116 Counsel for Courtenay Polymers relied upon Rentokil Pty Ltd v Lee[21] in support of his contention that a 'related company' is to be construed as one operating within the same industry as Courtenay Polymers.
117 In Rentokil the appellant employer had a number of "streams" of business. The respondent, a former employee, was employed in one of those streams. The restraint clause in question relevantly sought to restrain the respondent from carrying on, being associated with or engaged or interested in the stream of business of the employer. It was held at first instance that the clause sought to restrain the employee from engaging in any of the various streams of business. On appeal it was held that the correct construction was that the restraint was limited to the particular stream in which the respondent had been employed and did not extend to the other streams of business.
118 The decision in Rentokil is not relevantly applicable to the position here. In Rentokil there was a basis in the terms of the agreement itself for construing the restraint as applying only to the "stream" of business in which the particular employee had been employed. Here there is no such basis. There is nothing in the deed to suggest that "related company" refers only to a company operating within the same industry as Courtenay Polymers.
119 In my view this term, in its reference to "any related company", is relevantly similar to the clause in issue in IF Asia Pacific v Galbally,[22] as was the submission of APC and Mrs Woon. In that case, the plaintiff ("IF"), one of a group of companies known as the IF group, carried on a consultancy business. IF alleged that the defendants, former employees of IF, breached restraint of trade covenants. One of these covenants relevantly provided that the defendants could not "offer to perform services and otherwise solicit the custom of any person or corporation which at any time during your company's contract with it was a client of IF or its related companies."[23] There was no definition of "related companies" and there was confusion in the evidence as to the entities in the corporate group.[24]
120 Dodds-Streeton J held that the clause could not be restricted to services, custom or business "the same as or similar to" those of IF. The text of the clause and the contractual documents displayed generality rather than ambiguity, and to incorporate the restriction would have been to remake the clause rather than give expression to its real meaning.
121 In the present case there is also generality, not ambiguity. To restrict the term in the manner suggested by Courtenay Polymers' submissions would be to remake the clause.
122 As to the submission regarding the geographical limitation, this does not assist in reading down the expression "any related company". The evidence does not establish that it is the only company in the group with activities in Victoria. In submissions, Courtenay Polymers contended that the non-existence of related companies in Victoria was apparent from the evidence. In response to questioning counsel conceded that the evidence of this was silence.[25] Further, the reference to "any related company" must have been intended to have some operation. If the clause were limited to Courtenay Polymers, the reference to "any related company" would be superfluous.
Conclusion on validity of deed of separation restraint of trade
123 The deed of separation restraint of trade term (clause 7) is too wide. The term cannot be restricted to the business of a related company operating within the same industry as Courtenay Polymers. It cannot be restricted to companies operating in Victoria. There is no satisfactory evidence of who the related companies are or what their businesses are. The term is invalid on this ground.
The non-solicitation provision
124 The deed of separation provides, in clause 8, that Mr Deang will not "for a period of 12 months ... directly or indirectly ... solicit ... or have any business dealing away [sic] any person ... who has at any time during [his] employment with the Employer been a customer of the Employer". This term does not have the impermissible width of the restraint of trade provision already considered. In my view its terms are reasonable to protect Courtenay Polymers' legitimate business interests. Mr Deang has breached this provision as a result of his significant role in the APC business and the dealings that business had in the 12 months after 7 February 2003 with Johnson Matthey and with ARI.
Contract claims - pre 7 February 2003 conduct
125 Under clause 7.2 of the employment agreement Mr Deang undertook and warranted not to disclose confidential information or use it for his own purposes. Under clauses 1 and 2 of the confidentiality agreement Mr Deang agreed not to reveal any of the trade secrets, confidential operations, processes or dealings or any information concerning the organisation, business finances or affairs of Courtenay Polymers, and not to use any such information in any manner which might cause loss to Courtenay Polymers.
126 Evidence was given by both Mr Hansen and Mr You (Hyundai) as to the dealings they had with each other in January and early February 2003 resulting in the first order, for 33 metric tonnes, of the material known as UR654 from ARI to Hyundai. Mr Hansen's evidence was that he became aware of the product as a result of his general knowledge of world suppliers, research on the internet, and telephone contact with Mr You. Mr You gave evidence, which I accept in its entirety, which indicated that information about UR654 was published on the internet and was available from Hyundai on request.
127 Courtenay Polymers alleges misuse of confidential information concerning its products. In final oral submissions counsel for Courtenay Polymers would not identify what specific confidential product information was alleged to have been disclosed. My perception is that this aspect of the claim was all but abandoned because the relevant information was not confidential. To the extent that this aspect of the claim was pursued, I reject it on the ground that Courtenay Polymers has failed to establish that Mr Hansen was at any relevant time in possession of confidential information concerning Hyundai's product UR654 or Courtenay Polymers' product 9050.
128 The position in relation to the customer information concerning ARI was, in effect, subsumed in the submission that Mr Hansen was a part of the combination, which included Mr Deang, who together established APC. It seems to me that it must follow from the conclusions I have reached concerning Mr Deang's involvement in the APC business that he disclosed all the information he had concerning ARI to those establishing APC. This disclosure may never have involved any specific communication. In the circumstances here, Mr Deang, in effect, transposed everything he knew concerning ARI from Courtenay Polymers to those setting up the APC business. At least some of this information was confidential.
129 In the circumstances I find that Mr Deang breached clause 7.2 of the employment agreement and clauses 1 and 2 of the confidentiality agreement.
The claim against Mrs Woon - accessory liability
130 For the reasons given, I proceed on the basis that there is no claim made against Mrs Woon in relation to any alleged contractual breach by Mr Deang. The only claim pleaded is that Mrs Woon is liable to compensate Courtenay Polymers pursuant to s 1317H of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) as a person involved in a contravention of the Act within the meaning of s 79.
131 Mrs Woon has allowed herself to be used as a means of concealing the true position in relation to both the management of, and the equity holdings in, APC. She has done this at the request of Mr Chan. There is no evidence that she has had any involvement with Mr Deang. Whilst her role in this matter is not one which reflects well on her, I accept her evidence as to her ignorance of APC's business.
132 Courtenay Polymers' submissions concerning Mrs Woon were based upon her position as the sole director of APC and what was submitted to be "constructive" accessory liability as a consequence.
133 The necessary basis for liability under s 79 and ss 181(2), 182(2) and 183(2) is knowledge of the essential facts which constitute the contraventions.[26] The knowledge required is actual, not constructive.[27]
134 The evidence does not establish actual knowledge by Mrs Woon of the essential facts of Mr Deang's contraventions.
The claims against APC
135 The position in relation to APC is different. Mr Chan had actual knowledge of the essential facts. On the basis of the evidence to which I have referred establishing Mr Deang's involvement in the APC business, and the evidence which has led me to conclude there was concealment of Mr Deang's involvement in the APC business, I conclude that Mr Chan had actual knowledge of the fact that Mr Deang was assisting in the establishment of a competing business whilst still an employee and a director of Courtenay Polymers, and that Mr Deang was conducting, or assisting in the conduct of, that business before and after his resignation as a director and employee.
136 The claims against APC are made on the basis of s 79 and ss 181(2), 182(2) and 183(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and under that were described as both limbs of Barnes v Addy.[28]
137 Amongst other things, counsel for APC submitted it cannot be liable under s 79 for contraventions which occurred prior to 20 February 2003 when it was incorporated.
138 In Barnes v Addy, it was held that strangers are not to become liable as if they were trustees unless they receive and become chargeable with some part of the trust property, or they assist with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the trustees. In the modern context, accessory liability for breaches of fiduciary duty by directors arises where a person dishonestly assists the defaulting fiduciary[29] or where a person receives property, with requisite knowledge, not necessarily amounting to dishonesty, which has been dealt with by the defaulting fiduciary.[30]
139 Here, APC, upon its incorporation, had actual knowledge of all the essential facts. Its only officer is Mrs Woon. She is merely a front. The person or persons who constitute the true "mind" of APC cannot be identified with certainty but they certainly include Mr Chan, and, my conclusion is that they also include Mr Deang. Each of them had actual knowledge of all the essential facts.
140 The activity which I have found constituted a breach of statutory and fiduciary duties by Mr Deang commenced prior to 7 February 2003 and continued thereafter. Whilst still an employee and director of Courtenay Polymers before 7 February 2003, he established with Mr Chan, and perhaps others, a competing business, and he conducted that business in a manner intended to conceal his involvement thereafter. APC was an important part of this course of activity, particularly the concealment. As the Dellow decision makes clear, the breach of duty does not stop at the point of resignation.
141 APC is liable as a person involved in Mr Deang's contravention of his statutory duties. It aided and abetted the contravention and was knowingly concerned in it. Its involvement began immediately upon its incorporation and it had knowledge of the essential facts immediately upon its incorporation.
142 It is also liable under the second limb of Barnes v Addy for dishonestly assisting Mr Deang in his breaches of fiduciary duty. Whilst the submissions asserted liability under the first limb of Barnes v Addy, no proprietary remedy is sought. Given my other findings, it is unnecessary to determine whether APC is liable on this basis.
Other issues
143 The claim for intentionally inducing breach of the deed of separation fails because I have found the only term which is the subject of this claim to be invalid.
144 APC and Mrs Woon made substantial submissions on an alleged absence of proof of any damage. I find that there was damage suffered by Courtenay Polymers. A new competitor, APC, has captured part of the business of one of its customers, ARI. The quantum of the loss is a separate issue. The issue of relief in this proceeding is not confined to compensatory damages and it is preferable that all issues of relief are dealt with together after the parties have had the opportunity to consider these reasons.
Conclusions on claims other than the misappropriation claims
145 My conclusions on the claims made, other than the misappropriation claims, are accordingly as follows: