R v Anderson

GENERAL DIRECTIONS

1. I commence by referring to some general directions and warnings.

Presumption of innocence

1. The accused, Mr David Edward Anderson has pleaded not guilty to all the charges on the indictment. The Crown has the obligation of proving the guilt of the accused based on the evidence placed before me. This obligation continues throughout the whole of the trial. Mr Anderson is not required to prove any fact or to meet any argument or submission made by the Crown - he is presumed innocent, unless the evidence led in the trial satisfies me to the appropriate standard that he is guilty of the crimes charged.

Onus and standard of proof

1. The prosecution in general, bears the onus of proof, from the beginning to the end of the trial, to establish the guilt of the accused. The standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt and those words have their ordinary meaning - it is not sufficient for the Crown to show a suspicion of guilt or to demonstrate that the accused is probably guilty. The matters that the Crown needs to establish beyond reasonable doubt are the essential elements of the offence. However, the Crown is not required to prove the truth and reliability of every disputed fact nor to answer every question that might be posed concerning the evidence in the case.
2. The accused has raised the defence of mental illness. This raises an exception to the general rule as to who bears the onus of proof in this trial. The onus rests on the accused to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that he was mentally ill at the time of the doing of the act constituting each alleged offence. If so, then I will enter a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness.

Dispassionate approach

1. Certain evidence was admitted in this trial which emphasises the need for the Court to proceed without emotion in its assessment of the evidence. In particular, the nature of the alleged injuries suffered by the accused's parents, and of course, the relationship between the accused and his parents who are the complainants in this matter.
2. In the same manner as required of a jury, I will approach the assessment of evidence in this trial in a dispassionate manner and without emotion or sympathy and without any element of prejudice.

Multiple counts on the indictment

1. It is alleged by the Crown that the accused committed the various offences identified in the counts in the indictment. Those counts are being tried together as a matter of convenience. I am, however, required to return a separate verdict in relation to each of the counts. Each charge needs to be considered separately. There is no legal requirement that each of the verdicts must be the same.
2. Giving separate consideration to the individual counts means that I am entitled to bring in verdicts of guilty on some counts and not guilty on some other counts if there is a logical reason for that outcome.
3. If I were to find the accused not guilty on any count, I would have to consider how that conclusion affected my consideration of the remaining counts.

Defence has no obligation to call evidence

1. The accused did not give evidence in response to the Crown case: see Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50. The accused was entitled to give evidence, but was under no obligation to do so. The accused is entitled to say nothing if he so chooses and to make the Crown prove his guilt to the high standard which is required, subject to his raising of the defence of mental illness.
2. The accused's decision not to give evidence cannot be used against him in any way during the course of the Court's deliberations. No inference may be drawn adverse to the accused in this respect. The decision of the accused not to give evidence cannot be used to fill any gaps that might be thought to exist in the evidence tendered by the Crown, nor can it be used in any way as strengthening the Crown case or in assisting the Crown to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.
3. The Court must not speculate about what might have been said in evidence if the accused had given evidence at the trial.

Alternative verdict to Count 1 on the indictment

1. There is an alternative count to charge 1 on the indictment. Ultimately, if I am not satisfied that the Crown has proven the necessary elements of the principal offence of wounding Mr Andrew Anderson with the intention to murder, I must enter a verdict accordingly and proceed to consider the charge in the alternative. The ingredients of the alternative charge of wounding with the intention to cause grievous bodily harm, are not identical to that of the principal charge.
2. However, the availability of the alternative count is not an invitation to compromise my verdict.

FACTS

1. The matter proceeded through the tender of a brief of evidence by the Crown that comprised a number of statements and documents. The Defence tendered a series of medical reports. None of the deponents of the statements or facts were disputed by the accused.
2. The background to this matter is that the accused is the son of the complainants, Mr Andrew Anderson and Mrs Patricia Anderson. At the time of the alleged offences, he was aged 18 - 19 years.
3. Following the birth of the accused, the family resided at Castle Hill for a short period of time before settling at a residence at Blairgowie Place, Oatlands.
4. From about 2011, the accused began to experience difficulties in relation to depression. In 2012, the accused's father, Mr Andrew Anderson noted that the accused had intentionally cut his left forearm in the kitchen with a knife. In those circumstances, the accused's parents sought the services of a psychologist, Dr Bastian and a psychiatrist, Dr John Pickering.
5. The accused thereafter commenced counselling with Dr Pickering and was put on anti-depressant medication.
6. Mr Andrew Anderson had discussions with the accused as to why he self-harmed and stated that he needed professional help. The accused did not disclose any reasons and simply responded: "I don't know" and shrugged his shoulders.
7. In February 2013, the accused was noted to have gone down to the park with a bottle of mineral turps from the garage and was drinking it.
8. In late February 2013, the accused saw Dr Pickering and his parents were advised that for his mental health, he should leave school. He thereafter commenced employment with the Burwood RSL as a barman and from early November 2013 as a cellarman.
9. Around August 2014, the accused announced to his family that he had entered into a same-sex relationship with Shane Inskip, with whom he came to reside with at Weber Crescent, Emerton.
10. From April 2015, the accused communicated to his family members and friends both directly and via social media platforms, that he was adopting a female persona known as Dakota Guns. During this same period, the accused began to disclose to other family members and friends, again both directly and on Facebook, that his father had sexually assaulted him on a number of occasions since he was a child. During those communications, the accused also made it clear he considered his mother to have been complicit to the alleged activities by her silence.
11. The accused entered into a relationship with Mr Shane Inskip, after December 2014, although I note that Mr Andrew Anderson believed they had been in this relationship since September 2014. The accused talked to Mr Inskip about his father, Mr Andrew Anderson, raping him. The accused also made similar assertions to Mr Inskip's mother, Ms Michelle Large, as recounted in her statement of 27 January 2016. The accused informed Mr Inskip that his father sexually assaulted him and that it happened a lot of times. He stated that the accused informed him that it hurt him "that much that no one was listening to [the accused] about what had happened. He said that it happened while they were camping, water-skiing, snowboarding and other trips that they would go on." Mr Inskip said that the accused did not mention any specifics, but sometimes when they were having sex, the accused would stop and start crying because he was thinking about what his dad had done to him. He stated that at points, the accused thought that his dad was behind him or his dad was watching him.
12. In May 2015, Ms Megan Anderson, the sister of the accused, gave evidence that she received a Snapchat message from the accused. It was a picture of him in a singlet and shorts with high heels on. The caption at the bottom of the picture was: "Dakota Guns is here."
13. During September 2015, the accused continued to distance himself from his family and resigned from his employment at Burwood RSL. On 30 September 2015, the accused left a number of handwritten notes inside his father's work briefcase and motor vehicle. Mr Andrew Anderson's evidence was that he saw a handwritten note sitting inside his brief case, on top of his diary, stating: "COME HERE YOU." He subsequently went to his car, and when he went to insert the key into the ignition, I noticed another note covering the speedometer. This note also said: "COME HERE YOU." When he arrived at work, Mr Andrew Anderson opened his diary out and he observed, written inside, the same message; "COME HERE YOU." He believed that this was all written in the accused's handwriting.
14. Mr Andrew Anderson subsequently sent a text message to the accused stating: "I see you called in last night and left messages for me. What do you mean by the messages?" The accused responded with a series of five text messages, stating: "No", "No", "No daddy no", "What did I do wrong daddy?" and "Daddy no". Mr Anderson then sent a text to the accused, stating: "I think you should see a doctor. Can I please take you a doctor?" The accused responded: "Can if you want not gunna change anything they don't know me better than I know myself - no one does for that matter the only way it's going to be productive is if you're the one talking."
15. In early October 2015, the accused's parents took the accused to see Dr John Pickering, who prescribed Zoloft on the basis that the accused may have a bipolar disorder over and above what was believed to be amphetamine intoxication. The accused however continued to reside with his partner during this period.
16. On 5 November 2015, the accused returned to his former workplace - Club Burwood, and in the morning, walked behind the bar and commenced to drink alcohol. Staff alerted family members who were concerned the accused was under the influence of drugs. Police and ambulance were called and the accused was admitted to Bungarribee House, a mental health facility within Blacktown Hospital.
17. During his admission at Bungarribee House, the accused continue to repeat the allegations against his father. The accused was discharged from Bungarribee House on 20 November 2015, and thereafter resided with his partner. In late November 2015, the accused appeared to have discontinued his medication - I will come to address this later in my reasons. On 11 December 2015, the accused saw Dr Mahmood at Bungarribee House who observed that the accused was "thought disordered and exhibited tangential and circumstantial speech but denied any perceptual disturbances."
18. Leading up to Christmas 2015, the accused sent a number of SMS and Facebook messages to family members and a former work colleague, Ms Jill Durrant. These messages repeated the allegations against his father, and asserted that "David does not exist" and that the mother of his partner was his actual birth mother. On 24 December 2015, the accused, in a Facebook post, wrote: "I guess I deserve a good lifetime full of rapin[g] and a mother who not only lets it slide but encourages it. Horror movies aren't so fucked up."
19. On 26 December 2015, the accused sent the following message to his father:- "If you are ever in my physical presence again I'm gunna have no choice but to use whatever weapon or situation I'm in to end your life as I cannot trust you nor can I trust my own mind as I cannot be positive that it will not black out and seeing as you have had control of my mind and it memories every day of my entire life there's no way I can determine the extent of the power and control you have over my mind my life and my freedom. That's the only option I have left. I cannot get you locked up in a state where I can be confident there is no way you can get into my physical presence as everyone who knows everything and always has known refuses to accept and admit it - and therefore my word against the world's isn't gunna get you out of my life. So this is my formal warning to you. I'll need some form of signed evidence from you on arrival (if you ever do plan to attempt to be in my physical presence) that you've read and agree to the above terms and conditions and if such an event occurs that I do murder you then I am exempt from all criminal charges and legal action as you had already agreed to those terms before the event took place and attempted to be in my presence with a comprehensive knowledge and understanding of all above terms and conditions. Oh, and one more clause questioning of mental state is not allowed as this is a subjective matter."
20. Police were subsequently notified, and when police arrived to take the accused to Bungarrabie House, he was handcuffed. Mr Andrew Anderson said to the accused: "They're just here to help you son" at which point the accused screamed out: "Fuck you Dad, I remember what you all done, I remember everything." Police observed that the accused was very angry and aggressive when his father was in close vicinity: see evidence of Constable Walsley at pp 219 - 222 of Exhibit 1 and Constable Jennifer Marshall at p 225 of Exhibit 1. I will later detail the circumstances of his treatment. The accused was subsequently discharged on 5 January 2016.
21. At about 3:30 am on Friday 22 January 2016, Mr Andrew Anderson was awoken by the front doorbell of the home he shared with his wife at Blairgowie Place, Oatlands. Mr Andrew Anderson went downstairs and opened the front door to find the accused standing on the front porch. After a short time, Mrs Patricia Anderson also came downstairs to the front door.
22. Mr Andrew Anderson spoke to the accused and said to him: "It's 3:30 am. What are you doing here?", to which the accused replied: "I want to talk". Mr Andrew Anderson said: "It's so late" to which the accused replied: "I want to talk and sort things."
23. Mr Andrew Anderson observed that the accused was wearing grey trackpants, thongs and no shirt. Mr Andrew Anderson observed that the accused looked the best he had seen him look for some time. He did not have dark circles under his eyes, he looked clean and fresh and he spoke calmly and seemed passive. Mr Andrew Anderson then unlocked the door and let the accused come in. At the time there was no other person present except for himself and Mrs Anderson. After the accused came into the house, the front screen security door was locked, but the main door was closed but not locked.
24. The accused went into the kitchen and put his bum bag on the kitchen bench before proceeding to the sink to wash his hands thoroughly. He then dried his hands with a tea towel. Mr Andrew Anderson endeavoured to engage the accused in small talk. The accused went to every room on the ground floor, turned the lights on and was said to have done this in a hurry. According to Mr Andrew Anderson, the accused seemed to be getting agitated. Mr Andrew Anderson and his wife stayed in the family room during this process. The accused then returned to the kitchen and was standing near the knife block on the kitchen bench and then stated: "Does the sun rise at 6 am?" to which Mr Andrew Anderson replied: "Yeah, that's about the time."
25. The accused then opened his bum bag and pulled out a packet of cigarettes and a rifle bullet, which he said was a lighter, and proceeded to light up a cigarette in the kitchen. He was then advised by Mr Andrew Anderson that he would have to smoke outside. Mr Andrew Anderson then unlocked the back door and went out with the accused to have a talk with him. During the time they were outside, Mr Andrew Anderson stated that the accused was becoming more agitated by pacing around him and heavily drawing on the cigarette. After completing his cigarette, he went back inside and Mr Andrew Anderson followed the accused in. The accused noticed the improved security and Mr Andrew Anderson stated that it was because "you kids have all left home and mum is often home by herself." He then proceeded to close and re-lock the Crimsafe door and closed the glass door. The accused then returned to the kitchen bench where his bum bag was and did a blood sugar test. After the test, he injected himself with some insulin. He then moved back to the kitchen bench where the knife block had been, and stated: "Where's the knife block?"
26. The knife block had been removed by Mrs Patricia Anderson whilst the accused and Mr Andrew Anderson were in the backyard. Mr Andrew Anderson then engaged the accused in discussion stating: "How's Shane going?" The accused responded: "How dare you even mention his name?" Mr Andrew Anderson then said: "Okay, I was just asking."
27. The accused then went to the laundry and got an energy drink out of the bar fridge and went to the toilet. After returning from the laundry, he went to the sun room which adjoined the family room. He then put on "Buck Cherry's rape song" and turned the volume very loud. He then came back to the family room and said: "Do you know why I'm here?" At this time, the accused was approximately 2 metres away from Mr Andrew Anderson. He then proceeded to lunge at Mr Andrew Anderson, and grabbed him around his neck and force slammed the back of Mr Andrew Anderson's head against the window. Mr Andrew Anderson then proceeded to grab the accused's wrist to ease the pressure around his neck and they struggled for about thirty seconds. According to Mr Andrew Anderson, he said to the accused: "Don't do this, Dave don't do this." The accused then became aggressive, and Mrs Patricia Anderson went upstairs to apparently contact 000.
28. The accused relaxed his grip around Mr Andrew Anderson's neck and Mr Anderson released his grip on the accused's wrists. The accused then ran around the bench and picked up a steak knife from its block, which was located near where the main knife block in the kitchen was kept. This knife block was not removed by Mrs Patricia Anderson, unlike the previous knife block to which I have earlier referred. Mr Andrew Anderson saw the accused grab the knife and he immediately ran to the opposite side of the table in the family room. The accused started chasing Mr Anderson around the table with the knife cocked ready to stab him. At that point, Mr Anderson was focussed on avoiding being stabbed and how he could escape. He was mindful that Mrs Anderson would probably come back after calling 000 and also could be stabbed.
29. Mr Andrew Anderson endeavoured to talk to the accused and encouraged him to put down the knife, but determined from the appearance and mannerisms of the accused, that this would be a futile exercise. He then ran around the table about four times and started to try to put the accused off. During one of the pauses, the accused said: "If you're going to keep running around the table, I'll have to flip the table." At that point, Mr Andrew Anderson pretended like he was going to race to the back door and started heading towards the back door. He only took one step and immediately raced to the front door as he wanted to escape and thought that it would get the accused away from Mrs Patricia Anderson.
30. As Mr Andrew Anderson was unlocking the door, the accused stabbed him twice in the back with the knife. This caused the front of his body to be pushed against the door. Mr Andrew Anderson then used his shoulder to force open the door and stumbled out onto the front balcony of the house.
31. Whilst on the balcony, the accused continued to grab at Mr Andrew Anderson. Mr Andrew Anderson put the accused in a head lock and tried to push him backwards over the balcony balustrade. At that point, Mr Anderson had the accused around his neck and was facing in the same direction. The accused's right hand was holding the knife and Mr Anderson was holding the accused under the chin with his left hand. During this time, he could see the accused's right arm coming around in a frenzied motion, with the knife in his hand and stabbing him in the stomach. Mr Andrew Anderson felt immediate pain and felt the knife go in three to four times during the attack. He also had his left arm cut three times, and then he was stabbed around the left eye multiple times to the point that he had lost vision in his eye. Mr Andrew Anderson stated that he could not push the accused over the balustrade because he was too strong and he was slipping on all the blood on the tiles. He then said to the accused: "Dave, you're killing me. Dave, you're killing me."
32. At that point, Mr Andrew Anderson noticed Mrs Patricia Anderson standing on the front balcony nearby. She was screaming: "Dave stop! Stop!" Mrs Anderson then attempted to pull the accused away from her husband, at which point the accused turned to Mrs Anderson and punched her in the right eye using his fist and continued to punch her to the top and back of the head. The accused then punched Mrs Anderson in the ribs. At that point, the accused went to the games room on the ground floor and later returned with a cricket bat. Mrs Anderson yelled at the accused: "Get out leave us alone, haven't you done enough?" At that point, she could not see where the accused was, but stated that she knew he was somewhere in the back of the house. When the accused returned with the cricket bat, she ran to the porch and knew that she needed to get the accused away from Mr Andrew Anderson, and accordingly yelled at the accused to try and draw his attention to her. The accused stood over Mrs Patricia Anderson with a cricket bat and raised above his head.
33. Mrs Patricia Anderson yelled: "Leave us alone, someone help us!" The accused then swung the bat aiming for Mrs Anderson's head. The bat subsequently struck her on the left forearm. At that point, the accused stopped. Mr Andrew Anderson then called his wife inside the front the door. Mr Anderson struggled with the accused as he tried to secure the security door but was unable to do so. During this struggle, the accused was able to punch through a glass panel of the front door, and entered the house and stood over Mr Anderson as he laid on the floor. Mr Andrew Anderson then said: "You've killed me. Let me die in peace. Let me die in peace." The accused then went away, giving the opportunity for both of his parents to leave the house where they raised the alarm with their neighbours.
34. Police and ambulance attended at 4:12 am, and the accused was arrested and cautioned.
35. At the time of his arrest, the police officers recorded the accused making an number of statements. Probationary Constable Emilie Kitchen in her statement at [14] recorded:- "When I got back to {REDACTED} Blairgowie Place S/Cst Devescovie and P/Cst Rixon were standing with the male who was arrested. The male was sitting in the gutter, still handcuffed to the rear. The male was rambling about various things, and said the following:- He said - 'Why would they move the knives and not the steak knives. Of course I'm going to use the steak knives, fucking stupid.' 'I hit her in the head with the bat.' 'Why would she put the knives away at 3:30 am in the morning?' He repeated this several times. 'Why would they not run away after I stabbed them several times?' 'They left the kitchen window slightly open. Why would they do that? How would they forget that? They would always check that. They've never left that unlocked. Someone could easily break in.' 'Even when I was trying to push him off the verandah he still kept trying to help Mum after.' 'I could have just smashed her skull in. She was just lying there and he wasn't doing anything. He was just trying to get her out. Why didn't he just run away?' 'Why did they now put security up after I left? Why do they need security.' He was talking about the security on the doors and windows of the house."
36. Probationary Constable Storm Rixon in her statement at [13] recorded- "P/Cst Kitchen stayed with S/Cst Devescovi and ANDERSON, and I went towards the house, where Sgt Barnes and S/Cst Quinn were. They came out of the house and said: 'The whole house is a crime scene.' I walked back to S/Cst Devescovi and ANDERSON and started creating the Crime Scene Log. S/Cst Devescovi informed me we would convey ANDERSON to Parramatta Police Station. During this time ANDERSON was still rambling. ANDERSON said - 'Why did they not run. I just stabbed my parents.' 'Excuse me, what percentage of the police force are women?' 'Every day at 3 o'clock Dad checks all of the windows to make sure they're locked. Every single day he does this, but today he didn't.'"
37. Constable Kelly Quinn in her statement at [23] recorded:- "While outside number 7 I stood in front of the arrested male. While I was watching the male he was mumbling to himself. I heard him say: He Said - 'Why would they move the large knives and not the steak knives, of course I'm going to use the steak knives. Fucking stupid.'"
38. Sergeant Brett Barnes in his statement at [11] recorded:- "The accused was saying 'What have I done, what have I done'. He was also repeating words that I could not understand. Senior Constable DEVSCOVI and I repositioned the male so he was seated upright. Senior Constable DEVSCOVI said, 'My name is Senior Constable DEVESCOVI from Castle Hill Police. You are under arrest for assault. Do you understand that?' The Accused said, 'Yes. Yes.' Senior Constable DEVSCOVI said, 'You do not have to do or say anything if you do not want to. Do you understand that?' The Accused said, 'What have I done, what have I done.' At this time I did not hear the Accused say anything other than 'What have I done.' Senior Constable DEVSCOVI said, 'You do not have to do or say anything if you do not want to. Do you understand that?' I still did not hear the Accused say anything that I could understand. Senior Constable DEVSCOVI said, 'I will record what you say or do. I can use that recording in Court. Do you understand that?' The Accused continued saying, 'What have I done. What have I done.'"
39. Senior Constable Michael Devesconi in his statement at [18] - [20] recorded:- "[18] Soon after sitting the male up I issued the official caution to the male and made sure I did so clearly and slowly, as I could tell the male was still in a disturbed state. The time was approximately 4:15 am. I Said: 'My name is Senior Constable Devesconi from Castle Hill Police. You are under arrest for assault. Do you understand?' He Said: 'Yes.' I Said: 'You do not have to say anything if you do not want to. Do you understand?' [19] The male was babbling and muttering. He Said: 'What have I done? What have I done?' I Said: 'You do not have to say anything if you do not want to. Do you understand?' [20] He did not give an audible response. I continued with the caution. I Said: 'I will record what you say or do. I can use that recording in Court. Do you understand?' He Said: 'What have I done? What have I done?'"

PROCEDURE FOR THE DEFENCE OF MENTAL ILLNESS

1. I turn now to consider the defence of mental illness that was raised by the accused. The defence of mental illness was considered in R v Minani (2005) 154 A Crim R 349; [2005] NSWCCA 226. In that case, Hunt AJA (with whom Spigelman CJ and Howie J agreed) held at [32]:- "[32] Proof of the specific intention which the Crown must prove in such a case is not always an easy one where there is an element of mental illness involved. In Hawkins v The Queen [1994] HCA 28; (1994) 179 CLR 500 (at 510, 512-514, 517), the High Court held that, contrary to what had previously been thought to be the law in this State, evidence of mental illness is relevant to the question as to whether the accused's act was done with the specific intent charged. The High Court held that the order in which the issues should be determined in a case where there is evidence of mental illness is: (1) Was it the act of the accused which, in this case, caused the malicious wounding? (2) Was he criminally responsible for doing that act? (3) Was that act done with the specific intention required? The second question is resolved by a finding that mental illness had been established. The third question arises only if the second question is answered adversely to the accused and, in those circumstances, the evidence of mental illness (even though insufficient to make out the defence) is relevant to the issue of specific intent. That evidence is not, however, relevant to the issue as to whether the act of the accused was a deliberate one. The High Court said (at 515) that there was no necessary inconsistency between mental abnormality and the existence of a specific intent, but nevertheless the evidence of mental illness must be taken into account in determining whether there was that specific intent. As the judge found in the present case that the defence of mental illness had been established, it was unnecessary for him to make any finding of specific intent (emphasis supplied)."
2. It is therefore necessary to firstly determine whether the acts against his father, Mr Andrew Anderson, and his mother, Mrs Patricia Anderson were willed and voluntary.

COUNT 1: Wounding Mr Andrew Anderson with intent to murder

1. I turn now to consider the elements of the offence which is the subject of count 1 on the indictment. At this stage, consistent with the principles in Minani, I ask whether the acts of the accused in respect of Mr Andrew Anderson were deliberate acts and the question of the accused's alleged mental illness is irrelevant at this stage: see R v Settree (No 2) [2016] NSWSC 1079 at [16] - [17] (Campbell J).
2. A wound is an injury that involves the breaking or cutting of the interior layer of the skin (dermis) and the breaking of the outer layer (epidermis) is not sufficient: R v Smith (1837) 8 C & P 173; which was cited favourably in R v Shepherd [2003] NSWCCA 351 at [31] (Kirby J with whom Meagher JA and Shaw J agreed).
3. As a threshold issue, the wounding must have been caused by a voluntary act of the accused, and subject to the defence of mental illness, the Crown will need to prove an intention to murder, being an intention to kill Mr Andrew Anderson.

COUNT 2: Wounding Mr Andrew Anderson with intent to cause him grievous bodily harm

1. I approach this count in the alternative in the same manner that I have approached count 1, but note that the ingredients comprising this offence materially differs, in the sense that the Crown needs to establish that the accused intended to cause grievous bodily harm to Mr Andrew Anderson (as opposed to killing Mr Andrew Anderson).
2. I have earlier recited the elements above for Count 1. I repeat what the Crown has to establish in relation to the element of wounding. However, in contradistinction to count 1, the Crown needs to prove, subject to the defence of mental illness, that the accused intended to cause grievous bodily harm. Grievous bodily harm means really serious harm.

COUNT 3: Wounding Mrs Patricia Anderson with intent to cause her grievous bodily harm

1. I approach this count in the same manner as how I approached the alternative count, being count 2.

Voluntariness direction

1. At this stage, it is convenient to briefly outline the following direction on voluntariness that is relevant to the above offences.
2. The wounding that caused the injuries to Mr Andrew Anderson and Mrs Patricia Anderson must have been caused by a voluntary act of the accused - that is, the act of stabbing must be the deliberate act of the accused before he can be held criminally responsible for the consequences of that act. An act is not deliberate if it was not voluntary. To give rise to criminal responsibility, deferring the question of the accused's defence, the act must be a willed act of the person accused of committing the offence. This is distinct from the issue of whether the accused intended certain consequences from his act - it is a more fundamental concept that is concerned with the nature of the act itself.

The acts were willed and voluntary

1. There is no contest that the acts of the accused were willed and voluntary - neither party has made a submission to the contrary.
2. According to the s 177 certificate under the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), Mr Andrew Anderson was examined by the resident medical officer, Dr Quoc Hung Diep. The certificate confirms that Mr Andrew Anderson sustained stab wounds to the left side of his face, as well as to the front and rear of the chest wall, abdomen, left upper forearm and back. Surgery was required to remove the broken off tip of the knife used by the accused that was lodged in his lower T 11/12 vertebrae. Mr Andrew Anderson also sustained a depressed fracture of his right eye socket. I am satisfied that these injuries clearly constitute wounds within the meaning of ss 27 and 33(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).
3. Mrs Patricia Anderson's injuries were also the subject of a s 177 certificate, but it was prepared by Dr Andrew Richard Coggins. Dr Coggins noted two open wounds that breached the dermis over the scalp region and therefore required irrigation (cleaning and stapling) and also noticed a single superficial incised wound below the eye, which did not breach the dermis, but did breach the epidermis. He also observed contusions across both forearms and the left sided forehead, consistent with recent trauma by blunt force and possible defence wounds. To the extent that the open wounds breached the dermis and epidermis, they clearly fall within the definition of wound contemplated by s 33(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900.
4. I am satisfied on the evidence that the accused's acts in relation to all the counts on the indictment were voluntary and willed acts and there was no evidence or submission made to the contrary.

WAS THE ACCUSED CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS ACTIONS?

Legal principles

1. As outlined in the above cases, in particular Minani, once the Crown establishes beyond reasonable doubt, the elements of the crimes with which the accused has been charged, I must turn my mind to the defence of mental illness. As I have also stated, it is the accused who bears the onus of proof, on the balance of probabilities: Mizzi v The Queen (1960) 105 CLR 659 at 664 - 665.
2. In R v PCB [2012] NSWSC 482, Johnson J at [46] - [48] summarised the principles applicable to a defence of mental illness in the following terms:- "[46] In R v Rodriguez [2010] NSWSC 198, I described the defence of mental illness in the following way at [33]: 'If it appears that the Accused was mentally ill at the time when he committed the relevant acts, a Court must return a special verdict that he is not guilty by reason of mental illness: s.38(1) Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990. The defence of mental illness is to be determined in accordance with the M'Naghten rules laid down in R v M'Naghten (1843) 8 ER 718. Those rules provide that every person is presumed to be sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary is proven. To establish the defence of mental illness, it must be proved upon the balance of probabilities that at the time of committing the acts causing death, the Accused was labouring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of his act, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong. A person does not know what he was doing was wrong when he does not know that it is wrong according to the ordinary standards of right and wrong adopted by reasonable persons, or when he cannot reason with some moderate degree of calmness in relation to the moral quality of what he is doing: The King v Porter [1933] HCA 1; (1933) 55 CLR 182 at 189-190.' [47] In R v Pratt [2009] NSWSC 1108 at [19]-[21], RA Hulme J provided the following helpful summary of relevant concepts: '[19] In relation to the concept of a 'disease of the mind' which produces such a defect of reason, the law requires that the accused's state of mind must have been one of disease, disorder or disturbance arising from some condition. The condition may be temporary or of long standing. It does not matter whether it is curable or incurable. It must result in the function of the reason, memory or understanding of the person being thrown into a state of derangement or disorder. A defect of reason, memory or understanding involves a disorder of the capacity to reason such as one that prevented the accused from knowing what she was doing, in that she did not know the physical nature or quality of her acts, or did not know that those acts were wrong, that is, wrong according to the ordinary standards of reasonable people in our community. [20] As to whether the accused did not know the acts to be wrong, the question is whether the accused could be said to know, in the sense of appreciating or understanding that the acts were wrong, if through a disease, disorder or disturbance of the mind she could not think rationally of the reasons which, to ordinary people, would make that act right or wrong. [21] A final matter to observe is that if through a disordered condition of the mind the accused could not reason about the matter with a moderate degree of sense and composure, it would be open to find that she did not know that what she was doing was wrong.' [48] With respect to medical evidence adduced at a trial involving the defence of mental illness, I observed in R v Rodriguez at [45]: 'Although medical evidence is not essential to prove the defence of mental illness (Lucas v The Queen [1970] HCA 14; [1970] 120 CLR 171 at 174), it is the invariable experience of criminal courts in this State that medical evidence is adduced on this issue. Juries (and Judges sitting alone) are not bound to accept and act upon expert evidence, but they are not entitled to disregard it capriciously: R v Hall (1988) 36 A Crim R 368 at 370; R v Klamo [2008] VSCA 75; (2008) 18 VR 644 at 655 [44]. A jury (or Judge sitting alone) ought not reject unanimous medical evidence unless there is evidence which can cast doubt upon the medical evidence: Hone v Western Australia [2007] WASCA 283; (2007) 179 A Crim R 138 at 146-148 [124]-[126]; R v Klamo at 644-645 [44]-[50].'" I respectfully adopt his Honour's analysis.

Expert evidence direction

1. Importantly, I note that expert witnesses have been called by both the Crown and the Defence. The Crown has tendered the report of Dr Olav Nielssen dated 21 April 2017, being Exhibit 2 and the Defence has tendered two reports of Dr Richard Furst, dated 20 September 2016 and 9 January 2017, having been marked as Exhibits A1 and A2 respectively. The expert evidence, amongst other things, go to the question of whether or not the accused was suffering from a mental illness at the time of the alleged commission of the offence, as well as the accused's psychological history: see R v Settree (No 2) [2016] NSWSC 1078 at [26] (Campbell J).
2. I remind myself of the following principles in relation to expert evidence. Expert witnesses are people who have specialised knowledge based on their training, study or experience, and as such, may express an opinion on matters within their expertise.
3. The value of any expert opinion is very much dependent on the reliability and accuracy of the material which the expert used to reach his opinion. It is also dependent upon the degree to which the expert analysed the material upon which the opinion was based and the skill and experience brought to bear in formulating the opinion given. Experts can differ in the level and degree of their experience, training and study, yet each can still be an expert qualified to give an opinion where that opinion is based on that witness's specialised knowledge.
4. The expert evidence before me is part of all the evidence to assist me, amongst other things, in determining whether the accused was criminally responsible for the acts for which he has been charged.
5. I bear in mind that if, having given the matter careful consideration, I do not accept the evidence of the experts, I do not have to act upon it. This is particularly the case where the facts upon which the opinion is based, does not accord with the facts as I find them to be. I am also entitled, to a degree, to take into account my common sense and own experiences if it is relevant to the issue upon which the expert evidence relates.
6. In this instant case, the experts of both parties have not been challenged. Accordingly, if it is not inherently unbelievable, I would need to have a good reason to reject it.

The psychiatric evidence

1. The accused was examined, on the request of his solicitors on 21 July 2016 and by audiovisual link on 14 December 2016. As I have referred to earlier, two reports have been admitted into evidence, being the report of Dr Richard Furst of 20 September 2016 (Exhibit A1) and 9 January 2017 (Exhibit A2). The reports confirm the accused's longstanding psychiatric problems. At the time of writing his first report, Dr Furst had access to what appears to be the contents of the police brief as well as the medical records of Blacktown Hospital, Justice Health, Reports from the accused's treating psychiatrist, Dr John Pickering, relevant assessments from Justice Health and a Court report prepared by Dr Sathish Dayalan, dated 1 April 2016.
2. Dr Furst noted that the accused had a history referred to by Dr John Pickering, which in his opinion, were more likely to be indicative of prodromal phase of a more serious mental illness in the form of schizophrenia which developed over the ensuing three to four years, accelerated by the stimulant drug, methylmphetamine (ice). He noted that the accused was uncooperative when Dr Pickering tried to assess him in October 2015 and was irrational, having an inability to reason logically, was ascribing idiosyncratic meanings to quite normal words and being quite guarded. Dr Pickering also observed some signs of thought disorder and the accused expressed some grandiose ideas, including stating the he was "unstoppable." He was also irritable, consistent with mood elevation/instability: see Exhibit A1, Report of Dr Furst dated 20 September 2016 at p 7. It was also noted the accused harboured the following thought content when assessed by Dr Pickering on 2 October 2015:- "He described something that he said was like a black patch over part of his memories, deducing from this that the only reason he would patch some part of his memory over would be to hide something unthinkable, and concluded from this that he had been raped by his father in childhood. He certainly had no actual memory of being molested as such."
3. Dr Furst had also had the medical records from Blacktown Hospital relating to the Bungarrabie House admission on 5 November 2015 to 20 November 2015, when he was recorded as having a diagnosis of drug-induced psychosis with a differential diagnosis of an onset of schizophrenia. It was noted that he said that he was limitless and invincible and that he believed his mother was not his mother, but that his partner's mother was his mother. He was also noted to have anger towards his parents for "controlling his life".
4. On 26 December 2015, the accused re-presented at Blacktown Hospital after sending his father a SMS text message, the details of which have earlier been described. At that point, he had been consuming drugs and was not taking his medication for his bi-polar schizophrenia. It was noted that there were a number of signs of agitation requiring emergency restraint and sedation. The accused told assessing doctors that he believed he had been sexually abused by his father all of his life. He believed that his father was controlling his mind and it was noted that he lacked insight into his illness and was thought to be irrational and paranoid. It was noted that he told doctors that his father had raped him two weeks prior. It was further noted that the accused was thought to be suffering from a drug-induced psychosis from ice and was admitted under the Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW) as a mentally disordered person. He apparently continued to believe that he had been sexually abused by his family and was thought to be disordered on 30 December 2015. He was discharged on 5 January 2016 and was referred to the Youth Early Psychosis Program and was given details of drug and alcohol services, but did not engage with either of those services prior to the offences the subject of these proceedings.
5. Dr Furst also noted the records of Justice Health which made a number of assessments of relevance. Dr Furst noted that Dr Gordon Elliott, carried out an assessment on 1 February 2016 which noted evidence of inappropriate laughter when the accused related his history. Evidence of a poor relationship with his parents generally and stated that he was being "harassed" by his parents and decided to assault them. The accused was disparaging about his previous psychiatric treatment, and was described as "cocky" and "confident" with some evidence of grandiosity. Dr Furst noted that the accused did not disclose his beliefs that he had been sexually abused by his father at the time when interviewed by Dr Elliott, likely leading the doctor to an incorrect appraisal of the seriousness of his mental health issues.
6. Subsequently, on 20 April 2016, the accused was assessed by Dr Matthew Hearps, psychiatrist, as being psychotic with persecutory delusions in relation to his father raping him since he was 13 years of age, but being unable to describe this because he was thought disordered. He noted that the accused believed his mother was complicit with the abuse. Dr Hearps thought that the accused was suffering from schizophrenia and that he would be a risk of violence to others as a consequence of his ongoing delusions. Accordingly, the accused was scheduled under the Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW) as a mentally ill person and referred to the Mental Health Screening Unit.
7. In May 2016, the accused was assessed by Dr Roberts, psychiatrist, and the accused informed him that he had been sexually abused from his childhood "pretty much every time [the accused] had contact with [his father]" and that he would always "black out." He informed Dr Roberts that he listened to the song "Rape me" by Nirvana and said "he could feel it" and "knew it was true." Dr Furst noted that Dr Roberts thought the accused to be delusional in relation to the alleged serial sexual assaults by his father and diagnosed him with schizophrenia and also scheduled him under the Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW) as a mentally ill person.
8. Treatment records were also observed from the Mental Health Screening Unit from 5 May 2016, which included an assessment by Dr Usman Malik, psychiatrist, on 6 May 2016 and the accused was recorded as being insightless, and continuing to believe that he had been abused by his father.
9. The court report prepared on 1 April 2016 by Dr Sathish Dayalan was also noted by Dr Furst, recording that the accused told the psychiatrist that he had been raped by his father and was insightless into his apparent mental illness. Dr Furst noted that Dr Dayalan had expressed an opinion that the accused's beliefs about his childhood sexual abuse at the hands of his father were most likely delusional, especially as he was unable to give a rational explanation as to why he had recently realised he had been sexually abused by his father in his early teenage years. Dr Dayalan believed the accused to be a mentally ill person, having delusional beliefs and thought disorder indicative of mental illness.
10. Having reviewed the material, Dr Furst found that the accused met the criteria for a diagnosis of schizophrenia and substance use disorder (methylamphetamine) and otherwise noted the medical diagnosis of insulin dependent diabetes mellitus. Dr Furst observed that the diagnosis of schizophrenia was made on the basis of the history and mental state presentation of the accused at the time of the assessment, review of his Blacktown Hospital presentations/admissions and a review of his Justice Health medical records.
11. Dr Furst stated that the persistence of the psychotic symptoms, especially when not using ice over the last several months in custody and observed affective disturbance (including blunted affect and fatuous affect) meant that the accused also met the criteria for the diagnosis of schizophrenia rather than a drug-induced psychosis alone or that the acute effects of intoxication were responsible for his presentation.
12. In his opinion, in relation to the mental illness defence, Dr Furst stated on p 12 of his report of 20 September 2016:- "In my opinion, Mr Anderson was labouring under a defect of reason within the meaning of the so-called McNaughton's Rules [sic] in the form of delusions he had been sexually abused by his father throughout his childhood, leading to irrational anger, in turn preventing him from thinking about the wrongfulness of his actions with a moderate degree of sense and composure at the time of the alleged offences. He probably felt morally justified in attempting to kill his father in response to the delusions he was experiencing at the time, anger and beliefs that extended to his mother, who he saw as complicit in his father's actions. In my opinion, Mr Anderson has the mental illness defence available to him."
13. Dr Furst further opined that the accused's poorly controlled diabetes and documented hyperglycaemia may have contributed to his abnormal mental health state at the times in question before the Court on 26 December 2015 and 22 January 2016, especially as he was also acutely psychotic. He states that the confusion, agitation and impairment in reality-testing he was experiencing at those times would probably have made it more difficult for the accused to reason about the wrongfulness of his actions with a moderate degree of sense and composure and to control himself.
14. In Dr Furst's follow up report of 9 January 2017, he remained of the opinion that the accused had a mental illness defence available to him because of the reasons outlined in his previous report.
15. Dr Olav Nielssen's report of 21 April 2017 was prepared at the request of the Crown and involved an interview with the accused by audiovisual link on 19 April 2017. Dr Olav Nielssen had available the contents of the police brief, the clinical records I have referred to earlier together with some of the other materials viewed by Dr Furst. It is unnecessary to detail the clinical records. Dr Olav Nielssen opined:- "I note the diagnosis of drug induced psychosis at the time of the two admissions to Blacktown Hospital. His condition is a drug induced condition in the sense that his use of methamphetamine was a factor in triggering the initial episode of psychotic illness. However, the role of drug use was to expose an underlying mental illness that has subsequently become severe and chronic. In retrospect, Mr Anderson's correct diagnosis at the time of the initial admission should have been schizophreniform psychosis because of the bizarre nature of his beliefs and the persistence of symptoms for some time after the effect of methamphetamine would have worn off. I believe Mr Anderson has the defence of mental illness open to him for these offences. He has a disease of the brain in the form of a severe and chronic form of schizophrenia, a psychotic illness independent of substance use that gives rise to a pattern of abnormality of mind that is recognised in law to be a disease of the mind. At the time of the offences he was affected by a defect of reason in the form of a delusion belief that he had been the victim of sexual abuse, together with an acute disturbance of logical thinking and impairment in his inability [sic] to control his emotional responses, made worse by the recent ingestion of methamphetamine. He was aware of the physical nature and quality of his actions in stabbing his father in a way that might have killed him. However, because of his interpretation of events arising from his severe mental illness, I believe that he was deprived of the ability to reason with any measure or sense or composure about the moral wrongfulness of his actions in stabbing his father, or the likely consequences of his actions. Mr Anderson's offences took place during what was in effect the first episode of schizophrenia, as he had yet to experience a full remission from symptoms after treatment despite the two admissions to hospital, and the delusional beliefs regarding his father did not abate until some months after he commenced adequate treatment in prison. The first episode of psychosis is a period known to carry a greatly increased risk of serious violence, including homicide and serious assaults, probably because of the more severe symptoms, including increased arousal and disorganised thinking, and the absence of any medical explanation for symptoms or the experience of remission after treatment."
16. Both the Crown and counsel for the accused submitted that the defence of mental illness had been established on the balance of probabilities and in this case, with respect to each of the offences of which the accused stands charged. Both Dr Furst and Dr Nielssen expressed their opinions by reference to the elements of the defence of mental illness. Both psychiatrists are satisfied that at the time of the accused acting as he did, he suffered from a defect of reason from a disease of the mind.
17. Dr Furst described this as a defect of reason "in the form of delusions that he had been sexually abused by his father throughout his childhood leading to irrational anger preventing him from thinking about the wrongfulness of his actions with a moderate degree of sense and composure at the time of the alleged offences." He states that the accused felt "morally justified in attempting to kill his father in response to the delusions he was experiencing at the time, anger and beliefs that extended to his mother, who he saw as complicit in his father's actions."
18. Dr Nielssen stated that Mr Anderson had a disease of the brain in the form of a severe and chronic form of schizophrenia, a psychotic illness independent of substance use that gives rise to a pattern of abnormality of mind that is recognised to be a disease of the mind, and at the time of the offences he was affected by that defect of reason in the form of the delusional belief that he had been the victim of sexual abuse, together with an acute disturbance of logical thinking and impairment in his inability [sic] to control his emotional responses, made worse by the recent ingestion of methamphetamine. Dr Nielssen stated that the accused was aware of the physical nature and quality of his actions in stabbing his father in way that might have killed him. However because of his interpretation of events arising from his severe mental illness, the accused was deprived of the ability to reason with any measure of sense or composure about the moral wrongfulness of his actions in stabbing his father, or the likely consequences of his actions.
19. Dr Nielssen does not specifically extend this to feelings about the accused's mother. This must be implicit based on the history - having also noted that the accused informed him that his mother was injured because "she was present and tried to intervene to stop the assault."
20. As can be seen, both experts have considered that, adapting the language of Johnson J in Rodriguez at [33], although the accused had the capacity to know the nature and quality of his actions, he felt justified about those actions he took amounting to an inability to reason whether what he was doing was wrong because of the disorientated state of his mind which resulted from his psychiatric illness. I bear in mind the value of expert opinion is very much dependent on whether the facts assumed for the purposes of expressing the opinion are sufficiently likely facts as I find them to be. Again, I am not obliged to accept the opinion of any expert and I am entitled to reject the evidence, especially where the facts upon which the opinion is based, do not accord with the facts as I find them to be. In this case however, it is important to bear in mind that the expert evidence was not challenged by either party and both parties propounded it.
21. Ultimately it is for me to decide whether I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the accused has made out the mental illness defence. In doing so, I have borne in mind that the two doctors not only come to the same conclusion, but provide like reasons for it, which clearly lead to the conclusion that the defence has been made out.
22. The reliability of expert psychiatric evidence often depends on, in substantial part, on the validity of the assumptions relied upon about the accused's medical history and the reliability of the accounts he has given. Again, whilst I am not bound to accept the accused's out of Court statements referred to in the various medical reports, they appear consistent with the other evidence I have received and the experts regard what the accused told them as being consistent with his disease. They are also reinforced by the evidence I have earlier referred to, in particular that from his family and partner. I am satisfied that the account is reliable and should be accepted.
23. The acts of the accused also provide strong support for the defence of mental illness. Questions of mental health do not emerge in a vacuum, accordingly I have taken into account the past and subsequent medical history to the extent that it may shed light on the accused's condition at the time of the events of 22 January 2016 - at the very least, these matters provide context.

The accused is not criminally responsible for his actions on 22 January 2016

1. On the evidence, I am satisfied that on the balance of probabilities that at the time that the accused perpetrated the acts, he suffered from a disease of the mind namely an acute exacerbation of his chronic schizophrenic illness. I am satisfied that on the balance of probabilities that at the relevant times, the accused suffered from a defect of reason from a disease of the mind, in that he did not know that his actions were morally wrong. He could not reason with some moderate degree of calmness in relation to the moral quality of what he was doing.

Effect of findings and declarations of mental illness

1. I propose to return special verdicts that the accused is not guilty by reason of mental illness with respect to each count on the indictment.
2. Given those proposed verdicts, it is necessary for the Court to consider what further order ought to be made under s 39 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW). That provision is in the following terms:- 39 Effect of finding and declaration of mental illness (1) If, on the trial of a person charged with an offence, the jury returns a special verdict that the accused person is not guilty by reason of mental illness, the Court may order that the person be detained in such place and in such manner as the Court thinks fit until released by due process of law or may make such other order (including an order releasing the person from custody, either unconditionally or subject to conditions) as the Court considers appropriate. (2) The Court is not to make an order under this section for the release of a person from custody unless it is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the safety of the person or any member of the public will not be seriously endangered by the person's release. (3) As soon as practicable after the making of an order under this section, the Registrar of the Court is to notify the Minister for Health and the Tribunal of the terms of the order.
3. In my view, the only appropriate order in this case, is to order the detention of the accused. The evidence reveals that the accused has a long history of mental illness which has included paranoid thoughts about other persons. The conduct of the accused as recounted in these reasons, reveals the actual danger that he poses to all those who became the victims of his acts.
4. Dr Furst in his supplementary report states:- Recommendations regarding future treatment and rehabilitation I would recommend that Mr Anderson remain under the care of Justice Health whilst in custody, who can monitor his mental health state, and provide necessary counselling and psychotropic medication Olanzapine or an alternative medication if he remains symptomatic. He is no longer a mentally ill person within the meaning of the Mental Health Act, as his acute symptoms have resolved. I would recommend treatment through the mental health clinic at Parklea a the current time, with a low threshold for re-admission to the Mental Health Screening Unit (MHSU) or the Long Bay Hospital in the event tat [sic] he suffers a relapse of psychosis, schizophrenia being a chronic and relapsing condition. Mr Anderson will also require drug and alcohol counselling and/or rehabilitation to address his substance abuse issues. Ongoing medical and endocrine reviews will be required to manage his diabetes, especially as antipsychotic medications can have an adverse metabolic impact. Prognosis He will require longer-term psychiatric rehabilitation and drug and alcohol counselling/rehabilitation. In the event that he is acquitted on the basis of mental illness, the Forensic Hospital at Malabar would be the logical progression for Mr Anderson, with regular reviews by the Mental Health Review Tribunal and likely placement at the Bunya Forensic Unit at Cumberland Hospital for longer-term psychiatric rehabilitation.
5. Dr Nielssen in his report states:- The acute symptoms of Mr Anderson's mental illness have responded to treatment, in the sense that he reports that he no longer believes he was the victim of sexual abuse, or that he was under surveillance or in danger. However, he has what appears to be a disabling negative syndrome of chronic schizophrenia, and is likely to require indefinite treatment with antipsychotic medication under the supervision of a forensic mental health service.
6. If this trial proceeded before a jury it would have been necessary for them to be informed of the legal and practical consequences of a finding of not guilty by reason of mental illness pursuant to s 37 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW).
7. The purpose of s 37 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW) is to ensure that the jury understands the consequences of a special verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness including the terms of s 39 of the Act and the role of the Court and the Mental Health Review Tribunal with respect to the protection of the community and the person who may be acquitted on these grounds. The effect and findings of the orders I will make are that the accused will remain in detention and be held as a forensic patient and come under the supervision of the Mental Health Review Tribunal. This will mean that the accused will not be released until the Tribunal is satisfied that the safety of any member of the public or the safety of the accused will not seriously be endangered by his release. The case of the accused will be reviewed by the Tribunal as soon as practicable and he will be subject to review at 6 monthly intervals. If at some stage in the future the accused comes to be released, it may be on conditions and if any of those conditions are breached or his mental condition deteriorates to a point where he may be a serious danger to others, the Tribunal may order that he be apprehended and further detained. In such cases as this, it is important that the community understands the practical realities of the orders that are made.

CONCLUSION

1. Before concluding this judgment, I wish to direct some of my comments to those who have been affected by the events which gave rise to this trial. In particular, it is appropriate to acknowledge the accused's parents and family who have supported him in difficult circumstances and who ultimately became the victims of his actions. It is also appropriate to acknowledge the work of the NSW Police and other people associated with this matter who responded as they did.
2. I enter the following special verdicts:- 1. Pursuant to s 38(1) of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW), on the charge of wounding Mr Andrew Anderson with the intention of murdering him, I find the accused not guilty by reason of mental illness; 2. Pursuant to s 38(1) of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW), on the charge of wounding Mr Andrew Anderson with the intention to cause him grievous bodily harm, I find the accused not guilty by reason of mental illness; and 3. Pursuant to s 38(1) of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW), on the charge of wounding Mrs Patricia Anderson with the intention to cause her grievous bodily harm, I find the accused not guilty by reason of mental illness.
3. Further, I also make the following orders and directions:- 1. In accordance with s 39(1) of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW), I order that the accused be detained in a correctional centre or such a place that may be determined from time to time by the Mental Health Review Tribunal until his release by due process of law; 2. I direct that as soon as practicable, the Registrar of the Court notify the Minister for Health of the terms of this order; and 3. I direct that as soon as practicable, the Registrar of the Court notify the Mental Health Review Tribunal of this order and provide the Tribunal with the following documentation:- 1. Copy of the reason for the verdicts and orders; 2. Transcript of the trial; and 3. The Exhibits tendered by the Crown and counsel for the accused at the trial. DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 15 June 2017