Revised Ground One - Double Punishment
40Revised ground one alleged that his Honour imposed a form of double punishment in assessing the applicant's culpability for the cultivation offence.
41As noted above, a significant matter relied on by his Honour in assessment was the sophisticated aspects of the cultivation system utilised by the applicant:
"To my mind the features of the crime which are significant in assisting in making this assessment include the highly sophisticated nature of the setup that he had established for the purpose of cultivating this crop. Clearly much effort had been expended in establishing this plantation. What is more, a sophisticated electronic surveillance system had been employed which enabled him to detect any unwanted person approaching the premises ...
A disturbing feature is that he held a telecommunications device which I have described within the facts as I have found beyond reasonable doubt. True it is, he is to be sentenced in relation to his possession of that particular device but I can also take into account the fact that he had that in his possession and the only purpose for which he could have had such a device I that which I have described in the facts [ie to prevent listening devices being utilised]. ...
Additionally he is charged with diverting the electricity without authority. Again, he is charged in relation to that and he will be sentenced discretely for it but nonetheless I should also indicate that it is one of the indicia that described the relative sophistication of this particular plantation. I do not take the fact that he has committed this crime into account as an aggravating feature in this offence, but merely to indicate the relative sophistication of the establishment of this plantation.
Clearly to my mind the only real inference available as to why he did that was to ensure that the amount of electricity that was used in the cultivation of this crop did not reflect in the bill that would be payable to the electricity authority nor would it disclose the relative amount of electricity that was used in its purpose so as to attract the attention of those who might be attracted to the unusual amount of consumption of electricity for a house premises such as that to which the supply was connected." (emphasis added)
42Mr Boulten SC contended that this aspect of his Honour's reasoning involved a form of double punishment in that the circumstances of the cultivation offence were treated as being aggravated by reason of the applicant's conduct in diverting electricity and possessing the telecommunications device, conduct in respect of which he was separately sentenced. He referred to the decision in Pearce v R [1998] HCA 57; (1998) 194 CLR 610.
43In Pearce, the offender pleaded guilty to charges under s 33 and s 110 of the Crimes Act 1900 both of which had, as an element of the offence, the infliction of grievous bodily harm. The charges arose out of a course of criminal conduct involving the infliction of grievous bodily harm upon the one victim. The appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 years with a minimum term of eight years for each offence. The sentences were made wholly concurrent. The High Court found that each of these sentences contained a portion of punishment for the infliction of grievous bodily harm upon the victim and this constituted a form of double punishment (at [40] to [43] per McHugh, Hayne and Callinan JJ; Gummow J agreeing at [69], contra Kirby J at [132]):
"40. To the extent to which two offences of which an offender stands convicted contain common elements, it would be wrong to punish that offender twice for the commission of the elements that are common. No doubt that general principle must yield to any contrary legislative intention, but the punishment to be exacted should reflect what an offender has done; it should not be affected by the way in which the boundaries of particular offences are drawn. Often those boundaries will be drawn in a way that means that offences overlap. To punish an offender twice if conduct falls in that area of overlap would be to punish offenders according to the accidents of legislative history, rather than according to their just deserts.
...
43. The trial judge sentenced the appellant to identical terms of imprisonment on counts 9 and 10 and made those sentences wholly concurrent. We can only conclude that the sentence on each of those counts contained a portion which was to punish the appellant for his inflicting grievous bodily harm on his victim. Prima facie, then, he was doubly punished for the one act."
44The plurality (McHugh, Hayne and Callinan JJ) then considered whether the conclusion that the appellant had been doubly punished was avoided by the making the sentences wholly concurrent and concluded it was not:
"44. Does that matter if, as was the case here, an order was made that the sentences be served concurrently?
45. To an offender, the only relevant question may be "how long", and that may suggest that a sentencing judge or appellate court should have regard only to the total effective sentence that is to be or has been imposed on the offender. Such an approach is likely to mask error. A judge sentencing an offender for more than one offence must fix an appropriate sentence for each offence and then consider questions of cumulation or concurrence, as well, of course, as questions of totality.
...
49. Looked at overall, it may well be said that the effect of the sentences imposed on this appellant was not disproportionate to the criminality of his conduct. Nevertheless, we consider that the individual sentences imposed on counts 9 and 10 were flawed because they doubly punished the appellant for a single act, namely, the infliction of grievous bodily harm. Further, to make the sentences imposed on those two counts wholly concurrent may also be said to reveal error in that to do so failed to take account of the differences in the conduct which were the subject of punishment on each count." (emphasis added)
45These passages from Pearce are often cited for the proposition that the appropriate means of sentencing for multiple offences is to first identify the appropriate sentence for each offence and to then consider questions of cumulation, concurrency as well as totality (Pearce at [45]). They also indicate, however, that at the first stage of determining the appropriate sentence for the individual offences, it is necessary to fix an individual sentence that avoids double punishment in respect of some element or aspect that one of those offences has in common with other offences that the offender is being sentenced for (Pearce at [49]).
46This is illustrated by the sentences imposed on the appellant in Pearce when his matter was remitted to this Court (R v Pearce, Court of Criminal Appeal, Sheller JA, Dowd and Hidden JJ, 18 December 1998, unreported). The sentence for the s 33 offence was confirmed but he was resentenced for the s 110 offence to a fixed term of two years to be served concurrently with his sentence on other counts including the s 33 offence. The relatively small penalty imposed for the s 110 offence reflected the fact that he was punished for the element of inflicting grievous bodily harm in the penalty received for the s 33 offence.
47In this case although his Honour sought to avoid the suggestion that the appellant was being twice punished for possessing a telecommunications device and diverting electricity, in my view that conclusion cannot be avoided. His Honour's conclusion as to the degree of sophistication involved in the cultivation offence were part of the reasoning that lead to the finding as to the overall level of seriousness of the offence. His Honour took into account the fact that the applicant "held" (ie possessed) a telecommunications device and diverted electricity to avoid detection. Those matters were encompassed by separate charges in respect of which he received separate sentences. The level of sentences imposed for those offences, being 12 months and 3 months imprisonment, suggests that they fully reflected the criminality involved in that conduct.
48This conclusion does not, however, necessarily lead to the result that there was error on his Honour's part in the sentence arrived at for the cultivation offence. As noted, in Pearce the sentence on one of the offences was ultimately confirmed on remittal. In R v Elphick [2010] NSWCCA 112 the Crown appealed from a sentence imposed by the District Court on the respondent for affray and assault occasioning bodily harm. Each sentence consisted of a non-parole period of 18 months with a balance of term of 6 months and they were wholly concurrent with each other. The charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm had been included on a certificate under s 166 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. Both offences arose out of the same events and had a common element of unlawful violence having been inflicted on the same victim. The sentencing judge had felt restricted in imposing sentence by the two year limit applicable to the offence the subject of the s 166 certificate and expressed a concern that, in order to avoid double punishment, he could not sentence the respondent for the affray on the basis of the unlawful violence also the subject of the assault offence (at [25]).
49This Court concluded that sentencing judge was not so constrained. Grove J, with whom Allsop P and Hislop J agreed, held (at [26] to [30]):
"26 Those observations [of the sentencing judge] reveal a misapplication of the cited authority [ie Pearce]. The vice to be avoided is "punishing an offender twice" but this does not require ignoring elements which are common to overlapping offences.
27 In the present case it would have been apt to consider, independently, the facts and circumstances relevant to sentence for the indicted offence of affray and proceed to sentence accordingly. No inhibition on so doing is provided by the existence of the offence on the s 166 certificate.
28 The strictures in the extract from Pearce are focussed upon the avoidance of double punishment not on the structure of sentence imposition. The fact that the mechanics of dealing with the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, in the absence of election, placed a limit on the term for that offence does not operate to inhibit an appropriate sentence being imposed for the offence of affray.
29 If the offence of affray is first dealt with, then when turning to deal with the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, any necessary step in assessment of punishment for that crime to avoid that which would amount to double punishment can be taken.
30 In my view, the Judge's perception that the statutory constraint which limited sentence for assault occasioning actual bodily harm to imprisonment for 2 years restrained him from imposing a greater sentence than that for the offence of affray was incorrect and it was a material error to apply that perception when pronouncing sentence."
50Consistent with these observations, it was open and in fact appropriate for his Honour to consider the common "elements" or aspects to the various charges in the course of sentencing for the cultivation offence first before addressing the offences on the s 166 certificate including the charges of diverting electricity and possessing a telecommunications device.
51In my view the potential for double punishment arose at the later point in the sentencing judgment when his Honour imposed custodial sentences for the diversion and possession charges. It is at this point that a tension arises between the approaches taken in various authorities to fix a sentence that avoids double punishment. In Elphick, Grove J proceeded to resentence the respondent to 3 years imprisonment on the affray offence (at [44]). In relation to the sentence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, his Honour stated (at [45]):
"... I would not intervene in respect of the extant sentence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm but an order permitting concurrent service whereby the entirety of that sentence will be subsumed within the non-parole period of the sentence for affray will, as contemplated by Pearce, avoid any double punishment of the respondent."
52With respect, I doubt that Pearce "contemplated" the avoidance of double punishment by making the sentences concurrent. To the contrary, in Pearce the use of concurrency was found not to have avoided double punishment. Instead it was found to have masked the "flaw" in the individual sentences which arose from the double punishment for the element of causing grievous bodily harm to the one victim that was common to both offences (Pearce at [43]). I note that a similar approach to that of Grove J in Elphick on this issue was adopted by Kirby J in Kinchela v R [2010] NSWCCA 167 at [47] (Hodgson JA and Whealy J agreeing).
53However, it is unnecessary to consider it further on this appeal. In my view if there is any error it only arises in respect of the sentences for diverting electricity and possession of a telecommunications device and not for the cultivation offence. To have ignored those matters in describing the sophistication of the applicant's system of cultivation would have been artificial. It would have run the risk that the overall sentence would not reflect the totality of the applicant's conduct in cultivating prohibited plants. I do not understand the applicant to be seeking leave to appeal in respect of the sentences imposed for the divert electricity and supply charges. Unlike the sentences considered by the High Court in Pearce those sentences have now been served in their entirety.
54Further, even if his Honour erred by considering the diversion of electricity and the possession of the telecommunications device in determining the applicant's culpability for the cultivation offence I would still have concluded that no other sentence was "warranted in law" (s 6(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912). Leaving aside any consideration of the diversion of electricity or the telecommunications device, the applicant was still operating a sophisticated cultivation system involving a number of plants just short of the large commercial quantity.
55I reject ground one.