JUDGMENT (Defamation - contextual truth - defendant's imputations bad in form - incapable of being carried)
1 At the conclusion of the s7A jury trial on 17October 2001, the jury found that the relevant publication carried the following defamatory imputation:
"Having interviewed the first plaintiff about his failure to stop when the crew of a disabled yacht let off flares to attract his attention, the committee investigating the 1998 Sydney to Hobart Yacht Race suspected on reasonable grounds that the first plaintiff was guilty of gross misconduct in that he failed to stop and render assistance to the crew of that yacht."
2 By paragraph 11 of the Amended Defence filed on 14 March 2002 the defendant pursuant to s 16 of the Defamation Act 1974 pleads the defence of contextual truth specifying two contextual imputations;
"(a) there were reasonable grounds to suspect that the First Plaintiff was guilty of gross misconduct in that he failed to stop and render assistance to the crew of a disabled yacht in the course of the 1998 Sydney to Hobart Yacht Race;
(b) in the light of an interview with the First Plaintiff and other relevant matters, there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that the First Plaintiff was guilty of gross misconduct in that he failed to stop and render assistance to the crew of a disabled yacht in the course of the 1998 Sydney to Hobart Yacht Race".
3 Paragraphs 12 to 16 of the Amended Defence plead interstate defences.
4 By Notice of Motion filed on 10 May of this year the plaintiffs move to have the defence of contextual truth (paragraph 11) and the interstate defences (paragraphs 12-16) struck out.
5 The second order sought can easily be dealt with. It is the expressly stated position of the plaintiffs that there is no interstate component in their case. There is no reliance upon interstate publication or republication on the question of liability and, as was expressly stated during the course of submissions, no reliance is placed in relation to damages on any publication or republication outside of New South Wales. In these circumstances paragraphs 12 to 16 of the defence are otiose and will be struck out.
6 The publication upon which the plaintiffs sued was an oral publication. The evidence of that publication during the 7A jury trial (over which I presided) was a videotape of the relevant press conference of which a transcript was produced. That transcript is appended to these reasons.
7 The plaintiffs seek to have struck out the defence of contextual truth. The defendant is not justifying the imputation found by the jury.
8 The plaintiffs attack the defence on about every basis in the steps involved in the formulation of a contextual truth defence. In McBride v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2000] NSWSC 747 (4 August 2000) I reviewed the authorities in relation to those "steps". I do not propose to repeat what I there said. The most significant development in the law in relation to s16 is the decision of the Court of Appeal in John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Blake [2001] NSWCA 434 especially in relation to s16 (2)(c) and the part particulars of truth play in the determination of whether the s16 (2)(c) "effect" reasonably can be found (see Spigelman CJ paragraphs [4], [5] and [6]).
9 In the instant case the plaintiffs must succeed on at least two of the threshold considerations. The first is the form of the contextual imputations each of which in my view lacks the requisite precision. The imputation (cause of action) to which the purported plea under s 16 has been raised as a defence is that found by the jury which is clear in its terms. The jury found that the matter complained of meant that the plaintiff actually was suspected by a named body of being guilty of gross misconduct. The two contextual imputations advanced by the defendants, as counsel for the plaintiffs submitted, "backtrack" from the actual meaning and do so by attributing to the matter complained of meanings more abstract and more vague and lesser in their import. The defect in form arises in relation to (a) and (b) by the failure to identify who or what it was that had the reasonable grounds or what is said to provide the basis of suspicion. The use of such expressions as "in the light of" and especially "other relevant matters" in my view is the impermissible employment of what are described as "weasel" words. They are so vague as to be embarrassing and add nothing to what are in effect meanings "watered down" from that found to have been carried and have no substance independent of that captured by the plaintiff's imputations.
10 I am not persuaded that either of these two meanings is good in form. Nor am I persuaded that either or both is or are reasonably capable of being carried by the matter complained of at the same time and in addition to the found imputation. If they are capable of being carried at all they are so carried in subtraction from the imputation pleaded by the plaintiff and found by the jury.
11 The "steps" to which I have referred to above are well known and are set out in Jackson v John Fairfax and Sons Pty Ltd (1981) 1 NSWLR 36 at 39G-40, Hepburn v TCN Channel Nine (1984) 1 NSWLR 386 at 400; Allen v John Fairfax and Sons Pty Ltd (NSWSC, unreported, 2 December 1988 pp8-9); Waterhouse & Anor v Hickie (1995) Aust Torts Rep 81-347 at 62,488.
12 Those steps there referred to in each case commence with propositions about the defendant's contextual imputation vis-à-vis the plaintiff's imputation. One of the antecedent "steps" is the determination of whether the publication on which the plaintiff has sued is reasonably capable of carrying the imputation upon which the defendant relies. Another antecedent "step" is the question of the form of that imputation. (There is of course an additional antecedent "step" which does not relate to the defendant's contextual imputation but rather to the plaintiff's imputation. That is the step provided for in s 16(2)(a) - the plaintiffs imputation must relate to a matter of public interest or be published under qualified privilege).
13 I have found each imputation to be bad in form and to make it quite clear I find as a matter of law that the matter complained of is incapable of carrying meanings to the purport of the proposed contextual imputations, on a reasonable basis, in addition to the meaning found by the jury which candidly must be characterised as capturing the essential sting of the publication. Further of course when one considers the essence of each of the contextual imputations sought to be relied upon by the defendant it has to be observed that each has within it the essence of the plaintiff's imputation that on reasonable grounds the plaintiff was suspected of being guilty of gross misconduct.
14 There is no need for me to consider the observations of the Chief Justice in Blake referred to above. That point namely the s16 (2)(c) "effect", is simply not here reached. What the Court of Appeal said in Blake is of course binding on me. I will merely observe that it is my respectful view that to determine whether the contextual imputation (carried and proper in form) has the effect as provided for by s16 (2)(c), one does no more than "assume" that that contextual imputation or, if more than one, those contextual imputations are "substantially true". This is a question of law to be determined on that assumption. In my view it is inappropriate to determine that question by reference to what in reality could be the shifting sands of particulars of a case to be proved (which may or may not make good that assumption). In this respect I prefer the views of Hodgson JA at paragraph [61]: that is, when one considers the true nature of the defence of contextual truth it ends up being a matter of weighing imputation against imputation.
15 Accordingly I strike out paragraph 11 of the Amended Defence.
16 The formal orders are:
- Paragraph 11 of the Amended Defence is struck out.
- Paragraphs 12 to 16 of the Amended Defence are struck out.
- The defendants are to pay the plaintiff's costs.
- The matter is stood over to the Registrar's Defamation Directions List on 12 July 2002.