11 The difficulty I have with this submission is, even if it be accepted that it was inconvenient to annex approximately 150 pages of annexures to Mr Piriz's affidavit, no steps were taken by the applicant to utilise the provisions of r 117(2) and make the documents exhibits to the affidavit. I note in passing r 118, Irregularity, provides that an affidavit may, with leave of the Tribunal, be used notwithstanding any irregularity in its form.
12 Mr Prince submitted that what he described as the irregularity in respect of service could be cured by the application of r 85 or r 89(5) of the Rules. These rules are directed to circumstances where the provisions of the Act or the Rules do not make any, or adequate provision, for a procedure to be followed, or if there is no rule, order, direction or practice direction in force, the practice, procedure or usage of the Supreme Court is to be utilised. The difficulty I have with this submission is that Pt 15 of the Rules deals with Service and Notice of Hearing in a comprehensive manner. The applicant failed to observe the requirements of Pt 15, r 105. Simply put, it does not allow service by facsimile.
13 In considering the competing motions for declarations, two significant matters have been exercising my mind. The first is that it is essential to ensure the expeditious and cost-effective disposal of matters such as this. To assist in this goal, case management occurs. This must be balanced against the interests of justice as the High Court observed in State of Queensland v JL Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 146 at 154:
…the ultimate aim of a court is the attainment of justice and no principle of case management can be allowed to supplant that aim.
14 However, where a court has power to vary orders made in respect of the filing and serving of affidavits in circumstances where a self-executing order has been made but not complied with, in my view, the power should only be exercised with caution and with due regard to the principle that orders are made to be observed. In this case, the purpose was to compel compliance after default.
15 The second matter is the balancing of the overall interests of justice. It appears to me that the failure to comply by the applicant with the orders of 21 October 2005 was due, in a significant way, to the dilatory conduct of the applicant's solicitor. The solicitor on the record in this matter is James Biady, the Principal of J Biady & Associates Pty Ltd.
16 Two affidavits of Joanne Khoo sworn on 11 January 2006 and 21 February 2006 respectively, were tendered by the applicant. Ms Khoo deposed that she is employed as a solicitor with J Biady & Associates Pty Ltd and is assisting Mr James Biady in the day to day conduct of the proceedings on behalf of the applicant. Ms Khoo was admitted as a solicitor in August 2005 and since that time has been working under the supervision of Mr Biady.
17 Ms Khoo stated she commenced day to day dealings with this matter on or about 9 December 2005, although she had undertaken various work on the file prior to this date. She deposed Mr Biady had left to travel overseas on 6 December 2005 and she was the only fulltime solicitor employed in the firm during this period and had limited secretarial support. Ms Khoo further stated that during the period 9 December 2005 to 15 December 2005, she was occupied predominantly by preparing for a contested hearing in the District court which was listed to commence on 15 December 2005. It appears from Ms Khoo's affidavit that Mr Biady did not return to the office prior to 23 December 2005.
18 I can only infer that Mr Biady thought that it was appropriate to leave an inexperienced solicitor responsible for complying with orders that included a self-executing order. A fair reading of my earlier judgment in Piriz v AAPT would lead to the conclusion that these proceedings remained on foot by the finest of margins. Furthermore, the way this case proceeded, as put by Mr Prince, makes it plain that a conscious decision was taken to proceed in the way they did and not plead mistake or other mitigation but rather choosing to contest the default on the basis that it was a most technical breach of the Rules.
19 Notwithstanding the applicant's approach, this matter is finely balanced. On the basis that service was substantially affected in accordance with the order, I am prepared to exercise my discretion in favour of the applicant. I should make it clear, were this not the case, I would decide the case differently.
20 In balancing the overall interests of justice, I am not prepared to have the applicant's case jettisoned as a result of the conduct of the applicant's solicitor. In my view, I should deal with this matter in accordance with r 88 of the Rules. This rule gives the court the power to waive strict compliance with any procedural requirement, or to exempt any party from compliance with any such requirement. I therefore propose to vary the formal requirements of r 105(d) to provide service of the affidavits as filed, or received by the Registrar on 23 December 2005 to be effected by facsimile transmission on that day. I waive the default in respect of r 105.
21 I should indicate that I am perfectly comfortable in taking this approach as the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provides in Pt 10 Div 2, r 10.5 for various methods of service. Rule 10.5(2)(c) provides that if the notice advising the address for service is a solicitor's office which includes a facsimile mail address, service may be effected by faxing a copy of the document to that number. Although the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules apply to the Supreme, District and Local Courts and the Dust Diseases Tribunal, and not this Court, this court is currently reviewing its rules to consider any variation in light of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules.
22 In adopting this approach, I should make it clear to the applicant that I am not in any way excusing the applicant's conduct. The applicant finds himself in this position due to the dilatory conduct of the solicitor on the record in this matter.
23 In determining the motions in this way, it is necessary to consider the question of whether I have the power to vary order 4 in light of the self executing orders found in order 9.
24 Mr Fisher submitted that one of the consequences of the default in respect of the orders was that the proceedings were dismissed in accordance with the self-executing order.
25 Mr Prince contended that the court had the power to vary the terms of the orders made on 21 October 2005, relying on r 134, Extension and Abridgement. Rule 134 provides as follows:
134 Extension and abridgment
(1) A tribunal may, on terms, by order, extend or abridge any time fixed by the Rules or by any order.
(2) A tribunal may extend the time under subrule (1) as well after as before the time expires whether or not an application for the extension is made before the time expires.