Park v Choi

Procedural history

1. Shortly after service of the statement of claim, on 18 April 2019, the defendants' previous solicitors, HIS Lawyers, wrote to the plaintiff's solicitors requesting further and better particulars of the statement of claim. They did not receive a response (see paragraph 6 of the affidavit of Mr Stanton) and on 2 May 2019 the plaintiff was ordered to respond to the defendants' request for particulars by 8 May 2019. These were answered in a dismissive fashion (see paragraphs 8 and 9 of the affidavit of Mr Stanton) despite further requests. When the proceedings came before me on 23 May 2019, I made a timetable for exchange of submissions and an argument date on 20 June 2019, as well as granting leave for an amended statement of claim by 6 June 2019.
2. JusticeLink records receiving an Amended Statement of Claim on 11 June 2019 (not 7 June, as set out in the defendants' chronology). On 12 June 2019, HIS Lawyers wrote to the plaintiff's solicitors raising further objections to the redrafted pleadings, additionally noting that some defective pleadings were carried over from the previously pleaded statement of claim (see paragraph 12 of the affidavit of Mr Stanton).
3. On 20 June 2019, during the course of argument, counsel for the plaintiff conceded that the statement of claim required substantial amendment and that the argument could not proceed until those amendments were made. The argument was stood over part-heard to 8 August 2019 and the following orders were made: 1. Grant leave to the plaintiff to file and serve an Amended Statement of Claim including but not limited to the issues raised in the course of the argument today, such Amended Statement of Claim to be filed and served by 18 July 2019, with every page paginated, amendments underlined and each paragraph in the matters complained of paragraph-numbered. 2. Any challenge to the Amended Statement of Claim by 5 August 2019. 3. Matter stood over part heard to Thursday 8 August 2019 in the Defamation List.
4. On 19 July 2019, the plaintiff filed a Further Amened Statement of Claim. The defendants wrote to the plaintiff, on 2 August 2019, raising objections to the Further Amended Statement of Claim and sought further and better particulars (see paragraph 16 of Mr Stanton's affidavit).
5. It was clear that the part-heard argument could not proceed on 8 August 2019. Instead, I made the following orders directing the plaintiff to respond to the defendants' objections: 1. Plaintiff respond to the defendants' letter dated 2 August 2019 by 15 August 2019. 2. Matter stood over to the Defamation List on Thursday 5 September 2019 for further directions.
6. On 16 August 2019, the plaintiff responded to the defendants' request for further and better particulars (see paragraph 18 of Mr Stanton's affidavit) and the part-heard argument was set down for its conclusion on 17 October 2019. In the course of the pleadings, as I noted in my judgment at [50], the plaintiff's counsel made further applications for leave to replead.
7. Following the conclusion of argument, I reserved until 14 November 2019), when I made the following orders: 1. The claim for publication 1 set out in paragraphs 3 - 5A of the statement of claim is struck out, with leave to replead. 2. The plaintiff is granted leave to replead the imputations in publications 2 - 4 in accordance with my rulings set out above and, where compliance with those rulings impinges upon other imputations, to redraft those imputations as well. 3. Plaintiff's amended statement of claim to be filed and served by 4:00pm Wednesday 27 November 2019. 4. Proceedings relisted in the Defamation List on Thursday 28 November 2019 for further directions for completion of the defendants' applications, including applications for further rulings. 5. Costs reserved.
8. In broad terms, the plaintiff ended up with no rulings on imputations because it was impossible to unscramble the good imputations from the bad, in circumstances where the plaintiff was still seeking leave to replead. The plaintiff was successful in relation to the application for summary dismissal of the first matter complained of, not because of the merits of his arguments, but for much the same reason. In my judgment (at [50]-[51]), I made the following observations concerning the reason for allowing the plaintiff to replead his claim and refusing the defendants' summary dismissal application: "50 As I note in my conclusions below, particularly in relation to the extrinsic facts plea, it is in part to accommodate Mr Manner's request for another attempt to plead that I have been unable to make final orders in terms of the imputations argument and have had to make general repleading orders, which is a remedy of last resort in imputation arguments, and not a procedure I have been obliged to use before. 51 As a result, I have refused the application for summary dismissal, and set out my reasons for doing so."
9. I granted the plaintiff leave to replead publications 1 to 4 and reserved the issue of costs to be determined, adding (at [94]-[95]): "94 The first matter complained of has been struck out but, given the potential for there to be some reformulation of the claim, perhaps by true innuendo, I have granted leave to replead. The costs of this issue would normally go to the defendant, but I propose to reserve them so that a costs order can be made when the statement of claim is at last able to be the subject of rulings. 95 There remain potential difficulties in the formulation of the imputations in relation to the remaining three publications. I propose to reserve the question of costs so that the parties can make such submissions as may be appropriate when the imputations have been the subject of a final ruling and any other outstanding issues, such as complaints about a claim for aggravated damages, have also been ventilated. This is a highly unsatisfactory situation given the degree of delay caused by the plaintiff's poor pleading, and this may be reflected in the costs orders to be made when the pleading has been rectified and the capacity hearing is finally able to be concluded."
10. The plaintiff filed a Second Further Amended Statement of claim on 29 November 2019 according to JusticeLink (not 27 November 2019 as stated in the chronology). The Second Further Amended Statement of Claim pleaded a new cause of action, which the defendants say went beyond the leave granted on 14 November 2019 (see paragraph 29 of Mr Stanton's affidavit). While the pleading of this fifth claim is not challenged, the defendants say that this is also relevant as to costs.
11. The defendants rely on this history to seek costs orders against the plaintiff, and for such costs to be paid by the plaintiff forthwith.

Costs provisions under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW)

1. UCPR rr 42.1 and 42.7 provide: "42.1 General rule that costs follow the event Subject to this Part, if the court makes any order as to costs, the court is to order that the costs follow the event unless it appears to the court that some other order should be made as to the whole or any part of the costs. … 42.7 Interlocutory applications and reserved costs (1) Unless the court orders otherwise, the costs of any application or other step in any proceedings, including - (a) costs that are reserved, and (b) costs in respect of any such application or step in respect of which no order as to costs is made, are to be paid and otherwise dealt with in the same way as the general costs of the proceedings. (2) Unless the court orders otherwise, costs referred to in subrule (1) do not become payable until the conclusion of the proceedings."
2. The general rule is that an amending party is obliged to pay the other party's costs thrown away by reason of such amendments (see Kazal v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 1422 ("Kazal") at [21]). Given the plaintiff was granted leave to amend his pleading in relation to each of the pleaded publications (i.e. publications 1 to 4), on the basis that the plaintiff would be obliged to pay the defendants' costs thrown away by reason of the amendment to the Further Amended Statement of Claim the subject of my 14 November 2019 judgment, the remaining questions are, as Adamson J helpfully identified in Kazal at [21]: 1. whether there "should be any exceptions to a costs order on that basis in the present case"; and 2. whether the plaintiff "ought be ordered to pay the costs thrown away… forthwith".
3. The "costs" referred to under rr 42.1 and 42.7(1), including costs that are reserved and costs in respect of any such application or step in respect of which no order as to costs is made, do not become payable until the conclusion of the proceedings, unless the court orders otherwise (r 42.7(2)).
4. In addition to costs following the event is the general principle that, where a party seeks leave to amend a pleading, that party should pay the costs "thrown away" by reason of the amendment. This rule, although not expressly contained in the UCPR, is one which is almost invariably complied with. The essence is that the costs in question have "been wasted" (Andromeda v Holman (1920) 130 LT 329 at 330 per Bankes LJ).

The parties' submissions

1. Mr Senior submits that his clients were successful by reference to the chronology of the proceedings, the observations contained in my judgment and the circumstances leading to the orders that I made. The statement of claim had to be totally redrafted on a series of occasions, and he submits that his clients are entitled to the costs thrown away by these amendments as well as on the basis of having been successful in their objections.
2. Mr Senior then addresses each of the factors identified in Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd (2002) 55 NSWLR 1; [2002] NSWSC 432 for the ordering of payment forthwith, rather than at the conclusion of proceedings: 1. First, the pleading in its latest form represents a substantially reformulated pleading from the original statement of claim and two subsequent attempts, a point considered relevant in Kazal at [41]. In fact, the extensive striking through of imputations and underlining of reformulated imputations, new particulars (including new particulars of extrinsic facts) and the inclusion of an entirely new matter complained of (the Fifth Matter Complained Of, said to be relied upon as to damages only) make the document difficult to read. Apart from the addition of a new claim, all these amendments were made in response to the defendants' objections and my rulings on those objections, where I note that I described the pleading as a "poorly drafted statement of claim" (at [11]). 2. It is also relevant that the imputations I ultimately ruled on were not the plaintiff's first attempt, but followed a series of letters sent by the solicitors for the defendants pointing out the errors in question (as I noted in my judgment at [5]-[8]). It should not be a difficult task to plead imputations where the language of the publication is as simple and direct as is the case here. 3. Arguments about imputations are not compulsory. Well-drafted imputations can, and do, go to trial without rulings in an increasingly large number of cases. However, where the imputations are as badly drafted as was the case here, rulings are necessary, because there are few more melancholy results than a claim by a plaintiff failing at trial because the imputations have not been pleaded properly. 4. Where amendments are required, the procedure for argument and rulings should not take as long as they have here. From the time the statement of claim was filed (13 March 2019), as the above history shows, the defendants sent long and carefully explained objections in their correspondence. The plaintiff's hostile stance to these objections was noted by me in my judgment (at [7]); a similar response occurred in Kazal (see the observations of Adamson J at [42]). Mr Senior submits that the costs of the relevant correspondence and the hearings on 20 June and 17 October 2019 could have been avoided (or at least reduced) if the plaintiff had responded constructively to the objections by considering them, without waiting until being ordered to do so by the Court. 5. Finally, the proceedings have taken a year to get this far. No defence has yet been filed. Mr Senior submits that the final determination of the proceedings is likely to be some time away (see Kazal at [43]).
3. The plaintiff's counsel submits that "the Defendants met with no success in their claims of the lack of defamatory capacity in respect of the Plaintiff's pleadings" (paragraph 18 of the plaintiff's written submissions). The plaintiff's counsel lists a number of factors at paragraph 17 in support of his claim of partial success, which I set out verbatim: "a. The Defendants sought an order for the First Letter to be summary dismissed - this was entirely refused by the Court; b. The Defendants sought an order striking out of paragraphs 5(a), 5(b), 5(c), 5(e), 5(f) and 5(g)) in the First Matter Complained Of for want of defamatory capacity - these were entirely upheld by the Court in favour of the Defendant, with leave to replead. c. The Defendants sought an order striking out of paragraphs 8(a), 8(b), 8(c), 8(d), 8(e), 8(f), 8(g), 8(h), 8(i) and 8(k) in the Second Matter Complained Of for want of defamatory capacity. Ruling upon this question was deferred by the Court until after repleading. Importantly also, comments by the Court related only to the form of the pleaded imputations and not to the question of capacity which was in no way specifically impugned. The question of defamatory capacity in respect of these imputations has not been the subject of any determination for or against the Plaintiff by the Court. The Defendants also asserted that paragraphs 8(d), 8(e), 8(g), 8(h), 8(i) and 8(k), the imputations were not reasonably capable of arising, The Court however found that in respect of paragraphs 8(e), 8(f), 8(g), 8(h), 8(i) for example also, the Court stated at [66] and [70]-[71] that the imputations were clearly capable of being conveyed. d. The Defendants sought an order striking out of paragraphs 11(a), 11(b), 11(c), 11(d), 11(f), 11(g), 11(h), 11(i), 11(k), 11(l) for want of defamatory capacity. Similarly, upon the striking out and leave to replead on those paragraphs, such was upon the basis of form only and not to the question of capacity. The question of defamatory capacity in respect of these imputations has not been the subject of any determination for or against the Plaintiff by the Court, nor was a finding of want of defamatory capacity in respect of these imputations evident in the obiter of the ruling. e. The Defendants sought an order striking out of paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i) and (k) of the Fourth Matter Complained Of. Similarly, the question of defamatory capacity in respect of these imputations has not been the subject of any determination for or against the Plaintiff by the Court nor was a finding of want of defamatory capacity in respect of these imputations evident in the obiter of the ruling. Further, as in the Second Matter Complained Of, the Defendants also asserted that paragraphs (d), (e), (g), (h), (i) and (k), the imputations were not reasonably capable of arising, The Court however found that in respect of paragraphs (e), (f), (g), (h), (i) the Court found that the imputations were clearly capable of being conveyed."
4. The plaintiff's counsel additionally submits that "on balance, the complaints of the Defendants in the vast majority of instances met with no success, and were without basis. Accordingly, no award of costs ought to follow in respect of a proceedings predicated upon those unvalidated complaints" (paragraph 23 of the plaintiff's written submissions).
5. Mr Manner's submissions are wrong. For example, in relation to the first matter complained of, I struck out all the challenged imputations (at [37] - [45]) as well as the extrinsic facts claim (at [46] - [49]) but acceded (at [50] - [51]) to Mr Manner's request to attempt to distil the imputations afresh and therefore made general repleading orders, something I described as "a remedy of last resort".
6. In Ralmana Pty Ltd v BGC Contracting Pty Ltd [2016] WASC 131, Kenneth Martin J, in the course of determining an application for indemnity costs on an application with a very similar history, made the following observations: "22 Had there been a genuine act of intellectual engagement on the part of the plaintiff, then it seems to me this strike out application could have been avoided, as the deficiencies were obvious and were clearly articulated by the defendant. On that basis, there seems to me to have been a clear lack of sufficient or effective conferral on the part of the plaintiff, and for that reason it is appropriate here for the court to indicate its displeasure with these events and do that by an order for indemnity costs in relation to the outcome of this application. I would respectfully adopt what was said by Wheeler J in Quancorp Pty Ltd v MacDonald [1999] WASCA 101 [7] (adopted by the Court of Appeal in Swansdale), that 'where a party has by its conduct unnecessarily increased the cost of litigation, it is appropriate that the party so acting should bear that increased cost'. 23 That conclusion is reinforced for me here by the written costs submissions received from the plaintiff - which have articulated a de minimis attitude to the adverse strike out decision which has been rendered, indicating that the strike out application was but only a small mini-battle viewed in the scale of a greater war, so that the outcome was not all that significant - being, to invoke the analogy raised by the Black Knight in Monty Python and the Holy Grail, 'just a flesh wound' - and could therefore be brushed aside on that basis. It should not be. There was a significant defeat here, and my reasons, if they are read, indicate a stark conceptual deficiency in the plaintiff's pleaded case that needs to be frankly acknowledged and engaged with. There are elements of loser's bravado associated with the submissions that I have read on the part of the unsuccessful plaintiff, and that reaffirms me in my primary view that there ought, in this circumstance, to be an order for indemnity costs of the application favouring the defendant. On that basis, I will issue an order in terms of par 1 of the defendant's minute of 9 June 2016."
7. Mr Manner did not answer the defendants' arguments as identified by Mr Senior in the above passages. Instead, he submits that the defendants' "lack of entitlement of any costs order against the Plaintiff in respect of complaints centred around defamatory capacity" meant that there is no basis for "this extraordinary claim which is contrary to the presumptive rule that payment of costs in interlocutory proceedings are not payable until the conclusion of the proceedings per r. 42.7(2) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005" (paragraphs 24 and 25 of the plaintiff's submissions).

The relevant principles of law

1. The first issue is to determine whether one party or the other was successful, and, if there was mixed success, what proportionate allowance should be made for success.

Costs following the event and interlocutory defamation applications

1. Interlocutory applications in defamation can be complex and the costs can be considerable. Defendants, who are brought into court and have no prospects of damages, may find wasted costs a heavier burden as a result, and costs orders made for the plaintiff may not necessarily be the same as those made in the case of a defendant (Ritter v Godfrey [1920] 2 KB 47 at 53 per Lord Sterndale MR). In addition, caution should be exercised in interlocutory arguments, particularly where a party can point to only partial success, or both parties have breached timetables. There is much to be said for leaving costs in such circumstances to the ultimate victor, for the reasons expressed in Cretazzo v Lombardi [1975] 13 SASR 1 at 11 (per Bray CJ) and 16 (per Jacobs J).
2. In the present case, the procedural history is wholly in favour of the defendants. Short of drafting the statement of claim for the plaintiff, they could not have done more.
3. I do not see how Mr Manner can interpret a grant of leave to amend the whole of the pleading because of its hopeless drafting as amounting to a successful result for his client. He has been granted leave to amend, but the consequence must be the payment of the costs thrown away, which in this case includes all costs of meeting all the failed pleadings, including the imputations argument.
4. The only victory of significance to which the plaintiff can point is the defendant's lack of success in relation to the application for summary dismissal. The reasons for this refusal were, however, the plaintiff's hopeless pleading of the case, in circumstances in which the plaintiff had sought leave to amend. Additionally, the defendants' challenges to the plaintiff's imputations for this publication were all soundly based. The defendants should be entitled to an order for costs in their favour in the form of the first order drafted by Mr Senior.
5. Many of the costs involved are not only incurred in an application which I consider to have been very substantially successful, but are also costs thrown away by reason of the subsequent amendment. These are "wasted" costs in that not only was I unable to make the rulings required but the pleading was completely redrafted following the leave to do so granted in my judgment.

Costs "thrown away"

1. The origin of the term "thrown away" is lost in the mists of time, but its meaning is literally what it says. As Holt AsJ states in French v McKenna (No 2) [2012] TASSC 8 at [5], the leading case is Burgoine v Taylor (1878) 9 Ch D 1, where Jessel MR said (at 4 - 5): "Solicitors cannot, any more than other men, conduct their business without sometimes making slips; and where a solicitor watches the list, and happens to miss the case, in consequence of which it is taken in his absence, it is in accordance with justice and with the course of practice to restore the action to the paper, on the terms of the party in default paying the costs of the day, which include all costs thrown away by reason of the trial becoming abortive. As a general rule, solicitors in my branch of the court consent to such an order as is now asked, and that such an application should be opposed is to be a novelty. Still, as the Appellant was in default, he must pay the costs of the application to the Court below, …"
2. Trials these days are rarely overlooked in the manner that appears to have occurred in those far-off times, and the term has come to be used largely in relation to reformulated or amended pleadings. As a general rule, where pleadings have been amended, opposition is as much a novelty today as it was then.

Costs payable forthwith

1. When should the costs be payable forthwith, as opposed to being payable at the end of the litigation?
2. Applications for costs of interlocutory arguments to be assessed forthwith are relatively common in defamation actions, although such orders are made sparingly; as McCallum J noted in Templar v Britton (No 3) [2014] NSWSC 802 at [3], the decision most often cited in support of such an application is Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd (2002) 55 NSWLR 1; [2002] NSWSC 432. In Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd, Barrett J set out three categories where the court might consider making such an order, although noting that the question should ultimately be determined according to the demands of justice.
3. These principles are summarised in the decision of Simpson J in Hamod & Anor v State of New South Wales & Anor [2007] NSWSC 707 at [5], where her Honour additionally sets out the history of the provision and relevant caselaw, noting that these are collected in (now defunct) Ritchie: Supreme Court Procedure NSW at 3154.1-3154.2. Simpson J noted that Barrett J concluded that sub-r (3) was not intended to confine the discretion conferred by sub-r (1) and that earlier authorities relevant to Pt 52A r 9(1) Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW) are of guidance in the construction of UCPR 42.7.
4. Adamson J made similar observations in Kazal at [40], identifying the three relevant categories in the same manner as Barrett J, Simpson J and McCallum J: "In Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 432; 55 NSWLR 1, Barrett J, at 4-5, identified the relevant factors that were relevant to the Court's power to make an order that costs be payable forthwith, by reference to Pt 52A, r 9(1) of the Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW) (the statutory predecessor to UCPR 42.7) as follows: (1) Where the application or aspect in respect of which the costs order is made represents the determination of a separately identifiable matter or the completion of a discrete part; (2) Where the conduct of the party against which the costs order has been made was unreasonable; (3) Where there is likely to be a significant time period before the proceedings are finally determined."
5. In Templar v Britton (No 3), McCallum J took the view (at [4]) that "the ordinary kind of pleadings stoush that frequently is determined in the Defamation List does not readily fall within the notion of a "discrete, separately identifiable aspect of the proceedings", as that notion is to be comprehended according to the authorities." McCallum J considered (at [6]) that "the critical issue" was whether the conduct of the proceedings "demonstrated some unreasonable conduct on the part of the party against whom the costs have been ordered." However, the compelling factual situation in that case was that the delay was due to the plaintiff's legal representatives; the plaintiff was a sole parent on a pension with the care of a disabled child, and there were compelling "access to justice" issues (at [12]). Those factors outweighed the unreasonable conduct of the case and the order for costs to be payable forthwith was not made.
6. The common thread running through these submissions is that mere lack of success, even over a long period, is not enough; there must be unreasonable conduct as well. The question is whether this is what has occurred here.

Analysis of the submissions

1. Although Mr Manner describes the defendants' complaints as being "centred around defamatory capacity" and not warranting even a costs order in their favour, this is not the case. The defendants' complaints relate not only to the issue of whether the imputations pleaded were conveyed and defamatory, but to the inability of the plaintiff to plead the sting of their imputations (see Park v Choi at [49] as set out above) resulting in multiple iterations of the statement of claim, as well as to the delay caused to these proceedings generally.
2. Mr Manner submits that "[t]he Supreme Court specifically excluded such an order in interlocutory matters where "what had been resolved were simply a step along the way to the final resolution of the proceeding"", citing Austin J in Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 664 at [172]. It is certainly the case that Austin J made this observation, although in passing and whilst considering other bases for an order for immediate assessment: "172 I do not accept the first alternative submission of the Morningstar interests, that an order for immediate assessment and payment is appropriate simply because the Federal Court proceeding has come to an end. The issues between the parties in the Federal Court proceeding are continued in the cross-claim in the proceeding in this court, which is substantially identical with the Federal Court claim. If what had been resolved were simply a step along the way to the final resolution of the proceeding, I would not make the order that the Morningstar interests seek."
3. It can be seen that when Austin J is using the term "simply a step along the way", his Honour is describing interlocutory proceedings of the kind that McCallum J more robustly referred to as "the ordinary kind of pleadings stoush that frequently is determined in the Defamation List" in Templar v Britton (No 3) at [4]. (I note that in fact Austin J did go on to make orders for certain costs to be assessable forthwith, but on the different basis, namely that the relevant part of the claim was concluded, which is not the case here).
4. The procedural history of the arguments over the form and capacity of the imputations in these proceedings is far from being "simply a step". As was the case in Kazal (at [41]), there was a series of pleadings which were abandoned; worse, that included the pleading the subject of my judgment, with the result that there is no ruling on the imputations currently pleaded. Additionally, as was the case in Kazal (at [42]), there was a determined refusal to entertain any of the objections until the very last moment; one of the results of this was that the hearing had to be adjourned part-heard. I consider the conduct of the applications by the plaintiff to have been "unreasonable" in the sense identified by both Adamson J and McCallum J in their Honour's respective judgments.
5. As a result of these applications taking almost a year to be determined, in that the plaintiff did not file the current pleading until recently), the proceedings are still at an early stage, which I note is the third category identified by Barrett J.
6. For the above reasons, the plaintiff is to pay the costs identified by the defendants in their draft orders, such costs to be assessed if not agreed and to be payable forthwith pursuant to UCPR r 42.7.

Costs of this application

1. The costs to be assessed and payable forthwith should include the costs of this application. While the plaintiff was entitled to resist the making of orders pursuant to UCPR r 42.7, the seeking of costs orders against the defendants and the characterising of a hopeless pleading as one in which the plaintiff had been entirely victorious was unreasonable.
2. The parties have agreed a timetable for the future conduct of these proceedings and I propose to make those orders separately.

Orders 1. The plaintiff pay the defendants' wasted costs in addressing the amended statement of claim filed on 7 June 2019 and the further amended statement of claim filed on 19 July 2019 (including the defendants' costs of and occasioned by the hearings on 20 June and 17 October 2019), payable forthwith. 2. The plaintiff pay the defendants' costs of this application on the same basis.

Amendments 17 April 2020 - Typographical errors at [25(d)], [34], [40], [49] and [50] DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 17 April 2020