RESOLUTION OF THE APPEAL
18It should be noted at the outset that the existence of a debt does not necessarily mean that the person to whom it is owed has an unqualified right to payment of it in cash. It has long been recognised that parties to a loan contract are unrestricted in the provisions they may make concerning the circumstances enlivening an obligation to repay the whole or part of money lent. Thus, for example, "[i]t is well-established that it is possible to have a contract of loan in which the parties agree that the lender is limited to recourse to particular funds or assets for repayment of the loan" (Commissioner of Taxation v Firth [2002] FCAFC 95; 192 ALR 542 per Sackville and Finn JJ, citing inter alia Matthew v Blackmore (1857) 1 H & N 762 at 771 - 2; 156 ER 1409 at 1417 and R v New Queensland Copper Co Ltd [1917] HCA 34; 23 CLR 495 at 501 - 2). As Rares J observed in Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (in liq) [2012] FCA 1028 at [1199], "[n]on-recourse loans are a commonplace". Consistent with these statements is the observation of Gleeson CJ in Hawkins v Bank of China (1992) 26 NSWLR 562 at 572 that the obligation to repay a debt may be conditional.
19In my view, the present case should be resolved by ascertaining whether, in the circumstances that occurred, the Noteholders' contracts provided for the face value of the Notes to be repaid to them in cash or provided for another, exclusive, means of discharge of the debt that HIH acknowledged in Clause 2A.1(a) of the Trust Deed.
20Condition 12 of the Conditions of Issue permitted HIH NZ to elect to redeem the Notes for cash but it made no such election. Furthermore, under Conditions 4 and 9, Noteholders could, in certain circumstances, require conversion of their Notes to HIH shares prior to the Conversion Date but none required this.
21In these circumstances, Condition 12.3 required that the Notes be "automatically converted" into HIH shares on 12 June 2003. As the primary judge concluded, the word "automatically" simply indicated that no notice was needed to trigger the conversion process. When Condition 12.3 came into operation, HIH NZ was required to effect conversions in accordance with Condition 6.5. This condition prescribed the two-step procedure for conversion referred to by Graham J, involving, first, HIH NZ redeeming the Notes for an amount equal to their face value and, secondly, HIH NZ, on the direction of the Noteholder, applying "the whole of the moneys payable to it on redemption in subscribing for [the relevant] number of Ordinary Shares".
22Perpetual argued that the obligation under Condition 6.5(a) to "redeem" the Notes constituted an obligation of HIH NZ to pay the Noteholders the face value of the Notes and that the stipulation in Condition 6.5(b) that HIH NZ apply the redemption money in subscription for HIH shares ended with the termination of the Noteholders' Contracts, leaving the obligation to redeem unqualified by any obligation to pay the redemption money to HIH rather than the Noteholders.
23I do not accept these submissions. HIH NZ's obligations to redeem the Notes and to pay the redemption money to HIH both accrued prior to termination of the Noteholders' contracts. Termination of the contracts relieved HIH NZ of a duty to perform the obligations after termination but left it liable for its breach of contract in not performing them prior to termination (see [14] above). Perpetual's submission that the obligation to subscribe for HIH shares came to an end on termination (because the Noteholders' direction to apply their money for that purpose was brought to an end by termination) whilst HIH NZ's redemption obligation remained on foot is incorrect. Both obligations existed until termination and both came to an end on termination, with HIH NZ remaining liable for its breach in not having performed them prior to termination. Accordingly, there was no point at which the obligation to redeem, but not the obligation to apply the moneys payable on redemption to subscribe for HIH shares, was operative.
24The result is that HIH NZ was at no time required to redeem the Notes by paying their face value in cash to the Noteholders. Whilst the obligation to redeem existed, it was always an obligation to redeem by one, exclusive, means, that is, by applying the redemption money in subscription for HIH shares. Contrary to Perpetual's submission, this conclusion does not ignore the Federal Court's finding that conversion was a two-step process. The two steps were to occur, but always in tandem. HIH NZ was never required to take the first step without taking the second. As HIH NZ submitted, the first step was "intimately and inextricably bound up with a concomitant obligation under Condition 6.5(b) to apply the moneys redeemed to the subscription for HIH shares" (Written Submissions [34]).
25The Noteholders emphasised that it was they who were to apply for HIH shares and submitted that this could not occur unless they were entitled to be paid the redemption money by HIH to enable them to do it (Written Submissions [49]). However the redemption money was to be paid, not to the Noteholders, but to HIH. Although that payment was to be made on their behalf, the Noteholders were contractually bound (until termination) by their irrevocable direction that that occur. They had no right to re-direct the payments to themselves and therefore had no right to receive them.
26These conclusions concerning the Conditions of Issue are consistent with Clause 2A.1 of the Trust Deed. Clause 2A.1(a) referred to the existence of a debt but, for the reasons given in [18] above, that did not of itself indicate that the Noteholders were entitled to payment of the Notes in cash.
27Clause 2A.1(b) of the Trust Deed obliged HIH NZ to pay the face value of "the Notes or, as the case may be, that part of the Notes as are to be redeemed on the date due for repayment". This obligation was expressed to be "subject to any obligation of the Company to convert the Notes" into HIH shares. This qualification precluded Clause 2A.1(b) being the source of any presently relevant obligation of HIH NZ to redeem the shares in cash. As HIH NZ did not elect under Condition 12 to redeem the Notes in cash, it was obliged to convert them into HIH shares. The qualification to the payment obligation in Clause 2A.1(b) was thus enlivened and conversion was required in accordance with Conditions 6.5 and 12.3. The qualification in Clause 2A.1(b) applied when HIH NZ came under "any obligation" to convert, not simply where conversion in fact occurred.
28Clause 2A.1(b)(i) would have applied if HIH NZ had elected to redeem the Notes in cash but the provision does not indicate that there are or may be other circumstances (for example, when the first step of the conversion process is taken) in which the Noteholders are entitled to be paid the face value of their Notes in cash.
29In summary, my view is that the Noteholders' contracts gave rise to debts of HIH NZ to the Noteholders (as represented by the Trustee) but provided that unless HIH NZ elected in accordance with the contracts to redeem the Notes in cash, the debts would, and could, only be discharged by HIH NZ subscribing on behalf of the Noteholders for HIH shares. For the reasons given in [18] above, it was open to the contracting parties to provide that the Noteholders' rights would be so limited.
30Neither an overview of the contractual documents nor a detailed examination of their provisions reveals any intent that the Noteholders would, in the absence of HIH NZ electing to redeem the Notes, acquire a right to payment to them of the face value of the Notes.
31The basic premise of the transactions was that the Noteholders would provide funds in return for shares in HIH. This placed the Noteholders at risk because the value of their investments depended upon the value of HIH's shares but this was consistent with the statement in the Prospectus pursuant to which the Notes were issued that "Noteholders do not have a right to redeem the Notes for cash" (p 8).