerable damage was done to the Lucky 7 store, leading to another of the back-up offences.
At 7.20pm the offender sent Cassandra Fenech's mother a text message saying "Ur dead u filthy cunt".
At about this time the offender left the Lucky 7 store and rode the same bike to an address in Merrendale Street Gorokan. He knocked on the front door, professing to be from the Red Cross. The female occupant realised that something was wrong so she rang both her husband and her brother-in-law, asking them to come to the house. Her brother-in-law, Ben Greenland, who lived nearby, immediately drove his utility vehicle to the house. He parked in the driveway and walked towards the house, calling out to the occupant. The offender then approached Mr Greenland, with the knife raised and pointed at him, and said "Give me your keys". Mr Greenland did so and the offender got into the utility and drove away. The armed robbery of Mr Greenland constitutes one of the offences to be taken into account on sentence.
Mr Greenland and the occupant of the house immediately contacted the police, who were already searching for the offender.
The offender then drove Mr Greenland's utility to a house in Thelma Street, Long Jetty, where his paternal grandparents, Colin and Norma Breen, lived. He was intending at the time to murder them. He was already in their rear yard when a sensor light came on. The offender thought that his father, Paul Breen, might have come to visit them, so he - the offender - walked to the front of the house, intending to kill his father first and then his grandparents. However when he reached the front of the house he realised that it was not his father but the next door neighbours who had arrived home in their car. He went up to them, pointing the knife in their direction, and told them that he was swapping his vehicle for their car. After allowing the male to get things out of the car, the offender drove off in their Holden Commodore. This episode gave rise to three offences to be taken into account on sentence, namely the armed robbery relating to the car, and the offender's possession of a hunting knife with intent to murder each of Colin and Norma Breen.
The offender then drove the Commodore to an address in Robertson Road Killarney Vale, where two of his friends lived. They were recreational shooters, and one of the bedrooms in their house was dedicated to the storage of firearms and hunting equipment. The room had a combination lock on the door and four locked safes inside which contained the firearms. The offender's purpose in going to the house was to obtain a shotgun which he was proposing to use to kill his family. One of the two residents, Kirrily Shelton, was at home at the time. The offender went into the house where he held up the knife and asked Ms Shelton to open the safe. After a couple of similar requests Ms Shelton went and obtained the keys and opened the door to the room. At the time she thought that the offender wanted to put the knife inside the room. However once the door was open he demanded that she get him the shotgun. She refused, and started to lock the room again. He took her hand with the keys in it and squeezed tightly, causing her pain. In due course he let her go and after taking her phone for a while he left. In the process he smashed the knife against a glass panel in the front door, causing it to crack.
The offence of possessing a hunting knife with intent to intimidate Ms Shelton is another of the offences to be taken into account on sentence.
The offender then drove to his father's home in Playford Road Killarney Heights. His father, Paul Breen, was asleep on the lounge in front of the television. His partner, Felicia Crawford, was in her bedroom watching television. The two children, Dane and Rachael, were playing in Rachael's bedroom.
The offender used the butt of the hunting knife to smash through two glass panels in the front door. He did this purely for effect, as the door was unlocked. He then kicked the door open and went into the lounge room. When Paul Breen saw him he screamed: "Oh my God! Corey!" At that point the offender went up to his father and stabbed him repeatedly in the chest area. Paul Breen died on the spot.
Dane Breen, who was then aged 12, had come out to the hallway to see what was happening, and witnessed his father being repeatedly stabbed. He ran to the rear yard of the house where he tried to get his sister Rachael to safety. Rachael would not come, so Dane ran to a neighbour's house and told them to call the police.
In the meantime, Felicia Crawford ran out of the house into an attached garage which had been converted into a bedroom. She tried to hide behind a door, but the offender opened the door and, having pinned her against the wall with it, he proceeded to stab her several times in the back of the chest as well as the head and neck. Felicia's daughter Rachael, then aged 7, was present at the start of this attack on her mother. At 8.03pm Felicia's oldest daughter, Brooke, received a call from Felicia's mobile phone in which she could hear Rachael letting out a single scream, which was followed by relative silence.
After the attack Felicia staggered back to her bedroom and lay on her bed. Her wounds were bleeding and blood was coming out of her mouth. In the meantime, Rachael had run around the corner until she thought that the offender was gone. She then returned to her mother's bedroom, and was there when Felicia fell off the bed and died.
Dane and a number of neighbours were standing outside the neighbours' homes when they saw the offender calmly walk out to the Commodore, look at them and then drive off.
Shortly afterwards police saw the offender's car and started to follow him. He was reaching speeds of up to 120kph in a 70km zone, and narrowly missed colliding with other vehicles. However, after a while the Commodore's clutch burnt out, and the vehicle slowed down and started emitting large quantities of smoke. Eventually, when the car had nearly stopped, the offender got out and tried to run away, followed by the police. The path he took ended in a dead end. The offender stopped at the dead end and faced police, holding the knife. Police called on him to drop the knife, which he did. He lay down on his stomach, allowing police to handcuff him.
A police officer told the offender that he was under arrest for multiple stabbings and stealing a car, to which the offender replied: "Multiple murder, mate". He also said "I achieved my mission".
The offender was taken to Wyong Police Station where a recorded interview took place shortly afterwards. Before discussing this interview, however, it is appropriate to say something more about the injuries sustained by the two victims, as revealed by the autopsy reports.
The post mortem examinations were conducted by the forensic pathologist, Dr Brian Beer. He found that Paul Breen had sustained a total of 15 stab wounds. There were six wounds to the chest, four of which had entered the heart and one the left lung. These constituted the immediate cause of death. There was also a stab wound to the right forehead which had penetrated the skull, as well as a number of more superficial wounds, some of them of a defensive nature. Given that five of the chest wounds and the forehead wound had penetrated bone structures, Dr Beer concluded that severe force must have been used to inflict them.
Felicia Crawford was found to have sustained four stab wounds to the back of the chest, two of which had penetrated the left lung. These constituted the immediate cause of death. The other two chest wounds had caused soft tissue damage only. In addition she had sustained a stab wound to the back of the neck as well as two wounds to the left side of the head, and a defensive injury to her left hand. Given that the two fatal injuries had penetrated her ribs, Dr Beer concluded that severe force must have been used to inflict them.
I turn now to discuss the offender's police interview.
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The Offender's Interview
The offender was remarkably disinhibited during the course of this interview, and expressed, in no uncertain terms, his pleasure that he had killed each of the victims. He said that he had an "absolute pure hatred" of both of them. This was attributed, he said, to his "shit upbringing", as he described it, which included his father beating him when he was a child, and was compounded by his father's lack of support when the offender was convicted of assault in 2010. He said that when the clutch burnt out in his car he was on his way to his mother's house, where he would probably have "knifed" her, her boyfriend, his brother and sister, and whoever else was there.
The offender told police that he was prone to blackouts - he had been blacking out since he was a teenager. He initially said that the first thing he remembered about the evening was arriving at his grandparent's home. But he then proceeded to describe going to a store and pushing shelves at a "big guy" and demanding his car keys. (I should interpolate here that, on all accounts, Mr Romanos was a large man). At first the offender was mistaken as to which store it was where this had happened, but later he corrected himself. In addition he remembered stabbing the driver of a car, although he said he did not recall the details. He commented, rightly, that this could have happened on his way to the store. When asked how he obtained the utility vehicle, he said that he was down a driveway near a house when the utility was driven into the driveway and the driver got out and ran towards the house. He, the offender, who was carrying the knife, demanded that the driver give him the car keys, which the driver did. This appears to be a generally accurate description of how the offender obtained the car from Mr Greenland, although the offender made no mention of having previously knocked on the door of the house, pretending to be from the Red Cross.
In other words, the offender had a recollection of many of the events of that evening. His descriptions of the events he did remember were often quite precise. He was also surprisingly forthcoming during this interview. Indeed the evidence in relation to some of the Form 1 offences came from the offender's own lips during the course of this interview. This is relevant to another significant issue on sentence, namely the extent, if at all, to which the offender was affected by alcohol or drugs when he committed these offences, and I will be returning to discuss this later.
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The Offender's Level of Culpability
The Crown submits that these offences fall within the worst category of objective seriousness for murder and attract the provisions of s 61(1) of the Act. That section provides as follows:
"A court is to impose a sentence of imprisonment for life on a person who is convicted of murder if the court is satisfied that the level of culpability in the commission of the offence is so extreme that the community interest in retribution, punishment, community protection and deterrence can only be met through the imposition of that sentence."
In spite of the apparently mandatory terms of this provision, the court retains an overriding discretion to impose a lesser sentence. Section 61(3) provides that "nothing in subsection (1) affects section 21(1)". Section 21(1), provides:
"If by any provision of an Act an offender is made liable to imprisonment for life, a court may nevertheless impose a sentence of imprisonment for a specified term."
I turn therefore to discuss matters relevant to the objective seriousness of these offences and the offender's level of culpability. It is appropriate to commence with the aggravating and mitigating factors which the Court is obliged to take into account pursuant to s 21A of the Act.
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Aggravating and Mitigating Factors Under s 21A
I am referring here only to the factors which are relevant to the offender's culpability for the offences rather than those which relate only to the offender personally, which I will be discussing later. The aggravating factors which apply in this case, and are not inherent in the offence of murder, are as follows: first, pursuant to paragraph (2)(ea), the offences were committed in the presence of a child under 18 years of age. In this case the murder of Paul Breen was committed in the presence of his son Dane, then aged 12. Rachael, aged seven, witnessed the beginning of the attack on her mother and was with her when she died shortly afterwards. Associated with this, and pursuant to paragraph (2)(g), the emotional harm caused to the two children was substantial, as was the emotional harm done to other family members, as indicated by the various Victim Impact Statements. I will be referring to this matter later, as it is a significant issue in the circumstances of this case.
The next aggravating factor, pursuant to paragraph 21A(2)(eb), is that the offences were committed in the home of the victims. Finally, pursuant to paragraph (2)(m), the offences involved multiple victims and a series of criminal acts. I will also be saying more about this later.
There are no mitigating factors under s 21A(3) relating to the offences, although there are two mitigating factors relating to the offender personally which I shall discuss later.
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The Offender's Motivation and State of Mind
In assessing the objective gravity of these offences, the offender's motivation and state of mind in committing them is a highly relevant matter.
It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to envisage any rational motive for these extraordinary offences. However it is clear that the offender harboured deep-seated feelings of resentment and anger against his family members, particularly his father, and by extension against Felicia Crawford. He had also been nursing violent fantasies for a considerable time. In August 2009 the offender wrote a letter to his mother, which included the following:
"…This is a true account of the mind of Corey Alan Breen. Its [sic] gone on too long to remain unsaid…I'm the kind of guy you love to be around. I'm happy, fun and would do anything for my friends. But this changes when I'm alone. I get very angry and plot out murders of people I hate. I do it all in my head. I run over it again and again refining every detail. They are always extremely horrific and extremely brutal … I'm scared someday soon the monster that I've kept locked away for so long will finally reach the surface. This can't happen. Everything will change. People will die and people will suffer … I'm not stupid though. I know that all these things I ponder are wrong, very wrong. They are evil. I know this but I don't care….I do know these violent fantasys [sic] are wrong but that's not why I haven't committed them. The honest answer is this. Because at the moment nothing has pushed me quite that far yet. But I do feel it is close."
This letter assumes a highly chilling quality when one considers the circumstances of these offences, more than three and a half years later.
After receiving this letter the offender's mother encouraged him to get psychological help. However it seems that the offender kept these thoughts to himself, and few people knew about them until they finally emerged, with catastrophic consequences, on 29 March 2013. When one looks at what the offender was doing earlier that day, it is difficult to pinpoint any particular triggering event. Certainly the offender had consumed some alcohol that afternoon. I will be referring to this later. Also he had been arguing with his partner. But neither of these was, on all accounts, particularly unusual. In his police interview, the offender said that he and Ms Fenech had been "having a shit run for a while". That afternoon, he said, there was no one to calm him down. To use his own words, he went on to say:
"So it just went on from there. But it's always sort of been … like a time bomb sitting in my head. I knew sooner or later I was going to go and fucken get my old man and the rest of the cunts. And just tonight was the night."
The offender said that when he was apprehended he was on the way to his mother's house. If the clutch had not burnt out, he said, he would have:
"knifed her and her fucken boyfriend and my brother and sister and whoever else was there."
Both these offences were accompanied by an intention to kill the victims. The offender openly admitted this during his police interview. In any event, his actions in inflicting the multiple deep stab wounds on the two victims were clearly indicative of such an intention. Mr Young SC, who appeared for the offender, did not seek to argue to the contrary. Nor could he do so in the circumstances.
The Crown submitted that both offences were premeditated, in that the offender had long contemplated killing family members. Certainly there was an element of spontaneity in the commencement of the events on 29 March 2013, but once the offender had decided that he was going to kill members of his family he set out in a determined way to achieve his aim. Dr Nielssen described his actions thereafter as "purposeful".
Mr Young submitted that there was no positive resolve to commit the murders before that afternoon. However he agreed that once the offender commenced this course of action, following the argument with his partner, he continued until he was stopped.
The evidence indicates that the offences were premeditated in the sense that they were not spontaneous actions, committed on the spur of the moment or in reaction to other events. The offender's actions in attempting to obtain weapons before he left home were indicative of his intention at that time to do harm to his family members. However I cannot find that the offender's actions that evening were pursuant to a deliberately formed plan of action which had been hatched well in advance. To use the offender's own words in his earlier letter to his mother, the "monster" had finally reached the surface.
In assessing the offender's level of culpability it is relevant also to consider his personality features at the time, and whether his actions were influenced by other factors, such as alcohol or drugs. This is potentially relevant to his prospects of rehabilitation, and therefore to the protection of the community, one of the issues to be considered under s 61(1).
Mr Young tendered a report of the forensic psychiatrist, Dr Olav Nielssen, dated 23 July 2015. Dr Nielssen had seen all documentary material relevant to this case and had twice interviewed the offender by audio-visual link with the Long Bay Correctional Centre.
The offender told Dr Nielssen that he had no recollection at all of the events surrounding the killings. His last memory, he said, was playing poker at home. The next thing he remembered was being in the police cells with blood all over his hands. This was after the ERISP, of which he similarly had no memory. He had been drinking heavily that day, he told the doctor, and had also taken several Venlaxafine tablets. This is an antidepressant drug which had previously been prescribed for him. Dr Nielssen gave evidence on sentence, in which he was asked about the offender's stated amnesia for these events. The doctor said that the most common explanation would be an alcoholic blackout, but it would be unusual to have an alcoholic blackout for such a long period of time. The Venlaxafine tablets apparently taken by the offender earlier that day could also have contributed to the offender's lack of memory he said, as well as to his uninhibited answers during the interview. He described Venlaxafine as a very potent antidepressant which has an amphetamine-like effect in high doses.
The offender's state of intoxication during his ERISP is a particularly relevant matter in this case. The delight he expressed in having murdered the two victims is quite chilling. Dr Nielssen expressed the opinion that the offender was affected by alcohol at the time. However the doctor had only read the interview. He had not watched the DVD of it. I have had the benefit of watching the DVD, and the offender does not appear to me to have been under the influence of alcohol. He was very precise in his answers, occasionally correcting the interviewer. Indeed there is evidence from the police officer that he could discern no sign of alcohol intoxication, from the offender's breath or otherwise. On the other hand, the offender's lack of judgment and inhibitions during the interview is surprising, to say the least, from an otherwise intelligent person. The offender told Dr Nielssen that not only did he not remember the interview, but "the person in the interview is not me…it sends my blood chilling".
In all the circumstances, I cannot escape the conclusion that the offender must have been affected by some form of drug at the time of the interview: at least by the Venlaxafine which he had reportedly taken earlier that day, and possibly also by some form of illegal drug. It is also possible that his extraordinary frankness during the interview was prompted by some form of unconscious relief that the "monster" inside him had finally emerged, so he was no longer going to have to wrestle with his internal battles.
The offender told Dr Nielssen that he had been suffering intermittent blackouts since his teens. Various scans had been performed, but no neurological abnormalities had been detected. He had also been drinking heavily and taking various forms of illegal drugs since his late teens.
In his report Dr Nielssen diagnosed the offender as suffering from substance abuse disorder. He considered that the offender has good prospects for eventual rehabilitation into the community. The offender is of above average intelligence, and the main issue to be addressed is his substance abuse disorder. The doctor considered that the offender would be unlikely to pose a threat to other family members if he were not affected by alcohol or drugs.
Dr Nielssen gave evidence about these matters, which I shall discuss very shortly. Before doing so, however, it is pertinent to refer to the report of the forensic psychiatrist Dr Yvonne Skinner, dated 7 August 2015, which was tendered by the Crown. Dr Skinner had read all relevant documents relating to the case, and had viewed the DVD of the offender's ERISP. However she had not interviewed the offender personally. She noted that a year before these events, in March and April 2012, the offender had been diagnosed by a psychologist as suffering from depression and anger management issues. The offender had had problems controlling his anger since he was a child. Dr Skinner agreed with Dr Nielssen's diagnosis that the offender was suffering from substance abuse disorder. She also considered that he was suffering from a personality disorder characterised by anger, impulsivity and affective instability. Dr Skinner disagreed with Dr Nielssen's opinion that the offender would be unlikely to pose a threat to other family members if he is released into the community. She said she has seen many people who return to substance abuse after long periods of enforced abstinence while in custody. In addition, personality factors are important in a person's prospects of rehabilitation, and the offender has a long history of anger and poor impulse control. For these reasons she considered that the offender's prospects for rehabilitation must be considered guarded.
It was essentially in response to Dr Skinner's report that Dr Nielssen was called to give evidence in the sentencing proceedings. He was asked by Mr Young about Dr Skinner's diagnosis of personality disorder, and he said that he rarely makes that diagnosis because it lacks scientific reliability. It refers to maladaptive traits which are present throughout life, but longitudinal studies have shown that many people who have been diagnosed with personality disorder do not meet the criteria when they are reviewed later in life. For this reason it is an unreliable diagnosis.
As to the offender's prospects for rehabilitation, the key matter, Dr Nielssen said, will be his ability to control his substance abuse. In cross-examination the doctor agreed that many people who indicate their intention to refrain from substance abuse do not live up to their expectations when they are released from custody. However he commented that a long period of enforced abstinence seems to help maintain abstinence. He also said he could not disagree with Dr Skinner that a risk of reoffending exists, but it is very difficult to quantify, and the overall level, based on statistics, is low.
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Other Relevant Matters
The Crown submitted that the offender deliberately set out to instil fear and terror in the people he came into contact with. The Crown submissions pointed to the offender's unnecessary smashing of the glass panels on the front door of his victims' home. The offender admitted in his police interview that this was probably a scare tactic, "just to give him the fucken spooks before I killed the cunt". In the case of both victims, Paul Breen and Felicia Crawford, there can be no doubt that this scare tactic worked. Both of them must have realised what was almost certain to follow, and their last moments must have been filled with unimaginable fear and horror. This is a highly significant matter when considering the objective seriousness of these offences.
It is also relevant to the seriousness of each of these offences that it was not committed in isolation. As the Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed in Adanguidi v R (2006) 167 A Crim R 295 at [32], in situations where two offences are committed at essentially the same time and place and are part of the one episode of criminal conduct, the Court can have regard to the whole of the conduct in determining the level of culpability involved in each offence.
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The Victim Impact Statements
I turn to discuss the consequences of the offender's actions on other family members. Section 28(4) of the Act provides that the Victim Impact Statements given by family members can, if the prosecution applies and the Court considers it appropriate to do so, be taken into account on sentence on the basis that the harmful impact of the primary victim's death on immediate family members is an aspect of the harm done to the community. The Crown in this case made such an application. It was not opposed by Mr Young upon the basis that my consideration of the statements is to focus on matters relevant to the impact of the deaths on the family members concerned. This is the approach which I would have adopted in any event. It is consistent with the authorities on this subject.
In relation to the impact on the two children, Dane Breen and Rachael Crawford, it is probably unnecessary to resort to s 28(4), given that it is already an aggravating factor under s 21A(2)(ea) of the Act that the offences were committed in their presence and, under s 21A(2)(g), that the emotional harm caused by the offences was substantial. There can be no doubt that these two children have suffered the most enduring and extreme trauma as a result of witnessing the murder of their parents. The Victim Impact Statement of Dane Breen, in particular, indicates that his life has been irretrievably damaged by the events of that evening. He now suffers from anxiety and depression; he often inflicts self-harm and he harbours suicidal thoughts. These events have affected every aspect of his life. He finds it difficult to make friends or sustain friendships because of his depression and his inability to trust people. He cannot think of his parents without re-living the trauma of their deaths. Rachael similarly is suffering the effects of severe stress. She still has nightmares and is often anxious and frightened.
The impact of these offences on the two children has therefore been devastating, and they will almost certainly continue to be affected by these events for the rest of their lives. Moreover, this was a foreseeable consequence of the offender's actions. Had he adverted to the matter, he would have realised that the two children would probably be at home with their parents that night, and would therefore be forced to witness the slaughter which he was bent upon inflicting.
This, in my opinion, is a very significant aggravating factor in the particular circumstances of this case.
The other Victim Impact statements powerfully express the overwhelming trauma that the offender's actions have inflicted on other family members. Simply listening to and reading these statements is a distressing experience in itself. The whole family has been devastated by these murders.
Dane and Rachael are now primarily in the care of their older sister Brooke, who was aged 22 at the time of the killings. Brooke, Felicia's daughter, described the total changes in her life as a result of these murders, as well as her own acute distress at the loss of her much loved mother and step-father. She has been diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder as well as depression and anxiety.
Debra Breen, the offender's mother, was intensely traumatised by the events of 29 March. She describes herself as being constantly haunted by the realisation that her son was coming to kill her. She also suffers from post‑traumatic stress, together with anxiety, nervousness, depression, doubt, guilt and hair loss. These symptoms, she says, impair her life every day, affecting her work and her personal life.
Ashleigh Breen, the sister of the offender and the daughter of Paul Breen, has similarly been traumatised by these events, and sees a psychologist and a counsellor in order to deal with her symptoms of anxiety and depression. Some days, she says, it is so bad that she cannot function.
Paul Breen's father, Colin Breen, gave a very moving statement. His wife, Norma, had been extremely distressed by the murder of her son, and died about nine months later. His life also has been irrevocably affected by these events.
As already indicated, I treat the harm done to these family members as an aspect of the harm done to the community as a result of these offences. And it is clear from these statements that the emotional harm has been and continues to be very substantial indeed. In my view it goes well beyond what would be expected as a "normal" consequence of the crime of murder - if indeed there is such a thing as a normal consequence in relation to this offence.
I would like to extend my own and the Court's heartfelt sympathy to those who have suffered so extensively as a result of these offences. I know that no sentence this Court can impose could ever start to address the harm and distress that these offences have caused to many people, and will continue to cause.
[10]
Conclusion in Relation to s 61(1)
I return now to the central question in this case, namely whether the offender's level of culpability is so extreme as to attract the provisions of s 61(1). In this regard I refer to the judgment of Wood CJ in CL (as he then was) in R v Harris [2000] NSWCCA 469 at [84] and [85].
"84 The features required for qualification in the 'worst case category' were defined in Twala NSWCCA 4 November 1994, where it was said:
'in order to characterise any case as being in the worst case category, it must be possible to point to particular features which are of very great heinousness and it must be possible to postulate the absence of facts mitigating the seriousness of the crime (as distinct from the subjective features mitigating the penalty to be imposed)...'
85 'Heinousness' has been described as follows:
'The adjective "heinous" which gives the noun `heinousness' its meaning has been variously defined as meaning atrocious, detestable, hateful, odious, gravely reprehensible and extremely wicked. The test to be satisfied is thus a substantial one'. R v Reginald Keith Arhurell (Hunt CJ at CL unreported 3 October 1997).' "
There is no doubt whatsoever that these two offences are of the utmost seriousness. They go almost to the top of the range of objective seriousness for murder. However there are two matters which, between them, make me conclude that the offences do not fall within s 61(1). First is the fact that, although the offender set out to kill his family members that evening, and his actions were purposeful and premeditated in that sense, nevertheless the offences themselves had not been plotted or planned in advance. Something inside the offender snapped that afternoon, and sparked off the horrendous series of events which followed. It is impossible to know precisely what it was which triggered these actions, but it was probably connected with the alcohol and drugs which the offender had earlier consumed. The second matter relates to the offender's prospects of rehabilitation. I accept the evidence of Dr Nielssen that the offender has very reasonable prospects of rehabilitation, particularly if he can abstain from drugs and alcohol on his release. Also relevant here is the offender's deep remorse, which I accept is genuine. I will be saying a little more about this when discussing matters relating to the offender personally, but it is also relevant here as it goes to his prospects of rehabilitation. And that in turn is relevant to the issue of community protection under s 61(1).
In short, I consider that because of the combination of those two matters, the absence of pre-planning and the offender's prospects of rehabilitation, this case does not quite reach the extremely high bar set by s61(1). Accordingly, I will not be imposing the maximum sentence of life imprisonment in relation to these offences.
The offences are, however, of an extremely high order of seriousness and will attract, between them, a very lengthy sentence of imprisonment.
It is appropriate to mention here that there are two principal guide posts in sentencing: the maximum sentence, and the standard non-parole period. I have already discussed the maximum penalty. The standard non-parole period for murder is imprisonment for 20 years. However given the extreme seriousness of the present offences, the non-parole periods will be well in excess of that standard.
At this point I turn to discuss a few matters personal to the offender and his background.
[11]
Matters Personal to the Offender
The offender has two previous convictions. On 11 February 2003, at Wyong Children's Court, he was convicted of maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm and was placed on a 12 month bond. The offence took place when the offender was 16 years old and resulted in his having to change schools. On 30 September 2009, at Gosford Local Court, he was convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and was again placed on a 12 month bond. It was this offence which resulted in his losing his job as a security guard.
Both these offences obviously involved personal violence on the part of the offender and therefore constitute an aggravating factor under s 21A(2)(d) of the Act. On the other hand, the fact that he was placed on a bond in each case presumably indicates that the level of violence was not of a particularly high order.
As to mitigating factors relating to the offender personally, I have already discussed his prospects of rehabilitation. In addition, pursuant to paragraphs (i) and (k) of s 21A(3), he has expressed deep remorse for his actions and has pleaded guilty to these charges. Both these matters merit further discussion.
First, the offender's expressed remorse: the defence tendered a document signed by the offender in which he expressed deep remorse for the inestimable damage he has done to his family members. At first I had grave doubts as to the genuineness of the offender's expressions of remorse. It is all too easy for someone in his position to claim feelings of remorse after the event, and thereby seek a reduction of sentence on this account. But this is a most unusual case, as indicated - amongst many other things - by the letter the offender wrote his to mother nearly four years before the murders. In one sense the offender had taken on a different persona when he committed these horrific offences. Also, and very significantly on the issue of remorse, the defence tendered a letter from Rev. Peter Baines of the prison chaplaincy service. To quote the first paragraph of this letter:
"There is no excuse for the actions committed by Corey Breen that are the reason that he is before you. As long as I have known him, he has never sought to excuse or mitigate what he has done. He takes full responsibility for them, in a manner I find rare in my 18 years as a chaplain. Corey is horrified by what he has done and finds it difficult to accept that anyone would do other than shun him for what he has done. He defines remorse. I do not say this lightly."
In the light of this material I accept that the offender is genuinely and deeply remorseful for his actions. In one sense I have already taken this issue into account as it was relevant to the offender's prospects of rehabilitation, one of the two factors which in my opinion took this case outside the purview of s 61(1).
The remaining matter arises from the offender's pleas of guilty to both charges. Section 22 of the Act provides that a court must take into account the fact that an offender has pleaded guilty and may accordingly impose a lesser penalty than it would otherwise have imposed.
The Courts have interpreted s 22 as generally requiring a reduction of sentence in recognition of the plea's utilitarian value and in order to encourage early pleas of guilty. In the present case the offender indicated his intention to plead guilty early in the process, and in the normal course of events would therefore be entitled to a reduction in sentence. However it is now accepted that in exceptional cases of great heinousness a reduction in sentence on this account does not necessarily have to be given: Milat v R [2014] NSWCCA 29. In my opinion the present is such a case. The offender is extremely fortunate to escape a life sentence, and in my opinion it would be inappropriate, in the most unusual circumstances of this case, to allow any further reduction on account of his pleas of guilty.
The sentences I am about to impose will obviously be very lengthy. The offender is still a relatively young man, of 29. He will be past middle age by the time he qualifies for parole, and will be elderly by the end of his sentence. He will have spent more than half his life in custody, and in many ways he is likely to be a different person by then.
The offender will obviously be sentenced separately for each of the two murders. The sentence in relation to each of the two principal offences will be partly concurrent with and partly cumulative upon the sentence for the other offence. In this regard it is necessary to take account of the principle of totality, namely that the overall penalty is to reflect the total criminality involved in these offences.
In this case, because the sentence for the murder of Paul Breen is to be increased by reason of the Form 1 offences, I propose to sentence the offender first in relation to the murder of Felicia Crawford, then partially accumulate the sentence in relation to the murder of Paul Breen, taking account of the Form 1 matters. If I were to sentence him in the order set out in the indictment, the additional term for the Form 1 offences would be subsumed within the sentence for the murder of Felicia Crawford.
The offender is likely to require a lengthy period of supervision upon his eventual release from custody. However, given the length of the sentences I am about to impose, there will in any event be a substantial parole period, and therefore no special circumstances have been shown which would justify a variation of the statutory ratio between the head sentence and the non-parole period.
The offender has been in custody since 29 March 2013, and his sentences will therefore commence on that date.
I formally convict the offender of the two offences to which he has pleaded guilty. In accordance with s 167 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 I dismiss the charges in relation to each of the listed back up offences.
I am required to warn the offender, which I now do, of the existence of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006, and the fact that that Act applies to the offences of which he has been convicted, and for which he is about to be formally sentenced. At some future point in time, an application may be made that, notwithstanding the completion of his sentences, he nevertheless ought to be detained in ongoing custody or else ought to be the subject of an extended supervision order, impacting on his liberty.
Corey Alan Breen, I sentence you as follows:
1. In relation to the offence of murdering Felicia Crawford, I sentence you to imprisonment consisting of a non-parole period of 26 years commencing on 29 March 2013 and expiring on 28 March 2039, with a balance of term of 8 years, commencing on 29 March 2041 and concluding on 28 March 2047.
2. In relation to the offence of murdering Paul Breen, and taking into account the nine Form 1 offences, I sentence you to imprisonment consisting of a non-parole period of 28 years commencing on 29 March 2018, and expiring on 28 March 2046, with a balance of term of 9 years, commencing on 29 March 2046 and concluding on 28 March 2055.
3. The total term of imprisonment is therefore 42 years, with a non-parole period of 33 years. The earliest date on which the offender will be eligible for release on parole is 28 March 2046.
[12]
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Decision last updated: 25 November 2015