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[2021] VSC 145
Supreme Court of Victoria
2021-03-31
Nichols, J
Original judgment source is linked above.
CONTRACT - Causation - Remoteness - Loss of opportunity - Whether breach of contract caused loss of opportunity - Standard of proof for determining whether breach caused loss of opportunity - Standard of proof for determining plaintiff's hypothetical conduct for purposes of causation - Where no loss proven plaintiff is entitled only to nominal damages - Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex 341 - Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332 - Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 54; (1991) 174 CLR 64 - Crown Insurance Services Pty Ltd v National Mutual Life Association of Australia Ltd ;
CORPORATIONS - Oppression - Whether conduct in breach of shareholders agreement was oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly discriminatory - Whether plaintiff entitled to order for purchase of shares - Orders for purchase of shares compensatory in nature - Plaintiff to be placed in no better position than had the oppressive conduct not occurred -Wayde v New South Wales Rugby League [1985] HCA 68; (1985) 180 CLR 459 - Campbell v Backoffice Investments [2009] HCA 25; (2009) 238 CLR 304 - Wain v Drapac (No 2) [2013] VSC 381 - Donaldson v Natural Springs Australia Ltd [2015] FCA 498 - Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 232, 233.
1 The plaintiff, KSG Investments Pty Ltd (KSG), is a minority shareholder in the defendant, Open Markets Group Ltd (Open Markets), which was established in 2012 and operates a digital platform for trading in Australian securities markets. Kosmas Galtos, KSG's sole shareholder and director, was employed as Open Markets' CEO during 2012 and 2013 and was, between July 2012 and April 2013, one of its directors.
2 In October 2012, Open Markets and its six original shareholders including KSG, entered into a shareholders agreement (SHA). The agreement contained terms governing the issue of new securities, to the effect that any proposed issue of shares must be the subject of a major shareholders' resolution, that new securities must be first offered to existing shareholders in their respective shareholding proportions by the service of written notice, and that existing shareholders may "mop up" any shares not taken up by other existing shareholders according to the process set out in the SHA.
3 KSG alleges that between July 2013 and March 2016, Open Markets issued a number of ordinary shares without complying with those requirements. Open Markets' alleged breaches of the SHA form the basis of KSG's claim, which is in two parts.
4 First, KSG claims damages from Open Markets for breach of the SHA. KSG says it received no notice of the new allotments and was as a result, deprived of its rights to participate in those allocations. As at July 2013 KSG held 9.5% of Open Markets' issued shares. The company's failure to invite KSG to purchase shares in accordance with its proportionate entitlement caused KSG not to exercise its rights to take up shares which KSG would have exercised had it received offers in accordance with the SHA, each time new securities were issued. KSG's pleaded case was that it would have purchased every share that it was entitled to purchase under the SHA, and would, in 2016, have sold the shares at a profit. Its loss is calculated as the difference between that profit and the costs that KSG would have incurred to purchase the shares.
5 Second, KSG alleges that the allotment of shares in breach of the SHA had the effect of diluting KSG's shareholding, and was oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or discriminatory against, it within the meaning of s 232 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), as was the failure by Open Markets to produce certain records sought by KSG. KSG seeks an order under s 233(1)(e) that Open Markets purchase its shares at fair value, with an appropriate reduction of the company's share capital.[1]
6 The alleged breaches of the SHA in connection with the issue of new securities were, at least by the end of the trial, substantially admitted by Open Markets. The principal issues in contention are, on the breach of contract claim, whether Open Markets' breaches of the SHA (admitted or otherwise established) caused KSG to suffer any loss and whether KSG has proved that loss and, on the oppression claim, whether the conduct of the company's affairs falls within s 232 in circumstances in which relief in the form of a buy-out order should be granted.
7 Open Markets contended that KSG has established neither that any breaches of the SHA caused loss to KSG, nor the existence of a loss, to the requisite standard of proof. It also says that its conduct in breach of the SHA ought not be considered as oppressive of or unfairly prejudicial to KSG, at least because there was no evidence that KSG was treated any differently to any other shareholder in relation to the provision of offers for the relevant share allocations, and because its conduct did not cause KSG to suffer any loss; its conduct was not damaging to KSG's rights in a manner that was unjust or inequitable.
8 In order determine the oppression claim it is necessary to consider the circumstances in which the company's issues of new shares occurred, notwithstanding the admitted breaches of the shareholders agreement.
9 There are 17 share allocations the subject of the claim.[2] They are set out in Schedule 1 to these reasons, which also sets out share sales (transfers) and allocations that occurred between 2013 and 2019.
10 Kosmas (Kos) Galtos gave evidence for KSG. His father, Con Galtos, gave evidence on the subject of the funds available to Kosmas and KSG to purchase shares in Open Markets. Each was cross-examined. KSG's solicitor, Omar El-Hissi, a principal at NOH Legal, produced documents on an application that occurred during the trial and gave evidence about communications between himself and Open Markets' solicitor in the course of separate litigation between Kosmas Galtos and Open Markets, in 2013. He was not cross-examined.
11 Open Markets called two witnesses: Emlyn Scott, a founder and director of Open Markets, and Andrea Marani, who was until February 2020, the company's Chief Executive Officer and Managing Director. Each was cross-examined. Both parties called forensic accounting evidence concerning KSG's claim for damages.
12 The business idea that became Open Markets was developed by Emlyn Scott and Rick Klink. In early 2012, while he was Chief Executive Officer of the National Stock Exchange of Australia (NSX) Mr Scott, with NSX's blessing, commenced developing an online stockbroker and engaged Mr Klink's company, Paritech Pty Ltd (Paritech) to build a financial information exchange platform to enable electronic trading on the NSX. Mr Scott learned that there was little interest in connecting with the NSX, amongst existing online stockbrokers. He and Mr Klink then decided to build their own online broker which would connect with the NSX and began to establish the business and to commence capital raising. Mr Scott took responsibility for designing the trading platform and raising funds, and Mr Klink took charge of developing the platform. Mr Scott recruited Brian Price, the then Chairman of the Financial and Energy Exchange which owned the majority stake in NSX, who invested an initial $15,000. Mr Klink and Mr Scott decided that they would seek to acquire the necessary Australian Financial Services licences from a dormant company, in order to contain costs and streamline the licence acquisition process.
13 By about mid-2012 Emlyn Scott and Rick Klink were looking to engage someone to set up the company and other structures that would become the vehicle for the business. Mr Scott knew Mr Galtos through a mutual friend and, shortly after meeting him, engaged him to undertake a number of tasks on a part-time basis, including incorporating the company and engaging lawyers and accountants to prepare corporate documents, which Mr Galtos did.
14 Kosmas Galtos was also charged with acquiring financial services licences from a dormant stockbroker, Camerons Stockbrokers Limited (Camerons). Mr Klink had found the licences for sale and assigned Mr Galtos to handle the purchase negotiation with Camerons.
15 Open Markets was incorporated on 26 July 2012 with one ordinary share.[3] At its commencement, Mr Galtos was its sole director and KSG was its sole shareholder.
16 When the company structure was formalised in October 2012, Open Markets appointed an additional director, Mark Darras (whom Mr Galtos had recruited), and issued 100,000 ordinary shares to a number of initial investors, fully paid to $100,000.
17 As at 20 October 2012, Open Markets had six shareholders (the original shareholders) as follows:
18 On 11 October 2012, Open Markets and the initial members entered into the shareholders agreement. The relevant provisions of the SHA are set out in Schedule 2 to these reasons.[3]
19 Further share allotments were made between November 2012 and July 2013, and as at July 2013, the shareholdings were as follows:
20 KSG maintained its shareholdings at 9.5% of the company's issued capital during that period.
21 It is apparent from the transactions set out in schedule 1 that original shareholders Iron Mountain Pty Ltd (Iron Mountain), Paritech (Rick Klink's company) and Serpantine Pty Ltd (Serpantine, Emlyn Scott's company) took up shares in the July 2013 allocation but did not subsequently acquire shares in the relevant period. Mr Scott's second company Beaupride Pty Ltd (Beaupride) acquired shares in the July 2013, as did entities owned by his brother and nephew. Entities owned by Mr Scott's brother acquired shares in January and February 2014, in August 2014 and in June 2016. It is also apparent that numerous people and entities other than the original shareholders became shareholders during that period.
22 Emlyn Scott's evidence was that he did not believe that between July 2013 and March 2016 that Open Markets had sent out any "subscription notices" (that is, offers required by clause 11 of the SHA to be made by written notice to the original shareholders to take up new securities), to any shareholders. That evidence was consistent with the fact the company produced no documents evidencing compliance with clause 11 and was reflected in Open Markets' admissions.
23 KSG relied on two documents by which it sought to establish Open Markets' consciousness of the notice and offer requirements of the SHA, or a practice of sorts that reflected such an awareness.
24 The first was a draft proposed members circulating resolution dated in January 2013 concerning an issue of 31,484 new fully paid ordinary shares that, according to the document, had been made in December 2012. The resolution proposed retrospective approval of the share offer and also proposed an amendment to the shareholders agreement for the purposes of that offer, to the effect that the 're-offer' provisions by which shortfall shares were to be offered to shareholders who had accepted shares offered to them (by clauses 11.5(3) and 11.6 of the SHA) were not to apply, and further that the Board may offer any shortfall remaining after the application of clauses 11.5(1) and (2) to any person on the terms of the offer and without a major directors resolution during a stated period. The document was signed only by Emlyn Scott for Serpantine and concerns a period prior to the relevant period. It is nonetheless instructive because it reveals that the processes for share offers adopted by Open Markets at the commencement of the relevant period expressly contemplated that the requirements of the shareholders agreement in respect of the issue of new securities must be complied with unless varied and also because, at that time, it anticipated that a resolution by all shareholders would include KSG, for which provision had been made on the signing clause of the document.
25 The second document was a proposed special majority shareholders resolution concerning the July 2013 share issue, likely dated at about 25 July 2013. The document was executed only by Mr Scott for Serpantine and Price for Iron Mountain, but had been prepared on the basis that it would be executed by Serpantine, Paritech, Remgrid and Iron Mountain - omitting Mauconla Holdings and KSG who were the remaining original shareholders. It stated that the participating shareholders held 85.6% of the issued shares, a proportion of shareholders sufficient to pass a major shareholders resolution. [4] It said in effect that the company was in need of urgent re-capitalisation and that the parties proposed to issue, and had in fact issued, shares to the persons named in the schedule. The schedule named those investors who in fact took up shares in July 2013. Like the resolution proposed in January 2013, this document, although it contemplated a different process, evidenced an appreciation by Open Markets at that time that the issue of shares required observance of the relevant provisions of the SHA.
26 Open Markets' processes are considered further in Part D below in relation to the claim for relief under s 233 of the Corporations Act.
Information about capital raising sent to shareholders
27 Information about proposed new securities offers was sent to shareholders and prospective investors throughout the period. KSG's case was that Open Markets' provision of information to shareholders was relevant to its claim for relief under s 233 of the Corporations Act, essentially because it was unfairly deprived of information that other shareholders had received. KSG's response to Open Markets' publications that it did receive during the period is relevant to the causation element of KSG's claim for damages for breach of the SHA, as discussed below in Part C.
28 Emlyn Scott did not become a director of Open Markets until December 2015, but was, from the inception of the company until around late 2015, the person mainly responsible for capital raising both internally and through external investors. He prepared or was involved in the preparation of financial forecasts, promotional documents called 'pitch decks' (investor-focused presentations, each pitching an offer of shares at an anticipated price) and related memoranda which were sent to, and used in communications with potential investors. He was also involved in the preparation of written shareholder updates which were periodically sent to existing shareholders. The shareholder updates included information about capital raisings and significant milestones reached by Open Markets. Mr Scott's evidence was that it was unlikely that new shareholders would have invested without first receiving information of the kind contained in the information memoranda or pitch decks, but said that the company's pitch for new investors was often made personally, including by Mr Scott and Mr Klink, and investors were brought into the company by their relationships with Mr Scott, Mr Klink and others.
29 The three original shareholders who took up new shares in July 2013 (Paritech, Serpantine and Iron Mountain) plainly had opportunity to invest in the company at that time. Neither they nor the remaining shareholders Remgrid (Mr Klink's company) nor Mauconla Holdings (Mr Darras' company) subsequently invested. Mr Scott said that he was always aware of what was going on within Open Markets because he was in constant dialogue with management and the board.
30 Mr Scott was closely involved with capital raisings in the period between July 2013 to March 2016. Communications to potential investors were sent via Open Markets' customer management system, about which there was no substantive evidence. The process changed once Andrea Marani, who was appointed Chief Executive Officer in June 2016 (at the time at which he joined Open Markets' board), appointed an external company secretary, Kim Clark, who assumed responsibility for communications with shareholders.
31 In September 2016 Ms Clark sent an email to existing shareholders asking them to update their information. Mr Marani said that he was informed at about that time that Kosmas Galtos had responded to Ms Clark's email and complained that he had not received certain shareholder notices, and in response Mr Marani instructed Ms Clark to ensure that all communications directed to shareholders, including any notices, were sent to Mr Galtos in his capacity as director of KSG. He also instructed Genevieve Wood, Open Markets' marketing manager, to ensure that all updates and notifications were sent to all shareholders. The exchanges between Mr Galtos and Open Markets at that time, are discussed below.
32 Throughout the period there was little interest among existing shareholders in taking up shares on offer. As Mr Scott put it, "no-one took up their allotments". That was consistent with the documentary evidence of shareholdings in Open Markets during the relevant period (see schedule 1). Andrea Marani's assessment of the company's attempts at capital raising after July 2013 was that most existing shareholders would not respond to capital raising efforts and Open Markets was reliant on two or three major existing shareholders or forced to look outside the existing shareholders to increase capital investment.
33 The documentary record as to information memoranda, pitch decks and like materials concerning capital raising created by the company, was incomplete. Open Markets did not produce a comprehensive set of documents and nor did KSG proffer comprehensive evidence about what it did and did not receive. It is likely that promotional materials were produced and distributed for most, if not all, share allocations. Certain of those materials, of which there was evidence, and which KSG did receive, are discussed in Part C.
34 KSG's oppression claim (which is considered in Part D below) focussed on the 'dilution' of its shares and the exclusion of the KSG from opportunities to invest. It was not established that Open Markets issued shares in order to dilute KSG's shareholding. Throughout the period Open Markets engaged in fundraising because it was in need of working capital. Open Markets was, throughout the period, growing its business and attracting investment, but it remained a start-up enterprise.
35 The purpose of the July 2013 share issue was to fund the purchase of Camerons stockbrokers in order to acquire the licences necessary to operate, and to fund the establishment of a trading desk. Open Markets launched online equity trading including on the ASX and NSX in late September 2013. In a pitch to investors in October 2013, the company described itself as a new entrant in the online broking market which was, it said, substantially controlled by the four major banks. It aimed to take market share by offering lower prices, high automation, and integration of third party resources on its platform.
36 In October 2013, Open Markets was projecting it would 'break even' by May 2014 and that it would produce a positive EBIT by the final quarter of 2014, returning a profit of just over $200,000.
37 The company's financial statements recorded net losses before tax, in each of the years 2014, 2015 and 2016.
38 Open Markets formally engaged Kosmas Galtos as Chief Executive Officer in November 2012. He was to be paid gross remuneration of $175,000 per annum plus other un-specified performance-linked incentives. His letter of appointment noted that he owned approximately 9.5% of the issued capital of the company.
39 Mr Galtos' remuneration, and the means by which he paid for the shares that were issued to KSG, were in issue on the question of KSG's financial positon and its ability to have funded the acquisition of shares in Open Markets in and after mid-2013. That broader issue is considered later. Consideration for the shares issued to KSG was by given by Open Markets deducting moneys from amounts that were otherwise payable to KSG for services performed by Mr Galtos in accordance with his agreed remuneration, with Mr Galtos' consent. As to the balance of his remuneration, Open Markets did not in fact pay Mr Galtos until about February 2013. Although the company's letter appointing Mr Galtos was silent as to this fact, Emlyn Scott's evidence, which was un-contradicted, was that it was agreed that Mr Galtos would not be paid until the business "went live", which did not occur until 2014. However, Mr Galtos told Mr Scott in about February 2013 that he had run out of money and needed to be paid a salary, having not received an income since he had left his previous employment in late 2011. Thereafter, Open Markets paid Mr Galtos a salary, through KSG.
40 Mr Galtos' position as CEO was terminated on 9 April 2013. From about February 2013 Emlyn Scott had had what he said were "major concerns" about Mr Galtos' performance, specifically that he was not attending for work, was late for meetings and was not sufficiently familiar with the project management functions of his role. In about April 2013, Rick Klink, Mark Darras (the then Chairman of Open Markets) and Mr Scott met to discuss Galtos' position and decided that he would be terminated. The financial terms of the termination were relevant, on Open Markets' case, to the causation question on the claim for damages for breach of contract, which is considered in Part C below.
41 Mr Darras wrote to Mr Galtos[5] by email on 8 April 2013, referring to their discussion two days earlier (the content of which was not described, either in the email or by any witness), attaching a letter described as Mr Galtos' letter of resignation as CEO of Open Markets and indicating that 'financial amounts' would be sent through in a subsequent email. The attached letter was dated 9 April 2013 from Open Markets and was signed by both Mr Galtos and Mr Darras. Although the letter was signed, it evidently expressed Mr Darras' version of the terms on which Mr Galtos and Open Markets would part ways. The letter stated that it had been agreed that the contract for services between Open Markets and KSG would cease on 9 April 2013, on which date Mr Galtos would cease to be Chief Executive Officer of the company. The company would pay all accrued amounts owing to KSG and an additional amount said to represent three times the normal monthly fee, in the sum of $43,750. One half of that amount was to be paid 'immediately', and the balance on 20 May 2013, subject to KSG issuing tax invoices for those payments. Open Markets thanked Mr Galtos for his agreement to cooperate in handing over responsibilities and acknowledged and thanked him for his efforts in establishing the company and its business.
42 Mr Galtos responded at 6.14pm that day (8 April) by emailing Michael Wilton of Norton Rose Fulbright, Open Markets' solicitors at that time, raising a number of matters. Relevantly, Mr Galtos said that,
KSGI has historically accepted payment of 50% of invoice in cash (15th of each month) and converted the remainder to take up shares during capital raisings.
KSGI will not accept shares in lieu of cash payment for March invoice or the settlement amounts. ...
The proposed letter requires amendment to ....
43 Later that day, Michael Wilton responded to Mr Galtos, saying, without prejudice, that Open Markets would look at proceeding on "this basis", which I infer meant the basis set out in Mr Galtos' earlier email, and asked him to identify the shares that had been issued to KSG or were to be issued and "the prices", which I infer means the prices at which the shares had been issued or were to be issued.
44 Mr Galtos responded later again on 8 April 2013 (at 10.55 pm), and said relevantly that,
Records relating to $19,988.89 owing in shares, at the price contained in the Circulating resolution approved by all shareholders and printed in the office (file on server) to KSG Investments can be seen in the MYOB accounts (Share Capital account). ... It appears that a new Director has been appointed, but as a Director and Shareholder, I have not yet received written notification or formal advise [sic] of this action. No discussion has taken place as to timings for the next Board meeting and am concerned, as a Director, to proper transitional and ongoing arrangements being defined, agreed to and put in place as and when this matter is concluded. .... Looking forward to ... a speedy conclusion, so we may get on with bringing this business to market and getting things back onto the most positive footing possible.
45 Mr Galtos' statements in these emails of his preference for cash in lieu of shares and in relation to shares not yet issued but to be issued for which the sum of $19,988.89 had been retained by Open Markets, is relevant to the issue of his interest more broadly in acquiring shares in Open Markets. Mr Galtos was cross-examined on this evidence, as discussed below.
46 On 12 April 2013, Mr Klink wrote to the other directors of Open Markets advising that Mr Darras had resigned that day as both Director and Chairman, indicating he would assume the interim Chairman role. Later the same day Mr Galtos wrote to Mr Klink saying that he had received no reply to his emails or voicemails to Mr Klink and Mr Darras regarding payments due that day and asking for confirmation that funds would be transferred by the close of business that day.
47 On 15 April 2013 (at 3.43pm), Mr Galtos wrote to Mr Klink, Mr Scott, Mr Price and Mr Darras (copied to his solicitor) saying, relevantly:
I also look forward to receiving the updates previously requested ... on the status of the Cameron's acquisition (particularly if the agreement has been executed), the $640k deposit of funds from an investor (referred to in mails) and notification of the date and time for a board meeting to appoint a new CEO (in accordance with the SHA). I look forward to prompt receipt of all information that Directors are entitle [sic] to under the Corporations Act and the Shareholders Agreement.
48 Again on 15 April 2013 (at 6.06 pm) Mr Galtos wrote to Mr Klink (copied to Mr Scott, Mr Darras, Mr Price and his solicitor) referring to a call from Mr Klink that afternoon. Mr Galtos said:
Per your call at 5.09pm, I anticipated a discussion about facilitating payment of the sum agreed on Wednesday, post return of all financial records to the company ...
Having been totally surprised by your request for an immediate board meeting via telephone, I advised that I did not agree to a Board meeting without notice, but was willing to have a discussion. You conferenced me into a meeting with your brother (Paul), whom did not identify himself as present, and Michael Wilton (our lawyer).
In the discussion (lasting 40 seconds), you identified that Paul was now a Director (this has not been notified to Directors or ratified by a previous Board meeting) and that you wished to freeze the bank accounts as you have concerns as to company solvency. I advised that I required appropriate financial statements in order to facilitate informed decision making and appropriate time to consider them. You further went on to infer that the agreement signed by Mark Darras on Wednesday, facilitating my resignation as CEO, was without appropriate authority. I raised the initial purpose of the call ... and you hung the phone up.
Accordingly, please be advised that I do not believe that this was a lawful board meeting. I do not acknowledge that you have been appointed as CEO or Chairman (see SHA), Paul Klink does not have legal status as a Director and that no decisions were made in the discussion, nor lawful vote taken.
KSGI reserves all it's [sic] legal rights and I notify you that, as a Director, I shall be taking independent legal advise [sic] on this matter.
Please provide me with updated financial statements and all materials required under the Shareholders Agreement by return.
49 As at 15 April 2013, ASIC recorded the appointment of each of Rick Klink and his brother Paul Klink on 12 April 2013, on which date Mr Galtos was still a Director.
50 On 16 April 2013, KSG issued a statutory demand to Open Markets requiring payment of the sum of $45,718.68.
51 On 7 May 2013, Open Markets made application under s 459G of the Corporations Act to set aside the statutory demand. It made an offsetting claim, alleging that Mr Galtos' lack of care in the management of the company and in the launching of Open Markets' online brokerage service caused the company to incur costs, and to lose capital investment and to decrease in value, giving rise to a claim against Mr Galtos in the sum of $2,109,584.
52 Before the application to set aside the demand was heard, the parties negotiated and resolved the dispute on terms that they would release each other from all claims or liabilities arising from or touching upon the subject matter of the claim for removal of the statutory demand, in exchange for Open Markets making three payments to KSG: $35,000 to be paid immediately; $34,781.18 to be paid within 7 days of signing of the agreement; and $19,988,89 to be paid by 4 August 2013. Although neither party admitted liability, Open Markets had earlier agreed that it owed the sum of $19,988.89 to KSG.
53 Mr Galtos was removed as a director on 26 April 2013. Thereafter, he played no role in Open Markets and had no personal engagement with any of the original shareholders.
54 In evidence-in-chief, Mr Galtos described his termination from Open Markets as acrimonious. It is evident from his frequent reference, during cross-examination, to the fact that Open Markets did not pay moneys owed to him without numerous demands and until after he had issued proceedings, that the company's failure to honour its agreement with him without delay or conflict was greatly troubling to him. He also considered that he had been poorly treated by Open Markets in what he regarded as a surprise move to appoint Paul Klink to the Board without engaging in the process contemplated by the shareholders agreement. Those concerns were evident, for example, in his email to Rick Klink of 15 April 2013 at 6.06pm (as set out above).
55 On the question of his parting ways with Open Markets (leaving to one side his shareholding), Mr Galtos gave the following evidence:
After 9 April 2013, save for a holding position as director ... you had no role within Open Markets after that time, did you?
---No, not at all. No, except the handover which I tried to do as quickly as possible. I remembered immediately when concluding with some advice I was given by another CEO, there's no dignity in stalking a company you used to run. You leave it to get on and let them do what they have got to do.
After that day, you had no involvement in the management of Open Markets?
---None whatsoever.
You had no insight, other than as might be published by Open Markets to you, or to others, as to what was going on within Open Markets and its activities?
---That's correct. Not even a conversation with people, Facebook friends, that worked there. Not a single thing.
56 Subsequently, Mr Galtos took no steps to have himself reinstated as a director. He was aware at all times of the right of KSG to appoint a director under the SHA.[6]
57 After Mr Galtos' termination Rick Klink was appointed Chief Executive Officer of Open Markets. Andrea Marani had been offered the position of Chief Operating Officer of Open Markets in May 2013. In about June 2016, Rick Klink resigned as Chief Executive Officer and Mr Marani was promoted into that position. At that time, Mr Marani also became a director of the company. Open Markets first appointed an external company secretary, Kim Clark, shortly after Mr Marani assumed the position of CEO.
58 The following people, then, held directorships during 2013 - 2016: Rick Klink, between 12 April 2013 until 20 April 2018; Paul Klink, between 14 April 2014 to 15 December 2015; Emlyn Scott, from 15 December 2015; Andrea Marani, from 8 June 2016; Fergus Scott, from 15 December 2015 to 22 December 2017; Lionel Brownsea, from 15 December 2015 to 13 September 2016; Belinda Darras, from 15 December 2015 until 9 February 2016; Songyu Gao, from 2 November 2016.
59 The Shareholders' Agreement was terminated in April 2016, at which time Open Markets adopted a constitution as its governing instrument.
Communications between Open Markets and KSG after August 2013
60 After the termination of Mr Galtos' employment, he and Open Markets communicated intermittently. The first record of any post-employment communication was an email sent by Genevieve Wood, Open Markets' marketing manager, to Mr Galtos on 28 January 2014, attaching two shareholder updates that had been published during 2013. The content of the email suggests that it was likely sent in response to a communication from Mr Galtos but no such communication was in evidence. Ms Wood said, in the email, that she had spoken to Rick (evidently, Rick Klink) who was, she said, happy to provide Mr Galtos with what he needed and that he should contact Rick directly by email. Mr Galtos responded, saying,
Hi Gen, thanks for sending. What I'm after is in accordance with the law to receive exactly what all other shareholders have been sent and to be equally informed. As such will you please send me anything that is missing such as any other briefings and financial reports particularly the annual report. I will write to Rick directly to [sic] clarifying concerns on the company's failures to comply with the shareholders agreement and the law.
61 Ms Wood responded, attaching three further updates, saying she would pass on Mr Galtos' email to Rick Klink, but noting that Mr Galtos would be in touch with Mr Klink and that it would be faster if Klink received direct contact from Mr Galtos. Mr Galtos responded saying:
It may be best if you ask Rick to email me, providing such information as will bring the company into compliance with the shareholders agreement and its statutory obligations;
It's really for the company to comply with its legal agreements, so I do hope it proactively contacts me to resolve outstanding matters. I appreciate what you have sent.
62 There was no evidence of Mr Galtos directly contacting Mr Klink until March 2016, in the email mentioned below.
63 On 3 February 2014 Ms Wood emailed Mr Galtos and other recipients a copy of a media release announcing the appointment of a new head of sales for Open Markets. On 1 May 2014 Mr Galtos emailed Ms Wood, forwarding a notice he had received about the expiry of a domain name registered by Open Markets and suggesting she change contact details for that service.
64 On 8 October 2014 Mr Marani sent a shareholders update dated 6 October 2014, to recipients including Mr Galtos. On 24 October 2014 Open Markets' investor relations team sent to recipients, including Mr Galtos, a notice of annual general meeting for 2014 attaching the directors' report and financial report for that year.
65 On 8 April 2015 Mr Marani sent to recipients, including Mr Galtos, a quarterly shareholders' update for March 2015 and consolidated financial statements for the 6 months to December 2015, advising of the timeline for the publication of a further update and audited financial statements.
66 On 10 March 2016 Open Markets sent to shareholders a notice that the company was seeking to an urgent injection of capital and considered that it would benefit the company to cancel the existing shareholders agreement and adopt a new constitution. The email to Mr Galtos was addressed individually to him, and attached documents relating to the proposed changes. Mr Galtos responded to that email on 11 March 2016, copying Mr Scott and Rick Klink, seeking a list of the number of shares issued in Open Markets and information as to how much capital has been raised since the formation of the company, as well as whether each shareholder had signed the SHA.
67 On 7 September 2016, Open Markets wrote to Mr Galtos in an email that appeared to be a template communication. It asked that he provide his contact and entity details in order to assist the completion of the company's annual requirements. Mr Galtos responded on 20 September 2016, saying that his details had not changed and,
Per my previous requests, which have not been responded to, would you please send me a copy of the Share Register and provide a list identifying all capital raisings (date, price, shares issued etc).
68 On 22 September 2016 Kim Clark responded, introducing herself as company secretary saying that she was newly appointed and that his email was the first she had been made aware of a request from Mr Galtos, and informing him as to what was required to support a request for the share register.
69 Mr Galtos responded on 26 September 2016 (copied to Mr Klink and Mr Scott), saying:
It would appear that Open Markets and its shareholders have failed to act in accordance with the binding obligations laid down in the Shareholders Agreement entered into at foundation of the company. All information that I have requested is contractually required to be provided to me under the terms of the agreement and should I not receive the information requested within 7 days, I shall have no alternative but to ask my legal representatives to engage on the matter, including a full audit of potential breeches [sic]. I look forward to receipt of the materials without further delay or hindrance.
70 On 27 September 2016, Ms Clark responded, attaching a copy of "the latest ASIC statement for your information" and apologising for the delays experienced, noting that she had recently been appointed as company secretary and asking that all like correspondence be directed to her going forward. On the same day, Galtos replied, noting that while the provision of the statement was "progress", he had still not received "anything that identifies each capital raising that has occurred and the shares allocated", and asked her to resolve that issue.
71 On 4 October 2016, Ms Clark wrote to Mr Galtos advising that his previous request had been referred to the Board and that she would advise further in due course. On the same day, Mr Galtos replied, saying:
I look forward to receiving prompt response, within the next few days, from the board and supply of the requested information, that the foundation shareholders and company are contractually bound to provide. Please note, that any share that may have been issued during the 'life' of the Shareholder Agreement in place at the time of the company formation, that do not have a fully executed Deed of Accession on file, are issued invalidly and in breach of that Shareholders Agreement. Any votes that those shareholders participated in are potentially voidable.
72 On 12 October 2016, Mr Galtos again wrote to Ms Clark (copied to Mr Marani, Mr Scott and Mr Klink), saying:
I have received no response from the Directors of Open Markets to my reasonable questions. As you may guess, this is now giving me concern that some wrong doing or conflict of interest may have occurred that the Directors are not keen to acknowledge or address. Can you please tell me why there is a delay in receiving a response? Does this require legal assistance to get resolved or should I just directly contact all the shareholders to advise them as to my concerns and potential risk to their investments?
73 Mr Marani wrote to Mr Galtos that same day, (copied to Mr Scott, Mr Klink and Ms Clark), referring to a conversation held that day (about which no evidence was given) and attaching what he described as a breakdown of shareholders, shares issued and accompanying dates. The information was correctly said to have been readily available on the ASIC website. Mr Marani asked that Mr Galtos let him know when he had worked through the information so that they could discuss Mr Galtos' concerns.
74 On 18 October 2016, Open Markets sent its shareholders, including Mr Galtos, a "Shareholder Update", noting, amongst other things, Mr Marani's appointment as CEO of Open Markets on 1 August 2016.
75 Mr Marani and Mr Galtos met on 3 November 2016, to discuss Mr Galtos' concerns. What was said at that meeting is considered below.
76 On 18 January 2017 Mr Galtos wrote to Mr Marani referring to a meeting held in November 2016 asking Mr Marani to come back to him about resolving the matters they had discussed. Correspondence between them continued in January, February and March 2017, in the course of which Mr Galtos said that if matters were not "resolved" he would take legal action. In late May 2017 KSG's solicitors wrote to Open Markets alleging breaches of the shareholders agreement.
(a) During the seven month period from late June 2013 (when the parties executed the deed settling the termination dispute) until late January 2014 there was no communication between Mr Galtos and Open Markets. During that period Open Markets issued four shareholder updates. It had also issued one update in May 2013 (five in total). Those were not sent to Mr Galtos until January 2014. It is likely that Mr Galtos initiated contact with Open Markets which prompted it to respond by sending that material to him, but no such communication was in evidence.
(b) In January 2014 Mr Galtos told Open Markets that he wanted to receive exactly what other shareholders had been receiving, and first raised a concern that Open Markets had not complied with the shareholders' agreement and the law. He said he would pursue those concerns with Rick Klink but he did not do so, until March 2016. He said it was for Open Markets to pro-actively communicate and "resolve" matters with him.
(c) During 2014, 2015 and until March 2016 Open Markets and Mr Galtos communicated without incident - Open Markets sent various shareholders' publications to Mr Galtos and Mr Galtos made no complaint to Open Markets about any lack of communication, nor did he seek any additional material.
(d) Mr Galtos next raised his concerns about Open Markets' issuing of shares in March 2016 (some 26 months after he first raised a concern in that regard) and then again in September 2016. In October 2016 Mr Galtos told Open Markets that in his view any shares issued without the provision of a deed of accession had been invalidly issued. He threatened legal action in early 2017 and by at least May 2017 had retained solicitors who commenced communications with Open Markets.
Part C: Breach of Contract Claim
78 It was alleged that Open Markets, in respect of each of the share allotments the subject of the claim, breached clauses 11.1, 11.2, 11.5(3), 11.16 and 18.1 of the shareholders agreement.
79 The relevant parts of the SHA are set out in schedule 2. Clauses 11.1 and 11.2 in substance require that where the shareholders resolve to make an issue or allotment of shares or other securities, the Board must first offer those new securities to all shareholders in their respective shareholding proportion and must make the offer by notice in writing in accordance with the requirement in clause 11.2.
80 Clauses 11.3 to 11.5 govern how the company and the shareholders are to deal with the making and receipt of offers to take up shares. Clause 11.5(3) stipulates that the Board must re-offer any shortfall to those shareholders who accepted offers made under clause 11.1. Clause 11.6 permits the Board to offer any remaining shares to other parties, subject to clause 18, which stipulates that no party may transfer or issue or grant any interest in or encumbrance over shares or new securities to a person not already a shareholder unless that person has executed and delivered to each shareholder and the company a deed of accession, the form of which was prescribed by the SHA.
81 Open Markets admits that it did not offer any of the shares the subject of the claim to KSG before they were issued. The extent of Open Markets' admissions was the subject of discussion during the trial. In final submissions Open Markets, through its senior counsel, made clear that Open Markets conceded that it had breached clauses 11.1 and 11.2 in respect of each impugned share issue. It was accepted that no offers were made in respect of any 'shortfall shares' under clause 11.5, but the occasion for giving such notice did not arise, the process required by clause 11.1 not having been adopted. In that sense, the breach of clause 11.5(3) was derivative of the breach of clause 11.1 and 11.2, and might be described as hypothetical.
82 Open Markets accepted that clause 18.1 had not been complied with in respect of any of the share issues, save in respect of the allocation of shares to Chow Fah Thoo of 37,000 ordinary shares that occurred as part of the share issue made in July 2013.
83 All of Open Markets' admissions were subject to a carve-out in respect of the allocation of shares to Chow Fah Thoo. It contended that that allocation was an issue of securities to which sub-clause 11.7(5) of the SHA applied. Clause 11 had no application to an issue of securities in respect of which the conditions stipulated in that sub-clause were satisfied. If clause 11 did not apply to the issue of shares to Chow Fah Thoo, then Open Markets was not required to have offered those shares to KSG, and KSG's claim for loss insofar as it comprised an asserted loss of profit on the hypothetical sale of shares that KSG says it would have acquired if first offered to it and not to Chow Fah Thoo, falls away. Sub-clause 11.7(5) provides as follows:
11.7 This clause 11 does not apply to: ...
(5) an issue of New Securities to a new major investor in the Company, a strategic business partner of the Company or in connection with the acquisition of a company, assets or technology, in each case as approved by a Major Shareholder Resolution and provided that the new shareholder or shareholders enter into a Deed of Accession prior to the issue that takes effect at the time of the issue.
84 In order to attract the operation of the provision it was necessary, then, for Open Markets to establish that Mr Thoo was a "new major investor"; that the issue of shares to him had been approved by major shareholder resolution, and that Mr Thoo had entered into a deed of accession prior to the share issue that took effect at the time of the issue. KSG said that none of the elements of sub-clause 11.7(5) was established. Because of the conclusions I have reached in respect of the breach of contract claim more generally, this point is immaterial to the outcome of the claim. However, given the attention paid to the issue in the parties' submissions I will deal with the point briefly.
85 I accept that Chow Fah Thoo was a "new major investor". It was not disputed that he was a new investor. The expression "new major investor" was not defined in the SHA. Open Markets submitted that in the absence of any objective evidence of the intention of the parties concerning the definition of the term, regard should be had to the ordinary meaning of the expression, which the Oxford English Dictionary defines as "important, large, serious, significant". I accept that submission. Prima facie, words of a contract should be given their ordinary and natural meaning.[7] There was nothing in the context of the SHA that suggested or required a different reading. KSG did not put an alternative submission. Each of the exemptions in cl 11.7(5) is expressed broadly. The intent of the clause is, on its face, to facilitate the issue of new securities in a more streamlined fashion where an issue of shares would be of benefit to the company for the reasons set out in the clause. Mr Thoo was allocated 37,000 ordinary shares on 25 July 2013 at a cost of $750,000 which was two and a half times larger than the total amount of capital previously raised and as such, was the single largest capital investment made by any investor in Open Markets, at that point. At the time of the share allocation Mr Thoo's shareholding and was the second largest in Open Markets and comprised 17.2% of its issued share capital.
86 However, Open Markets did not establish that the issue of shares to Chow Fah Thoo had been approved by major shareholder resolution.
87 "Major Shareholders Resolution" was defined in cl 1.1(34) of the SHA as -
a resolution passed by a majority of Shareholders representing not less than 75% of all votes capable of being cast at a general meeting of the Company attended by all Shareholders.
88 The SHA specified a process for the making of major resolutions. Clause 10 read as follows:
10.1 The Secretary or any Director or Shareholder by notice to the Company, may propose a Major Shareholder Resolution in relation to a matter listed in clause 8.1...[9]
10.2 On receipt of such a proposal the Company must expeditiously take the steps required under the Act,[10] Constitution and this Agreement to obtain a Decision on the matter.
(a) a Major Resolution is passed by the required majority with or without amendment; or
(b) a Major Resolution is considered, voted on, but fails to obtain the required majority.
90 The SHA did not specify any further requirements for the making of a decision. Open Markets did not have a constitution, at the time.
91 Open Markets tendered an undated document purporting to record a special majority shareholders resolution, relevantly proposing to issue shares to persons listed in an attached schedule, which included the shares that were in fact issued to Chow Fah Thoo in July 2013. The document did not purport to be a circulating resolution pursuant to s 249A of the Corporations Act. It identified the parties to the proposed resolution as Serpantine, Paritech, Remgrid and Iron Mountain and stated that between them those parties hold 85.6% of the shares on issue. The document was signed only by Emlyn Scott for Serpantine and Brian Price for Iron Mountain. Together, those entities held 60% of Open Markets' issued shares at the time. The document contained unsigned execution blocks for Paritech and Remgrid.
92 Open Markets submitted that while there was no direct evidence of Paritech or Remgrid specifically agreeing to the resolution, on the relevant date the only two directors of Paritech, Rick Klink and Paul Klink, were also the only two directors of Open Markets, and in fact, Paritech itself purchased 14,808 shares in the July 2013 share issue. Rick Klink was also one of the two directors of Remgrid, the other being his wife Lisa Klink. Open Markets submitted that the July Share issue "must have been approved by the directors of OpenMarkets in order for it to have proceeded," and on that basis it was open for me to infer that each of Paritech and Remgrid made the required resolution, noting that a resolution is "not a document recording a decision, but the decision itself". Open Markets' reliance upon Rick Klink and Paul Klink's asserted implicit approval of the transaction was no more than an argument that a resolution must have been passed because the company proceeded to allocate the shares.
93 The evidence was insufficient to support an inference that a major shareholders resolution in respect of the July 2013 share issue (relevantly the issue of shares to Chow Fah Thoo) had been passed at all. A major shareholders resolution was required to be made in accordance with the process defined by clause 10. That process required the issue of a notice proposing the resolution.[11] The existence of the document tendered by Open Markets was an insufficient basis on which to conclude that notice of the resolution had been given. More significantly. It also required that the company take the steps required by the Act, any constitution and the SHA to obtain a Decision. The Corporations Act did not prescribe any step and there was no constitution. However, it is sufficiently clear from the language of clause 10 that a Decision was to be considered and voted upon. There was no evidence that any deliberative process or vote by shareholders had occurred, at a meeting or otherwise. Clause 10 did not itself expressly state that a vote must occur at a meeting (in this case, a meeting of shareholders). But it pre-supposed the existence of a forum within which a vote could occur. It is unnecessary to deal with the parties' remaining arguments on this point, including as to whether clause 1.1(34) did or did not require a vote to be cast a meeting, for the purposes of a major shareholders resolution.
94 Finally, KSG submitted that Open Markets did not establish that the deed of accession on which it relied had been entered into prior to the issue of Mr Thoo's shares, as was required by clause 11.7(5). I accept that submission. The deed of accession relied upon by Open Markets was executed on 25 July 2013, the same day of the share issue. On that day Rick Klink sent a letter to Mr Thoo, enclosing an unexecuted copy of the deed of accession for Mr Thoo's execution, noting that the shares had already been issued.
95 KSG also alleged that none of the other share issues were the subject of a major shareholders resolution as required by clause 8.1(1), and separately, that the original shareholders were obliged by clause 4.1 of the SHA to ensure that the company complied with its obligations under the SHA and that they did not do that, because they failed to ensure that Open Markets complied with the requirement to issue new securities only after passing a major shareholders' resolution as required by clause 8.1, the notice and offer requirements of clause 11 and the deed of accession requirements in clause 18.
96 Open Markets accepted that neither the company nor, for that matter, the shareholders, complied with the major shareholder resolution requirements in clause 8.1 in respect of any of the share issues or the deed of accession requirements, save in respect of the 37,000 shares issued to Mr Thoo. Open Markets submitted that the alleged breach of clause 4.1 went nowhere because shareholders were not permitted to interfere with the management of the company and, unless as specifically provided by the SHA, were not to give directions to the company's officers or employees.
97 KSG did not put the failure to observe those requirements as a separate ground giving rise to damages for breach of contract, its loss having arisen, on its case, by the company's failure to offer shares to it. However, KSG said that the fact that all of the relevant share issues had occurred without the company and the original shareholders complying with the SHA was relevant to the characterisation of the conduct of the company's affairs as oppressive within the meaning of s 232 of the Corporations Act. The characterisation of the conduct is considered below.
98 KSG emphasised a loss of opportunity to have purchased additional shares. More carefully examined, the claim was premised on loss of the profit that KSG says it would have earned on the sale of shares it says it would have purchased, had the SHA been performed. The elements of the claim are apparent from KSG's pleading, by which it said:[12]
(a) As a result of the company's breaches of the SHA KSG suffered loss, to be assessed on the basis of two alternative scenarios. Under "scenario 1" the claim was to be assessed on the basis that KSG would have participated in each relevant share issue, subscribing for all of the shares it was entitled to purchase under the SHA (that is, 9.5% of the total number of issued shares), and it also would have purchased any "shortfall shares", namely all of the shares that Open Markets issued during the relevant period to new shareholders, on the premise that had Open Markets complied with the SHA all of those shares ought to have been first offered to existing shareholders, and as it happened, no existing shareholders in fact subscribed for them. The shares would therefore have been available to KSG in its counterfactual world, and it would have subscribed for them. Alternatively under "scenario 2", the claim was to be assessed on the basis that KSG would have participated in each share issue in the same way, but would not have purchased any shortfall shares. On "scenario 1" it would have acquired 142,920 additional shares[13] by March 2016 and on "scenario 2" it would, by then, have acquired 16,205 additional shares.
(b) On the termination of the SHA on 11 March 2016 KSG would have sold all of the shares it held in Open Markets. A price of $95.70 was adopted, by reference to an off-market sale of shares to BMY Group Ltd that in fact occurred on 29 August 2016 at that price. On an assumed sale price of $95.70 KSG would have received total consideration of the sale of its "total actual shares[14] and additional shares", of $14,688.419 (on scenario 1) and $2,561,793 (on scenario 2).
(c) From the imputed consideration KSG deducted in each case the cost that it would have incurred to purchase the additional shares, calculated at the actual issue price for each bundle of shares, plus the interest KSG would have paid on funds borrowed to make the purchases (at ATO Division 7A interest rates, as a proxy for market rates).
(d) KSG therefore calculated its loss as the proceeds of the hypothetical sale of the shares it says it would have purchased (plus the proceeds from the sale of the shares it actually held), less the cost of acquiring those shares. On its scenario 1, KSG's total claim amounted to $9,964,506 (plus interest). On its scenario 2, KSG's total claim for loss amounted to $2,077,896 (plus interest).
99 KSG described its claim, in submissions, in various and at times, inconsistent ways. In its written opening KSG commenced with the statement that the damages sought "represent a loss of opportunity to have purchased shares that it ought to have been offered". When pressed in oral submissions, senior counsel for KSG described the loss as a loss of "the opportunity to invest"[15] but later said that what had been lost was the "opportunity to have purchased [the shares] at [a] lower amount and sell them at higher amount."[16] The latter characterisation is consistent with KSG's pleaded case, and the manner in which the case was conducted. KSG did not plead or attempt to prove a case that by reason of Open Markets' failure to offer shares to it in accordance with clause 11 of the SHA, it had suffered loss merely because it had not acquired shares it would otherwise have acquired, for example because those shares would have appreciated in its hands.
100 KSG's essential submission was that it was not required to prove on the balance of probabilities that KSG could and would have acquired shares in Open Markets, or that it would have sold the shares it would have purchased on its counterfactual hypothesis. Rather, once it was established that the offers that ought to have been made were not made (that is, once breach of contract was proved or admitted), it would follow readily that by reason of the breach of contract KSG had lost the opportunity to purchase shares (or to purchase and later sell). The task was then to assess the possibility of contingencies eventuating in KSG's favour, those contingencies being the possibility that KSG would have acquired shares and sold them at a profit. If I determined that the prospect of those events occurring was more than merely speculative then KSG should be awarded damages, in an amount that reflected that assessment. As Mr Clarke QC put it,
What we need to establish ... upon the balance of probabilities is that [the] opportunity was the foreseeable and probable result of the breach; that is, an opportunity would have arisen. That's easy in this case, simple. The next question is would we have invested? An assessment has to be made on a percentage basis.[17]
101 As shall be seen, the evidence that KSG relied upon to substantiate its claim reflected the framing of its claim in that way.
102 KSG's case did not appropriately distinguish between the requirements of causation and loss, or pay sufficient regard to what it was that the SHA promised - and of what, therefore, KSG was deprived by Open Markets' breach. Before returning to the question of what KSG was required to establish to what standard of proof, it is convenient to recall some of the governing principles, although they are well understood.
103 Generally speaking, a party who has sustained loss by reason of breach of contract is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same situation, with respect to damages, as if the contract had been performed.[18] As Brennan J explained in Commonwealth v Amann Aviation, that measure "ensures that the parties to the contract are kept to the benefits and burdens of the contract they have made: the plaintiff recovers no more than the net benefit he would have received under the contract; the defendant acquires no right to profit by his breach. The measure of damages for breach of contract is governed by the contract itself."[19]
104 Absent any contrary contractual stipulation a plaintiff is entitled to be compensated only for loss or damage which is the result of the defendant's breach. Causation is to be determined by application of the principles discussed in March v Stramare.[20]
105 The rule in Hadley v Baxendale[21] prescribes the condition on which damages can be awarded,[22] namely that "[w]here two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive ... should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it."[23] The rule is exclusionary; it marks out the boundary of liability for loss or damage caused by a breach of contract; it is not a ground of liability.[24]
106 If breached, a contract to provide a commercial advantage or opportunity enables the innocent party to bring an action for loss of the advantage of that opportunity.[25] An action for breach of contract lies upon the occurrence of the breach and a plaintiff should be entitled to at least nominal damages for loss of a promised opportunity.[26]
107 The existence of compensable loss (beyond nominal damages) and the relevant causal relationship may be established by reference to breach of an antecedent promise to afford an opportunity.[27] That proposition repays closer consideration. Damages will flow from the breach of contract (and a causal relationship will follow in that way) where the loss claimed corresponds sufficiently with the benefit or opportunity promised. It is necessary to properly identify what has been promised, in order to determine what has been lost by reason of the breach of promise.
108 The point is illustrated by the decision in Fink v Fink.[28] There, a separated husband and wife agreed that for a period of a year the wife may remain in the matrimonial home and be maintained, during which time the husband would take proceedings for divorce. The wife sued for breach of contract on the grounds that during the 12 month period the husband did not allow her to remain in the home, interrupted her occupation of it and sued for divorce. The wife claimed by way of damage that she had been deprived of the opportunity of being reconciled to the husband and living with him in a normal married life, being supported as such during the rest of her life. The wife contended that those damages were a natural consequence of the breach of the agreement. That claim failed. Starke J assessed the issue in this way:
"[t]he agreement does not provide for nor contemplate any benefit to the appellant other than remaining in the matrimonial home with the children. The purpose of the agreement is not to give the appellant an opportunity of reconciliation or of living a normal married life with the respondent ... the damages claimed by the appellant do not flow from any breach of the agreement alleged..."[29]
109 The causation requirement, then, cannot be avoided by characterising the claimed loss as a loss of opportunity of one kind or another and then simply assessing all potential subsequent events as contingencies that might follow, entitling the claimant to damages provided the prospect of their materialising is more than speculative.
110 The necessity of paying regard to the relationship between the claimed breach of promise and the claimed loss, also follows from the rule that in an action for breach of contract a defendant is not liable in damages for not doing that which they have not promised to do, recalling however, that by reference to the limit stated in Hadley v Baxendale, the defendant may be liable for damages that arise naturally from the breach.[30]
111 On the question of proof of loss, where a plaintiff has been deprived of something of monetary value the tribunal of fact is not relieved of the duty of assessing the loss merely because the calculation is difficult or because the circumstances do not admit of the damages being assessed with certainty.[31] As Deane J said in Amann,
...[E]ven in an action for repudiation or breach of contract where damage is not an element of the cause of action, a plaintiff bears the onus of establishing the extent of his loss or injury on the balance of probabilities. ... [T]here are ... cases where considerations of justice or the limitations of curial method render ultimate findings, about what would have been or what will be, impracticable or inappropriate. In such cases, damages must be assessed on some basis other than findings about what would ultimately have happened if the repudiation or breach had not occurred or about the precise ultimate implications which exist after the repudiation or breach. In particular, it may be appropriate that the damages be assessed by reference to the probabilities or the possibilities of what would have happened or will happen rather than on the basis of speculation that probabilities would have or will come to pass and that possibilities would not have or will not.[32]
112 It is important to recall that the well-established proposition that proof in such cases may be approached by an estimation of the chances of the relevant loss occurring, concerns the proof of damages, not the question of causation. So much is plain from the language and context in which these issues are discussed in the authorities, including those mentioned here. The assessment of damages is a question that arises subsequent to the issue of causation, and causation is to be determined on the balance of probabilities. That is so, whether the action is in contract or in tort.[33] It is also so, notwithstanding that competing hypotheses may be in play. As Brennan J said in Sellars (which concerned damages under s 82(1) of the then Trade Practices Act, but in which the reasoning in relation to causation is applicable also in contract cases),
Where a loss is alleged to be a lost opportunity to acquire a benefit, a plaintiff who bears the onus of proving that a loss was caused by the conduct of the defendant discharges the onus by establishing a chain of causation that continues up to the point when there is a substantial prospect of acquiring the benefit sought by the plaintiff. Up to that point, the plaintiff must establish both the historical facts and any necessary hypothesis on the balance of probabilities.[34]
113 A similar point was made in Sellars, where the plurality said (citing Hotson v East Berkshire Health Authority with approval) that where the issue of causation turns on what the plaintiff would have done, there is no reason to depart from the requirement that proof be established on the balance of probabilities, notwithstanding that the question is hypothetical.[35]
114 This issue was considered by the Court of Appeal in Crown Insurance Services, in which an insurer had sued an agent who had, it was alleged, breached duties in contract and tort in assisting the insured to complete proposal forms and failing to ask questions of the insured which, on the insurer's case, would have revealed a scan and x-ray of the insured's spine, that the insured had not disclosed. The insurer submitted that it was only required to establish on the balance of probabilities that the agent's breaches had deprived it of an opportunity to impose a condition on the insurance excluding liability for back injury and thereafter all that was needed was to determine the value of the lost opportunity; that it was no answer to the claim that, on the balance of probabilities, it would not have imposed any conditions.[36] The insurer also submitted that proof on the balance of probabilities was only required where the issues concerned historical facts.
115 Buchanan JA (which whom Warren CJ and Byrne AJA agreed) held that unless the insurer proved that it would have imposed a condition excluding liability for back injury if it had been informed of the scan and x-ray, it could not establish any loss caused by the agent's wrongdoing, citing Sellars for the importance of the distinction between proof of causation and damages.[37] While it was true, Buchannan JA said, that courts have drawn a distinction between proof of historical facts on the one hand and hypothetical facts on the other, that distinction is drawn only in assessing damages after it has been established that the defendant's breach of obligation caused loss.[38]
116 Buchanan JA drew attention to the observations of the plurality in Sellars, to the effect that when the issue of causation turns on what the plaintiff would have done, the ordinary civil standard of proof should apply, notwithstanding the question is hypothetical.[39]
117 More recently, the High Court has emphasised the importance of delineating between proof of causation and proof of loss.[40]
118 Returning now to KSG's case, the shareholders agreement did not confer on shareholders the right to profit from selling shares for which they were entitled to subscribe. The substance of clause 11 was that if the shareholders resolved to issue shares then the Open Markets board must first offer those new shares to all shareholders in their respective shareholding proportions, by a notice in writing. Each shareholder was entitled, within a window of 20 business days, to give notice to the board that it accepted the offer in whole or in part (or wished to subscribe for additional shares if available). Thereafter, upon receipt of payment by a shareholder for the shares the subject of offer (for which no time was specified), the board must allot and issue the new shares, and re-offer any shortfall shares, in the sequence specified in the SHA.
119 Had the agreement been performed, the benefit conferred on KSG would have been in each case receipt of an offer to purchase with a period of exclusivity, in respect of the number of shares to which it was entitled to subscribe. If KSG did in fact want to subscribe and if it were able to make payment, the agreement required the company to issues shares to KSG, on receipt of payment. Equivalent rights were conferred in respect of short-fall shares, if any.
120 When attention is paid to the rights and obligations conferred by the SHA, it becomes plain that KSG did not, by establishing a breach of clause 11 (which was admitted), also establish that it had lost the opportunity to profit by selling the shares that it says it would have purchased.
121 Nor was the loss claimed, loss of the kind that naturally followed 'in the usual course of things' from the breach of contract itself. The causal link between the loss claimed and the damage was not self-evident. The shareholders agreement established, by the offer provisions in clause 11, a mechanism by which existing shareholders were to be afforded the opportunity to buy shares exclusively for a limited period at the time of each new issue. It did not thereby guarantee shareholders the right to maintain parity in their shareholding proportions; it did not promise an opportunity to make a profit. For reasons discussed below, Open Markets' failure to comply with the clause 11 offer requirements did not, of itself, mean that there was in fact no opportunity otherwise for KSG to have purchased shares. However, even if that were assumed to be the case, and even if the benefit to be conferred by the contract were properly described as "an opportunity to purchase shares", deprivation of that opportunity did not establish loss of the kind claimed.
122 That being so, it was not open to KSG (having established breach of contract) to prove its claim by positing what it would, could or might have done had things gone its way, as contingencies to be assessed on the basis that, provided that they were more than speculative, their value would sound in damages.
123 Even if loss of profit on shares that may have been acquired on a shareholder taking up a clause 11 offer were foreseeable as a consequence of breach of that clause (and KSG did not direct any submissions to that proposition, other than to assert it), that fact would not of itself establish causation. Foreseeability goes to remoteness, not causation. Furthermore, as noted earlier, the contemplation of the parties marks the boundary of liability for loss caused by a breach of contract; it is not a ground of liability.[41]
124 KSG was required to establish the causal link between the breach of the shareholders agreement and its loss, on the balance of probabilities. It was required to do so notwithstanding that its causation case was, properly understood, required to engage with competing hypotheses, including in relation to what it could and would have done in the counterfactual world in which the agreement was performed. Once the causal link was established, at that point the value of the loss caused by the breach of agreement might be established by evaluating the possibilities that events favourable to KSG would have materialised.
125 Open Markets submitted that the correct approach was that:
(a) KSG was to establish on the balance of probabilities, that it if had received offers in respect of each relevant share issue that it could and would have purchased the proportion of shares that it was entitled to buy and, given notice in respect of any shortfall, purchased all available shortfall shares;
(b) KSG would then be required establish on the balance of probabilities, the existence of an opportunity of some value to KSG to sell its actual and hypothetical shares around or shortly after March 2016. That would entail KSG establishing that it would have taken steps to sell its shares and that had it done so there was a more than negligible chance of a third party seeking to pay a price for the shares which if paid would result in a profit to KSG on the sale;
(c) Once the matters in (a) and (b) were established, the question is, at what value does the Court assess that lost opportunity, taking into account all of the evidence? It is only at this stage that the assessment is to be made on the degree of "possibilities or probabilities".
126 I accept Open Markets' submission. It reflects the principles discussed earlier.
127 KSG's counterfactual case took, as its foundation, the share allocations that in fact occurred - at the times, in the amounts and at the prices for which they occurred. It did not account for the possibility that had Open Markets made share offers in accordance with clause 11 the uptake amongst original investors might have been different (and this was not a point that Open Markets pursued) or that Open Markets may have taken a different approach to capital raising, had KSG sought to acquire a significant stake in the company. Open Markets did contest the latter point, contending, through Emlyn Scott, that attempts would have been made to block KSG acquiring a substantial interest in the company. That point is considered later. The evidence relevant to KSG's case is assessed on the basis of the case as put.
128 KSG's primary case, as earlier discussed, was that it could and would have acquired all shares available to it based on its proportionate entitlement of 9.5% of issued shares, and all "shortfall shares" available, in total 142,920[42] shares during the relevant period. Reduced to its essence, KSG's case was that, had the shareholders agreement been complied with, every single share that was in fact issued to new shareholders during the period (those other than to the original shareholders) would instead have been acquired by KSG. Calculated at the actual issue price for each share allotment, the total cost to KSG would have been $4,172,221. Over the period (leaving aside any borrowing costs) KSG would have required to raise funds for those purchases as follows:
(a) $1,452,911, in or around July 2013;[43]
(b) $99,995, in our around January 2014;
(c) $442,540, in or around February 2014;
(d) $157,500, in or around March 2014;
(e) $70,260, in or around April 2014 (a total of $2,223,206 in the financial year ended 30 June 2014);
(f) $274,995 in or around August 2014;
(g) $1,054,050 in or around June 2015 (a total of $1,329,045 in the financial year ended 30 June 2015);
(h) $320,000 in or around January 2016;
(i) $299,970 in or around March 2016 (a total of $619,970 between January and March 2016).
129 KSG calculated interest payable on the funds that it says it would have borrowed to finance its purchases, at $550,590. As to finance costs, the assumption embedded in KSG's case was that in fact, Kosmas' father Con Galtos would have lent the funds for share purchases to KSG "at peppercorn interest", although for the purposes of quantifying its claim KSG allowed borrowing costs at ATO Division 7A rates, as a proxy for commercial interest rates. KSG did not address, in its evidence, the question of KSG's ability to meet commercial borrowing costs.
130 On its alternative case KSG calculated its entitlement to purchase shares at 9.5% of the total number of shares issued during the relevant period (16,205 shares). Calculated at the actual issue price for each share allotment, the total cost to KSG would have been $425,593, leaving aside any borrowing costs. KSG would have required:
(a) $167,197 in or around July 2013;
(b) $9,485 in or around January 2014;
(c) $42,070 in or around February 2014;
(d) $14,980 in or around March 2014;
(e) $6,671 in or around April 2014 (a total of $240,403 during the financial year ending June 2014);
(f) $26,110 in or around August 2014;
(g) $100,200 in or around June 2015 (a total of $126,310 during the financial year ending June 2015);
(h) $30,400 in or around January 2016;
(i) $28,480 in or around March 2016 (a total of $58,880 between January and March 2016).
131 KSG calculated interest expenses on the funds that it says it would have borrowed to finance its acquisitions, at $58,304. Open Markets submitted that although the funds needed to fund the scenario 2 acquisitions were substantially smaller than on scenario 1, the amounts required were still significant. That was indeed the case, given KSG's financial positon, discussed below.
What means did KSG have to acquire shares in Open Markets?
132 The assessments of KSG's ability and intention to acquire shares in Open Markets inform one another, however it is convenient to consider the evidence directed to those issues, in turn.
133 On the question of KSG's ability to fund the purchases of shares, Mr Galtos' evidence, although addressed to a hypothesis (what would have been feasible had the SHA been performed), nevertheless concerned concrete circumstances (KSG's financial means during a past period) that Mr Galtos ought to have been in a position to describe in detail. In fact, he gave only superficial evidence on that point. He said that, "at all times between April 2013 and March 2016 I had the capacity to source the required funds to purchase the shares". He said three things only, by way of elaboration. First, that the moneys paid to KSG in settlement of its dispute with Open Markets were wholly available to be applied to the purchase of shares. Second, that his father, Con Galtos, "would have made those funds available to me, for peppercorn interest". (Con Galtos gave evidence and was cross examined. His evidence is considered below). Third, that in his former employment as CEO for a listed company, he had led a number of capital raisings, and had a "significant network of corporate and high net worth contacts that invest in start-ups and established companies, that I could have called upon". Those people or entities were not identified. Mr Galtos' evidence in chief was remarkable for its lack of elaboration, particularly given the unqualified terms in which it was expressed.
134 Open Markets submitted that Mr Galtos did not give any evidence in support of scenario 2. That is correct insofar as the submission refers to Galtos' own evidence. The prospects of KSG acquiring shares in accordance with its alternative case must, however, be assessed on all of the evidence.
135 KSG submitted that it was important that it would have needed to raise the funds to acquire its shares over a period of about three years; that is, it did not have to source the funds at the outset of the period, in a lump sum. KSG did not, however, by way of Mr Galtos' evidence or otherwise, attempt to marry the amount of funds required at relevant points throughout the period, with the availability of any particular amount or source of funds at relevant times (save in respect of the July 2013 share issue, to which I shall return) or account more generally for the financial position of KSG or Mr Galtos. KSG did not assert any additional alternative case about how many shares it would in fact have purchased if it could not have funded its "scenario 2" purchases. KSG effectively left that task for the Court, on the premise that the prospect that KSG could (or would) have invested was to be assessed as a contingency that might materialise in KSG's favour.
136 KSG had been set up as a corporate vehicle to receive fees generated by professional services performed by Mr Galtos, and those fees were its sole source of income. It had limited assets and no shareholding other than its Open Markets shares. Its financial statements recorded losses in the 2012 and 2013 financial years. For the 2013 year, which accounted for the whole period of Mr Galtos' employment with Open Markets) its income was $105,920 comprised of fees received from Open Markets and directors fees from other companies. A net loss of $6,834 and negative equity of $18,423 were recorded. No financial statements of for the 2014 year were produced. KSG's tax returns for 2014 recorded gross income of $27,300 and a negative asset position. Income for 2015 and 2016 was $21,850 and $16,350 respectively, and in both years KSG reported negative assets. Mr Galtos was cross-examined on the fact that the 2014 tax return did not include the income of $19,988 paid to KSG by Open Markets pursuant to the deed of settlement. His evidence was,
I will have to investigate that with the accountant. I am afraid that when I went overseas I started to manage KSG Investments by remote control and kind of left it to the accountants to look after. I was, again, focused on what I was going to do next.
137 Mr Galtos agreed that throughout the period, KSG continued to earn minimal income and said that after he left Australia in mid-2013 to live in Europe, it was maintained as billing vehicle for any directorship income and to hold the shares of Open Markets. As he put it, "there was no effort on my part whatsoever to grow KSG Investments when I went overseas".
138 Mr Galtos said in his evidence in chief that he would have been in a position to apply the funds received in settlement of the dispute concerning his termination by Open Markets, the whole of which was due to have been paid to him by 4 August 2013. On KSG's primary case it would have required $1,452,911 (excluding any borrowing costs) to purchase shares in the July 2013 share issue alone, and on its alternative case, $167,197 (excluding borrowing costs). At best, had that money been in fact wholly available for share purchases, KSG would have been able to purchase only 5,017 shares at an issue price of $17.89, not 76,289 shares (KSG's scenario 1) or 6,331 shares (scenario 2).
139 When cross-examined, Mr Galtos agreed that the settlement moneys went into KSG's bank account and were then regularly transferred into his personal account over a period of about 18 months from mid-July 2013, and that money was used to fund his daily living expenses over the remainder of 2013-2014, in between his work assignments. Mr Galtos did not seek to explain how, in those circumstances, had KSG received offers under clause 11 of the SHA, it would have been feasible for it or him to permit the whole or even a substantial part of the settlement moneys to be applied to the purchase of Open Markets shares, whether in July 2013 or later, and the evidence did not support such an inference. Nor was the evidence capable of supporting an inference that Mr Galtos could have diverted to KSG any other income he might have earned during the period, to purchase any or a particular number of shares.
140 It may be concluded that without substantial borrowings KSG could not have made the share purchases that it claimed. KSG identified four possible sources of finance.
141 First, Con Galtos, Kosmas' father. Con Galtos' evidence was that had Kos requested his assistance at any time he would have "readily and willingly offered my support to him and his business endeavours" and, "[a]t all times between July 2013 and March 2016, I had the means, if required, to support KSG and advance funds to KSG to enable it to participate in share issues and capital raises". He had not been aware during 2013-2016 that Kos required any assistance.
142 Con Galtos, who was 79 years old in 2013, had had success in numerous business ventures dating from the 1960's. He identified, as sources of funds, his residential property, said to have been valued in 2016 at $840,000, unencumbered save for a debt to the ANZ Bank of $200.70, against which he could have borrowed, and a line of credit with the ANZ Bank. He said that he had a regular source of income that "would be sufficient to satisfy serviceability for a loan against the equity in my property". Neither the source nor the amount of that income were identified. Importantly, Mr Galtos senior stopped short of saying that he could and would have sourced a particular amount or amounts of funds at particular times, for KSG or Kosmas, and stopped short of demonstrating how his borrowings would have been repaid. The evidence was in the general terms I have described.
143 In fact, bank statements established that Con Galtos had access to credit of, at most, $131,859 during the period. The property was subject to two mortgages and was in both Con's name and that of his wife, Beverley. Mr Galtos senior accepted that in order to have obtained fresh borrowings against the security of his home he would have required the consent of his wife, who did not give evidence. Separately, he had not previously sought the consent of the ANZ bank for lending for the purposes of the kind contemplated and led no evidence about the likelihood of the ANZ or any other bank lending for the purposes of providing funds to KSG. He had never provided any loans or other financial assistance to KSG or Kos, other than to "fund his court case" (of which no details were provided). KSG did not establish that Con Galtos was in a position to borrow money against the equity of his home in order to lend it to Kos or KSG.
144 That leaves the line of credit. I accept Con Galtos would have had a desire to assist Kos, had he been asked for help during the period. However, there was no evidence about the extent to which he would and could in fact have drawn down particular amounts at particular times (he did not say so in his evidence, other than in the general terms described above). He did not address how he would have managed the interest and principal repayments, had he drawn on his line of credit. The question of repayments is relevant because it is reasonable to expect, on the evidence given by Con Galtos, that he would have assessed any particular request for funds by Kos in light of the need to make repayments on the line of credit, understanding that neither KSG nor Kos had any demonstrated ability to assist in meeting repayments. Con Galtos' evidence about loan serviceability was limited to a prospective loan against his property, not a line of credit, and was in such general terms that it could not be sensibly evaluated. Any conclusion, for example, that Con could and would have drawn down a significant lump sum from the line of credit (up to the maximum credit available, $131,859) and sustained subsequent repayments, would be no more than speculation.
145 The evidence does not permit me to conclude that it is more likely than not that Con Galtos would have been in a position to advance to KSG funds in any particular or approximate amount, from the line of credit, and that he would have done so. KSG did not seek to establish that Con would have advanced to it a particular sum of money that, although falling short of the amount required to purchase the whole of the scenario 1 or scenario 2 shares, would have financed the acquisition of a small number of shares at any particular price during the period.
146 Second, Kos Galtos said that he could have borrowed money against the security of KSG's shareholding in Open Markets. When cross-examined he agreed that doing so would have been in breach of the SHA. The correct position was that KSG would have required the written consent of all shareholders in order to encumber its shares.[44] KSG led no evidence about by whom and the terms on which such a loan might have been advanced. Third, Mr Galtos said that he could have diluted his own shareholding in KSG and sold KSG shares to unnamed others, in order to fund KSG's purchase of Open Markets shares. He gave no detail about such an arrangement and nor were any submissions directed to why that was a realistic source of funding. Finally, Mr Galtos said he had access to private equity companies and links to "the kind of people" who would have been interested in investing in a venture like Open Markets. His contacts were unnamed. His evidence about these sources of funding was entirely speculative, unsupported by any documents and lacking in credibility.
147 I consider that KSG has not established that it had the means to acquire the shares it says it would have acquired on scenario 1 or scenario 2. KSG did not seek to establish a different case, concerning the acquisition of a small number of shares.
Would KSG have acquired shares in Open Markets?
148 Even if KSG could have funded its projected acquisitions the question remains whether it is more likely than not that it would have done so. There were several components of the evidence relevant to that question and it is convenient to consider them in turn before assessing the cumulative effect of the totality of the evidence.
149 A significant part of the evidence elicited during the cross examination of Mr Galtos concerned KSG's claim that it would have acquired Open Markets shares had it received offers in accordance with the SHA. He gave evidence of how he (and through him, KSG) would have behaved in that counterfactual world and about what interest KSG did in fact take in Open Markets at the time.
150 Witnesses may give evidence on causation questions, about how they say they would have behaved had different circumstances prevailed.[45] Such evidence is addressed to a counterfactual hypothesis and concerns the witness's own state of mind. Of its very nature it is, to quote Handley JA in BNP Paribas v Pacific Carriers Ltd, [46] "ex post facto subjective [evidence] of an interested witness". State of mind evidence some years after the event may also involve reconstruction. Evidence of this kind should be approached cautiously, paying particular attention to relevant surrounding circumstances when drawing an inference of causation.[47]
151 In final submissions KSG said that usually (and implicitly, in this case), the question of reliance ought be assessed by reference to objective criteria rather than subjective evidence. However, KSG's case that it would have taken up additional shares in Open Markets was distinguished by the paucity of objective facts upon which it could rely.
152 Mr Galtos accepted that during the entire relevant period and in fact until the point at which KSG commenced these proceedings, KSG never once expressed any intention (directly to Open Markets or otherwise) to acquire any shares in Open Markets. There was no documentary evidence in relation to KSG's professed interest in Open Markets during the relevant period.
153 In final submissions KSG relied on two positive facts. First, it said that the fact that it maintained the shareholding it had when Mr Galtos left Open Markets' employ evidenced its interest in maintaining an investment in the company. That KSG did maintain the shares it held at June 2013 is evidence of the fact that KSG wished to maintain an investment at that level, and that it did not want to sever all ties with the company. It is a separate question, however, whether KSG would have been sufficiently motivated and appropriately placed to acquire significant additional shareholdings during the following three years. That KSG maintained its shares is consistent with its case that it remained interested in the company, and is one fact in the factual matrix to be considered, but of itself it does little to establish that KSG would have acted as it asserts. The fact that KSG held shares did not of necessity mean that KSG would have increased its shareholding in the manner it claimed, had it received a personal invitation to do so.
154 Next, KSG said that Mr Galtos' correspondence with Open Markets in April 2013 evidenced its intention to participate in capital raising. By the emails it relied upon, Mr Galtos told Open Markets that he looked forward to receiving updates on the status of the Camerons acquisition, and the proposed appointment of a new CEO, and asked that he be provided with updated financial statements and all materials required under the SHA "by return". The correspondence evidences his interest in Open Markets at the time, and the fact that he wanted to receive the information he requested at that time. It does little to inform the question whether, during the subsequent three years, KSG would have made substantial investments in Open Markets. It also needs to be considered in light of the evidence of how Mr Galtos responded to information that he received about Open Markets in the period after his employment, which is addressed below.
155 Open Markets submitted that I could not be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that KSG would have purchased the shares it asserted it would have purchased had the relevant offers been made. It relied on:
(a) the fact that KSG did not seek to appoint a director notwithstanding its entitlement under the SHA to do so;
(b) the fact that Mr Galtos had no insight into or any contact with the management of Open Markets after his leaving in mid-2013;
(c) the fact that Mr Galtos had never invested his own money in Open Markets;
(d) the fact that neither Mr Galtos nor KSG had a history of investing in shares;
(e) KSG's attitude towards its shareholding disclosed in the negotiations between KSG and Open Markets in relation to Mr Galtos' termination entitlements;
(f) KSG's response to the information it did receive concerning Open Markets' capital raising, during the relevant period.
156 Mr Galtos accepted that he was aware at all times of KSG's right to appoint a director to the company[48] but took no steps to do so. On this subject Mr Galtos said that he was removed as a director without his consent. That was correct and was not a ground of his complaint in this proceeding, being in effect an aspect of his negotiated severance from Open Markets. He said in substance that he was unsatisfied with his removal from the company but as far as his personal role in the company was concerned, he and Open Markets had reached terms and that was that. In response to a question about his lack of involvement, Mr Galtos said,
I remembered immediately, when concluding, with some advice I was given by another CEO, there's no dignity in stalking a company you used to run. You leave it to get on and let them do what they have got to do.
157 Objectively considered, it is unsurprising that Mr Galtos refrained from seeking re-appointment, particularly in light of the fact that he and Open Markets had parted ways by a settlement of legal dispute over Mr Galtos' remuneration, in which Open Markets claimed that Mr Galtos had been negligent in the performance of his duties as CEO. The fact that he did not seek to re-assert himself in the operation of the company does not by itself establish that in different circumstances Mr Galtos might not have re-assessed his position, but it is also consistent with his having decided to move on and look to other opportunities.
158 After Mr Galtos' employment ceased he had no involvement with the management of Open Markets whatsoever, nor any contact with those running the business. He accepted that he had no visibility of or insight into the company's management, prospects or affairs, other than what he might have gleaned from reading the material he received from time to time. Mr Galtos had, however, formed a view about the competence of Rick Klink, who was a director during the whole of the period, Open Markets' sole director between April 2013 and April 2014, and its chief executive officer from the time of Mr Galtos' removal until June 2016. Mr Galtos had a poor opinion of Mr Klink's ability to run a company. That evidence is discussed below. That fact makes less credible KSG's contention that, had it received offers complying the shareholders agreement, it would have made very substantial investments in Open Markets.
159 As noted earlier, Mr Galtos did not invest his own money in Open Markets, but paid for his shares by way of salary sacrifice. That evidence did not significantly advance the question whether or not KSG would have made significant investments in Open Markets after mid-2013, had it received the relevant offers. It did demonstrate that during his employment Mr Galtos was sufficiently interested in holding shares in the company that he was prepared to accept shares as part of his remuneration. Although KSG did not pay for the shares in cash, it did provide valuable consideration for the shares (the provision of services by Mr Galtos) when it could have taken cash. I accept that during his employment Mr Galtos was a committed investor in Open Markets. However, circumstances after Mr Galtos' leaving Open Markets were significantly different in many respects, as the evidence given by Mr Galtos discussed below, revealed.
160 It was significant, though, that neither KSG nor Mr Galtos had any history of investing in shares other than KSG's holding its shares in Open Markets, that it had acquired in the course of Mr Galtos' employment. While it was true that Mr Galtos had, in employment elsewhere, raised capital for other people, what he posited in respect of Open Markets was a personal venture, different in kind and magnitude from his existing experience.
161 In his evidence in chief Mr Galtos asserted in unequivocal terms that,
Had I received notice of the various issues of shares and capital raises during the relevant period I would have participated in them and purchased KSG's entitlement pursuant to the first option rights, and, any shortfall shares that were available, following the conclusion of the first option offering to existing shareholders until March 2016 when the SHA was terminated. After this time, I would have sold my interests. I have, since March 2016 learnt that the following capital raisings have occurred between April 2013 and March 2016. ... My shareholding has therefore diluted during that period. I could have and would have paid for shares I was entitled to be issued and paid for any shortfall in share issues during that period.
162 In support of his commitment to investing in Open Markets Mr Galtos said that due to his involvement in establishing Open Markets he had confidence in the potential of its business, and that after his resignation he was "keen to continue being involved as an investor with a view of increasing my shareholding". The evidence, like that concerning the financial capacity of KSG to invest, was given in the most general of terms and in template style.
163 When cross-examined Mr Galtos emphasised his enthusiasm for the company. In response to the proposition that he wanted to completely terminate any ongoing relationship with the company once the settlement of his employment dispute was resolved, he said that,
In fact when I caught the plane to England I went to a big party of friends, trying to persuade them to buy shares through Open Markets and to use the company, et cetera, et cetera.
164 He said that he discussed with a mutual friend he met in England,
... my frustrations that on the one hand I have a friend who I have a disappointment with [Emlyn Scott] which was difficult for my social circle; on the other hand, something I fell in love with, the company that I believed in; and then the reality that that didn't work out in that work and I moved forward to try and be an entrepreneur.
165 Open Markets submitted that in cross-examination Mr Galtos walked away from the case that he would have caused KSG to invest in Open Markets to the extent alleged in the claim. Mr Galtos disputed that he was walking away from KSG's stated case but in fact, when cross examined, he did qualify the position taken in his witness statement, revealing a considerably more equivocal assessment of what he would have done on the counterfactual hypothesis, than had been put in his evidence in chief.
166 Mr Galtos said, when pressed, that he would have tried as hard as he could to take up shares in Open Markets, provided that KSG received a personalised offer compliant with the SHA. That position was at times expressed in his evidence to be further conditioned on his need to have been satisfied by whatever information would have been made available to him about Open Markets, at the time.
167 Some passages of cross-examination serve to encapsulate the tenor of the evidence.
168 KSG contended, on Mr Galtos' evidence in chief, that it would have taken up all of the shares on offer in January 2014, at a total price of $100,000. When challenged on that assertion, and whether he would have caused KSG to seek to borrow $100,000 to invest at a price of $35 a share, his response was,
Not knowing what they did or didn't send anybody else at the time - because that hadn't been disclosed either - I have to make a judgment based on what I may have done in that hypothetical situation and I've got to tell you that I believed in the company, I believed in the trajectory it was going on. I believed that with basically decent management ... Andrea Marani ... knows his stuff ... I would have invested and I would have done everything possible to invest to the maximum that I could invest in it and bring people with me. I had an investment. It was worth something. I want to maximise that investment. It's capitalism, mate.
169 When asked about the claim that KSG would have bought approximately $440,000 worth of shares in February 2014 had it received an offer in accordance with the shareholders agreement Mr Galtos said,
If had had received notice of a share issue I would have participated in the share issue or done my damnedest to participate in the share issue, based on the documentation received. I don't know what financials I would have gotten at the time...but if they were positive like I've now seen, absolutely. I would have done everything possible to maximise the commercial opportunity I had in front of me.
170 When it was put that the fact that he did not seek financial information about Open Markets after early 2014 revealed his lack of enthusiasm to invest hundreds of thousands of dollars in the company, Mr Galtos said,
That is not a good characterisation of where I am. Had I received the documentation I would have done everything possible to continue to invest in the company.
171 When cross-examined about the claim that KSG would have acquired $320,000 worth of shares in January 2016 and $249,700 worth of shares in March 2016, Mr Galtos said,
If the shareholders agreement was conformed to ... in the principle of wanting to protect my investment I would have tried to participate as best as I possibly could.
172 When asked about the share issue that occurred on 2 March 2016 for 1,000 shares at $50 per share and a second issue on 3 March 2016 of 7,142 shares at $35 per share, Mr Galtos said that,
I would have tried to take up that offer, yes. ... subject to all the correct paperwork and understanding the capital needs of the company, of course.
173 In light of that answer, when pressed on whether KSG would have taken up the offer of shares regardless of what the company's disclosures revealed, or whether KSG's taking up the investment would have been conditional on being satisfied as to what was discussed in the information memoranda or other reports, Mr Galtos' evidence was,
No, of course not. I can't give you a blind - you are asking me hypothetical questions without the capital raising documents in front of me. ...No investor would get carte blanche. ...All investment is dependent on the material provided to you.
174 Mr Galtos went on to say that all of his answers to the effect that KSG would have taken up shares were given on the basis that he had assumed that "all the necessary documentation would be there that explains the finances of the company, the investment proposition, et cetera".
175 As to the question what he would have made of the information memoranda and the like, if made available to him at the time, for the purposes of determining whether the investment was a good one for KSG to make, Mr Galtos' evidence was as follows:
(a) In the context of the evidence set out above, he said, that
I would have been satisfied with a lot of things that was put in front of me because I have now seen the pitch decks that were used for many of those capital raisings and they, on the balance, said that the story of the company was positive. Sorry it's very difficult for things that didn't happen ... and what I might do when I wasn't offered the chance.
(b) When it was put that he did not exhibit particular interest in Open Markets in early 2014 Mr Galtos said that he would have looked to invest, and that,
Had I been presented with documents appropriate to a capital raising, I would have looked at the financials, I would have looked at the pitch deck, I would have looked at the story, I would have looked at the trajectory, particularly any graph showing the value of the company was going up and the forecasts of the directors and audited accounts, which I never got to have, but it is wrong to characterise that I wasn't interested in that company. I loved the company. I was very interested and it's not every day that you get to set up an online stockbroker. It was a pretty unique thing in a technology guy's career and it was very special to me.
(c) When asked about his response, at the time, to having received in October 2014, a notice of annual general meeting with directors' report and financial reports, counsel for Open Markets having put that he would have been very keen to read the reports and understand how the business was travelling, his answer was that,
I would have looked over it but my general view of accounts published by companies that I am not running is that it can be made to say anything you want. But yes, I would look at it. I'm not an accountant and I'm not an auditor but I would understand financial statements as they are presented, yes. ... I would have glanced ... I would have looked at it all.
176 Arising out of the cross-examination on the question whether he would have assessed information about the company before deciding to invest, Mr Galtos was re-examined (without objection) on the question of what he would have considered important, in the "pitch decks" and related memoranda that had been produced by Open Markets in the course of the litigation, had he seen them at the time.
177 Mr Galtos said in effect, that he was impressed by the material and that it gave the impression of a "business...that's going to grow... [and] can be highly profitable". He gave no indication however, of having critically analysed the material to form his own considered view of it. He said that he was seeing some documents for the first time, while being re-examined. His evidence was in large part an unfocussed commentary on the quality of the presentation slides, various parts of which he said "looked good" and that he "liked". He said that parts of the slides conveyed a "very strong" offer. He did volunteer, however, in relation to a graph that he described as projecting that, "the revenue goes exponential like a skyrocket", that it was "a great graph" and "most people wouldn't believe it at first blush so you would ask a few more questions." He also said, in relation to a projection that the company would experience a 26 per cent revenue growth in 2015, "[t]hat's massive. Nothing grows at 26 per cent. Then the graph indicating the growth line, that growth trajectory, even if the company is overstating it a little bit it shows that the future is going to look pretty good there."
178 The evidence was too general and unfocused to be of any real assistance on how the information would have informed KSG's decision to invest at the time. It reflected the difficulties of attempting to mount a case not made in chief, in re-examination. This evidence is also to be considered in light of the evidence concerning Mr Galtos' response to material he did receive at the time, set out below.
179 Open Markets submitted that the attitude displayed by Mr Galtos towards the acquisition and disposal of shares during his negotiations with Open Markets in April to June of 2013, was inconsistent with his counterfactual case that he would have done everything within his power to take up shares in Open Markets had he received relevant notices. KSG submitted that those negotiations occurred in materially different circumstances and that the plausibility of KSG's counterfactual case could not be assessed on that basis. The substance of the negotiations was as follows:
(a) As noted earlier, Mr Galtos wrote to Open Markets on 8 April 2013 relevantly stating that KSG had historically accepted payment of 50% of its invoices in cash and 'converted' the remainder in order to take up shares during capital raising, however, KSG would not accept shares in lieu of cash for invoiced amounts or for amounts paid in settlement of Mr Galtos' termination from Open Markets.
(b) On 16 April 2013, KSG issued its statutory demand. Open Markets issued an application to set aside the statutory demand and before that was heard, the parties commenced negotiations.
(c) In the course of a telephone call between the parties' solicitors on 10 May 2013, Open Markets' solicitor Mr McNamara said to KSG's solicitor Mr El-Hissi, that Open Markets was keen to do a deal to buy out Mr Galtos' shares. Mr El-Hissi asked him to get instructions and put Open Markets' position in an email (Mr El-Hissi gave evidence to this effect and was not cross-examined).
(d) The parties' solicitors exchanged letters on 15 May 2013. It was not possible to discern which letter preceded the other, but that was not material. Mr El-Hissi set out what KSG was prepared to accept in relation to the moneys the subject of the statutory demand. He also said that KSG had contributed two payments, the second being the sum of $19,988.89 "by way of share capital" in respect of which KSG had not received shares, as a result of which Open Markets was indebted to KSG in that amount and payment was sought accordingly. Separately, he said in respect of KSG's 10% shareholding in Open Markets that "Our client is willing to discuss the sale/transfer of these shares for valuable consideration. In that regard our client is inviting your client to make an offer on these shares". On the same day, Open Markets' solicitors made an offer to resolve KSG's claims on the basis of a payment of part of the moneys sought by KSG and a purchase within 14 days of KSG's shares for the price of the remainder of the moneys sought by KSG.
(e) On 3 June 2013 Open Markets offered in relation to KSG's moneys paid in anticipation of an allocation of shares, that shares could be issued or alternatively monetary payment made, provided a reasonable time was allowed.
(f) On 3 June 2013, KSG's solicitors offered to accept a settlement comprising five elements, namely payment of the full amount of moneys owed in respect of the employment entitlements that had been claimed in the statutory demand; repayment of the sum of $19,988.89 (the capital contributed in anticipation of a share issue); that a reasonable offer be made to KSG for the shares it held in Open Markets, to be paid contemporaneously with the other moneys; the provision of guarantees; and that a deed of settlement and release be prepared to give effect to the settlement.
(g) On 4 June 2013, Open Markets' solicitors wrote confirming that the parties had agreed in respect of the principal amount of money payable (in the full amount claimed by KSG in respect of the termination dispute). On the same day, KSG's solicitors wrote also confirming agreement to that effect. On 5 June 2013, KSG's solicitors again wrote to Open Markets' solicitors asking them to forward the "offer on the shares for our client's consideration" and asking them to draft a deed of settlement.
(h) It is apparent that by this stage the parties had reached agreement on terms of settlement in respect of the dispute as to KSG's entitlements consequent upon the termination of its relationship with Open Markets, but were separately negotiating in relation to KSG's shareholding. In the context of the 3 June letter, the offer to which the 5 June email referred was an offer in respect of the proposed purchase of KSG's shareholding. On 12 June 2013, KSG's solicitors again wrote saying that they were awaiting an offer for KSG's shareholding in Open Markets.
(i) On 18 June 2013, Open Markets' solicitors told KSG's solicitors that Open Markets believed it could obtain an offer of $30,000 for the remaining shares and asked for confirmation that that was acceptable to KSG.
(j) On 18 June 2013, Mr Galtos told Mr El-Hissi by email that the $30,000 offer was "to [sic] low", but it should be addressed after the debts were sorted. He said he was happy to keep the shares "and my SHA rights" and preferred not to tie the two matters together.
(k) The parties formally settled the termination dispute by a deed of settlement executed in June 2013 and by payment of the sum of $89,770.07 to KSG. That settlement did not deal with KSG's shareholding in Open Markets.
181 First, at the time at which Mr Galtos was terminating his relationship with Open Markets, he was not prepared to accept shares in lieu of cash in accordance with his earlier practice.
182 Second, Mr Galtos, while employed by Open Markets, had made a payment of $19,988.89 in anticipation of a future share allocation (that is, he allowed Open Markets to retain that sum, expecting to be issued shares in lieu of a cash payment for the services he had provided). In mid-2013 Open Markets was prepared to issue shares to KSG on account of that payment. KSG was not prepared to accept shares at that time and required a cash payment.
183 Third, in respect of the shares already held by KSG, Open Markets first raised with KSG the prospect that it might procure a buyer for those shares. KSG was willing to contemplate selling its shares to Open Markets but only if Open Markets was prepared to pay a price that was acceptable to KSG. KSG asked Open Markets to forward an offer as it had promised. In fact, KSG only received an indicative offer from Open Markets and considered it to be too low. Ultimately, Mr Galtos decided that he did not want to sell his shares. By June 2013 he was happy to keep them.
184 Open Markets submitted that Mr Galtos' preparedness to entertain a reasonable offer if one were made to sell his shares, and his unwillingness to take further shares at that time in lieu of a cash payment, was inconsistent with his asserted interest in expanding his shareholding in Open Markets and with his claim that, given appropriate offers during the relevant period, he would have taken every opportunity to acquire shares.
185 Mr Galtos denied that the stance taken in his negotiations with Open Markets indicated a desire to completely terminate his relationship with Open Markets. He said that he was focused on getting what was owed to him so that he would have the ability to make choices about what he did with his money. His statements that he did not want to take up shares in lieu of cash were not statements as to his future intention, nor were they any form of election as to whether he would, in the future, acquire further shares. On the question of his willingness to entertain the sale of his shares at that time, Mr Galtos said that he was always willing to consider the sale of any asset for a reasonable price, and as it happened, Open Markets made what he considered to be a token offer for the shares and he did not consider it reasonable and rejected it.
186 I consider that the content of the communications makes clear that as a matter of fact, Mr Galtos' stated position in respect of wanting a cash payment and not being prepared to accept an allocation of shares in lieu thereof was a position in respect of the termination of his employment relationship with Open Markets, and not a statement of future intent.
187 As to the implications of Mr Galtos' having taken that position, for KSG's counterfactual case, the discussions about the possible sale of KSG's existing shares and possible allocation of new shares on account of the $19,988 paid by KSG occurred in a particular context in which Mr Galtos was attempting to finalise a dispute about the entitlements flowing from his employment. The fact that Mr Galtos wanted to finalise his existing entanglement was not, of necessity, irreconcilably inconsistent with him taking a different position at a later time, in different circumstances. However, the upshot was that KSG's counterfactual case posited that Mr Galtos would have taken a very different attitude to owning Open Markets shares, than the attitude he had exhibited during the course of resolving his employment dispute. The fact that he had preferred cash to shares in mid-2013 did nothing to positively assist KSG's case that it would later have had a fervent commitment to increase KSG's shareholding by whatever means was reasonably available to it, if only it had received the appropriate notices. It was one fact to be considered with various others, in the overall assessment of KSG's counterfactual case.
188 Mr Galtos' evidence that he would have been willing to sell any asset he held for a reasonable price was instructive, however, in that it evidenced a straightforward commercial attitude towards the sale and acquisition of assets. The proposition that Mr Galtos advanced was that a financial opportunity that was assessed as being advantageous (an offer at the right price) would have been entertained. While KSG was not obliged to establish that its posited hypothetical investment in Open Markets would have been a sound or commercially wise investment when viewed prospectively, the commerciality of KSG's position judged by Mr Galtos' own evidence about how he regarded his shareholding in April to June of 2013 (dispassionately), is a relevant benchmark among others, against which to assess its counterfactual assertion.
KSG's response to information and opportunities to take up shares
189 For the purposes of assessing KSG's factual assertion that it was deeply interested in increasing its shareholding in Open Markets and would have done so given the right opportunity, the way in which KSG in fact responded to information and potential opportunities to invest of which it became aware during the period is informative. Receipt by KSG of information about Open Markets' capital raising activities during the period, although not a precise proxy for hypothetical events in the counterfactual world (in which KSG would have received offers complying with the SHA), does afford an objective measure of KSG's interest in Open Markets, during the period.
190 On the question of how he (and KSG) engaged with Open Markets and the potential to acquire shares in it in the period following his resignation, Mr Galtos gave the following evidence in chief:
After my resignation I was keen to continue being involved as an investor with a view of increasing my shareholding. I have not received any notifications from Open Markets in relation to any capital raises until about September 2016, at which time I received an email from Open Markets requesting me to confirm my contact details. ... I first became aware that Open Markets undertook a number of share issues without my knowledge in about September 2016. Upon becoming aware I initiated correspondence with Open Markets ... Whilst, I did receive, from time to time, marketing material from Open Markets from about 8 October 2014, I did not receive notice any capital raisings [sic] between 26 April 2013 and being [sic] the date I ceased being a director until March 2016 when the SHA was terminated. Had I received notice of the various issues of shares and capital raises during the relevant period I would have participated in them and purchased KSG's entitlement pursuant to the first option rights and, any shortfall shares that were available, following the conclusion of the first option offering to existing shareholders until March 2016 when the SHA was terminated.
191 Mr Galtos then, made these points: first, he was keen to continue being involved as an investor with a view to increase his shareholding after he resigned from Open Markets; second, he did not in fact know that Open Markets undertook a number of share issues until about September 2016; third, he received no notifications from Open Markets in relation to capital raises until then; fourth, he did receive "marketing material" from October 2014; finally, had he received notice, he would have participated.
192 It will be recalled that the breach of agreement of which KSG complains is the failure to make an offer in accordance with clause 11 of the SHA in respect of each relevant share allocation. An offer of that kind was required to comply with certain formalities and provided a period within which the shareholder had an exclusive right to take up the relevant proportion of shares. Mr Galtos distinguished between an opportunity to invest generally, such as may have been provided by having knowledge of Open Markets' capital raising activities, and receipt of a formal notice and an offer consistent with clause 11. In substance, Mr Galtos advanced the position that an opportunity to invest required the making of an offer by Open Markets in this form. I will return to that issue below.
193 In this context it should be observed that although, in the passage cited above, Mr Galtos distinguishes between "notifications from Open Markets in relation to capital raises" and "marketing material", he nevertheless said positively in his evidence-in-chief that he did not know that Open Markets undertook a number of share issues until about September 2016 and that he did not receive any notifications from Open Markets in relation to any capital raises until that time.
Mr Galtos' knowledge of need for capital raising by Open Markets
194 When cross-examined on his unwillingness to take up additional shares in Open Markets in the context of the negotiations that occurred in mid-2013, Mr Galtos spent some time asserting in effect that there was no point leaving his money with Open Markets in anticipation of receiving shares because no capital raising was imminent. Ultimately, after he was pressed several times, he accepted that he understood at the time that an issue of shares was anticipated, although he did not know the date on which a share issue was anticipated.
195 Mr Galtos accepted that at the time at which he left Open Markets (having resigned in April 2013 having concluded his negotiations over his termination over the next two months), he knew that KSG needed to raise substantial amounts of capital in order to acquire a stockbroking licence. He had been the principal person at Open Markets tasked with undertaking the acquisition of Camerons and the negotiation as to the terms of that deal. When asked about the agreement between Open Markets and Camerons, Mr Galtos said initially that he believed that the contract between them was executed before he departed Open Markets and he recalled celebrating the fact that the parties had reached an agreement, "getting the signature", by having beers with Rick Klink and Emlyn Scott. He accepted that the payment required by Open Markets to complete the agreement was $385,000 to be adjusted for any amount of cash at bank held by Camerons at the date of completion. In that context he agreed that he was aware that further capital raising would be needed beyond April 2013, and also said that while he was at Open Markets both he and Mr Scott had been constantly looking for people to invest in the company, including by engaging with people outside the group of the five initial shareholders.
196 Later in the cross-examination, Mr Galtos was asked again about the deal with Camerons, and the proposition was re-put that Open Markets needed hundreds of thousands of dollars in order to satisfy its requirement in respect of the acquisition of stockbroking licences from Camerons. His evidence was, in substance, that he was aware that the contract with Camerons had not been signed by the time he had left and could have been renegotiated at any time, as a result of which he didn't "know what the status" of the contract was after he left and he was not aware of what arrangements were or were not in place.
197 It was put that he knew Open Markets had commenced trading and it must have required capital in order to conduct its business after his departure which it did not have at the time of his departure, such that by January 2014 he was fully aware that there must have been significant capital raising that had been undertaken by Open Markets. He gave the following evidence:
[B]y January 2014 you were fully aware that there must have been a capital raising and a significant capital raising that had been undertaken by Open Markets. Do you accept that?---It didn't stick in my head that way at the time, Mr Evans.
Was that because you didn't have much particular interest in Open Markets at that time?---No, Mr Evans. I had started a new life with a new partner in Denmark, in Aarhus, and was busy travelling between Aarhus and London trying to look after my son from a previous relationship, start a relationship, get a business going in Europe. There were other things in my life than the previous investment that was there. I had a lot going on at the time. I had eight job interviews for Verizon Solutions, for European head of sales. I had eight job interviews for Dimension Data at the time. It was just a lot, you know? ... There's a lot going on in my life. It isn't a reflection on my interest or lack thereof in Open Markets.
198 Then, to the proposition put to him that because a lot was occurring in his life at the time, even if he had been given notice of capital raisings he would not have caused KSG to borrow millions of dollars in order to invest in Open Markets, his response was:
I would have looked to invest myself, looked at borrowing money against the shares, looked at other financial structures including selling shares in my company for new shareholders to come in and participate. Borrowing is not the only route to be able to participate in the purchase of those shares and it would be wrong to characterise it as such.
199 Mr Galtos' evidence on the question of his knowledge of the arrangements between Open Markets and Camerons was at times evasive. Once it became apparent that the point of the cross-examination was to establish that Open Markets would have been in need of capital in around mid-2013 and would have been looking for investors, Mr Galtos sought to backtrack from his earlier evidence in which he directly answered the questions put. Ultimately, it was established by his evidence in relation to the mid 2013 period and in relation to later during the relevant period (discussed below) that he did understand that Open Markets, a start-up enterprise that was actively growing, was both in need of capital and was actively seeking it, thereby creating opportunities for the uptake of both shares and convertible notes. That Mr Galtos had many things occurring in his life did not explain, in a plausible way, that he simply 'did not register' that Open Markets was capital raising.
200 It was put to Mr Galtos that he had not made any inquiries of Open Markets around mid-2013, with a view to investing. His response was that,
Well I believed in the good faith commitment of the shareholders agreement and also it is a reality, when someone is trying to raise capital they tend to chase you. You don't have to find people to give your money to, they come and ask you. So perhaps naively, whatever it may be, my expectation was that the shareholders agreement would be conformed to and that money is money and every single time that company raised money it grew exponentially in value.
201 Throughout his cross examination Mr Galtos repeated the theme that Open Markets did not chase him when it should have, and that he was entitled to rest on his expectation that it would pursue him if it was capital raising.
202 He did not directly answer why he made no inquiries of the company when it ought to have been apparent an opportunity to invest existed. In this context, Mr Galtos did say that, given the difficulties between himself and Open Markets in relation to his departure,
[t]he nonsense that we went on about, about not paying per our agreement and having to go to a settlement, there's no need for me - I have lots of friends. There is no need for me to contact people that things aren't going great with. But I had no personal animosity.
203 That evidence was probably closer to the true position: Mr Galtos did not feel inclined to contact those running Open Markets, given the circumstances in which they parted. Although, in his evidence he was restrained in his criticism of Open Markets in relation to those events, it was his view that Open Markets had not kept the terms of its agreement with him and had treated him poorly, being forced to make payment to him. Objectively, that was not an unreasonable view to take. The difficulty of his parting with Open Markets did not of itself necessarily require the conclusion that Mr Galtos would never have invested in Open Markets at a later time if it had made sense to do so, financially; it is one fact to be weighed in the matrix with other facts.
Mr Galtos' response to Open Markets' publications
204 Mr Galtos was cross-examined on a number of documents published by Open Markets, that he did receive during the period. Mr Galtos' appreciation of Open Markets' need to raise capital during the period by issuing shares and convertible notes, and his insistence that he adopted and was entitled to adopt, a "holding position", refraining from actively pursuing investment until and unless he received an offer from Open Markets compliant with the SHA, emerged as significant themes in the evidence.
205 Mr Galtos received shareholder updates published by Open Markets dated 24 May 2013 and 11 September 2013, on or about 28 or 29 January 2014.
206 The 24 May 2013 update advised that Open Markets had successfully completed the acquisition of Camerons on 10 May 2013, acquiring the necessary licences, that "Stage 3 Part I" of capital raising had been successfully completed and that "Stage 3 Part II" capital raising for "go-live working capital" was then under way and that a new information memorandum was ready for distribution in the following week. Mr Galtos accepted that when he read that document, he would have understood that the acquisition of Camerons had been completed in May 2013. He said that he "obviously didn't process it at the time". It was put to him that, had he been at all interested in participating in a capital raising at the time at which he read the document, he would have raised concerns regarding that fact with Open Markets in January 2014, not having received the May 2013 update when it was published. His answer was that,
I would have read it, definitely read it. I obviously missed the context of "financial" but I accept that I should have read it, but I still don't believe that the onus sits on me to chase for capital raising under the shareholders agreement.
207 The reference to "financial" is to the heading for that part of the update describing the capital raising stages, mentioned above. Mr Galtos' evidence that he did not 'register' that the document conveyed that capital raising had been under way and was once again under way was unconvincing. The document unambiguously stated that capital raising Stage 3 Part I had been completed and was closed, and that the next stage was, at the date of the document, underway.
208 Mr Galtos correctly said that he was not informed of the capital raising when it occurred but received the documents after the fact. That, however, did not explain why, if he was so keenly interested in acquiring a significant stake in the company, he did not, on receipt of that material, seek to ascertain what opportunities then existed for investment. KSG's case is not that it was excluded from offers of investment only in 2013, but that throughout 2013 to mid-2016 it had been deprived of an opportunity to invest in Open Markets. The May and September 2013 updates told KSG that Open Markets had embarked on a capital raising programme, which was to be expected given that its business was then in its very early stages.
209 The 11 September 2013 update advised that Open Markets had placed and settled its first live trades on the ASX and NSX, that the Open Markets Web-Trader platform was being finalised and tested and a launch planned for October, together with the company's marketing website. Mr Galtos gave the following evidence about his receipt of that publication:
I want to suggest to you that therefore upon reading those [documents] you must have realised that there had been a significant capital raising which had been undertaken since your departure from Open Markets?---I don't know what I was thinking at the time, Mr Evans.
I will suggest to you that you must have also realised that no offer had been made to you in respect of participation in that capital raising?---Can I have a moment just to think about what I was doing in January 2014? I'm not sure. I'm not sure.
I will suggest to you that if you had in fact any intention to participate in any capital raisings with respect to Open Markets between the time of your departure and reading these shareholder updates on or around 29 January 2014 you would have taken steps to notify Open Markets that you had intended to take part in these and that you had been deprived of that opportunity?---Like when I did in 2016 and they didn't answer.
That's not a responsive answer?---Well, I'm saying ... I have hindsight now on when I did contact the company that they just didn't answer made me jump through hoops constantly without resolving the issue, hence why we are here in court, but it clearly didn't hit me in the head that something was amiss or I would have acted. I don't know why I didn't act at the time. I'm not sure. I was in a new relationship with my Danish partner at the time. I don't know. I don't know why I didn't act. If it had hit me in the face I would have, I am no shrinking violet.
May I suggest to you the reason you didn't act was because you had no intention whatsoever to participate in a capital raising that was undertaken by Open Markets which would have required KSG to stump up significant amounts of capital?---I can understand why you present it that way but that wasn't my intention.
210 Mr Galtos accepted that in January 2014 he was aware that Open Markets was still fundamentally a start-up company and, as he put it, "in its embryonic phase". His contention that he did not appreciate that Open Markets was engaging in capital raising was unpersuasive. It was inconsistent with his evident understanding of the company's need for capital and that it was at a very early stage in its life, with ambitions to grow.
211 Mr Galtos' stated reason for not following up seeking an opportunity to invest in early 2014 was that the onus was not on him to "chase for capital raising". As discussed above, in January 2014 Mr Galtos had told Open Markets' marketing manager Genevieve Wood that he sought briefings, financial reports and any materials sent to other shareholders, but the focus of his communications was Open Markets' apparent non-compliance with the SHA. It was put to Mr Galtos that his email correspondence with Open Markets in January 2014 was consistent with him not having any interest in acquiring shares but rather being interested in asserting breaches of the shareholders agreement. His non-responsive answer was that he had a positive relationship with Ms Wood and did not want to cause her problems at Open Markets, and that he wanted Rick Klink to make contact with him directly. He said further that it became clear to him from the attachments that "something fishy was going on" and while he accepted that he did not proactively get in contact with the company, "they didn't contact me either and life was pretty busy being by myself in a new relationship, et cetera, et cetera". There was no evidence that Mr Galtos followed up that email conversation or that Open Markets responded. Mr Galtos said that he could not recall whether he subsequently communicated with Mr Klink and that his focus was on "the next thing rather than the past thing". He repeated his point that he was entitled to wait for Open Markets to come to him, throughout his evidence.
212 Open Markets correctly submitted that Mr Galtos focused in his evidence on Open Markets' breaches of the shareholders agreement. His communications with Open Markets disclose that during the period, his focus was also on asserting breaches by Open Markets. He first took the position that it was for Open Markets to pro-actively contact him and to resolve its failure to comply with the SHA, as early as January 2014. He did not thereafter, follow up Open Markets seeking opportunities to invest.
213 It is helpful to place that point in context. It was true that the company was obliged to send an offer to KSG in accordance with clause 11 of the shareholders agreement each time it proposed to issue shares pursuant to a shareholders' resolution, and it did not do so. The shareholders agreement did not require KSG to take any action in order to entitle it to receive an offer of that kind. But KSG, in pursuing an order of damages for breach of contract, sought to make a case that, had it not been for Open Markets' breaches of agreement, it would have substantially invested in the company. Assessed in a common sense way, for KSG to have done so would have required Mr Galtos to have had a significant interest in Open Markets as an investment prospect, throughout the whole of the relevant period.
214 Although Mr Galtos sought in his evidence in chief to paint a simple picture (he was deprived of an opportunity and he would have invested had he known), when pressed, he asserted that he was entitled to wait until Open Markets chased him to invest his capital before he was required to take any affirmative steps to show an interest in investing. That reticence reflected his actual conduct, whereby KSG took no active steps to ascertain whether there were opportunities to invest and took no active steps in response to information it did receive which clearly evidenced that the company was engaging in substantial capital raising. It was inconsistent with Mr Galtos' asserted keen interest in Open Markets. The evidence that Mr Galtos was entitled to wait for Open Markets to come to him was in my assessment an argumentative response to the problem of KSG's contemporaneous conduct which, although entirely consistent with the shareholders agreement, did not readily accommodate that case that KSG wished to establish.
215 As I have said earlier, what occurred in the real world is not a perfect proxy for the characteristics of the hypothetical world to which KSG addressed its causation case. Nevertheless, KSG's lack of action significantly undermines its case that it would have been a substantial investor if only it had received a clause 11 offer on the occasion of each share allocation.
216 There were no objective facts that accounted for KSG's rationale for refraining from pursuing Open Markets if Mr Galtos was as keen as he says he was to increase KSG's investment. There were no objective facts that accounted for the bright line distinction that Mr Galtos drew between the effect that an offer conforming with the shareholders agreement would have had on him had it been made, and his receipt of information (albeit after the event at times and not specifically addressed to him in the form of an invitation for the most part) that did occur in the period 2013 to 2016. Mr Galtos did not advance an explanation as to why he would have responded so very differently had he received an offer to invest, as opposed to information promoting the company and generally inviting investment (which, in January 2014 was provided after the event but subsequently, was provided as it was published). It is true that there is a legal difference between the circulation of the shareholders update (whether provided in time or after the event) and the provision of a clause 11 offer. However, what is relevant for the purposes of assessing KSG's causation claim is the difference that those forms of communication would have had on KSG's decision-making process and its decision to pursue investment in Open Markets.
217 KSG produced a shareholder update dated 9 May 2014 which Mr Galtos accepted he had received and would have read at the time. Relevantly, the update summarised the company's key activities since December 2013, including the development of its advisor services business, approval from the ASX to offer trading in exchange traded options and arrangements to offer products supported by Macquarie Bank and Bank of Queensland with discussions under way with other major banks. It was said that the preceding few months had seen a steady increase in trading volumes and a strong uptake of new business. The document set out that it was essential that the business have sufficient working capital to fund itself to breakeven point and maintain sufficient regulatory capital to comply with the minimum requirements for market participants in the ASX. The document relevantly read:
Convertible Notes Investment Offering: In order to ensure that [Open Markets Australia Ltd] has sufficient cash reserves to support the business growth and to avoid dilution of shareholders, Management is proposing the issue of Convertible Notes in OMAL which will be used as liquid cash on the balance sheet to meet increasing requirements from ASX Clear. The Notes will be issued in minimum values of $20,000 and will pay a rate based on the 90 day bank bill rate plus 7% and will be payable quarterly in arrears. ... Shareholders interested in considering the take-up of Convertible Notes please express your interest to Andrea Marani at amarani@openmarkets.com.au. Relevant documentation will be provided and a dial-in conference will also be arranged to discuss the offer in more detail.
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218 Mr Galtos volunteered in his evidence that the document was "important", that he did not know whether he had read it as closely as he should have at the time, but that he should have read it properly and that he had "a responsibility to read them properly because of the investment I have". It was put that he took no steps to inquire of Open Markets regarding his ability to participate in the offer. Mr Galtos did not contend that he took such steps and explained his position by saying that,
I relied on the good faith commitments of the shareholders agreement totally. So maybe that's naïve on my part. I didn't - you know, in my head I thought they would do the things we had promised so I apologise but I take your point on what you're saying there.
219 When his attention was drawn to the explicit invitation in the update to contact Mr Marani if interested in considering the take-up of convertible notes, Mr Galtos said:
That's not the processes laid out in the shareholders agreement and I didn't have to rely on that statement. I can rely on the fact that they were meant to send me first a resolution for a major shareholders resolution to approve a capital raise followed by a process which is well defined within the shareholders agreement. So they could write anything they want in one of these documents. I rely on the shareholders agreement. So if it slipped past me at the time sorry I just thought that they were going to do something in accordance with the shareholders agreement because that's what the company was obliged to do.
220 That evidence encapsulated the case that Mr Galtos sought to make when placed under pressure during cross-examination. In this particular instance, Mr Galtos received contemporaneous notice of the company's need for working capital and of an invitation to invest by taking up convertible notes with an offer to provide documentation and a conference to discuss the offer in detail. Mr Galtos cannot have been left in any doubt that the company was capital raising and that, should he wish to take up the offer, he could have availed himself of it. Mr Galtos' evidence was argumentative in substance and form. It revealed an unwillingness to grapple with the significance of his contemporaneous actions and the difficulties that that caused for his claimed degree of interest in being a major investor in Open Markets.
221 Mr Galtos accepted that he had received a shareholder update of 6 October 2014 at or about the time of its publication and that he would have read it on receipt. The update advised about numerous developments in the business and said that Open Markets had raised $440,000 through the issue of convertible notes and was continuing to monitor its capital requirements. He said that his head was focused on shares, not convertible notes, but in hindsight he understood that the issue of convertible notes was a capital raising exercise. When it was put that he took no steps to contact anyone at Open Markets regarding the issue of convertible notes, he said that he didn't think to at the time and didn't understand it to be 'a share issue'. Because he considered them to be a debt instrument, it "didn't stick in my head that way". He had earlier given evidence that, because of his experience in capital raisings for the company of which he was formerly chief executive, he was familiar with different types of equity and debt raisings available to a listed company in Australia and was familiar with the idea of convertible notes as a method of raising money. He understood that a convertible note is a hybrid security which starts as a debt but is converted into shares potentially, usually at the election of the note holder. I accept that Mr Galtos, in his own mind, described a convertible note as a 'debt instrument', but given his earlier evidence it was not credible for him to suggest that it did not occur to him that by issuing convertible notes, Open Markets was raising capital. I also accept that the issue of convertible notes was not a 'share issue' in the context of the shareholders agreement, but nevertheless it plainly represented an opportunity to invest, which KSG did not seek to pursue.
222 Open Markets published a notice of annual general meeting on or about 24 October 2014 which it sent to shareholders with a copy of the directors' report and consolidated financial report for 2014. The document and attachments were sent directly to Mr Galtos by email. In response to the proposition that he would have been keen to read the financial statements at the time, Mr Galtos said:
I would have looked over it but my general view of accounts published by companies that I'm not running is that it can be made to say anything you want.
223 That evidence was at odds with Mr Galtos' insistence at other points in his evidence that, had he received offers to invest in shares in Open Markets, he would have considered those in the context of information about the company's financial circumstances which he assumed would have been provided at the time. Mr Galtos said that he recalled that when looking at the financial statements he was confused as to why the gross turnover of shares purchased on Open Markets' customers' accounts was not included in the financial statements, because that omission meant that he could not work out the net margin that had been paid by customers which would have, on his view, revealed "true profitability on a transaction basis". The financial statements revealed issued capital at $2,974,006, and it was put that its equity position was the method by which the company managed to have net assets of $2.218 million despite always having traded at a loss. In response, Mr Galtos said that, "So again with figures like that you can make it into what you need it to be".
224 When it was again put that if he was very keen to invest in Open Markets at all times he must have taken a careful view of what was contained in the financial statements provided to him at the very time at which he said he would have invested, his answer was:
[m]y intention was not to sell my shares in Open Markets so therefore I had a holding position. My mentality was one of holding. Nobody had put to me a capital raising offer so there was no need to consider my position. ... I had no need to consider the financial statements because I'm just holding them, because nobody has asked me to buy more. Had I been issued with a notice to buy more shares or invest more shares then I would have looked at the paperwork I received. I don't see it as my - it's pointless, like counting your gambling chips before you leave the table. I maybe should have read that closer. I didn't.
225 It was put that he was not concerned with the financial statements because he had no intention of acquiring further shares. Mr Galtos said he was "not in the habit of telling lies", that he had a baby on the way, was working three weeks a month in Dubai for nine months and had lots of distractions in his life.
226 Mr Galtos said that on reading the financial reports, he did not pick up that at that time (at December 2014), there were more than 238,000 shares on issue. If Mr Galtos was as keen on exercising the rights that KSG had under the shareholders agreement, it would have been reasonable to expect that he would have paid careful attention to the number of shares on issue as disclosed in the financial reports sent to him.
227 When asked about the fact that the 2014 financial statements recorded a trading loss, Mr Galtos said that he liked the idea of having 9.5% of the company and was happy that the value of his investment was growing, but otherwise he "didn't think about it". Mr Galtos' professed contentment with his ownership of 9.5% of the company was inconsistent with his evidence that he paid no attention to the number of shares on issue in the company. As noted below, I consider that the totality of his evidence indicates that he did in fact pay little attention to the financial statements. His resting on his 9.5% in those circumstances, reveals a failure, at the time, to engage with the true state of Open Markets' structure and business. The position, taken at face value, is so naïve as to be lacking in credibility, given Mr Galtos' professed expertise in capital raising and his professed "love" for Open Markets.
228 Mr Galtos received Open Markets' six month financial report to 31 December 2014 in April 2015. He said he would have looked at the financial report, but not in "absolute detail". The reports showed a consolidated loss for Open Markets and its controlled entities of $1,020,298 for the six months, before provision for income tax. The directors report stated that there was a need to extend funding requirements into mid-2015 and the company was actively seeking additional investment from interested third parties. Mr Galtos agreed that he read that report at the time. It was put to him that if he were concerned about the issue of shares or capital by the company without notice to KSG, that report would have triggered alarm bells for him. Mr Galtos did not answer the question about the company's capital raising but instead expressed his concerns about the fact that Paul Klink had been made a director of the company.
229 Mr Galtos' evidence in relation to Open Markets' financial statements was not coherent. On the one hand, he professed a detailed recollection of one part of the statements, but on the other he said he didn't need to consider them because he had a 'holding' position and also because he was distracted and busy, and further, that financial statements could be made to say whatever the reporting company wished them to say. This evidence was about his actions and state of mind at the time, not about hypothetical actions in a counterfactual world. Granted, those events happened several years earlier, but Mr Galtos did not say that he could not recall his response to the financial statements that he received.
230 In my assessment, Mr Galtos' evidence established that he did not make any serious attempt to consider Open Markets' financial statements at the time he received them or subsequently during the period. That conduct is inconsistent with the earlier evidence that he would have assessed offers made to him in accordance with the shareholders agreement in light of financial information about the company and sits uncomfortably with the fundamental thrust of KSG's claim that it had a very keen desire to increase its shareholding in Open Markets and would have done so had it been provided the opportunity. Mr Galtos' lack of attention to financial information concerning Open Markets during the period undermines the credibility of his asserted intent.
231 Furthermore, while I do not doubt that Mr Galtos had assumed many responsibilities in the relevant period and was busy and distracted, the fact is, he made no attempt in his evidence to explain why his actions would have been so different had he received an offer in accordance with the shareholders agreement. I accept that an offer personally addressed to KSG might have served to focus Mr Galtos' attention on the potential investment, but the evidence does not support the drawing of any stronger inference. The absence of such an offer does not, in the circumstances, credibly explain his general and persistent lack of interest in Open Markets during the period, which was punctuated only by Mr Galtos' complaints in early 2014 and late 2016, that Open Markets had not complied with the SHA in its capital raising activities. At one point during his evidence Mr Galtos described his mindset in these terms:
I'm a guy who is trying to make money as an entrepreneur who is trying to kick-start things and make things happen. When I get an opportunity I run with it. I wasn't given the opportunity so I wasn't running and maybe I should have been more forensic in these things but I wasn't. But I didn't get the notices of capital raising and therefore I didn't trigger to read documentation as closely as I could have. In hindsight, as an older person now, boy oh boy, I know what I will be doing in the future. I won't be trusting my partners in shareholders agreements.
232 This version of Mr Galtos' case was that an offer in the form of a clause 11 compliant notice would have triggered him to pay attention to the documentation he received, which would have then made him think about investing money in Open Markets. He accepted by that evidence that in the absence of such an offer, Open Markets was not a significant priority for him. As observed earlier, no objective facts were advanced in support of the potency of a conforming offer in KSG's counterfactual world.
233 To return to the subject of Mr Galtos' views about Open Markets' management, Mr Galtos volunteered that when working at Open Markets he had sat at a desk opposite Rick Klink and his wife, who did the bookkeeping, and had watched "the sloppy way" they ran their company Paritech. He said in answer to a question about his receipt in April 2015 of the directors' report for the period ended December 2014 issued under the name of Frederick Klink, that he was concerned about governance and sloppiness and keeping accurate records and doing accounts properly. When it was put in response to that evidence that he had a low opinion of Rick Klink's management capacity, he denied that was so but said,
I didn't think he was the neatest guy. I think he got stuff done. He's ex IBM trained. He knows his onus as a developer, as a guy, but I'm also aware that ASIC stopped him from - banned him from being a director or something like that before.
234 That assertion was not addressed or established by any evidence led by KSG. It was put to Mr Galtos that in light of that evidence, he should have had a healthy scepticism about investing millions of dollars into an entity controlled by people whom he didn't trust. His response was:
Sir, I don't think you have ever worked with Germans. I have a healthy scepticism about every business deal I get involved in. I have been involved in some very difficult commercial transactions between large multinationals where you can't trust the person smiling at you across the table. ... it doesn't mean I can't do a commercial transaction with them if I feel I can make a profit. I've got to understand the situation. I don't have to trust the person, I have to understand the situation. I think I have to be cautious, just like going through an intersection, but it doesn't mean I wouldn't.
235 Mr Galtos' evidence about what would have driven his approach to investment in Open Markets lacked consistency. His premise was that he could do a commercial deal where he thought he would make a profit with people he did not trust, provided he understood the situation. Earlier, he made clear that he did not understand the situation in any real sense because he did not pay any real attention to the information given to him about Open Markets, including its financial statements. The substance of his evidence was that he did not have a high opinion of Mr Klink, despite his avoiding a direct answer to the question.
236 When this inconsistency in his case was put to him, his response was that if he was able to raise sufficient capital to take up the shortfall shares, he would then have substantial rights and could put his own directors on the Board to get control of the company. He would then insist on governance standards that he was comfortable with. In that respect, when challenged, Mr Galtos accepted that under the then existing shareholders agreement KSG was only entitled to appoint one director, but he would have looked at having Open Markets increase or decrease the number of directors it had appointed and he may have been able to raise "even more money than what they were looking for", in which case he might have said to the company, "'Look, I will give you this much money but I want another directorship', and apply for a change to the shareholders agreement. But all that stuff is speculative because it didn't happen".
237 Whilst it is not hard to imagine a shareholder with a substantial interest in a company positioning itself so that existing governance arrangements might be changed in its favour so as to gain control of the company, how that might have occurred in KSG's case was, indeed, speculative. The proposition that Mr Galtos might have raised even more money than the company was seeking was even more speculative.
238 Further on Mr Galtos' 'holding position', he said that, in the context of questions about his receipt of financial information in April 2015, he was feeling "a little bit disempowered" by the fact that the company was not communicating with him and "so I just kind of watched as I held my investment with nobody contacting me, asking me for the next step for my investment". That passage exemplifies the position that Mr Galtos ultimately professed. He did nothing because he was waiting for an offer. That expression of conscious disempowerment does not sit at all consistently with his professed keen desire for an increased shareholding in the company, particularly given that information was placed in his hands about the company in the relevant period.
239 KSG's case was that around March 2016[49] it would have acquired $250,000 worth of shares at $35 a share and taken whatever steps were necessary to borrow the money to make that investment. In March 2016**,** Open Markets sent a personally addressed notice to Mr Galtos about the proposed adoption of a new constitution and cancellation of the then current shareholders agreement. The notice relevantly said that the directors were attempting to raise capital to meet an additional regulatory capital requirement and to support its recent growth and provide working capital. The company required an injection of $550,000 in the next four days and another $500,000 by the end of the month. The note conveyed the directors' view that cancellation of the existing shareholders agreement would facilitate the attraction of new capital because the existing agreement provided considerable advantages to the original shareholders through positions on the Board and the like.
240 Mr Galtos' response to the notice was to ask Open Markets to provide him with a statement of the number of shares held in Open Markets by himself or his company and to identify the total number of shares on issue in Open Markets and to "clarify if all shareholders in the company have executed the existing shareholders agreement and what the total amount of capital raised since the company was formed is".
241 It was put to Mr Galtos that he did not express any interest whatsoever in taking part in the proposed capital raising or ask for any financial information regarding the performance of the company. He accepted that he did not do so.
242 When pressed about his lack of active interest in Open Markets Mr Galtos said that his response to receiving the "first official communication in accordance with the shareholders agreement" giving him notice of a general meeting and a request that he invest capital was to ask a question about what he regarded as the most pertinent thing, namely his shareholding. He accepted that at no time after 11 March (the date of his email) did he indicate any desire for KSG to participate in any further share raising; his answer to this challenge was:
I couldn't because I wasn't clear of my position ... I asked the company to clarify as to how many shares I had in the company and how many were on total issue. I didn't have an answer to that question. How could I move forward when I don't know how many shares I have got so I don't know how many votes I have got? I don't know anything. I need to know things before I can take a position. I was completely in the dark, blind.
243 This evidence significantly undermined KSG's case that it maintained a keen interest in Open Markets during the period. The level of its interest was, according to this evidence, not sufficient to have motivated Mr Galtos to have had knowledge of how many shares he had in the company and where his shareholding stood in the context of the company as a whole. That evidence is also directly inconsistent with his earlier evidence that he was happy that he had 9.5% of the company. If it was a true reflection of Mr Galtos' state of mind at the time, it revealed an inexplicable passivity which was, once again, at odds with Mr Galtos' asserted fervent interest in Open Markets.
244 As Open Markets pointed out to Mr Galtos during cross-examination and again in submissions, the information he sought from Open Markets in September 2016 could have been obtained from an ASIC register search. He was entitled to send an email to Open Markets asking for that information, but his evidence that the lack of that information was the reason he did not take steps to invest, having received a personal notice that the company was seeking investment and desperately so, was wholly lacking in credibility and I do not accept it.
245 Both Mr Marani and Mr Galtos gave evidence about a meeting between them that occurred in November 2016 at a café on Little Bourke Street. Mr Marani's evidence was that Mr Galtos said to him in effect that Open Markets would discover in due diligence (which it would be undergoing for the purposes of its proposed initial public offering) that Mr Galtos had not been informed of capital raisings and nor had he authorised any capital raisings and that he was unhappy with his shareholding being diluted and would have invested 'had he known'. Mr Marani's recollection was that Mr Galtos then said, Marani having asked him whether he would really have invested considering the financial strength of the company, 'Yes, but of course I would say that'. Mr Galtos accepted he had likely said those things or words to that effect. It was put to him that the fact that he said, 'but I would say that, wouldn't I,' indicated that he was not telling the truth with respect to his interest in investing in Open Markets. Mr Galtos' evidence was that that phrase was a means of facilitating a discussion between two people in a negotiation where it is acknowledged that one may not believe the other; a phrase that has cultural resonance in the UK where Mr Galtos had lived. I accept that explanation and do not draw any implication from that conversation against KSG. On the other hand, Mr Galtos' self-serving statement to Mr Marani does not materially assist his case concerning how KSG would have behaved in different circumstances.
246 Finally, Mr Scott's evidence was that had KSG asserted a right to acquire further shares in Open Markets or to acquire 'mop up' shares, he would have recommended to the Board that they take steps to prevent KSG from amassing such a significant shareholding. Mr Scott elaborated on that contention only sparsely, saying that he envisaged steps such as seeking to amend the shareholders' agreement; Mr Scott's own opinion was that Mr Galtos was "toxic" and he did not want him involved with the company; that "[i]t's never good for a business for a shareholder that adds no value to acquire a big stake". It is likely that KSG would have encountered some opposition to any attempts to amass a very large shareholding given the bad blood between Mr Galtos and Open Markets. The evidence was insufficient for me conclude that it is likely that Open Markets or its shareholders or directors would have succeeded in blocking any attempts by KSG to amass shares.
247 Without repeating the reasons stated earlier, on the question of causation the threads can be drawn together in this way:
(a) KSG sought to persuade me on its primary case, that it would have paid in excess of $4 million during the period mid-2013 to mid-2016, to acquire a very substantial stake in Open Markets. On its alternative case, it sought to persuade me that it would have raised in excess of $400,000 within a period of just under three years; funds that on either case, it needed to raise by borrowing or persuading others to invest.
(b) KSG and Mr Galtos could not fund the purchase of Open Markets shares with their own money. KSG and Mr Galtos had no history of investing in shares. They had no history of borrowing money to make investments.
(c) KSG did not establish that it otherwise had the means to acquire the shares it says it would have acquired on either of its claim scenarios and did not seek to establish a different case, concerning the acquisition of a smaller number of shares at any time during the period.
(d) Even if my conclusion on that issue were wrong, the fact was, KSG was not in a position to 'write a cheque' for the acquisitions. On KSG's own case Mr Galtos would have had to expend time and effort to obtain significant funding for KSG's acquisitions, even if some funding was available from his father. The case that KSG would have done so, was implausible. That case was that KSG would have invested substantial sums in a company whose contemporaneous financial information it did not read, whose senior personnel it did not like, and in whom it made no effort whatsoever to invest in the three year period in question. Its case that had Open Markets complied with the shareholders agreement things would have been materially different, was not made out.
(e) KSG retained its shares after Mr Galtos left Open Markets, and in April and June 2013 Mr Galtos told Open Markets that he wanted to receive information about it, and its financial statements. At that time KSG did not want to acquire more shares in exchange for the moneys Open Markets had retained in its accounts. KSG's case was that Mr Galtos was effectively ruling a line under its entanglement with Open Markets so that he could make fresh choices. That position was a rational one and in theory was not by itself necessarily inconsistent with a later choice to make further major investments in Open Markets. There was however, no evidence to support the existence of a positive intention to invest further, in mid-2013, or subsequently. Moreover, nothing that Mr Galtos did in the three years that followed, evidenced the degree of interest in Open Markets that he professed.
(f) Mr Galtos knew that Open Markets was in need of substantial capital in mid- 2013 and that its need and desire for capital investment which it sought by issuing both shares and convertible notes, continued throughout the whole of the period. He received publications from Open Markets throughout 2014, 2015 and 2016 that advised shareholders of capital raising and opportunities to invest. In his evidence in chief he was not candid about what he knew.
(g) Mr Galtos read some of the material sent to him but on his own admission he read much of it superficially. He paid no real attention to Open Markets' financial statements when he did receive them, and didn't seek them out. His claims that the material that he received did not alert him to the fact that Open Markets was seeking to raise capital by investment by new shareholders and note-holders were not credible.
(h) Mr Galtos (and KSG) did not once, after January 2013 (when Mr Galtos was employed by Open Markets), take any positive step to seek to acquire shares in Open Markets.
(i) Mr Galtos offered three explanations for not having done so:
(i) First, he was very busy. As Open Markets submitted, Mr Galtos' numerous commitments with his new life do not plausibly explain why, if he was so keen to invest, particularly given his professed business experience, he would not have taken the time to read and understand the material he did receive from Open Markets. On the other hand, it is difficult to accept that, given his evidence about how busy and distracted he was, that had he received formal notice he would have taken the steps necessary to raise very substantial amounts of cash to enable KSG to invest in Open Markets;
(ii) Second, his position was one of "holding"; it was not for him to come to Open Markets, it was for Open Markets to pursue him. That answer was inconsistent with his professed desire to maximise his investment by whatever means were within his power; and
(iii) Third, when he finally did receive an offer that he regarded as compliant with the SHA (in September 2016) he could not act on it because he did not know how many shares he had and how many shares had been issued. That answer was, frankly, nonsense.
(j) Mr Galtos, for KSG, complained to Open Markets in January 2014 and again in September 2016 that the company had not complied with the shareholders' agreement in respect of capital raising. The focus of KSG's engagements with Open Markets was the assertion of legal rights and a perceived need for Open Markets to resolve matters with Mr Galtos, and not the pursuit of opportunities to invest.
(k) Throughout the whole period, Mr Galtos had no other direct engagement with Open Markets nor any visibility of how the company was being run. He had a poor opinion of Mr Klink's management ability. Mr Galtos and Open Markets witnesses both considered his departure from Open Markets to have been acrimonious. Mr Galtos took no steps to re-engage thereafter.
(l) Shortly after leaving Open Markets Mr Galtos moved overseas. He pursued many interests while there, both personally and professionally. In his own words, he was very busy. He had also, in his own words, moved on, to new ventures.
(m) Mr Galtos' evidence that had KSG received offers conforming with the shareholders agreement things would have been very different because he would have been "triggered" to consider investing in Open Markets, was not capable of supporting an inference that he would have then gone on to take the steps necessary to make a substantial investment in Open Markets. And even on the face of it, no subjective basis for the potency of an SHA compliant offer was proffered, save that Mr Galtos was otherwise very busy and distracted. Mr Galtos also posited in the counterfactual world, he would have been a very substantial shareholder in Open Markets and would have been able to dominate the company's board. In the circumstances that proposition was speculative. Those claims were insufficient to overcome the substantial cumulative weight of the surrounding circumstances including KSG's own behaviour in the period 2013 to 2016.
(n) In mid-2013, when negotiating with Open Markets, Mr Galtos took a straightforward commercial attitude to his shareholding - he would have been prepared to sell his shares for the right price, had Open Markets made a suitable offer. It did not, so he kept the shares. KSG's counterfactual case, in contrast, exhibited little sense of commercial reality. It asserted that it would have done everything in its power to take up all shares available for subscription, without seeking to establish a substantive commercial reason to justify such an investment. Mr Galtos pointed only to his attraction to Open Markets business model based on his experience in 2013, without having tested that belief against any objective fact concerning Open Markets' progress during the period after he departed its employ.
(o) As to the counterfactual case itself, Mr Galtos, perhaps not consciously, put a different case in his evidence in cross examination, than that put in his evidence in chief. When pressed, his case was that he would have "done his darnedest"; tried as hard as he could, to invest as much as he could. Even had the alternative been pleaded (it was not) or if it ought to have been considered to have been 'in the ring' on the ground that the parties contested the case on that basis (the 'case' only emerged in Mr Galtos' cross-examination), it did not provide the building blocks from which to determine causation. The degree of effort that could or would have been applied to the posited investment was neither quantified nor described qualitatively in a way that would have permitted sensible evaluation.
(p) Returning to the pleaded counterfactual case, for the reasons explained, it was unsupported by the objectively ascertainable facts. The evidence given in support of it was inconsistent and incoherent in the ways discussed.
248 As to Mr Galtos' performance as a witness, as I have observed earlier, at times Mr Galtos was argumentative and defensive. Throughout parts of his evidence he avoided directly answering questions. That characteristic likely reflected, in part, an aspect of Mr Galtos' communication style which was to over-communicate information and offer details that were relevant only at the periphery. It probably also reflected his emotional focus on the wrongs perpetrated by Open Markets. I say that with no disrespect to Mr Galtos, who was evidently hurt and disappointed by a number of aspects of his relationship with the company and with its behaviour. At times, however, his failure to answer questions directly revealed an unwillingness to grapple with facts that did not suit his case. On the question of what he knew about Open Markets' capital raising activities, as I have said earlier, he was not candid.
249 I accept the task of giving counterfactual evidence of this kind demands of the lay witness that he engage with a hypothesis that entails the mental construction of a hypothetical world. I also accept that in this case, Mr Galtos was also required to recall his own state of mind in the past, actual world, an exercise which of its very nature, risks much re-construction. Allowances must be made for the challenges inherent in that exercise, and I make that allowance. Those challenges do not, however, account substantially for the features of Mr Galtos' evidence discussed in the preceding paragraph.
250 Throughout his cross-examination Mr Galtos was given a fair opportunity to squarely explain his case, to address the circumstances that did prevail in the real world on the occasion of each relevant share allocation by Open Markets and to explain the mindset that he claimed he would have had, had circumstances been different. He had had that opportunity also in evidence-in-chief, but he had given only superficial evidence in a pro-forma style.
251 Ultimately, I consider that Mr Galtos committed himself to an exaggerated perception of how he would have behaved had things gone differently. I have no doubt that he perceived that he had a strong attachment to Open Markets and that he felt genuinely aggrieved by the company's non-compliance with the shareholders agreement. He maintained a distant admiration for Open Markets and a lingering affection for the project that he had helped launch. Ultimately, however, KSG did not discharge its burden of proof.
252 KSG's pleaded case was that on the termination of the shareholders agreement in March 2016 it would have sold all of its shares; it claims damages for the loss of profits it says it would have made on that sale.[50] It submitted that because of the processes governing the sale and transfer of shares in the SHA, it ought be assumed that any sale would have occurred over a period of about three months and, accordingly, the relevant time at which to assess any hypothetical sale would be within about three months of March 2016. On the question of KSG's counterfactual intention (that it would have wanted to sell its shares had a buyer been available at the right price), whether the date for the hypothetical sale is taken to be March 2016 or sometime in the subsequent three months or so, makes no difference to the assessment of the claim, on the available evidence.
253 By way of evidence in chief, Mr Galtos said only that he would have participated in share acquisitions until March 2016 when the SHA was terminated and "[a]fter this time, I would have sold my interests". KSG did not offer anything beyond that. Like the other parts of KSG's evidence in chief, this aspect of its evidence was notable for its lack of detail. It did not extend beyond an unelaborated assertion.
254 In cross-examination, Mr Galtos agreed that he learnt that the shareholders agreement had been terminated in March 2016. When asked whether the termination of the agreement was the reason he would have sold his shares, his answer was 'yes'; he said that he had done so before, in about 2001 in another venture, in which, "when the shareholders agreement was proposed to be changed I exited". No details of the other venture were provided. It had not been mentioned in his evidence in chief. It will be recalled that Mr Galtos had accepted earlier in his evidence that he had not at any time, either in his personal capacity or through KSG, sought to invest in shares. He did not seek to establish that the circumstances concerning that other venture were comparable to, or informed, those concerning KSG's shareholding in Open Markets. I do not accept that Mr Galtos' prior experience, if any, establishes that KSG would likely have sold its shares on the termination of the SHA in March 2016.
255 KSG did not in fact take any steps to sell its actual shares once Mr Galtos became aware of the termination of the shareholders agreement in March 2016. Open Markets pressed that fact in cross-examining Mr Galtos, and later submitted that KSG's behaviour in the real world undermined KSG's counterfactual case. When cross-examined Mr Galtos first said that he could not sell his shares in or about March 2016 because he did not have any basic information about his shareholding. In his email of 11 March 2016 discussed earlier, he had asked Open Markets to tell him how many shares he had and how many shares were on offer. He did not undertake an ASIC search to ascertain that information or proffer any reason why he could not have done so. As discussed earlier, the proposition that Mr Galtos did not know how many shares he had undermined, or was inconsistent with, various aspects of his purported deep interest in his shareholding in Open Markets. It is more likely that Mr Galtos did know how many shares he had. Even if that claim were true (and I do not accept that evidence) it does not provide a plausible reason for Mr Galtos' disinterest in selling his shares in or about March 2016.
256 Mr Galtos also said that he became aware from Open Markets' email of 10 March 2016 that there were other shareholders of which he was previously unaware, and he could not understand how shares had been issued without his consent or without the convening of a general meeting, which concerned him. As he put it rhetorically, "So how can I sell my shares in a situation that's so murky? It's not possible". He went on to say that it would affect his reputation were he to sell shares and "represent them" to anybody in those circumstances and, had he done so, he would be a "fraudster". Mr Galtos said,
I have an asset I can't sell because if I sell it without telling people that this might be the case I could be committing a crime and I'm not going to commit a crime for anybody ... [a]t this time I didn't have legal advice but pretty rapidly afterwards I went and took legal advice. ... I suspected under my knowledge of the Corporations Act that something had gone wrong. I first tried to engage amicably and then when it became impossible because I wasn't getting straight answers to straight questions I engaged legal representation and then I left it to the experts.
257 Mr Galtos then agreed that the reason he could not, in his mind, sell his shares, was because he was uncertain as to whether the shareholders agreement had been validly terminated. He elaborated, when pressed, that he knew that the shareholders agreement was "purported to be terminated" and that it was evidently the company's view that it had been terminated, but it was his view that it had not been validly terminated.
258 Mr Galtos' evidence that he had not appreciated before March 2016 that there were other shareholders in the company beyond the original shareholding, if taken at face value suggests at best, an utter lack of attention to the affairs of the company, alternatively wilful blindness to the facts that ought to have been apparent to Mr Galtos. It is more likely than not, however, that Mr Galtos did in fact understand that Open Markets had other shareholders beyond the original shareholders.
259 I accept that Mr Galtos did not have knowledge of or information about what had occurred internally at Open Markets, of the process that Open Markets had adopted for allocating shares when it had not adopted the process mandated by the SHA, each time an allocation was made. I accept that in and after January 2014 Mr Galtos held the opinion that Open Markets was not complying with the SHA.
260 I do not accept that Mr Galtos had the view in and around March 2016 that he could not sell his shares because of concerns over illegality. I consider that that evidence, and his evidence as to his state of mind in relation to his shareholding in March 2016 and subsequently, is unreliable re-construction created as a defence against the pressure of cross-examination. The fact is, he took no steps to put KSG in a position where it could have sold its shares, had it wished to do so.
261 As discussed earlier, Andrea Marani provided to Mr Galtos a list of shareholders and shares issued, on 12 October 2016. When asked whether he took any steps at all to try to sell his existing shares upon receipt of information about the shareholdings from Open Markets, Mr Galtos said that he did not take such steps and that at that stage or soon after, he had engaged his solicitor for advice.
262 Separately, Mr Galtos said that he had been approached by Mark Darras, the former chairman who was selling his shares, who asked Mr Galtos if he wanted to bundle his shares together with Mr Darras' shares to get a better price. Mr Galtos refused that offer. He did not say when that occurred.
263 In January and February 2017, Mr Galtos and Mr Marani exchanged emails and evidently had discussions, the details of which were not in evidence, about resolving Mr Galtos' concerns. Mr Galtos wrote on 10 March 2017:
[t]he fact a new capital raising has been announced that increases financial harm to my investment, I'm afraid the board does not appear to be acting responsibly or in the best interests of all shareholders to resolve this matter.
264 Mr Marani responded on 15 March 2017, disputing Mr Galtos' allegations and saying,
In any event, if you remain unhappy I'm prepared to resolve this matter on a commercial basis by sourcing a buyer for your shares. Please indicate if you wish to discuss this outcome.
265 Mr Galtos did not take up that invitation and said, when cross-examined, that by that point he had engaged legal representation. The fact was, by that stage Mr Galtos was not interested in resolving matters with Open Markets by negotiation.
266 Ultimately, on the question of what could be drawn from the fact that he made no steps to sell his actual shares at any time, Mr Galtos said, in substance, that the circumstances that did exist could not be compared with the hypothetical world in which, he said,
Had I taken up shortfall I would have had a bigger percentage of the company so would have been able to exercise more power at a general meeting which would have been duly convened because my director would insist upon proper corporate governance and then in the real world I find out that these things didn't happen and that I am not meant to sell my shares when I find out.
267 I accept that there are relevant differences between the posited hypothetical world and the events that occurred in 2016. The circumstances that did prevail in and shortly after March 2016 are an ill-suited proxy for whatever circumstances might have prevailed in the counterfactual world posited by KSG in which it would have had a significant number of shares and accordingly must have remained actively involved in the company, including at the time at which the termination of the SHA was proposed.
268 Focusing on KSG's counterfactual case, had it acquired a substantial number of shares by March 2016, it would have done so on the hypothesis that the company was conducting itself in accordance with the SHA. Mr Galtos did not establish either a subjective view or any facts by reference to which it would necessarily follow from the termination of a shareholders agreement that whatever arrangement was put in its place would be unsatisfactory or detrimental to him, or would provide a reason for him to exit the investment.
269 In the final analysis, KSG did not proffer any real basis on which I could be satisfied that it likely would have sold its shares in or shortly after March 2016. Its case was speculative. Ultimately, the selection of the March 2016 date served the purposes of KSG's case in linking its hypothetical sale with an off-market sale of shares that occurred on 29 August 2016 at a price of $95.70. That link was a contrivance.
270 In light of the above-mentioned conclusions, it is unnecessary to decide whether there was a more than negligible chance of a third party seeking to pay a price for the shares held by KSG which, if paid, would result in a profit to it on the sale, or to determine the value of KSG's claimed missed opportunity. I will, however, for completeness, set out the following factual and contextual matters:
(a) KSG contended that the fair value of its shares for the purposes of determining its entitlement to damages for loss of opportunity (and also for compensation under s 233) was $95.70 per share. That value was fastened upon by reference to the sale of 50,004 shares by Iron Mountain Pty Ltd and Financial Market Infrastructure to BMY Group Pty Ltd that occurred on 29 August 2016, at a total price of $4,785,382.80.
(b) Open Markets' shares issues, during the relevant period and subsequently, were as set out in Schedule 1 to these reasons, which identifies the number of shares issued, the total price paid, the purchaser and any relevant associated person. It also sets out the share sales (transfers) that occurred during and after the relevant period.
(c) Open Markets published, during the period, material of the kind described earlier, such as investor 'pitch decks' and associated memoranda. Open Markets accepted that that material recorded the assessments made from time to time by Open Markets and by the authors of the documents, of the value or potential value of the company (as the context of those documents indicated) based on the projected earnings calculations and assumptions set out in those documents.
(d) Open Markets expected that investors would assess that material in order to ascertain whether they should invest. Pitch documents projected share prices as 'first offers' or invitations to negotiate. The price at which shares were in fact issued was often different from the initially proposed price.
(e) Open Markets' Board approved the content of its pitch decks and like memoranda before they were circulated amongst potential investors. Emlyn Scott and the Board would satisfy themselves that each document was accurate and reliable before circulating it.
(f) Emlyn Scott accepted that Open Markets' pitch decks and like memoranda contained Open Markets' best assessments of its expected financial performance at the relevant times.
(g) Mr Scott agreed that the value of Open Markets in 2016 and 2017 was "almost entirely intangible value"; he said it was "a loss-making business" with "no tangible value".
(h) Andrea Marani accepted that the financial information, both historical and projected, contained in pitch decks and like memoranda prepared by Open Markets and tendered in the proceeding, had a reasonable basis.
(i) Open Markets relied on three reports by Michael Smith, a director of CFAS Advisory. In his first report, Mr Smith performed an arithmetic calculation of KSG's projected loss based on an assumed share price of $95.70. Those calculations were reflected in KSG's amended statement of claim. Mr Smith did not perform a valuation of the company as such, but in his second and third reports, responded to Open Markets' expert report, substantively reiterating the calculation of loss made in his first report on the assumed share price of $95.70. Mr Smith examined Open Markets' own valuations contained in its material published to potential investors, and deduced from that material, and from the sale of shares to BMY Group Pty Ltd in August 2016, that there was an inherent value in both the shares and the intangible assets of Open Markets at that time. He did not consider Open Markets' expert's opinion that a hypothetical purchaser would attach no value to the intangible assets owned by Open Markets to be reasonable. Conversely, in his opinion, it would not be considered unreasonable to apply a revenue multiple approach to value Open Markets, as Open Markets had done in its investor material.
(j) Open Markets relied upon an expert report from Dawna Wright of FTI Consulting. Ms Wright was asked to determine the fair value and the market value of Open Markets' shares as at 1 April 2016 and to express an opinion about whether there was a market for Open Markets' shares as at that date. Ms Wright was unable to provide an opinion as to the value of Open Markets' shares because she did not consider she could do so without an identified buyer for KSG's shares. It was her opinion that Open Markets should be valued by applying a net asset methodology. Her opinion was provided on a "limited scope valuation engagement" basis which, in accordance with the Australian Professional and Ethical Standards 225 - Valuation Services (APES 225), applies when "the member is not free, as the member would be but for the limitation or restriction, to employ the valuation approaches, valuation methods and valuation procedures that a reasonable and informed third party would perform taking into consideration all the specific facts and circumstances of the engagement or assignment available to the member at that time, and it is reasonable to expect that the effect of the limitation or restriction on the estimate of value is material".
271 KSG is entitled only to nominal damages on its claim for breach of the shareholders agreement. It has not otherwise made out its claim.
PART D - Claim for relief under Corporations Act ss 232-233
272 KSG contends that Open Markets' breaches of the shareholders agreement and its failure to respond to requests for books and records constitute oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly discriminatory conduct for the purposes of s 232(e) of the Corporations Act, thereby enlivening the Court's jurisdiction to award a remedy pursuant to s 233.
273 KSG seeks relief pursuant to s 233 of the Corporations Act in the form of an order that Open Markets purchase its shares at fair value with an appropriate reduction of the company's share capital, fair value being calculated "not on the basis of [the 10,564 shares] actually held, but rather on the basis of the shares that would have been held had there been no dilution [of KSG's shareholding]".[51] KSG claims that the effect of the "oppressive" conduct was to dilute its shareholding and that absent the conduct it would have held 9.5% of the total issued shares in Open Markets. The value of the shares that KSG says it would have held, is calculated by reference to the amount KSG says it would have obtained had it sold the (hypothetical) shares. KSG also seeks "interest on the shares" from the date at which it says it would have sold them.
The court must determine whether reasonable directors, possessing any special skill, knowledge or acumen possessed by the directors and having in mind the importance of furthering the corporate object on the one hand and the disadvantage, disability or burden which their decision will impose on a member on the other, would have decided that it was unfair to make that decision.[54]
275 At a minimum, the statutory phrase "oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly discriminatory against" imports a standard of unfairness to the evaluative determination whether conduct is oppressive.[55] Whether conduct is relevantly unfair is a question of fact and degree, and is to be judged objectively.
276 The conduct of a company's affairs may be unfair notwithstanding that the relevant directors did not hold any particular state of mind or intent and the operation of s 232 may be attracted to a decision made in good faith and for a purpose within power, but which reasonable directors would think unfair.[56] Put another way, "neither is it to be supposed that there cannot be oppression on the part of one who thinks that he or she is acting rightly".[57]
277 Sections 232 and 233 are to be read broadly. Reference to decided cases may helpfully expose how the statutory concept of 'oppression' is to be understood, but it is not a substitute for a thorough consideration of how the text applies to the facts in the case at hand.[58] As French CJ said in Campbell v Backoffice Investments, "[t]he imposition of judge-made limitations on their scope is to be approached with caution".[59]
278 If a court determines that the grounds for making an order pursuant to s 233 (as set out in s 232) have been satisfied, s 233 confers on the court broad powers to fashion orders that cure or terminate the oppressive conduct, or compensate the wronged party for any loss occasioned by that conduct.
279 In assessing whether orders should be made pursuant to s 233(1)(e) requiring the purchase of shares from a member (and, relatedly, in determining the price to be paid for any such shares) the Court must be guided by the principle that "the price to be paid is compensatory in nature and is aimed at redressing the wrong done (the oppressive conduct)".[60] The purpose of granting relief pursuant to s 233 is to remedy, or compensate for loss occasioned by, the conduct considered oppressive for the purposes of s 232(e). As such, it is permissible that the price to be paid for an aggrieved party's shares pursuant to such an order does not reflect their real or actual worth and that the price to be paid may be adjusted to reflect the value the shares would have had but for the oppressive conduct.[61]
280 Furthermore, consistently with the compensatory principle, if the aggrieved party has not suffered any loss as a result of the oppressive conduct, the Court may exercise its discretion not to make any award at all. Beach J's decision in Donaldson v Natural Springs Australia Ltd illustrates that point. There, the applicant alleged that the defendants interfered with his attempted transfer of his shares to a second company, and claimed a loss of the opportunity to make a profit on the transfer. Although it was unnecessary to decide the issue (the criterion in s 232(e) not having been made out), Beach J said he would, in any event, have declined on discretionary grounds to make an order. There was no probative evidence that the applicant had lost any valuable opportunity to sell his shares. An order for compensation would not be justified because it would have placed the applicant in a better position than that in which he would have been absent the oppressive conduct.[62]
281 The Court's power to order relief is not conditional on the existence of ongoing oppressive conduct; however, the absence of continuing oppression may indicate that the awarding of relief is not an appropriate exercise of discretion.[63]
282 At the heart of KSG's case is the contention that the shareholders agreement embodied a clear understanding between the original shareholders and the company about how new securities would be issued, which was intended to afford those bound by the agreement the opportunity to maintain parity with their original shareholding proportions, and the company's capital raising was conducted in consistent and blatant disregard of that agreement. KSG's pleaded case was that Open Markets' failure to comply with the SHA was conduct of the company's affairs that was both contrary to the interests of the members as a whole and oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to or discriminatory against KSG, but its evidence and submissions were confined to the latter ground.
283 As KSG put it, the deprivation of opportunity for KSG to participate on an equal basis with others sprang from both the lack of process and the specific failure to make a priority offer and give notice to KSG. The breaches of clause 11 occurred in a wider context, in which the company and the other shareholders evidently took no or no effective steps to comply with the requirement that new share issues must be the subject of a major shareholders resolution.
284 Open Markets said that while it was true that the requirements of the shareholders agreement in respect of new share issues were not complied with, that fact affected all shareholders in the same way. None received offers in accordance with clause 11. Open Markets had to seek to raise interest from third parties because there was never any competition between shareholders to take up shares. In that respect, KSG was not discriminated against or treated unfairly because it was in no different a position than other shareholders. The processes mandated by the SHA were not followed, but that was a technical breach which had no relevant prejudicial effect on KSG. For the reasons discussed in the context of the breach of contract claim, KSG did not establish that it would have taken up additional shares if offered or that it had the means to do so, even if it wished to do so.
285 KSG sought to make much of the fact that Open Markets sent to other shareholders, but not to KSG, documents supporting the company's capital raises such as information memoranda and related 'pitch decks'. That that occurred was not said to constitute a breach of the SHA, and plainly it was not. KSG said, however, that its exclusion from communications about Open Markets' capital raising activities was revealing of the company's attitude towards KSG - in that Open Markets made no effort to send KSG highly relevant material when it would have required little effort to do so. It also compounded the prejudice to KSG, of it not having received offers in accordance with clause 11, because it was effectively left in the dark about opportunities to increase its shareholding.
(a) In respect of each of the relevant share allocations Open Markets did not comply with the requirements stipulated by clause 11 of the SHA, by which new securities were to be first offered to original shareholders by written notice, and nor did it comply with the requirement that the issue of new securities be the subject of a major shareholders' resolution (clause 8.1), or the requirement that the grant of new securities to a new shareholder must not occur unless the proposed new shareholder delivers to each existing shareholder and the company, a deed of accession (clause 18.1).
(b) KSG did not receive the offers by written notice that it ought to have received under clause 11 of the SHA, and neither did any other original shareholder.
(c) It would have been a straightforward exercise for Open Markets to send any relevant communications to KSG, which remained a shareholder throughout the period.
(d) Processes for share offers adopted by Open Markets evidenced by proposed resolutions in early 2013 and early 2014 expressly contemplated that the requirements of the shareholders agreement in respect of the issue of new securities must be complied with unless varied.
(e) Open Markets required working capital throughout the period and was actively and publicly raising capital, and sought to attract new investment by its key personnel seeking to persuade their own contacts to invest and by widely publishing material promoting investment in the company through its networks. Its allocations of new shares were not directed to or concerned with the prospect of 'diluting' KSG's shareholding.
(f) Some of Open Markets' marketing material was sent directly to existing shareholders. Mr Galtos and KSG did not receive that material in the period of about seven months from July 2013 to late January 2014. After that time, throughout the period, KSG periodically received Open Markets' marketing material. It is not possible to determine whether KSG received all of the material that went to other shareholders but KSG did receive sufficient information to alert it to the fact that Open Markets was engaged in capital raising by issuing new shares and convertible notes. It paid scant attention to the material it did receive. Mr Galtos placed little value on Open Markets' financial statements and related information; he regarded its promotional material as propaganda.
(g) Although KSG's case is concerned with 17 particular allocations of shares, the circumstances attending each allocation were not relevantly different from one another.
287 These circumstances naturally provoke the question why Open Markets did not comply with the processes in the shareholders' agreement.
288 Until the trial had substantially progressed, KSG did not seek to plead a case of purpose or intention on the part of Open Markets, and when it did apply to amend its pleading, its application was refused.[64] Putting the specific question of intent to one side, Open Markets' witnesses were cross-examined without objection on the circumstances in which the shares were issued in breach of the shareholders agreement, and the evidence was as follows.
289 Mr Scott said in his evidence in chief (which was unchallenged) that he was not aware at the time that Galtos did not receive notice of the July 2013 share issue. He did not address that question in respect of the other share allocations.
290 Mr Scott was cross-examined about the process undertaken by Open Markets in issuing its shares and its failure to comply with the shareholders agreement. Mr Scott was not a director of Open Markets until December 2015, and consistently said, in answer to questions about whether he understood the correct process and whether it had been followed, that as a shareholder he was aware of what the process required, but did not know whether or not the process had been complied with; that was a matter for the Board, and he assumed that those responsible would have done their job properly. Mr Scott did not recall attending any shareholders meetings or being aware that any were held in respect of the allotment or new issue of securities between July 2013 and March 2016. He did not have any positive recollection of any meetings having occurred, apart from annual general meetings.
291 When crossed-examined about the draft special majority shareholders resolution concerning the issue of shares that had occurred in July 2013, Mr Scott said that he was not a Board member and did not write the document. It will be recalled that on its face the document concerned a resolution to be executed by Serpantine, Paritech, Remgrid and Iron Mountain, who between them held a sufficient majority of shares to pass a major shareholders resolution, and that it omitted both KSG and Mauconla Holdings. Mr Scott accepted that no executed circulating resolution signed by the requisite number of shareholders had been produced. He said in substance that he assumed that lawyers for the company had drafted the documents that he was shown, noting that an annexure to the document bore the name of Norton Rose Fulbright.
292 Mr Scott was asked to explain why there was no provision for KSG to sign the document, and he could give no explanation.
293 Mr Scott agreed that as a founding shareholder's representative he knew about the rights conferred on original shareholders by clause 11 of the SHA. More generally, he was asked whether he was able to explain, "how you step around the pre-emptive rights provision in the shareholders agreement". His response was that, "[a]ll I know is that from my perspective or what I was trying to do, was that I was trying to do the capital raise. I wasn't looking after the administrative side of the business"; and that he assumed the Board were doing their job, together with the company's lawyers. As he put it, "Shareholders don't do that...[don't] check that the Board is doing the administrative side of the capital raise". Open Markets did not call any witness who served as a board member before December 2015.
294 Mr Scott was asked to explain the transaction by which on 3 March 2016, Open Markets issued 7,142 shares at $35 a share (a total investment of $249,970 to a single investor). On 7 January 2016, Rick Klink had written to shareholders, stating that Open Markets needed an additional $500,000 working capital to "support the next growth phase of Open Markets". Mr Scott accepted that the issue of shares (like the others in the period) did not comply with the clause 11 offer and notice requirements of the SHA. When asked to explain why the requirements were not met, Mr Scott's answer was, "because it was an emergency capital raise and there wasn't time". The following exchange occurred:
So in an emergency you can bypass the pre-emptive rights; is that your evidence? --- It was a choice between the business going under or raising at $35.
So the answer to the question is yes, you can just bypass the shareholders agreement; is that what you're suggesting? --- No. I'm saying it's in the best interests of shareholders to actually keep the business running.
That's what you decided as a director? --- No. I didn't decide this. Rick did this emergency capital raise. I wasn't involved.
It has to be subject to board approval, doesn't it? --- It should have got board approval. --- It should have been. It would have had a shareholders resolution? --- Yes, of course it should have. --- It didn't? --- Not that I'm aware of.
295 Separately, in response to Mr Galtos' evidence that he would have taken up each and every ordinary share issue between July 2013 and March 2016, and exercised mop up rights in respect of any remaining shares, Mr Scott said that he would have recommended to the board to take whatever steps were available to prevent KSG from amassing such a significant shareholding, including "revoking" the shareholders agreement. His explanation was that,
I would not have wanted someone I believed to be so toxic to the company and every other investor, as Kos Galtos, to take such a significant interest in the company and have him involved.
296 Mr Scott was cross-examined on that evidence. The following exchange occurred:
You didn't want him to be involved with the company. You didn't want him to have any notice of any rights to purchase shares; isn't that correct? --- Whether he's given notice or whether I would like to or whether he's allowed to are two different things. Of course I wouldn't want him to be part of the business. He is toxic and he adds no value to the business.
You say you would have taken certain steps to prevent KSG from amassing such a significant shareholding. What are the certain steps?---So you can change the shareholders agreement or remove the shareholders through pre-emptive rights. It's never good for a business for a shareholder that adds no value to acquire a big stake - to become a big stakeholder in a business.
297 It was then put more directly to Mr Scott that his evidence that he would have taken steps to prevent KSG from amassing a significant interest in the company, revealed on his part a determination to ensure that KSG didn't gain any more shares than those it held when Mr Galtos was sacked as CEO. Mr Scott's response was,
So I would say that that's more about hypothetical which is how it was said: if he did something this is how we would have reacted. He didn't do something so we didn't do anything. There was no intent, no malice.
298 Mr Scott then agreed that his preference was to attempt to encourage purchases of shares by new investment rather than sale and transfer, saying,
I never support a sale if I can help it. It doesn't help the company. When the company is a loss-making company it needs to be constantly raising capital. A share sale doesn't help the company.
299 He went on to say that as a director he could not take steps to prevent a sale occurring, he could only encourage new investment.
300 Andrea Marani's evidence in chief (which was unchallenged) was that he was not aware, until 2016, that Mr Galtos had not received notice of the July 2013 share offer, or any other offers. He was not provided with the shareholders agreement or ever told what the requirements were, and was not aware in 2013 of the rights of shareholders under clause 11 of the SHA. He was not involved in the preparation of resolutions for shareholders, nor indeed any resolutions. He said that Rick Klink was responsible for such documents as the then CEO and Company Secretary. It was Mr Klink's responsibility to keep records of which shareholders responded to offers. Open Markets did not call Mr Klink to give evidence.
301 What conclusions may be drawn about Open Markets' failure to adhere to the shareholders' agreement?
302 Fundamentally, the facts relevant to KSG's pleaded case speak for themselves, in that the processes that were plainly intended to afford original shareholders priority in relation to new share offers and to require shareholders to approve new share issues by a special majority, were simply not observed throughout the three years in issue. That occurred in circumstances in which the regime established in the SHA was evidently understood within the company. I draw that inference from the documented proposed resolutions of January 2013 and October 2013, and from the evidence of Mr Scott who, although he was not a director until December 2015, was a founding shareholder and at all times knew of the relevant SHA requirements.
303 Emlyn Scott gave evidence in a straightforward and direct manner, answering the questions put to him rather than seeking to argue a case. Assessed by itself, his evidence that as a shareholder he relied on the board to do its job and ensure processes were complied with was, on its face, unexceptional. However, it did not take the question of what occurred within Open Markets very far. Open Markets did not call any board member or otherwise seek to explain its processes. The limitations of its evidence must be understood, though, in the context of the confines of the case that it was called to answer.
304 As to why Open Markets did not comply with the shareholders agreement, in its final submissions KSG said that I should draw the inference that "the defendant's failure to give notice to KSG of the capital raisings was not an oversight and that the defendant had knowledge of the unfairness of its conduct" to KSG. It said that I should do so at least in part as a result of the defendant's failure to call Rick Klink. It said that I should draw the further inferences that the defendant knew that the breaches would cause KSG's shareholding to be diluted and that it knew that KSG intended to participate in share issues between July 2013 and March 2016, and would have participated had it received the required notice.
305 Properly understood, the submission that Open Markets' failure was "not an oversight", is a submission that Open Markets intentionally did not give notice to KSG. The related submission that Open Markets had knowledge of the unfairness of its conduct directly invokes Open Markets' state of mind.
306 Looked at in isolation, it might appear that the question is simply whether the inferences properly arise because, if KSG's submission were accepted, they follow from the objective circumstances otherwise established. However, the difficulty with that submission was that KSG did not allege that the breaches of the shareholders agreement occurred pursuant to any purpose or that they were knowing or intentional, and nor was the case conducted by the parties on the basis that the issues of purpose, knowledge and intention were "in the ring", as it were.
307 As set out in my ruling on this issue, Open Markets pointedly sought clarity about the parameters of the plaintiff's oppression case both before and during the trial, explicitly raising whether the claim did or did not travel beyond the pleaded facts. The defendant submitted, in the context of the state of the pleadings, that the plaintiff ought not be permitted to make final submissions directed to the state of mind of Open Markets with respect to any pleaded breaches of contract as a ground or fact relevant to the Court's determination of a finding in relation to s 232 of the Corporations Act. KSG in turn sought leave to amend its statement of claim to allege that Open Markets was aware of the unfairness to KSG arising from the alleged breaches of the SHA, and that one of the purposes of the issue of shares in breach of the SHA was to dilute KSG's shareholding. It relied, among other things, on the evidence of Mr Scott that he knew of the rights conferred by clause 11 of the SHA and that he considered that Mr Galtos was "toxic" to Open Markets. That application was refused, including because on evidence filed in response to the application I was satisfied that the defendant had not come ready to meet the allegations at trial and would have taken steps to meet a case of that kind had it been pleaded at an earlier stage, that it did not take, and allowing an amendment at that point would be unfair.[65] The inferences that KSG seeks to draw are outside its pleaded case and therefore not open to be drawn.
308 Rick Klink was a director of two of the founding shareholders, Paritech and Remgrid, was a director of Open Markets from 12 April 2013 to 20 April 2018, was Open Markets' CEO from April 2013 to June 2016 and Open Markets' Company Secretary during the period 12 April 2013 to 24 August 2016. Mr Klink was in a relevant sense in Open Markets' camp,[66] and might have been expected to have been called on questions relevant to the circumstances in which Open Markets issued shares in breach of the SHA. Open Markets' witnesses accepted that there was no reason that it could not have made inquiries of Mr Klink in relation to this proceeding. However, in the circumstances there was no occasion for drawing inferences as to Open Markets' state of mind or deliberateness of action, or drawing them more readily because of the absence of Mr Klink from the witness box. KSG's submissions in reliance on Jones v Dunkel were misdirected. The rule established by that case applies where a party is required to explain or contradict something. Whether and what it is required to explain depends on the pleadings and the course of evidence in the case.[67]
309 Whether Mr Scott's evidence that he considered Mr Galtos to be toxic to the company was capable of founding an inference that Open Markets itself did not want Mr Galtos or KSG as a shareholder, need not be considered, because the ultimate point of that proposition, that Open Markets deliberately or knowingly excluded KSG from its SHA rights, is not open to KSG.
310 KSG separately submitted that Open Markets' conduct in issuing securities in breach of the SHA was unfair because many of those securities were issued to parties related to the board or, I infer from its submission, to the original shareholders. KSG pointed to the share issues made between July 2013 and June 2015, and three share issues made in 2017, to persons connected with Emlyn Scott (who did not become a board member until December 2015). The difficulties with that submission were first, that it was not alleged that the share allocations were unfair because they were made to related parties and second, the fact that the shares were taken up by parties connected with original shareholders or board members did not by itself establish that those parties had benefited at the expense of KSG.
311 As noted earlier, Open Markets did not call Rick Klink or any other board member who had tenure during the relevant period before late 2015. It did not seek to explain its processes or why the shareholders' agreement was not followed, in any considered way. The closest Open Markets came to explaining itself was in the course of Mr Scott's evidence about the "emergency" capital raise of March 2016,[68] discussed earlier. No explanation was given as to why Open Markets could not, before sending that communication, have put in place measures within time to invite original shareholders to invest in accordance with the priority offer provisions of the SHA. Mr Scott's evidence that there was a choice between undertaking a capital raising in those circumstances or allowing the business to fail, did not appear to be anything other than a genuine expression of his view, but it was hyperbolic.
312 More generally, the fact that Open Markets needed capital throughout the period could not itself explain or provide a justification for the failure of those bound by the SHA to work through the process required by clause 11 when issuing shares. Apart from the confined evidence that emerged during the cross-examination of Mr Scott in respect of the call for capital in January 2016, Open Markets did not seek to say that adherence to the process would have thwarted the injection of new capital.
313 It might have been the case that those closely involved in the company's day to day operations were, on the subject of share issues, focused on capital raising - getting new money in the door - and were unmindful of the processes that ought to have been observed, at least until an external company secretary was appointed in 2016. However, I do not consider, on the scant evidence available, it is possible to draw such an inference.
314 In summary, it is not possible to conclude one way or the other whether the breaches of the shareholders' agreement were inadvertent, and the question whether in relation to KSG they involved something more, including animus towards KSG, is not a question that was open for determination on KSG's case.
315 Be that as it may, the result of the defence conducted by Open Markets is that its failure to comply with the shareholders agreement was left unexplained. Although Open Markets made its forensic choices in an environment in which KSG had not alleged purpose or intent, it could have chosen to call evidence to explain what occurred, but it did not.
316 The conduct of the company's affairs in question involves a series of omissions which were unexplained. KSG's case was that the "continual and blatant" breaches of the SHA were discriminatory against and unfairly prejudicial to it. In its evidence and submissions KSG advanced two reasons why the conduct should be so characterised, namely that Open Markets' conduct was "not an oversight" (a contention that was not open to KSG, as discussed) and separately that the effect of the breaches of the SHA was to cause KSG to lose a valuable financial opportunity, as a result of which KSG's shareholding in Open Markets was diluted.
317 Noting that the criterion in s 232(e) is a composite expression and must be applied as such, I accept Open Markets' submission that the conduct was not unfairly discriminatory against KSG. The failures by Open Markets to comply with the SHA (clauses 8, 18 or 11) were not shown to have been directed to KSG or to concern it specifically, as distinct from shareholders generally.
318 Considered hypothetically in the abstract, there might have been unfairness to KSG in the period after Mr Galtos had left Open Markets' employment and before January 2014 when it was not receiving Open Markets' publications in that, although no shareholders received offers in accordance with clause 11 and none appeared to have participated in resolutions in respect of share issues, at least some other shareholders are likely to have had better access to information about Open Markets' capital raising activities than KSG did because of their ongoing connection with the company,[69] in which case the absence of formal notice of proposed share allocations may have been of less practical significance to those other shareholders. KSG did not articulate the point precisely in those terms but it was implicit in its submissions. Two responses may be made to that contention, assuming KSG meant to advance it. First, for all the emphasis at trial on the failure by Open Markets to consistently send all of its publications to KSG, Mr Galtos' evidence established that he paid little heed to the material that he did in fact receive. The absence of like material in part of the period is unlikely to have amplified any prejudice to KSG flowing from it not having received a clause 11 offer.
319 Second, any potential unfairness to KSG should not be considered in the abstract, but in light of the actual effect of the conduct on KSG. KSG evidently understood this point, focussing as it did in its submissions on a loss of opportunity and the "dilution" of its shareholdings.
320 As to the effect of the conduct, KSG said that "oppression" within the meaning of section 232 can be established without the applicant proving that it has suffered financial loss. It is unnecessary to address that contention as an abstract proposition of law. It was KSG's case that it had been "oppressed", relevantly because of the effect of the company's conduct on KSG, an alleged financial effect in the form of loss of an opportunity to purchase and then sell shares, and a dilution of its shareholding. It was therefore both necessary and appropriate to consider the effect of the conduct on KSG, when assessing its claim to have been oppressed.
321 KSG also said that it was neither appropriate nor necessary to apply a "counterfactual" or causation analysis to the question whether KSG should be entitled to relief under s 233. That point was misdirected.
322 The purpose of an order made under s 233 is compensatory. It is true that for the purpose of fashioning an order under s 233 the Court has a broad jurisdiction to redress the wrong in question and is not confined in its methodology in crafting a remedy.[70] However, in this case, in order to assess the effect of the impugned conduct on KSG (which is required in this case for both parts of the inquiry - whether the impugned conduct was "oppressive" of KSG, and if so, what if any remedy should be ordered), it is necessary to consider the position in which KSG would have found itself absent the conduct. That follows from the very nature of KSG's claim - that absent the conduct it would have purchased additional shares which it would later have sold. Put another way, where, as in this case, a party claims to have been oppressed because it has been adversely affected financially as a consequence of the conduct, it is necessary to consider the causal relationship between the impugned conduct and the alleged loss. That is so, whether one is assessing whether the conduct falls within the description in sub-paragraph 232(e), or formulating a remedy. In this case those analyses largely overlap, insofar as the claim turns on KSG having been deprived of an opportunity by the conduct.
323 For the reasons set out in Part C above, I do not consider that the conduct of Open Markets' affairs - its non-compliance with the shareholders' agreement in the circumstances alleged - had the effect of causing KSG to lose the opportunity of making a profit on the sale of hypothetical shares that it says it would have purchased (and later sold) had the company complied with the agreement. KSG did not advance any other detrimental effect.
324 KSG submitted that because of Open Markets' breaches of agreement its shareholding had been diluted. I reject that submission. For the reasons discussed in Part C, KSG has not established that its failure to acquire additional shares in KSG or to sell any shares, was caused by the conduct alleged. The SHA did not promise that any shareholder would maintain parity with other shareholdings in keeping with their original shareholding proportion. Performance of the agreement would not have had the result of KSG maintaining 9.5% of the issued shares in Open Markets. That result would have depended on KSG taking steps entirely within its control, had the agreement been performed.
325 I accept that Mr Galtos, for KSG, feels aggrieved that Open Markets did not comply with the shareholders agreement. However, in light of how KSG put its case, absent any proven effect on KSG, I do not find that Open Markets' conduct was oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against KSG.
326 Even if that conclusion were incorrect, for the above-mentioned reasons (and those set out in Part C above) it is inappropriate to order the relief sought by KSG.
327 KSG seeks what it describes as a buyout order, but at fair value assessed, "not on the basis of [the 10,564] shares actually held, but rather on the basis of what shares would have been held had there been no dilution" of KSG's shareholding. KSG seeks payment for its 10,564 shares as though they were in fact a much greater number of shares (namely 153,484 shares on KSG's scenario 1, or 26,769 shares on its scenario 2), and valued by reference to the profit it asserts it would have made on the sale it posits would have occurred in or shortly after March 2016.
328 KSG sought to rely on the observations of Ferguson J (as Her Honour then was) in Wain v Drapac (No 2) in relation to the price to be paid on a buy-out order, that,
What must not be forgotten is that it is the price to be paid that is being set, not how much the shares and units are worth on the open market. That price must be a fair price to redress the wrong done by the oppressive conduct. It is akin to paying the price for shares which had been diluted based on an assumption that there had been no dilution. [71] (emphasis added)
329 Unlike the applicant in Wain v Drapac (No 2),[72] KSG did not establish that any oppressive conduct had caused the dilution of its shares.
330 An order on the basis put by KSG (whether or not characterised as a "buy-out" order) would place it in a better position than that which it would have been in, had the impugned conduct not occurred. It would not be a compensatory order. Even if the conduct were properly characterised as falling within s 232(e) there would be no occasion for the exercise of this Court's powers to grant a remedy.
331 It is unnecessary to separately consider the further submission on which Open Markets relies, namely that a buy-out or other compensatory order would not be appropriate in circumstances in which the oppressive conduct ended some several years ago.[73]
332 KSG's pleaded claim in respect of access to Open Markets' books and records does not advance its case. KSG alleged that the affairs of Open Markets had been conducted in a way that was oppressive to KSG (or contrary to the interests of the members as a whole) on the grounds that Open Markets did not respond to five written requests for documents, made by its solicitors. It is unnecessary to set out the documents requested or the sequence of correspondence. In short:
(a) The requests were made both shortly before and shortly after these proceedings were issued. The claim, when commenced, sought an order under s 247A of the Corporations Act for inspection of the company's books and records.
(b) After negotiation between the parties, in September 2018 the Court ordered by consent that certain documents were to be produced. Open Markets produced documents pursuant to those orders in October 2018.
(c) KSG made no substantive submissions, in opening or in closing, about this aspect of its claim.
(d) KSG did not establish any basis for relief under s 233, in respect of the production of the company's documents.
(e) It is unnecessary to address the arguments made by Open Markets about the absence of a general right in KSG to inspect or obtain its documents.
333 KSG's claim for relief under s 233 of the Corporations Act fails.
Schedule 1 - List of Share Issues and Sales of Open Markets' Shares
Share Issues and Sales during the Period the Subject of the Claim
Financial Market Infrastructure Fund Pty Ltd (7,142)
Schedule 2 - Relevant Clauses of the Shareholders' Agreement
(19) Deed of Accession means a deed of accession in the form set out in Schedule 2 or as amended by the Company;
(33) Major Resolution means a Major Directors Resolution or a Major Shareholders Resolution;
(34) Major Shareholders Resolution means a resolution passed by a majority of Shareholders representing not less than 75% of all votes capable of being cast at a general meeting of the Company attended by all Shareholders;
3 Shareholders not to interfere with management
3.1 A Shareholder must not interfere with the management of the Company and, except as specifically stated in this Agreement, a Shareholder must not give directions to any of the Company's officers or employees.
3.2 Nothing in clause 3.1 restricts the right of a Shareholder to:
(1) appoint Directors as provided in this Agreement; or
(2) grant its consent withhold its consent or vote as a Shareholder.
4.1 Each Party must ensure that, subject to any express provision of this Agreement to the contrary:
(1) the Company complies with, and is able to perform its functions and obligations under this Agreement, the Constitution and the Act;
5.1 Unless otherwise agreed by all Shareholders in writing:
(1) each of Serpantine, KSGI, Mauconla and Iron Mountain is entitled to appoint a Director;
(2) Paritech and Remgrid are entitled jointly to appointed a Director; and
(3) a Director may be appointed by more than one of these Shareholders.
5.2 A person is not eligible to be appointed as a Director unless:
(1) they are of good character and high business integrity; and
(2) upon their appointment, a majority of the Directors are residents of Australia.
5.4 At the date of execution of this Agreement, the sole Director is Mr Kosmas Galtos.
5.5 A Shareholder entitled to appoint a Director under clause 5.1 is also entitled to remove and, if they so choose, to replace that Director.
8.1 Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, a prior Major Shareholder Resolution is required for the Company to:
(1) securities issue: issue, allot, redeem, purchase or grant options over any Shares, issue debentures or other securities or re-organise its capital in any way;
(2) variation of rights: vary the rights or privileges attaching to any securities issued by the Company, including the Shares;
10.1 The Secretary or any Director or Shareholder by notice to the Company, may propose a Major Shareholder Resolution in relation to a matter listed in clause 8.1 or Major Directors Resolution in relation to a matter listed in clause 9.1.
10.2 On receipt of such a proposal the Company must expeditiously take the steps required under the Act, Constitution and this Agreement to obtain a Decision on the matter.
11.1 Subject to clause 11.7, if the Shareholders resolve to make an issue or allotment of Shares, debentures or other securities pursuant to clause 8.1(1) (New Securities), the Board must first offer those New Securities to all Shareholders in their respective Shareholding Proportion (New Securities Offer).
11.2 The Board must make the New Securities Offer to each Shareholder by notice in writing (Subscription Notice) stating:
(1) the total number of New Securities available for subscription and the number being offered to each Shareholder; and
11.3 Within 20 Business Days after receiving the New Securities Offer, each Shareholder must give notice to the Board stating:
(1) whether it accepts all or a specified number of New Securities contained in its New Securities Offer or rejects its New Securities Offer in full; and
(2) if it wants to subscribe for a greater number of New Securities than the number in its New Securities Offer, that it offers to subscribe for a specified number of additional New Securities not subscribed for by other Shareholders under their New Securities Offers.
11.4 If a Shareholder does not give notice to the Board within the period specified in clause 11.3 of its acceptance or rejection of its New Securities Offer, the Shareholder is taken to have rejected its New Securities Offer.
11.5 After the expiry of 20 Business Days from the date a New Securities Offer is made under clause 11.2, the Board must:
(1) upon receipt of payment, allot and issue the New Securities accepted under clause 11.3(1);
(2) upon receipt of payment, allot and issue additional New Securities applied for under clause 11.3(2) to the full extent of the New Securities Offer or, if the number of additional New Securities applied for exceed the number available, allocate them in the Shareholding Proportion of Shareholders that applied for additional New Securities. However, no Shareholder may be allotted and issued more New Securities than the number it applied for; or
(3) re-offer any shortfall to those Shareholders that accepted under clause 11.3(1) or clause 11.3(2) on the basis set out in clause 11.1 with any excess applications dealt with in accordance with clause 11.3(2).
11.6 Subject to clause 18, if any shortfall remains after the process outlined in clauses 11.1 to 11.5 is complete, the Board may offer the shortfall to other parties approved by the Board by a Major Directors Resolution.
(1) an issue of New Securities with the written consent of all Shareholders;
(2) an issue of New Securities by way of an initial Public Offering;
(3) an issue of New Securities pursuant to a reorganisation of the capital of the Company;
(4) an issue of New Securities to an eligible person under a share or other scheme established under clause 9.1(8); or
(5) an issue of New Securities to a new major investor in the Company, a strategic business partner of the Company or in connection with the acquisition of a company, assets or technology, in each case as approved by a Major Shareholder Resolution and provided that the new shareholder or shareholders enter into a Deed of Accession prior to the issue that takes effect at the time of the issue.
12.1 A Shareholder must not Dispose of any Shares except as specifically provided or permitted under this Agreement or the Constitution.
12.2 Subject to clause 18, a Disposal with the written consent of all Shareholders is permitted (Permitted Disposal), and clause 13 does not apply.
12.3 A Shareholder must not unreasonably withhold consent to another Shareholder transferring its Shares to an Affiliate who complies with clause 18 by signing and delivering a Deed of Accession.
13.1 An intending Seller must give notice in writing (Transfer Notice) to the Company and to each other Shareholder (excluding the intended purchaser if that person is a Shareholder), setting out full details of:
(1) the Shares it proposes to sell (Transfer Shares);
(2) the name of the proposed purchaser and of any person who Controls the proposed purchaser;
(3) the Price per Transfer Share (which must be payable on Completion in accordance with clause 17.4);
(4) the warranties (if any) the Seller proposes to give the proposed purchaser;
(6) if applicable, notice that the Seller is exercising its Drag Along Rights (Drag Along Notice); and
13.2 A Transfer Notice cannot be withdrawn until the processes in clauses 14 and 17 (to the extent relevant) are complete.
18.1 No party may transfer or issue, or grant any interest in or Encumbrance over, Shares or New Securities to a person not already a Shareholder unless that person has executed and delivered to each Shareholder and the Company a Deed of Accession.
18.2 The Company must not register in its records or otherwise recognise any interest in or Encumbrance over Shares unless a Deed of Accession has been executed and delivered as required under clause 18.1, and unless all obligations of the Shareholder under this Agreement have been satisfied.
19.1 This Agreement overrides the provisions of the Constitution if there is any inconsistency.
(1) exercise its Shareholder Control to give effect to the provisions and intentions of this Agreement; and
(2) observe and comply promptly with the provisions of the Constitution.
38.1 A notice or other communication connected with this Agreement (Notice) must be in writing.
38.2 In addition to any other method of service provided by law, the Notice may be:
(1) sent by prepaid ordinary post to the address for service of the addressee, if the address is in Australia and the Notice is sent from within Australia;
(2) sent by prepaid airmail to the address for service of the addressee, if the address is outside Australia or if the Notice is sent from outside Australia;
(3) sent by facsimile to the facsimile number of the addressee;
(4) sent by electronic mail to the electronic mail address of the addressee; or
(5) delivered at the address for service of the addressee.
[1] By its originating application KSG sought, but neither pressed at trial nor formally abandoned, additional or alternative relief, namely an order pursuant to s 233 of the Corporations Act that a receiver and manager be appointed over Open Markets. It also sought, and pressed, declarations that Open Markets has breached the terms of the Shareholders' Agreement; that KSG was, in breach of the Shareholders Agreement, denied the opportunity to participate in capital raising and that pursuant to the Shareholders Agreement it was entitled to purchase shares in Open Markets between July 2013 and March 2016.
[2] There were, in evidence, 17 separate "Change to Company Details" forms, recording the issue of shares, in the period 25 July 2013 to 3 March 2016. Those share issues occurred on 15 separate dates.
Open Markets was originally named Open Markets Online Trading Pty Ltd and is the holding company of other members of the "Open Markets Group". The composition of the group is not material for present purposes.
[3] A purported variation of the SHA in or about 28 April 2013 was initially put in issue on the plaintiff's case but it was not ultimately pressed as an issue relevant to the plaintiffs' claims, and both parties accepted that the SHA as executed in October 2012 was the governing agreement.
[4] Shareholders Agreement, [1.1(34)].
[5] References to Kosmas Galtos in this context include reference to KSG, which Mr Galtos controlled and which was the vehicle through which he contracted with the company in that KSG rendered invoices, received payment and was issued shares.
[7] Darlington Futures Ltd v Delco Australia Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 82; (1986) 161 CLR 500, 510.
[8] "Major Resolution" is defined in cl 1.1(33) of the SHA as a "Major Directors Resolution or a Major Shareholders Resolution".
[9] Clause 8.1 enumerated the actions that the Company could only take with the authorisation of a prior Major Shareholders Resolution authorising it, including the issue of shares.
[10] Clause 1.12 defined "Act" as the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
[11] Clause 38 of the SHA specified the manner in which notices were to be given.
[12] Amended statement of claim, [7]; particulars thereto and Schedules 1 and 2.
[13] Meaning shares additional to the 10,564 shares it held as at July 2013, and still holds.
[14] KSG includes in its calculation the loss of profit it says it would have made on the sale of all of the shares it would have purchased, and the shares it held as at July 2013. The inclusion of its original shares is erroneous. The fact that KSG did not sell those shares is not causally connected to any breach of contract by Open Markets.
[15] T913.7 (Plaintiff's Closing Submissions).
[16] T930.31-931.1 (Plaintiff's Closing Submissions) (emphasis added).
[17] T914.18-24 (Plaintiff's Closing Submissions).
[18] Robinson v Harman [1848] EngR 135; (1848) 1 Ex 850; Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 54; (1991) 174 CLR 64, 98 (Brennan J) (Amann).
[20] March v E & M H Stramare Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 12; (1991) 171 CLR 506, 174-175 (McHugh J).
[21] (1854) 9 Ex 341 (Hadley v Baxendale).
[23] Hadley v Baxendale, 354 (Alderson B).
[26] See, for example, Tabet v Gett [2010] HCA 12; (2010) 240 CLR 537, 559 [48] (Gummow A-CJ) (Tabet).
[27] Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332, 359 (Brennan J) (Sellars); Tabet, 559 [47]-[48] (Gummow J), 581 [123]-[124] (Kiefel J).
[28] Fink v Fink [1946] HCA 54; (1946) 74 CLR 127 (Fink).
[30] Amann, 91-92 (Mason CJ and Dawson J).
[31] McRae v Commonwealth Disposals Commission [1951] HCA 79; (1951) 84 CLR 377, 412 (Dixon and Fullagar JJ).
[33] Sellars, 353, 355 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
[35] Sellars, 353 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, and Gaudron JJ).
[36] That the insurer would not have imposed a condition on the policy had been established in the primary proceedings. The appeal concerned the third party proceedings brought by the insurer including against its employee, the agent.
[37] Crown Insurance Services Pty Ltd v National Mutual Life Association of Australia Ltd [2005] VSCA 218; (2005) 13 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-659, [9] (Crown).
[38] Crown, [11]-[12], citing Malec v J C Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638 (Malec) and Sellars.
[39] Crown, [9] (Buchanan JA); Sellars, 353 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). Buchanan JA said that the observations of the plurality in Sellars were echoed by those of Lord Hoffman in Gregg v Scott [2005] UKHL 2; [2005] 2 AC 176, where Hoffman LJ said at [83] that, "[t]he fact that one cannot prove as a matter of necessary causation that someone would have done something is no reason why one should not prove that he was more likely than not to have done it. So, for example, the law distinguishes between cases in which the outcome depends on what the claimant himself ... or someone for whom the defendant is responsible ... would have done, and cases in which it depends upon what some third party would have done. In the first class of case the claimant must prove on a balance of probability that he or the defendant would have acted as to produce a favourable outcome. In the latter class, he may recover for loss of the chance that the third party would have so acted. This apparently arbitrary distinction rests on grounds of policy". In Allied Maples Group Ltd v Simmons & Simmons [1995] 1995 I WLR 1602, at 1609-11, Stuart-Smith LJ distinguished between the situation where proving that the defendant's breach caused a loss requires the plaintiff to establish what they would have done in the hypothetical past and where proving that the defendant's breach caused a loss requires the plaintiff to prove whether a third party would have conferred a benefit on the plaintiff, but for the defendant's breach. In the former, Stuart-Smith LJ said that the plaintiff must prove what it would have done, hypothetically, on the balance of probabilities. In the situation where the plaintiff is required to prove what a third party would have done, Stuart-Smith LJ found that all that was required to be proven was that there was a "substantial chance rather than a speculative one" that the third party would have acted to confer a benefit on the plaintiff. That distinction was rejected by the High Court in Badenach v Calvert [2016] HCA 18; (2016) 257 CLR 440, at 255 [41] (French CJ, Kiefel and Keane JJ) and at 467 [98]-[99] (Gordon J), who found that it is always incumbent on the plaintiff to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that an alleged loss was caused by the defendant's breach.
[40] See Badenach v Calvert [2016] HCA 18; (2016) 257 CLR 440, 453 [34]-[41] (French CJ, Kiefel and Keane JJ), 467 [98]-[99] (Gordon J).
[42] Apart from its original shareholding of 10,564 shares.
[43] KSG submitted that a period of about three months after each share offer should be allowed for KSG to have completed the acquisition of each share parcel, having regard to the process for acquisition contemplated by the SHA (which allowed a 20 day period for accepting an offer but did not specify an end date for payment). Whether the period would have been three months or shorter does not materially affect the analysis of the evidence or the conclusions that flow from it.
[44] Clause 12.1 of the SHA provided that a shareholder must not dispose of any shares except as specifically provided or permitted under the SHA or the constitution. Clause 1.1(24) defined "disposal" to mean sell, transfer, encumber or otherwise dispose of a legal or beneficial interest in a share. Clause 12.2 provided that subject to clause 18, a disposal with the written consent of all Shareholders is permitted and such permission cannot be unreasonably withheld. By clause 18.1 the holder of any security over KSG's shares would be required to executed a Deed of Accession, pursuant to cl 18.1.
[45] Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 5) (1996) FCR 73, 76 (Lindgren J) (Allstate).
[46] [2005] NSWCA 72, [46].
[47] Lord Buddha Pty Ltd (in liq) v Harpur [2013] VSCA 72; (2013) 41 VR 128, 206 [223]; Allstate, 76.
[48] See SHA cl 5.1(1) - "each of Serpantine, KSGI, Mauconla and Iron Mountain is entitled to appoint a Director".
[49] As noted earlier, KSG submitted that a period of about three months after each share offer should be allowed for KSG to have completed the acquisition of each share parcel, having regard to the process for acquisition contemplated by the SHA (which allowed a 20 day period for accepting an offer but did not specify an end date for payment).
[50] KSG's claim for loss of profits on its hypothetical sale erroneously includes a loss of profit on the existing shares actually held by KSG which are unconnected with any conduct the subject of this proceeding.
[51] Outline of KSG's closing submissions, [1].
[53] Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corporation Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 104; (2011) 288 ALR 310, 353 [172] (Campbell JA, Macfarlan and Young JJA agreeing) ("Tomanovic").
[54] Wayde v New South Wales Rugby League Ltd [1985] HCA 68; (1985) 180 CLR 459, 473 (Brennan J) ("Wayde").
[57] Campbell v Backoffice Investments Pty Ltd [2009] HCA 25; (2009) 238 CLR 304, 360 [176] (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ) ("Campbell v Backoffice Investments").
[58] Tomanovic, 354 [178], 355 [185].
[59] Campbell v Backoffice Investments, 334 [72] (French CJ).
[60] Wain v Drapac (No 2) [2013] VSC 381, [39] (Ferguson J).
[61] Wain v Drapac (No 2) [2013] VSC 381, [39] (Ferguson J).
[62] Donaldson v Natural Springs Australia Ltd [2015] FCA 498, [78], [271], [272] (Beach J).
[63] Campbell v Backoffice Investments, 362 [182] (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ).
[64] KSG Investments Pty Ltd v Open Markets Online Trading Pty Ltd (No 2) [2020] VSC 213.
[65] KSG Investments Pty Ltd v Open Markets Online Trading Pty Ltd (No 2) [2020] VSC 213, [39]-[59].
[66] Mr Klink ceased his appointment as CEO in mid-2016 but remained involved with the company as a shareholder.
[67] Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298, 322 (Windeyer J); Shellenberg v Tunnel Holdings Pty Ltd [2000] HCA 18; (2000) 200 CLR 121, 142-3 [51] (Gaudron J).
[68] The capital raise occurred in March 2016, though Mr Klink made the call for capital in January 2016 as set out in paragraph [294] above.
[69] See paragraphs [27]-[33] above.
[70] See eg Wain v Drapac (No 2) [2013] VSC 381, [39]-[46] (Ferguson J).
[71] Wain v Drapac (No 2) [2013] VSC 381, [46] (Ferguson J).
[72] See Wain v Drapac [2012] VSC 156, [251]-[256], [279] (Ferguson J).
[73] See Campbell v Backoffice Investments Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 95; (2008) 66 ACSR 359, 389 [132] (Giles JA).
[74] Clause 9 sets out the matters requiring a major directors resolution.
KSG Investments Pty Ltd
Open Markets Group Ltd [2021] VSC 145
(1994) 179 CLR 332
(1991) 174 CLR 64
(1985) 180 CLR 459
(2009) 238 CLR 304
(1986) 161 CLR 500
(1991) 171 CLR 506
(2010) 240 CLR 537
(1946) 74 CLR 127
(1951) 84 CLR 377
(1990) 169 CLR 638
(2016) 257 CLR 440
(2013) 41 VR 128
(2011) 288 ALR 310
(1959) 101 CLR 298
(2000) 200 CLR 121