The s106 Proceedings
4 For the purposes of the proceedings in this Court, QSR accepts the allegations of fact contained in the Summons for Relief under s106. In the s106 proceedings in the Commission the Opponents seek orders setting aside contracts, conditions or arrangements, pursuant to which the Third Opponent, Mr Peter Batterham, performed work in an industry, which are said to be unfair, harsh and unconscionable and declaring the same void ab initio. The focus of attention is on a document entitled "Option Deed" entered into between QSR and the Second Opponent ("Maylord") dated 2 November 1999, under which Maylord became entitled to acquire certain shares in QSR. In the event, the conditions for the exercise of the option were not fulfilled and they lapsed.
5 QSR is a public company which acquired a substantial restaurant business in the form of forty one Kentucky Fried Chicken stores from the previous owner and operator. The Third Opponent, Mr Batterham, was, together with certain other persons, a promoter of the scheme by which QSR acquired the business and was floated as a public company. Maylord is the trustee of the Batterham Retirement Fund replacing its predecessor, Woodglint Pty Ltd. It performed, and its predecessor performed, no other function than to act as the corporate trustee of the Batterham Retirement Fund and the Batterham Family Trust.
6 From late 1998 to mid 1999 Mr Batterham and his fellow promoters negotiated an agreement for the acquisition of the forty one stores. In October 1999 QSR was formed to act as a vehicle for this acquisition.
7 During the course of negotiating the acquisition arrangement Mr Batterham and his colleagues incurred expenses for which they were initially personally liable as promoters. These included various fees and charges including legal expenses, the costs of a prospectus and printing expenses. The expenses which they had jointly incurred came to slightly less than half a million dollars.
8 The Summons for Relief set out the remuneration for the founding directors of QSR, which included Mr Batterham, in the following paragraphs:
"[21] As part of the remuneration arrangements for the founding director (based upon advice received from UBS Warburg) each of the founding directors was to receive the following by way of remuneration:
(a) 400,000 shares at one cent each;
(b) directors fees of $36,000 per annum; and
(c) one million options exercisable at 50 cents in three years after issue upon the achievement of a performance benchmark (the 'Options'). The shares had a $1 issue price through the prospectus.
[22] The Promoters, who became the founding directors of the Respondent, received no other fees related to the transaction. The total remuneration (which was in compensation for work performed, the incurring of risk and forfeiting other opportunities) was to be solely in the form of equity and annual fees as set out above.
[23] The Chief Executive, Chairman and other directors of the Respondent were also to receive similar options to those given to the Promoters. The Chief Executive initially received 300,000 options, which was subsequently increased to 400,000 options. The difference in the number of options granted was intended to reflect the varying contribution to, and risks associated with, successfully implementing the Restaurant Acquisition Deal."
9 The Summons in the Commission alleges that it was Mr Batterham who recruited the Chief Executive of QSR and identified its future Chairman. With respect to the period before the float, the other activities of Mr Batterham, the Second Applicant in the Commission, were set out as follows:
"[42] The Second Applicant was involved in the preparatory work necessary to achieve the public offering of equity in the Respondent. In addition, the Second Applicant worked extensively on establishing the Deal. This included, inter alia , the establishment of the corporate function for the Respondent including the hiring of all relevant management staff. The Second Applicant also drew upon his extensive experience as an accountant and senior corporate commercial manager to establish corporate systems for the use of the Respondent and also engaged and supervised the work of systems consultants. The Second Applicant was required to undertake these tasks as the proposed Chief Financial Officer was at that stage working out his notice period with a previous employer. The role of the Second Applicant continued for a longer period than anticipated because of issues arising in respect of the performance of the Chief Financial Officer."
10 After the Claimant was floated on the Australian Stock Exchange, Mr Batterham continued to act as a director and as a member of the Property Sub-committee of the board. This Sub-committee was dissolved by the board at a meeting on 25 July 2000, a meeting attended by Mr Batterham. The minutes of the meeting do not suggest that there was any dissent from the proposal to disband the Sub-committee. However, on the s106 proceedings, Mr Batterham relies on the termination of his role on the Property Sub-committee.
11 The nature of his activities in this respect are set out in the Summons in the Commission as follows:
"[43] For a period of seven months from December 1999 to July 2000, the Second Applicant carried out work in respect of the property related obligations of the Respondent. The agreement between the Respondent and Tricon in respect of the restaurants necessitated the relocation of 8 stores and the upgrading of 27 stores over an agreed period. These stores were identified during negotiations with Tricon which the Second Applicant was involved in. The management of the Respondent had no experience in property matters and accordingly the extensive property and expertise of the Second Applicant was required in order to give effect to the contractual obligations of the Respondent. In February 2000 the board formally established a property sub-committee of the Board with the Second Applicant, Peter Copulos and Steve Copulos as members. The Second Applicant was paid $5,000 per month for performing this role effective from December 1999. The Second Applicant performed this role from an office at the corporate headquarters at Willoughby, Sydney, New South Wales. The Copulos representatives performed their duties from country Victoria and were also paid $5,000 per month for their role effective February 2000. The Second Applicant did not receive any superannuation contributions in respect of those payments."
12 I have referred above to the remuneration of the promoters of QSR, including the issue of options exercisable upon achievement of a performance benchmark. It is this matter, particularly the detail of the performance benchmark which is at the heart of the dispute between the parties. As will appear from the full terms of the Option Deed, which I will set out below, the trigger for the right to take up the options was the achievement by the company of earnings before interest, tax and depreciation of at least 18 per cent on equity in the three calendar years referred to. In the event a rate of return of 18 per cent per annum was achieved over the course of the three years. This comprised a rate of return significantly higher than 18 per cent for the first two years (namely 22.2 per cent for 2000 and 19.2 per cent for 2001). However, the return on equity was only 16.2 per cent for 2002. On the basis that the contract as properly construed requires the achievement of the 18 per cent target in each of the three calendar years, the performance benchmark was not met. It is the "unfairness, etc" of this eventuality, in the circumstance that the benchmark was met on average over the three years, that is at the heart of the dispute.
13 The circumstances in which the benchmark was proposed and incorporated in the Option Agreement are set out in the Summons in the Commission as follows:
"[25] It was the understanding of the Second Applicant, on the basis of discussions with UBS Warburg, that any performance benchmark in respect of the Options was to be measured against the average performance over a three year period. The performance benchmark was set on the basis of quantitative modelling by UBS Warburg which concluded that an average 18% internal rate of return was realistically achievable by the Respondent, particularly as the Promoters had negotiated the ability to sell properties on a "sale and lease back" basis for 9 of the 21 properties purchased in agreements with Tricon. These agreements enabled the funds employed to be reduced. Selling property on this basis would have produced an increase in return of funds employed particularly given that the properties were acquired on attractive terms as part of the "bulk" purchase of property and business assets. As such, the sale of property would have also had the effect of booking a profit on sale.
[26] It is the further understanding of the Second Applicant that the options component of the remuneration was intended to provide an initial benefit to the Promoters equivalent to at least $500,000 each. For this reason the exercise price for the Options was set at 50 cents with the face value of the shares being $1.00.
[27] The options were exercisable in the period 15 February 2003 to 15 March 2003 and, as such, acted as an incentive for the Promoters to remain with the Respondent for a period of 3 years and achieve the return on funds invested required to exercise the options. It was also a term of the agreements entered into with Tricon that the removal, resignation or replacement of any of them requires the written approval of Tricon as disclosed at page 47 of the prospectus.
[28] Over the 3 year period before the Promoters were potentially eligible to exercise the Options, the Promoters steadily lost the ability to influence the operations of the Respondent to achieve the return of funds as stated in the Prospectus. By the third year, the only year in which the targets were not achieved, the ability of the Promoters to influence the strategy of the Respondent, and accordingly the return on funds employed was effectively nil.
14 The Prospectus for QSR stated that Mr Batterham was entitled to one million options exercisable at 50 cents between 15 February 2003 and 15 March 2003. The options were issued at 1 cent each. The Prospectus stated:
"The exercise of all Options is conditional upon the Company meeting predefined performance criteria for the period up to 31 December 2002. The performance criteria are: the Company achieving the earnings per Share and dividends per Share forecast in this Prospectus and the Company achieving EBITDA of at least 18% of equity subscribed plus debt for the calendar years 2000, 2001 and 2002."
15 The Summons in the Commission states:
"[33] It was the understanding of the Second Applicant at all times that this performance benchmark required the Respondent to achieve an EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation) of finance raised through debt or equities subscribed for of at least 18% on average over the calendar years 2000, 2001 and 2002."
16 The Summons then outlines the circumstances in which the Deed came to contain a provision inconsistent with this "understanding".
"[34] The Prospectus was lodged on 3 November 1999. On the day prior to the lodging of the Prospectus, solicitors acting for the Respondent, Henry Davis York, presented an Option Deed to be executed in respect of the options referred to above and as disclosed in the Prospectus.
[35] Clause 2.4 of the Option Deed provides as follows:
" it is a condition to the exercise of the Option of the Company :
2.4.1 achieves the earnings per share and dividends per share forecast in the Prospectus for the financial years ending 30 June 2000 and 30 June 2001; and
2.4.2 achieves an earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation, and amortisation level in each of the calendar years 2000, 2001 and 2002 of 18% of Annual Funds Invested for the relevant calendar year". (emphasis added).
[36] The timing did not permit independent legal advice to be obtained in respect of the Option Deed nor was it suggested to the Second Applicant at any time that such independent advice be sought. There was intense pressure to finalise the transaction prior to the Christmas break. The focus in respect of documentation was to ensure that the claims made in the Prospectus were accurate and that there had been full disclosure in the Prospectus.
[37] The Second Applicant assumed that the wording adopted in respect of the performance benchmark in the Option Deed was consistent with that adopted in the Prospectus. At the relevant time the difference between the terms of the performance benchmark as expressed in the Prospectus as opposed to the Option Deed was not drawn to the attention of the Second Applicant.
[38] The Second Applicant did not become aware that the terms of the Option Deed were inconsistent with the terms of the Prospectus until it was brought to his attention at the beginning of December 2002.
[39] The Second Applicant executed the Option Deed on behalf of Woodglint Pty. Ltd in his capacity as Managing Director. Woodglint Pty. Ltd. entered into the Option Deed as trustee for the Batterham Retirement Trust".
17 The Summons sets out the circumstances in which control of QSR changed and the progressive marginalisation of Mr Batterham, leading eventually to his resignation. It asserts that QSR failed to ensure a proper return on capital by taking decisions which had the consequence that the 18 per cent benchmark was not attained in the third year.
18 The Summons concludes:
"[77] It is the submission of the First and Second Applicants that if the test for the exercise of the Options as set out in the Prospectus applied, the First Applicant would be able to exercise the Options as the Respondent would have satisfied the performance benchmark.
[78] Further, or in the alternative, the conduct of the Respondent in adopting a strategy of retaining properties and increasing the level of funds employed, a strategy contrary to representations contained in the Prospectus and objected to by the Second Applicant and other significant shareholders, led to a reduction in the EBITDA such that the Options could not be exercised. In the event such a strategy was not adopted, and the Respondent had acted consistent with representations made in the Prospectus, the Respondent would have satisfied the Performance Benchmark and the Options would have been exercisable.
[79] Further, or in the alternative, the Option Deed was unfair, harsh, or unconscionable or contrary to the public interest in that it required an EBITDA of 18% to be achieved for each of the 3 years rather than using an aggregate measure of EBITDA over the relevant 3 year period. A superior measure of the value of the contribution of the Promoters (in particular the Second Applicant) to the Respondent is to take an average performance over 3 years as opposed to requiring a level of return to be required in each of those years. The latter measure leads to the remuneration for the Promoters susceptible to short term factors that may impact adversely on EBITDA.
[80] Further, or in the alternative, the Option Deed was unfair, harsh, or unconscionable or contrary to the public interest in that it failed to take account of circumstances where the Promoters, in particular the Second Applicant, would lose the ability to be involved in management decisions of the Respondent, particularly decisions that led to the Respondent resiling from strategies established for the Respondent by the Promoters. These strategies, and the financial returns forecast to be achieved on the implementation of these strategies, were stated in the Prospectus. This financial modelling also formed the basis for the performance benchmarks established for the Options for the purpose of remunerating the Promoters. The changes in strategy effectively led to the Second Applicant being denied remuneration for his services in acting as Promoter of the Respondent.
[81] The conduct of the Respondent was unfair, harsh, or unconscionable or contrary to the public interest in that the Second Applicant was capriciously removed as, first a member of the property sub-committee of the Board and, subsequently, a director of the Respondent. The Second Applicant was neither offered nor received any payment or compensation for his removal as either member of the property sub-committee, or the Board. The Second Applicant was also not appointed to the Audit and Compliance Committee of the Respondent notwithstanding that he was the best qualified amongst the directors to hold such a position. This unfairness is compounded by payment of $500,000 made to another Promoter by the major shareholder, the Copulos Group, in similar circumstances, 12 months earlier, prior to formal valuations of the Respondent being available."
19 The orders sought with respect to the Option Deed are:
"5. An order declaring that the Option Deed entered into by the Respondent and the First Applicant dated 2 November 1999 (" Option Deed ") is unfair, harsh, unconscionable and contrary to the public interest.
6. An order that the Option Deed be varied so as to vest in the First Applicant the one million options granted to the First Applicant pursuant to the Option Deed.
7. In the alternative, an order that the Option Deed be varied so as to delete clause 2.4 of the Option Deed and to insert in its place the following clause:
' The Company achieving the earnings per Share and dividends per Share forecast in the Prospectus and the Company achieving EBITDA of at least 18% of equity subscribed plus debt for the calendar years 2000, 2001 and 2002.' "
20 Further orders are sought as follows:
"8. An order declaring that the contract, arrangement, condition or collateral arrangement between the Second Applicant and the Respondent whereby the Second Applicant performed work for the Respondent in an industry, including but not limited to the provision of management and administrative services to the property sub-committee of the Board of the Respondent, was unfair, harsh and unconscionable in that in it permitted the Respondent to terminate any such arrangement without providing reasonable notice, or in the alternative, making a payment in lieu of reasonable notice.
9. An order varying the contract, arrangement, condition or collateral arrangement between the Second Applicant and the Respondent whereby the Second Applicant performed work for the Respondent in any industry to include a term that upon termination of any such arrangement the Respondent shall give the Second Applicant twelve months' notice or payment in lieu of twelve months' notice."