Patricia Cassaniti v Commissioner of Taxation
[2010] FCA 642
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
2010-06-24
Before
Mr AJ, Edmonds J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (10 paragraphs)
Introduction 1 This is the second of the two applications I heard seeking declaratory relief that each applicant in each proceeding is entitled to a credit equal to the total of amounts said to be withheld from withholding payments (being salary or wages) said to have been made to each applicant during relevant years of income within the meaning of s 18-15(1) of Sch 1 to the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) ('the TAA'). 2 The applicant ('the taxpayer') by her original application dated 5 July 2008 sought, inter alia, declaratory relief, in reliance on s 221H(2) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) ('the ITAA 36'), that the decision of the respondent ('the Commissioner') to refuse to allow her a credit in the sum of $80,000, $150,000, $150,000, $250,000, $250,000, $234,000 and $252,200 for deductions/withholdings said to be made from payments of salary or wages said to be made to her in the years ended 30 June 1996, 30 June 1997, 30 June 1998, 30 June 1999, 30 June 2000, 30 June 2001 and 30 June 2002 respectively, was an invalid decision. 3 By an amended application dated 30 September 2008, the taxpayer amended her claim for relief by excluding the year ended 30 June 1996, in respect of which the Commissioner had since allowed a credit, and by relying on, in lieu of s 221H(2) of the ITAA 36, s 18-15(1) of Sch 1 to the TAA in respect of the years ended 30 June 2001 and 30 June 2002. 4 By letter dated 21 May 2009 (Ex F), the Australian Government Solicitor, on behalf of the Commissioner, wrote to the solicitors for the taxpayer informing them that having regard to the affidavit evidence of Mr Sam Cassaniti (the taxpayer's former husband), including the group certificates for the years ended 30 June 1997 to 30 June 2000 inclusive that were exhibited to his affidavit of 30 September 2008 (Ex 2), the Commissioner was prepared to allow credits for the years of income ended 30 June 1997 to 30 June 2000 inclusive, as follows: 30 June 1997 - $159,351.39 30 June 1998 - $171,496.00 30 June 1999 - $171,496.00 30 June 2000 - $252,200.00 5 In consequence, the only years still in dispute are the years ended 30 June 2001 and 30 June 2002 ('the relevant years of income'). In the year ended 30 June 2001 the taxpayer returned income by way of salary or wages from Reliance Financial Services Pty Ltd ('RFS'), as trustee for the Reliance Services Trust ('the Trust'), in the sum of $468,000, and claimed as a credit, for Pay As You Go ('PAYG') amounts withheld, the sum of $234,000. In the year ended 30 June 2002 the taxpayer returned income by way of salary or wages from RFS, as trustee of the Trust, in the sum of $520,000, and claimed as a credit, for PAYG amounts withheld, the sum of $252,200. 6 The taxpayer's application and amended application sought to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court conferred by both s 39B(1) and s 39B(1A) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The Commissioner raised a question as to the taxpayer's entitlement to the relief sought in reliance on the jurisdiction conferred on the Court by s 39B(1), but conceded that the taxpayer could invoke the jurisdiction conferred on the Court by s 39B(1A), which confers jurisdiction in any matter arising under the laws made by the Parliament. So, at the end of the day, the Commissioner did not take any point about the capacity of the Court to deal with the matter. 7 Likewise, in his written outline of submissions, the Commissioner raised matters which appeared to suggest that it was part of his case that the taxpayer was estopped from bringing her application. The matters raised were put as follows: (1) The jurisdiction of the Court under s 39B to grant relief by way of judicial review, in particular a claim for declaratory relief, is plainly discretionary. Relief may be refused under s 39B if the conduct of the party is inconsistent with the application for relief. It may be inconsistent, for example, if there is delay on the part of the applicant or the applicant has waived or acquiesced in the invalidity of the decision or does not come with clean hands. (2) Further, an important element in the exercise of the discretion is the question whether an alternative remedy was available to the taxpayer. According to the Commissioner, it was open to the taxpayer to have claimed a credit for the PAYG withholding in the proceedings in the Supreme Court of NSW in which the Commissioner obtained judgment by consent on 7 December 2007 for income tax and general interest charge in respect of the years of income ended 30 June 1997 - 2002 inclusive. In my view, that must be right: she was not prevented from doing so by s 177(1) of the ITAA 36 as the quantification of the credit stood outside the process of assessment; and s 177(1) was attracted only to the particulars of the assessment. Moreover, the Commissioner makes the observation that clearly the taxpayer was aware of the issue as can be seen from her objection which she had signed on 13 November 2007 prior to consenting to judgment. However, the taxpayer had not sought to pursue that issue in those proceedings; had not filed the present application until 7 July 2008, some seven months later; and now sought to assail the consequence of a judgment to which she consented by a collateral attack in this Court. Notwithstanding, on the last day of the hearing, senior counsel for the Commissioner made it clear that, despite the proceedings in the Supreme Court of NSW, no point was taken, in the way of either issue or Anshun estoppel, against the taxpayer's application in this proceeding. I therefore do not propose to consider the point. 8 Finally, by way of introduction, on the first day of the hearing I granted the taxpayer leave to file two affidavits out of time which necessitated granting the Commissioner an adjournment to consider whether he wished to put on any evidence in reply. As events transpired, he did not do so. At the time of granting the taxpayer leave to file the two affidavits out of time, I indicated I would publish my reasons for doing so when publishing my reasons for judgment. The first affidavit was an affidavit sworn by Mr Sam Cassaniti on 7 September 2009 (Ex 3). He had sworn an earlier affidavit on 30 September 2008 (Ex 2). The second affidavit was an affidavit sworn by Ms Kim Thorn on 6 September 2009 (Ex 4). I granted leave for the taxpayer to file these affidavits out of time because it seemed that nothing new was raised by them; they merely fleshed out, by recourse to documents which had not previously been brought forward, the taxpayer's case as it had always been articulated. Moreover, even if the Commissioner's case was marginally prejudiced by this evidence, and I could not see that it was, it was not a prejudice which could not be cured by the short adjournment I granted.