4.2 Is there an insufficiency of information?
38 FCR 7.23(1)(b) requires Qudos to establish that it does not have sufficient information to decide whether to start a proceeding in the Court.
39 In Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Limited v Ainsworth Game Technology Limited [2018] FCA 1511, Yates J said:
43 In this connection, a prospective applicant must demonstrate as an objective fact that it lacks sufficient information to decide whether to start a proceeding. The purpose of preliminary discovery is not to require the production of material that strengthens or enhances a decision to commence a proceeding, where that decision can reasonably be made on already existing material: Matrix Film Investment One Pty Limited v Alameda Films LLC [2006] FCA 591 at [19]; Costin v Duroline Products Pty Limited [2013] FCA 501 at [45]; McFarlane as Trustee for the S McFarlane Superannuation Fund v IOOF Holdings Limited [2018] FCA 692 at [65]. As Lindgren J expressed the position in Alphapharm Pty Ltd v Eli Lilly Australia Pty Ltd [1996] FCA 391: is there an obstacle consisting of the lack of key information which the prospective applicant needs to enable it to decide whether to commence a proceeding?
40 In the present case, Qudos relies on the evidence of Mr McKemmish. It submits that Mr McKemmish was unable to effect a comparison of the relevant source code in order to determine whether or not the AMB UX amounts to an infringing copyright work. Qudos relies on his second affidavit, summarised above, and also his third affidavit where Mr McKemmish says that because the prototype code of the Qudos UX was not in the same form as the production code of the AMB UX, he was not able to determine the extent of the similarities between the two. It further contends that it is unable to ascertain whether in developing the AMB UX, Infosys has misused its confidential information.
41 Infosys submits that there is no insufficiency of information. It contends that, objectively assessed, the information available to Mr McKemmish was sufficient and that a party cannot rely on preliminary discovery merely in the hope that it will be comforted in taking a decision in respect of which it already has sufficient information. It frames the relevant question as whether there is an obstacle consisting of the lack of key information which the prospective applicant reasonably needs to enable it to decide whether to commence a proceeding (citing Alphapharm Pty Ltd v Eli Lilly Australia Pty Ltd [1996] FCA 391 (Lindgren J) at [50]). In the present case, it submits that the conclusions reached by Mr McKemmish as to the common heritage of the Qudos and AMB UX/UI and the points of similarity to which he points, as well as any other information gleaned by Qudos from its assessment process, must provide a sufficient basis upon which Qudos can make a decision. It submits that Qudos has sufficient information to assess both the causal connection between the AMB UX/UI and the Qudos source material, and also the resemblance between the two.
42 I agree with Infosys as to causal connection. The evidence to which I have referred, pointing to the opportunities on the part of Infosys to have access to the code, UX and UI of the Qudos product, together with the common elements within the structure of the code and the unexplained references to Qudos-related data objects or variables in the AMB UX code such as "QCUBillerRequired" or QCUUserPasswordRequired", provide sufficient information for that purpose.
43 However, in the case of alleged copyright infringement a further central enquiry is whether or not there is sufficient similarity between the copyright material and the alleged infringement to amount to a substantial reproduction thereof. By way of example, section 36(1) of the Copyright Act relevantly provides that copyright in a literary work is infringed by a person who, not being the owner of the copyright, and without the licence of the owner of the copyright, does in Australia, or authorises the doing in Australia of, any act comprised in the copyright. One such act comprised in the copyright in the case of a literary work include reproducing the work in a material form: s 31(1)(a)(i). It is not necessary that those acts be done in respect of the whole of the literary work. That is because a reference to the doing of an act in relation to a work includes a reference to the doing of that act in relation to a substantial part of the work: s 14(1)(a). In the context of infringement, the test directs attention to the degree of originality in the expression of the part of the work reproduced: IceTV Pty Ltd v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd [2009] HCA 14; 239 CLR 458 at [40] per French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ. In IceTV, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ said at [157] that the statutory requirement that the part of the work taken must be substantial assumes that there may be some measure of legitimate appropriation. Their Honours also said (at [158]):
The case law does disclose that special difficulty has been encountered in considering the relationship between the phrase "a substantial part" in s 14(1) of the Act and the definition in s 10(1) of that species of "literary work" which is a "computer program", being: "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." (Emphasis added.) The phrase emphasised suggests the importance of function, although this is usually encountered in patent and designs law, rather than in the "traditional" law of copyright respecting original literary works.
44 The foregoing is not intended to be a complete exposition of the relevant law on the subject. Nor does it purport to summarise the totality of the case that Qudos seeks to bring. It does, however, point to the importance to the cause of action of forming at least a broad understanding of not only whether there has been copying, but as to the nature and scope of any copying in deciding whether to start a proceeding in the court to obtain relief.
45 The test for infringement in the context of a computer program was also discussed by Bennett J in CA, Inc. v ISI Pty Limited [2012] FCA 35; 95 IPR 424 at [173]-[179]. Her Honour said (at [178]-[179]):
178 It is apparent from IceTV and Data Access that special considerations may arise when considering whether or not a substantial part of a "computer program" has been taken. In IceTV, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ referred to the importance of function in the determination of substantial part for "computer programs". Although the current definition of "computer program" introduced by the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (Cth) does not expressly refer to "function", unlike the former definition introduced by the Copyright Amendment Act 1984 (Cth), their Honours observed at [158] that the current definition nevertheless has a functional aspect.
179 In order to determine whether a substantial part of a computer program has been reproduced, the question is not whether one necessary integer of a computer program is present (IceTV at [159] per Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ; Data Access at [85]-[87] per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). In IceTV, their Honours said at [159] that what is required is 'the need for some process of qualitative abstraction of the material features of the computer program in question'. This was in the context of a reaffirmation that what is entitled to protection is not the idea of the author but the fixed expression of that idea.
46 The evidence of Mr McKemmish indicates that he has been unable to form that understanding on the basis of the materials available to him. Properly understood, the evidence of Mr Michael does not disagree with that proposition. Mr Michael was specifically asked to address whether or not whether or not Mr McKemmish has sufficient information to determine whether the AMB code "contains any reproduction or adaptation". He does not address the question of whether he is in a position to assess the degree of reproduction or adaptation. This leaves Mr McKemmish's evidence as to the inadequacy of the information going to this question unchallenged.
47 In my view Qudos has established that after making reasonable inquiries it does not have sufficient information to decide whether to start a proceeding in the Court to obtain relief for infringement of copyright, breach of confidence and breach of contract.
48 I am satisfied that in order to make a meaningful comparison, it is necessary and appropriate for Qudos to be supplied with the source code that was prepared by Infosys from the stitched site of the Qudos UX/UI (that is, the code for the Qudos UAT site), and to be supplied with the February 2018 version of the AMB UX/UI source code. First, in a letter of 15 February 2018 Infosys refers to the Qudos UAT site being available on the internet. Mr McKemmish identifies the production code from the Qudos UAT site as being an appropriate comparator to enable a like for like comparison with the AMB UX code. The evidence indicates that the AMB site went live on 18 February 2018. Secondly, Qudos no longer has access to the UAT site or the source code underlying it, as confirmed in a letter from Infosys to Qudos on 9 October 2018. Thirdly, February 2018 was the time when employees of Qudos first noticed what they perceived to be close similarities between the AMB UX/UI and the Qudos UX/UI and observed that at least one Infosys employee was working on both projects. It was at this time that the first comparisons were made between the features of the UX for each. Fourthly, in February 2018 Qudos first raised its concerns of copyright infringement with Infosys.
49 These matters lead me to the view that it is appropriate that Qudos be provided with sufficient information to compare the source code of the Qudos UAT site with the AMB source code as both existed in February 2018; FCR 7.23(1)(b). I accept the submission advanced during argument by Qudos that it is in February 2018, before the allegations of infringement were first advanced, that an appropriate comparison may be made, because it is possible that subsequent changes to the software might serve to obscure the fact of any copying (in this regard, I hasten to add, I do not intend to convey any view one way or the other that this has or may have happened, deliberately or otherwise). There is no dispute that absent an order for production, this material would not be available to Qudos, but that Qudos reasonably believes that Infosys does have it. For the reasons stated, I consider it to be directly relevant to the question of the right of Qudos to obtain relief, and that it would assist it in making its decision; FCR 7.23(1)(c). However, I do not consider that it is necessary for Qudos to have access to be supplied with any change logs since this date. The comparison as at February 2018 should be sufficient. Nor am I satisfied that access to the AMB database and webserver is necessary.
50 I also accept that it is appropriate for Infosys to give production of documents recording the development and preparation of the AMB UX code prior to February 2018, such as minutes of meetings and correspondence between Infosys and AMB about that development and preparation. This will be reasonably necessary to enable Qudos to have sufficient information to decide whether there has been use made of what it contends to be its confidential information during the course of the creation of the AMB code.
51 I now turn to consider the scope of the order for discovery that should be made.