4.3 The Tribunal erred in its construction of sub-rules 23.10(c)(iv) and (v)
53 Applying these principles, in my view the Tribunal erred in its construction of the phrase "any income … from any source which the Trustee determines to be in respect of or arising out of the disability" in sub-rule 23.10(c)(iv) and therefore in its conclusion that sub-rule 23.10(c)(v) had no application to Mr McAulay's case.
54 First, the words used in sub-rule 23.10(c)(iv) are words of wide import. Not only does the rule refer to "any income … from any source", but, while they must be read in context, the words "in respect of" "have the widest possible meaning of any expression intended to convey some connexion or relation between the two subject-matters to which the words refer": Trustees Executors & Agency Co Ltd v Reilly [1941] ALR 105 at 111 (cited with approval by Gibbs J in McDowell v Baker (1979) 144 CLR 413 at 419).
55 Secondly, bearing in mind the width of the language used, in my view the DSP is income of a kind falling within sub-rule 23.10(c)(iv) if construed in accordance with its ordinary and natural meaning and in a business-like manner.
(1) Turning first to the word "income", this has been described as "a known legal and commercial term": Federal Commissioner of Taxation v WE Fuller Proprietary Limited (1959) 101 CLR 403 at 409 (Dixon CJ). So understood, the term is apt to embrace annual or periodic receipts of money by a person commonly as consideration for their exertion, but is not limited to income derived by such means. For example, an income may derive from a trust without any exertion on the part of the beneficiary. The DSP provides an income for the recipient who is deprived by reason of her or his disability of the capacity to earn an income or a sufficient income through her or his own exertions where other statutory criteria are met. As such, and as the Tribunal appears to have accepted, the DSP can properly be characterised as income.
(2) Further, it was not in issue as the Tribunal found at [25], that the eligibility criteria for the DSP are clearly linked to the existence of an identified disability which impairs the recipient's ability to work. In this case, the disability was identical to that which had triggered the member's entitlement to the TPD Benefit. As such, in my view it is income "in respect of or arising out of the disability".
(3) Finally, sub-rule 23.10(c)(iv) expressly applies to income "from any source". As such, read literally the fact that the DSP is a social security payment emanating from government is irrelevant.
56 Thirdly, the natural and ordinary meaning of sub-rule 23.10(c)(iv) accords with the context in which it appears, including its purpose as revealed by the language used.
57 In this regard, as I have earlier explained rule 23.10 deals with offsetting amounts with respect to two different kinds of benefits under the Superannuation Plan, namely, the Disability Benefit in sub-rules 23.10(a) and (b), and the TPD Benefit in sub-rules 23.10(c) and (d).
58 Taking each of these benefits in turn, rule 23.7 provides that a Disability Benefit is an annual pension payable in monthly instalments, or as determined by the trustee, equal to 75% of the member's final year salary and reduced by offsetting amounts as determined by the trustee under rule 23.10. Importantly under sub-rule 23.7(b)(ii), a Disability Benefit ceases when, among other things, the member ceases to be "Totally but Temporarily Disabled", upon the member's return to full-time duty, upon the Disability Benefit having been paid for two consecutive years, or upon the member reaching the Superannuation Date.
59 The kinds of amounts required to be offset against the Disability Benefit under rule 23.10 are greater than those required to be offset against the TPD Benefit. This is clear from the following matters:
(1) the preamble to sub-rule 23.10(a) requires the Disability Benefit to be reduced "by the total of the following amounts" (emphasis added); and
(2) sub-rule 23.10(a)(vi) expressly requires the trustee to offset any amounts which the trustee considers may become payable at a future date under (i) to (v) inclusive in relation to the period to which the Disability Benefit relates.
60 It follows that, unlike sub-rule 23.10(c)(v), social security and other payments must be offset under sub-rule 23.10(a)(vi) even if they are not in respect of, or do not arise out of, the disability and do not relate to the condition that resulted in the member being eligible for the Disability Benefit, providing those payments occur in the period to which the Disability Benefit relates. It can be inferred that this is because the Disability Benefit provides only a short term pension for a total but temporary disability, the purpose of which is to provide a "safety net" in the sense of ensuring that an income stream to a minimum level is available to members who are temporarily unable to work. Subject therefore to a person's entitlement to another benefit crystallising during the period of disability by virtue of the member turning 65, the scheme applying to the Disability Benefit effectively envisages that a person will be able to resume paid employment within the two year period.
61 By contrast, the TPD Benefit proceeds on the assumption that the member will never be able to resume paid employment. It is payable as a lump sum only which is measured by the member's projected retirement benefit plus a supplementary benefit and subject to the offsetting amounts under sub-rule 23.10(c): see rule 23.6 set out at [28] above. No provision is made in the Superannuation Plan for the replacement of income by an annual pension in lieu of the lump sum in the case of Total and Permanent Disablement. As such, the TPD Benefit serves a different purpose from the Disability Benefit. Thus, contrary to the Tribunal's assumption, the purpose of the TPD Benefit is not "to ensure replacement income is available to members who are unable to work." (Tribunal reasons at [34]).
62 The different purpose served by the TPD Benefit is reflected in the different criteria in terms of what is required to be offset. Thus only income or lump sum payments that may become payable in the future and which are determined to be "in respect of or arise out of the disability" and are "in relation to" the condition which resulted in the member being eligible for the TPD benefit must be offset under sub-rule 23.10(c)(v). Thus, by reason of the words "in relation to" the TPD condition in sub-rule 23.10(c)(v), a stricter nexus is required between future amounts required to be offset and the condition giving rise to the TPD entitlement than is imposed with respect to past payments required to be offset under sub-rule 23.10(c)(iv). The circumstances in which future income or lump sum payments may be offset are therefore limited to payments which serve a similar purpose to that served by the TPD Benefit. This reveals a clear and plain intention to avoid "double-dipping" with respect to future income, that is, the member being effectively paid twice in relation to the impact of the TPD condition (and the TPD condition alone) upon her or his capacity to earn an income through employment. I deal separately later with the Tribunal's rejection of the relevance of "double-dipping" to the question of construction.
63 The purpose of these provisions, as revealed by a consideration of their text, in turn explains important differences in the wording of sub-rules 23.10(a) and (c).
(1) Thus, it makes sense for sub-rule 23.10(a)(iv) to refer to "any other" income or payment (i.e. other than a payment under 23.10(a)(i) to (iii)), in circumstances where sub-rule 23.10(a)(vi) requires all future payments of a kind referred to sub-rule 23.10(a)(i) to (v) to be offset. Conceptually, in other words, the payments referred to in 23.10(a)(i) to (v) do not overlap. Consistently with this, the preamble to sub-rule 23.10(a) requires that the Disability Benefit be reduced "by the total of the following amounts" (emphasis added). As the trustee submitted, this requires the enumerated amounts to be assessed cumulatively in determining the total amount to be offset.
(2) Turning on the other hand to the TPD Benefit, it makes sense for sub-rule 23.10(c)(iv) to refer simply to "any" income or payment so as to include payments of a kind described relevantly in sub-rule 23.10(c)(ii) (i.e. social security payments) given that sub-rule 23.10(c)(v) requires only future payments of a kind described in sub-rules 23.10(c)(iv) and (v) which have the requisite connection to the disability to be offset. Consistently with this, the preamble to sub-rule 23.10(c) requires simply that the TPD Benefit be reduced "by any of the following amounts" (emphasis added). This requires, as the trustee submitted, a distributive reading of the enumerated subparagraphs.
64 It follows that the Tribunal fell into error at [31]-[33] of its reasons in drawing support from these differences between sub-rules 23.10(a) and (c) for the view that sub-rules 23.10(c)(iv) and (v) do not include social security payments to which the member is expected to become entitled as income support by reason of his disability. Nor does the construction which I favour render sub-rules 23.10(a)(ii) and (c)(ii) of the Rules otiose, contrary to the Tribunal's reasoning at [33]. In the case of sub-rule 23.10(a)(ii), social security payments constitute one of a number of separate amounts which must be excluded from the calculation of the Disability Benefit. Under sub-rule 23.10(c)(ii), social security payments which have been made must be offset, but in the case of future possible social security payments, only those of a kind which have the necessary connection to the disability may be offset.
65 Fourthly, counsel for Mr McAulay submits that this construction may have anomalous results, rendering it unlikely that it reflects the settlors' intentions. In particular, the member emphasised that sub-rule 23.10(c)(iii) requires only one third of any Loss of Licence Insurance (LLI) payment to be offset. The member submitted however, that that limit on the amount to be offset would be undermined on the trustee's construction. Specifically, Mr McAulay submitted that, if an LLI payment had already been made, the trustee would have a discretion as to whether or not to offset the whole of the LLI payment under sub-rule 23.10(c)(iv) or only one third of the payment under sub-rule 23.10(c)(iii). Equally, in his submission, the trustee would have a choice as to whether or not to characterise estimated future LLI payments as payments which may become payable under sub-rule (iv) so as to require that they be offset under sub-rule 23.10(c)(v).
66 There is some force in the member's submission that this would seem to give rise to an unlikely result. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that in order for any LLI payment to fall within sub-rules 23.10(c)(iv) and (v), it would still be necessary for the trustee to find that the LLI payments have the requisite connections with the disability and the TPD condition. It is not obvious that an LLI payment would have these connections.
67 It is ultimately unnecessary to resolve this issue in the circumstances of this case. In my view, even if sub-rule 23.10(c)(iv) as it applies to LLI payments were read down in the manner suggested by the member to avoid these consequences, that would not suffice as a reason for rejecting the force of all of the other considerations to which I have referred in determining how sub-rules 23.10(c)(iv) and (v) operate with respect to social security payments. In this regard, I would stress that different implications may be drawn as to the intended interaction between sub-rules 23(c)(iii), (iv) and (v), bearing in mind that the documentation governing superannuation schemes is often complicated and obscure, tending to be a "patchwork put together partly by way of reaction to legislative change, including (but not limited to) changes as to contracting out, preservation of benefits, equal treatment and taxation", as Walker J of the High Court (Ch Div) observed in The National Grid Company Plc v Laws [1997] PLR 157 at [65] (aff International Power Plc v Healy [2001] UKHL 20; see also Stevens v Bell at [29] (Arden LJ)).
68 Fifthly, as I have foreshadowed, the Tribunal rejected what it described as the "objection" that its preferred approach opens the way for claimants entitled to a TPD benefit to "double dip", finding that:
36. … This objection is not, however, particularly convincing, since if the [member's] TPD benefit is paid without deduction for anticipated future DSP benefits, his entitlement to DSP benefits (and thus the risk of "double dipping") is to be determined in accordance with the rules from time to time applicable to the DSP. If the Commonwealth Government has no objection to him receiving the DSP in addition to the TPD benefit, then that is a matter for the Commonwealth Government, and it is no part of the Trustee's role to pre-empt the Government's policy decisions on such matters.
69 However, in so reasoning, with respect, the Tribunal erred in dealing with the so-called "objection" at an abstract level and from the perspective of Commonwealth laws governing the DSP, instead of determining whether this was the intended purpose and effect of the rule objectively construed. For the reasons I have earlier given, it is apparent from the text of sub-rule 23.10(c)(v) that its purpose is precisely to avoid this sort of "double-dipping", notwithstanding the possibility to which the Tribunal referred that the laws governing eligibility to the DSP may change to the detriment of the member in the future. In effect, with respect, the Tribunal appears to have construed the document in light of what it regarded as the correct philosophical approach. Yet, as Arden LJ observed in Stevens v Bell at [31], the function of the Court (and equally of the Tribunal) is "to construe the document without any predisposition as to the correct philosophical approach".
70 Sixthly, the member submitted that the trustee's construction:
… has the result that a member's benefit is offset (and offset to $0) by the possibility that he may continue to be entitled to a social security payment. That is, the member loses the benefit of membership because he may continue to receive something to which any citizen is entitled whether or not they are a member of the fund. That construction is antithetical to the statutory purpose.
71 I do not accept that submission. As earlier explained, the Fund must be maintained relevantly for the ancillary statutory purpose in subs 62(1)(b)(ii) of the SIS Act of providing benefits for members of the fund where the member ceases paid work on account of ill-health: see above at [25]. Rule 23.6 provides a benefit for this purpose in order to address the members' financial needs in circumstances of Total and Permanent Disability and, together with sub-rule 23.10(c), makes provision as to how the amount of the benefit is to be calculated. In the case of the TPD Benefit, as the trustee submits, this targeted benefits approach implies that it is appropriate to reduce the benefits payable by reference to other receipts which are also likely to be payable with respect to the same events. The member's entitlement was only ever to a benefit calculated in accordance with these provisions. While from the member's perspective the result may be a harsh one, the fact that the amount offset in the individual case under a provision to avoid "double-dipping" reduced the benefit payable to nil does not therefore mean that the member has lost the benefit of membership as a matter of law. Nor does it follow that the entitlement to the benefit does not accord with the relevant ancillary purpose of SIS Act. The SIS Act does not require the trustee to provide a scheme in lieu of, or in addition to, social security.
72 Finally, contrary to the Tribunal's reasoning at [26], the examples given in clause 23.10(c)(iv) do not provide a basis for reading down the reference to "any income or lump sum payment from any source" by reference to the ejusdem generis principle. This reasoning suffers from a number of difficulties. It runs counter to the purpose of the scheme, as explained above. Furthermore, the words immediately preceding the examples given in sub-rule 23.10(c)(iv), namely "including but not restricted to", make plain the intention that the examples do not limit the kind of payments falling within the rule. By analogy, in PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2012] HCA 33; (2012) 247 CLR 240, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ held at [37]-[38] that the words "without limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes…" in a statutory definition of the term "commercial transaction" had the effect of precluding "resort to the ejusdem generis principle to limit the generality of the preceding words in the definition of 'commercial transaction'." In so holding, their Honours approved the statement by Mason J in Leon Fink Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Film Commission (1979) 141 CLR 672 at 679 that:
In this case the words "without limiting the generality of the foregoing" evince an intention that the general power should be given a construction that accords with the width of the language in which it is expressed and that this construction is not to be restricted by reference to the more specific character of that which follows. The clause therefore operates to negative the restrictive implication which might otherwise have been derived from the presence of the specific power to lend contained in para (a).
73 Further and in any event, the ejusdem generis principle can apply only where general words follow specific references and it is possible to identify a genus: Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme Board of Trustees v Kitching [2004] FCAFC 299; (2004) 139 FCR 272 at [88] (the Court). Neither requirement is met here. The general words precede the specific examples, and there is no indication that the two examples were intended to form a genus as I have explained.