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[2019] FCA 702
Federal Court of Australia
2019-05-20
Burley J
Original judgment source is linked above.
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 INTRODUCTION [1] 2 THE EVIDENCE [8] 3 FACTUAL BACKGROUND [14] 4 CONSIDERATION [34] 4.1 The dispute [34] 4.2 Is there an insufficiency of information? [38] 4.3 Qudos categories are overbroad and unclear [52] 4.4 Discretionary factors [56] 5 DISPOSITION [61]
4.1 The dispute 34 Qudos seeks preliminary discovery of a detailed list categories of documents pursuant to FCR 7.23. It submits that it has reason to believe that it may have the right to obtain relief in the Court from Infosys for infringement of copyright, breach of contract and misuse of confidential information. It relies on the affidavit evidence of Ms Hansen, who has deposed to such a belief. The basis upon which orders in accordance with FCR 7.23 are sought is apparent similarities between the AMB UX and that of the Qudos UX/UI and the underlying code for each. In summary, the contention is that those similarities signify that there has been a substantial reproduction of the copyright works owned by Qudos as well as violation of the confidence reposed in Infosys by Qudos when it disclosed information concerning its business and the UX/UI developed by HeathWallace, including internal Qudos business processes, process maps and data mapping and similar materials. 35 As I have noted, Infosys does not challenge the proposition that Qudos reasonably believes that it has the right to obtain relief in respect of the alleged unauthorised use of the Qudos UX/UI when developing the AMB UX/UI. In this context, and without any admission that it has infringed copyright, misused confidential information or acted in breach of the Master Banking Services Agreement, Infosys accepts that Qudos has established the requisite belief for the purposes of FCR 7.23(1)(a). 36 I accept that this is the case. The relevant question under this part of the rule is whether the prospective applicant has a reasonable belief that it may have the right to obtain relief; Pfizer Ireland Pharmaceuticals v Samsung Bioepis AU Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 193 (Allsop CJ, Perram and Nicholas JJ) at [17] and [69]-[70] (Allsop CJ) and [101]-[126] (Perram J). In that case Perram J said (emphasis in original): 120 The following propositions about preliminary discovery applications should be accepted: (i) the prospective applicant must prove that it has a belief that it may (not does) have a right to relief; (ii) it must demonstrate that the belief is reasonable, either by reference to material known to the person holding the belief or by other material subsequently placed before the Court; (iii) the person deposing to the belief need not give evidence of the belief a second time to the extent that additional material is placed before the Court on the issue of the reasonableness of the belief. That belief may be inferred; (iv) the question of whether the belief is reasonable requires one to ask whether a person apprised of all of the material before the person holding the belief (or subsequently the Court) could reasonably believe that they may have a right to obtain relief; and (v) it is useful to ask whether the material inclines the mind to that proposition but very important to keep at the forefront of the inclining mind the subjunctive nature of the proposition. One may believe that a person may have a case on certain material without one's mind being in any way inclined to the notion that they do have such a case. 121 In practice, to defeat a claim for preliminary discovery it will be necessary either to show that the subjectively held belief does not exist or, if it does, that there is no reasonable basis for thinking that there may be (not is) such a case. Showing that some aspect of the material on which the belief is based is contestable, or even arguably wrong, will rarely come close to making good such a contention. Many views may be held with which one disagrees, perhaps even strongly, but this does not make such a view one which is necessarily unreasonably held. Nor will it be an answer to an application for preliminary discovery to say that the belief relied upon may involve a degree of speculation. Where the language of FCR 7.23 relates to a belief that a claim may exist, a degree of speculation is unavoidable. The question is not whether the belief involves some degree of speculation (how could it not?); it is whether the belief resulting from that speculation is a reasonable one. Debate on an application will rarely be advanced, therefore, by observing that speculation is involved. 37 However, Infosys contends that there are three substantial reasons why orders for the preliminary discovery of documents in the categories proposed by Qudos would be refused: (a) there is no insufficiency of information within FCR 7.23(1)(b); (b) the Qudos categories are overbroad and unclear; and (c) a number of discretionary factors indicate that the Court should refuse to grant the relief sought. Each of these is considered below.
4.2 Is there an insufficiency of information? 38 FCR 7.23(1)(b) requires Qudos to establish that it does not have sufficient information to decide whether to start a proceeding in the Court. 39 In Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Limited v Ainsworth Game Technology Limited [2018] FCA 1511, Yates J said: 43 In this connection, a prospective applicant must demonstrate as an objective fact that it lacks sufficient information to decide whether to start a proceeding. The purpose of preliminary discovery is not to require the production of material that strengthens or enhances a decision to commence a proceeding, where that decision can reasonably be made on already existing material: Matrix Film Investment One Pty Limited v Alameda Films LLC [2006] FCA 591 at [19]; Costin v Duroline Products Pty Limited [2013] FCA 501 at [45]; McFarlane as Trustee for the S McFarlane Superannuation Fund v IOOF Holdings Limited [2018] FCA 692 at [65]. As Lindgren J expressed the position in Alphapharm Pty Ltd v Eli Lilly Australia Pty Ltd [1996] FCA 391: is there an obstacle consisting of the lack of key information which the prospective applicant needs to enable it to decide whether to commence a proceeding? 40 In the present case, Qudos relies on the evidence of Mr McKemmish. It submits that Mr McKemmish was unable to effect a comparison of the relevant source code in order to determine whether or not the AMB UX amounts to an infringing copyright work. Qudos relies on his second affidavit, summarised above, and also his third affidavit where Mr McKemmish says that because the prototype code of the Qudos UX was not in the same form as the production code of the AMB UX, he was not able to determine the extent of the similarities between the two. It further contends that it is unable to ascertain whether in developing the AMB UX, Infosys has misused its confidential information. 41 Infosys submits that there is no insufficiency of information. It contends that, objectively assessed, the information available to Mr McKemmish was sufficient and that a party cannot rely on preliminary discovery merely in the hope that it will be comforted in taking a decision in respect of which it already has sufficient information. It frames the relevant question as whether there is an obstacle consisting of the lack of key information which the prospective applicant reasonably needs to enable it to decide whether to commence a proceeding (citing Alphapharm Pty Ltd v Eli Lilly Australia Pty Ltd [1996] FCA 391 (Lindgren J) at [50]). In the present case, it submits that the conclusions reached by Mr McKemmish as to the common heritage of the Qudos and AMB UX/UI and the points of similarity to which he points, as well as any other information gleaned by Qudos from its assessment process, must provide a sufficient basis upon which Qudos can make a decision. It submits that Qudos has sufficient information to assess both the causal connection between the AMB UX/UI and the Qudos source material, and also the resemblance between the two. 42 I agree with Infosys as to causal connection. The evidence to which I have referred, pointing to the opportunities on the part of Infosys to have access to the code, UX and UI of the Qudos product, together with the common elements within the structure of the code and the unexplained references to Qudos-related data objects or variables in the AMB UX code such as "QCUBillerRequired" or QCUUserPasswordRequired", provide sufficient information for that purpose. 43 However, in the case of alleged copyright infringement a further central enquiry is whether or not there is sufficient similarity between the copyright material and the alleged infringement to amount to a substantial reproduction thereof. By way of example, section 36(1) of the Copyright Act relevantly provides that copyright in a literary work is infringed by a person who, not being the owner of the copyright, and without the licence of the owner of the copyright, does in Australia, or authorises the doing in Australia of, any act comprised in the copyright. One such act comprised in the copyright in the case of a literary work include reproducing the work in a material form: s 31(1)(a)(i). It is not necessary that those acts be done in respect of the whole of the literary work. That is because a reference to the doing of an act in relation to a work includes a reference to the doing of that act in relation to a substantial part of the work: s 14(1)(a). In the context of infringement, the test directs attention to the degree of originality in the expression of the part of the work reproduced: IceTV Pty Ltd v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd [2009] HCA 14; 239 CLR 458 at [40] per French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ. In IceTV, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ said at [157] that the statutory requirement that the part of the work taken must be substantial assumes that there may be some measure of legitimate appropriation. Their Honours also said (at [158]): The case law does disclose that special difficulty has been encountered in considering the relationship between the phrase "a substantial part" in s 14(1) of the Act and the definition in s 10(1) of that species of "literary work" which is a "computer program", being: "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." (Emphasis added.) The phrase emphasised suggests the importance of function, although this is usually encountered in patent and designs law, rather than in the "traditional" law of copyright respecting original literary works. 44 The foregoing is not intended to be a complete exposition of the relevant law on the subject. Nor does it purport to summarise the totality of the case that Qudos seeks to bring. It does, however, point to the importance to the cause of action of forming at least a broad understanding of not only whether there has been copying, but as to the nature and scope of any copying in deciding whether to start a proceeding in the court to obtain relief. 45 The test for infringement in the context of a computer program was also discussed by Bennett J in CA, Inc. v ISI Pty Limited [2012] FCA 35; 95 IPR 424 at [173]-[179]. Her Honour said (at [178]-[179]): 178 It is apparent from IceTV and Data Access that special considerations may arise when considering whether or not a substantial part of a "computer program" has been taken. In IceTV, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ referred to the importance of function in the determination of substantial part for "computer programs". Although the current definition of "computer program" introduced by the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (Cth) does not expressly refer to "function", unlike the former definition introduced by the Copyright Amendment Act 1984 (Cth), their Honours observed at [158] that the current definition nevertheless has a functional aspect. 179 In order to determine whether a substantial part of a computer program has been reproduced, the question is not whether one necessary integer of a computer program is present (IceTV at [159] per Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ; Data Access at [85]-[87] per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). In IceTV, their Honours said at [159] that what is required is 'the need for some process of qualitative abstraction of the material features of the computer program in question'. This was in the context of a reaffirmation that what is entitled to protection is not the idea of the author but the fixed expression of that idea. 46 The evidence of Mr McKemmish indicates that he has been unable to form that understanding on the basis of the materials available to him. Properly understood, the evidence of Mr Michael does not disagree with that proposition. Mr Michael was specifically asked to address whether or not whether or not Mr McKemmish has sufficient information to determine whether the AMB code "contains any reproduction or adaptation". He does not address the question of whether he is in a position to assess the degree of reproduction or adaptation. This leaves Mr McKemmish's evidence as to the inadequacy of the information going to this question unchallenged. 47 In my view Qudos has established that after making reasonable inquiries it does not have sufficient information to decide whether to start a proceeding in the Court to obtain relief for infringement of copyright, breach of confidence and breach of contract. 48 I am satisfied that in order to make a meaningful comparison, it is necessary and appropriate for Qudos to be supplied with the source code that was prepared by Infosys from the stitched site of the Qudos UX/UI (that is, the code for the Qudos UAT site), and to be supplied with the February 2018 version of the AMB UX/UI source code. First, in a letter of 15 February 2018 Infosys refers to the Qudos UAT site being available on the internet. Mr McKemmish identifies the production code from the Qudos UAT site as being an appropriate comparator to enable a like for like comparison with the AMB UX code. The evidence indicates that the AMB site went live on 18 February 2018. Secondly, Qudos no longer has access to the UAT site or the source code underlying it, as confirmed in a letter from Infosys to Qudos on 9 October 2018. Thirdly, February 2018 was the time when employees of Qudos first noticed what they perceived to be close similarities between the AMB UX/UI and the Qudos UX/UI and observed that at least one Infosys employee was working on both projects. It was at this time that the first comparisons were made between the features of the UX for each. Fourthly, in February 2018 Qudos first raised its concerns of copyright infringement with Infosys. 49 These matters lead me to the view that it is appropriate that Qudos be provided with sufficient information to compare the source code of the Qudos UAT site with the AMB source code as both existed in February 2018; FCR 7.23(1)(b). I accept the submission advanced during argument by Qudos that it is in February 2018, before the allegations of infringement were first advanced, that an appropriate comparison may be made, because it is possible that subsequent changes to the software might serve to obscure the fact of any copying (in this regard, I hasten to add, I do not intend to convey any view one way or the other that this has or may have happened, deliberately or otherwise). There is no dispute that absent an order for production, this material would not be available to Qudos, but that Qudos reasonably believes that Infosys does have it. For the reasons stated, I consider it to be directly relevant to the question of the right of Qudos to obtain relief, and that it would assist it in making its decision; FCR 7.23(1)(c). However, I do not consider that it is necessary for Qudos to have access to be supplied with any change logs since this date. The comparison as at February 2018 should be sufficient. Nor am I satisfied that access to the AMB database and webserver is necessary. 50 I also accept that it is appropriate for Infosys to give production of documents recording the development and preparation of the AMB UX code prior to February 2018, such as minutes of meetings and correspondence between Infosys and AMB about that development and preparation. This will be reasonably necessary to enable Qudos to have sufficient information to decide whether there has been use made of what it contends to be its confidential information during the course of the creation of the AMB code. 51 I now turn to consider the scope of the order for discovery that should be made.
4.3 Qudos categories are overbroad and unclear 52 Infosys submits that FCR 7.23 requires the documents sought to be "directly relevant" to the claim that the prospective applicant reasonably believes may exist and that any discovery ordered be confined to the extent of information that is necessary, "but no more than that which is necessary" in order to overcome the insufficiency of information already possessed by the applicant. In this regard Infosys contends that even if there is some insufficiency of information available to Qudos, the categories pressed by Qudos extend well beyond what could be reasonably necessary to enable Qudos to decide whether to commence a proceeding. 53 I agree. In my view the categories proposed are prolix. They do not lend themselves to a clear understanding of the documents that are required. There are 18 numbered categories, one of which includes 6 sub-categories. The categories themselves include defined terms that are themselves extensive. For instance, a definition of "Qudos Provided Documents" is said to mean documents provided by Qudos to Infosys and then sets out a list of 22 sub-categories of documents ranging from "change requests" to "Qudos specific product rules" and "Error messages". This defined term is in 8 of the categories sought. Another definition states that the term "QCU Materials" has the meaning defined in cl 26.3(a) of the Master Banking Services Agreement which in turn refers generally to confidential information that is specific to QCU. To the extent that these categories seek production of materials that have been delivered by Qudos to Infosys, I would not require it to be supplied pursuant to FCR 7.23. Qudos has not demonstrated that it is unable from its own enquiries to ascertain what materials it supplied to Infosys. It should bear the burden of doing so. Otherwise, in my view the detail and verbosity of the categories is such that in my view there is some merit in the objection advanced by Infosys that production in accordance with them would be oppressive. 54 However, it is not necessary to address the various drafting difficulties that arise from the categories, because, although senior counsel for Qudos, Mr Richard Cobden SC, sought to defend the drafting during argument, ultimately he accepted that an alternative approach to the production of documents that would satisfy the requirements of Qudos is the production of the categories of document identified in [5] above. 55 In my view these documents will provide sufficient information for Qudos to be able to decide whether to start a proceeding in respect of the foreshadowed proceedings. This production may well fall short of the production to which Qudos may be entitled on discovery in the event that proceedings are commenced, but in my view it addresses the requirements of FCR 7.23.
4.4 Discretionary factors 56 Infosys advances several reasons to support the contention that the Court should in its discretion decline to make orders under FCR 7.23. First, it submits that the categories as articulated impose an oppressive burden of discovery. It submits that in giving discovery in accordance with the categories set out in the Amended Originating Application, many months of work will be required by a number of its employees. Secondly, it submits that the discovery sought is broader than necessary. 57 Understandably, these points address the categories set out in the Amended Originating Application. They do not address the rather simpler categories that were proposed during argument and which find their final form in [5]. Those categories do not suffer the drafting problem to which Infosys referred in argument and are in my view not likely to cause oppression of the type posed by the form initially proposed. Nor are they broader than necessary. Senior counsel for Infosys, Mr Hennessey SC, did not submit otherwise. 58 Thirdly, Infosys submits that it is unclear that Qudos has undertaken all relevant analyses of the materials that it already has. For the reasons set out in section 4.2 above, I do not consider that this is a factor militating against the grant of orders. Fourthly, Infosys contends that there has been an unexplained delay in bringing this proceeding. It submits that the formal dispute resolution processed under the Master Banking Services Agreement ceased on 12 April 2018 and yet the Originating Application was filed in November 2018. I have summarised the progress of the discussions between the parties in section 2 above. In my view the evidence is sufficient to indicate that prior to the issue of the proceedings Qudos was engaged in taking reasonable steps in an effort to resolve the dispute it had with Infosys more generally, and to ascertain information as to whether or not to commence the proceedings. 59 Fifthly, Infosys contends that Qudos has repeatedly changed its position in relation to production. Infosys voluntarily produced the AMB UX code in answer to Mr McKemmish's first affidavit and yet now is being asked to produce more material. There is perhaps some force in this submission insofar as Qudos was content to accept production of this software in the expectation that it would provide the relevant information, no doubt on instructions and with expert assistance. However, two principal items of information appear to have been missing from the production. One is the production code version of the Qudos UAT site (to enable like for like comparison), the other is the version of the AMB UX code as at February 2018 (to enable comparison at the relevant point in time). The first appears to have been based on a misapprehension on the part of Qudos as that the AMB UX code would also be supplied in the form of prototype code. The second is unexplained. Neither is the fault of Infosys. These matters may factor into the question as to the appropriate order to be made in relation to costs of the application, however, I do not think that they are sufficient to warrant the refusal of the relief sought. 60 Finally, Infosys submits that Qudos may well have decided already to commence proceedings in the context of its broader disputes with Infosys in relation to the performance of the Master Banking Services Agreement, and that any suggestion that discovery is necessary to assess whether litigation is worthwhile falls to be assessed in that context. However, the application is brought in the context of the specific questions posed under FCR 7.23 in circumstances where Ms Hansen, an officer of the court, has deposed to being unable to decide whether to start a proceeding in this Court to obtain relief for infringement of copyright, breach of contract and misuse of confidential information. I would not lightly set that to one side in the face of the speculative submission that a decision has already been made.
Qudos Mutual Limited
Infosys Limited