PEP Community Services Inc. trading as PEP Community Services v Job Futures Ltd
[2008] FCA 1264
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
2008-08-18
Before
Templeman J, Spender J, McKerracher J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (7 paragraphs)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 These proceedings have been transferred by Templeman J from the Supreme Court of Western Australia to this Court. It is unnecessary to revisit his Honour's reasons for doing so save to observe that the proceedings include a 'special federal matter' as that expression is defined in s 6A of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (WA) (the Cross-Vesting Act). The special federal matter (as to which the definition in s 3(1)(a) of the Cross-Vesting Act is a matter arising under Pt IV of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (the TPA). 2 Although the matter was transferred to the Western Australian District Registry of the Federal Court, it is common ground that his Honour did not specify to which particular registry the proceedings should be transferred because there were both Western Australian and New South Wales elements in the claim. 3 The respondent in this matter and in WAD 114 of 2008, Community First Inc v Job Futures Ltd, contends that each matter should be transferred to the New South Wales District Registry. 4 The applicant opposes any transfer.
Legal Considerations 5 Section 48 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the Act) provides as follows: The Court or a Judge may, at any stage of a proceeding in the Court, direct that the proceeding or a part of the proceeding be conducted or continued at a place specified in the order, subject to such conditions (if any) as the Court or Judge imposes. 6 The Court is required to be satisfied after considering all the relevant matters that there is sound reason to direct that the proceedings be conducted or continued elsewhere. The test which is to be applied requires consideration of where the case can be conducted or continued most suitably bearing in mind the interests of all the parties, the ends of justice and the determination of issues between them, and the most efficient administration of the Court: National Mutual Holdings Pty Ltd v The Sentry Corporation (1988) 19 FCR 155 at 162. 7 In Jacobs v Claudius Enterprises Pty Ltd [1985] ATPR 40-511, Spender J observed that the following were relevant factors for the Court to consider when deciding whether to change venue: (a) the residence of the parties; (b) the residence of the witnesses for the various parties; (c) the expense and prejudice likely to the respective parties; (d) the likelihood of delay being a significant consideration; (e) whether there is, in respect of the competing suggestions as to venue, any possibility of an interference with a fair trial of the hearing; and (f) the balance of convenience having regard to all considerations. 8 In addition to the Pt IV TPA question there are issues raised concerning restraint of trade at common law and pursuant to the New South Wales Restraints of Trade Act 1976 (NSW). Clause 35 of a subcontract agreement between the applicant and respondent provides that the document is governed by the law in force in New South Wales. Each party submitted to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the courts exercising jurisdiction in New South Wales. The respondent submits that this clause together with the convenience of witnesses tips the balance in favour of the hearing proceeding in the New South Wales Registry of this Court. 9 It is to be noted that cl 35 is not an exclusive jurisdiction clause but I accept that it does disclose an intention on the part of the contracting parties to the litigation to prefer any dispute arising under the contract to be conducted in courts within the specified State: Australian Co-operative Foods Ltd & Anor v National Foods Milk Ltd [1998] FCA 376 and Aquila Resources Limited v Pasminco Limited [2004] FCA 39 at [36]-[41]. 10 However, I also accept the applicant's submission that such a clause in a change of venue application does not carry weight where federal legislation is involved: Plantagenet Wines Pty Ltd v Lion Nathan Wine Group Australia Ltd [2006] FCA 247 at [61] per Siopis J. It is true also that little weight is attached to such a clause where State legislation is involved providing that such legislation is reasonably uniform in nature: Westpac Banking Corporation v O'Brien [1997] ACTSC 107; Rothwells Ltd (in liq) v Connell [1995] QSC 30. In this regard, it may be that the Court is required to construe the New South Wales Restraints of Trade Act 1976 (NSW) but no particular difficulty in doing so was advanced in argument. It is to be noted this is a succinct piece of legislation which by s 3(3)(d) does not affect the operation of any other enactment relating to the validity of restraint of trade. Such other enactment, of course, may include the TPA itself which has been pleaded. The effect of s 4 of the New South Wales Restraints of Trade Act 1976 (NSW) is that (subject to the subsection to which I have referred), a restraint of trade will be valid to the extent to which it is not against public policy, whether it is in severable terms or not. I have not been addressed on any particular difficulties which may arise by reason of the need to consider the provisions of this legislation.