39 Mr O'Loughlin, QC who appeared with Mr Keogh for the second defendant disputed that any such inference was open. He pointed to the provisions of the Act and the terms of the certificate itself. He contended that a determination was required, under the Act, to be made in accordance with Division 3. This necessarily meant that the Panel would, consistent with s 28LJ, ignore any non-secondary psychological impairment. It was contended that the very exercise carried out by the Panel of determining a degree of psychiatric impairment and then stating that the impairment met the threshold and no more, was consistent with the exercise being carried out in accordance with law. The sole focus of its task, he contended, was to address the degree of impairment consistent with the Act - not to articulate what was secondary and what was primary. He argued that the distinction between primary and secondary impairment is a distinction well known to psychiatrists practising in the personal injuries field and has been so since the Transport Accident Act 1986 and the Accident Compensation Act 1985 were amended in the mid 1990's. He relied upon passages in Winneke P's judgment Lincoln referring to the distinction. He contended that it was not necessary for the Panel to state in terms that it had disregarded the secondary as it was implicit that it would have done so. He argued that the symptoms noted by the Panel at the time of its examination all pointed towards a primary psychiatric impairment and that this was the subject of its determination. Ultimately he contended that if the Panel was guilty of any error, it may simply have been of deciding the facts wrongly and that such a finding was not susceptible to judicial review. In respect of the adequacy of the reasons he argued that it could be implied from the reasons that the Panel had put to one side any consideration of secondary psychological impairment.