Paphos Providores Pty Ltd v Constable Ladha

mmentaries on the Laws of England, (1769), Bk IV Category: Principal judgment Parties: 2013/317587 Representation: Counsel: DPM Ash / WK Soon / TCN Phan (Appellant) MG Sexton SC / C Lenehan (Second Respondent) NL Sharp (Third Respondent)

Solicitors: Joe Weller & Associates (Appellant) Crown Solicitor's Office (First and Second Respondents) Australian Government Solicitor (Third Respondent) File Number(s): 2015/13950; 2015/143560 Decision under appeal Court or tribunal: Supreme Court of NSW Jurisdiction: Common Law Division Citation: [2014] NSWSC 1788 Date of Decision: 17 December 2014 Before: Johnson J File Number(s): 2013/317587

[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]

[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment] Paphos Providores Pty Ltd (the appellant) conducted a business selling clothing and accessories. The first respondent, a Constable of police, executed a search warrant on the appellant's business premises. A number of items, including clothing, handbags, watches and jewellery, were seized. The appellant commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court seeking return of the items and damages. A decision was made not to prosecute the appellant for offences under the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth). However, the first respondent applied to a magistrate for an order pursuant to s 3ZQZB(4)(d) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) for the seized items to be destroyed on the basis that the items were likely to be used in the commission of a serious offence, namely, an offence under s 148 of the Trade Marks Act. Under s 3ZQZB of the Crimes Act, a magistrate could permit a thing seized or document produced under the Act to be retained or forfeited. Relevantly, the magistrate could order that the thing or document be destroyed if he or she was satisfied that it was likely to be used in the commission of a serious offence. Under s 3CA, these functions were conferred on the magistrate in a personal capacity. The appellant sought a declaration in the Supreme Court that the conferral of power on magistrates by s 3ZQZB(3)(b) and s 3ZQZB(4)(d) of the Crimes Act, to order the destruction of seized things and documents, was invalid. The appellant submitted that this was for three reasons. First, the conferral of power on the magistrate in a personal capacity was an invalid exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth. Second, the sections were not a valid exercise of the trade mark power for the purpose of s 51(xvii) of the Constitution. Third, the destruction involved an acquisition of property other than on just terms, contrary to s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution. The primary judge rejected each of these contentions. The appellant appealed against the decision of the primary judge relying on the first and third of its reasons as to why the provisions were invalid. Held (Bathurst CJ, Beazley P and Leeming JA agreeing) dismissing the appeal: 1 Was there an invalid conferral of judicial power on the magistrate (i) The judicial power of the Commonwealth can only be conferred on a court created by s 71 of the Constitution or brought into existence by a State. While the concept of judicial power is incapable of precise definition, the exercise of judicial power generally involves the determination of controversies between parties as to the existence of rights or obligations according to law: [38]-[40] (Bathurst CJ); [57] (Beazley P); [58] (Leeming JA). R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia [1956] HCA 10; 94 CLR 254; Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead [1909] HCA 36; 8 CLR 330; The Queen v The Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd [1970] HCA 8; 123 CLR 361 (ii) There are powers which are neither purely administrative nor purely judicial and it lies within the authority of the legislature to determine where the exercise of the powers will lie. An example is the power to order forfeiture of property: [41] (Bathurst CJ); [57] (Beazley P); [58] (Leeming JA). R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia [1956] HCA 10; 94 CLR 254; Thomas v Mowbray [2007] HCA 33; 233 CLR 307; The Queen v Spicer; Ex parte Australian Builders' Labourers' Federation [1957] HCA 81; 100 CLR 277; The Queen v Quinn; Ex parte Consolidated Food Corporation [1977] HCA 62; 138 CLR 1; Attorney-General (NT) v Emmerson [2014] HCA 13; 253 CLR 393; Precision Data Holdings Ltd v Wills [1991] HCA 58; 173 CLR 167 (iii) The finding of facts and formation of opinions as to the legal rights and obligations of parties can be elements in the exercise of administrative power. The fact that it is necessary for an administrative body to form an opinion as to the commission of an offence, as a step in a decision to take action, is not offensive to principle. That is equally the position where what is required is a finding of satisfaction that property is likely to be used in the commission of a serious offence, as a precondition for making an order under s 3ZQZB(4) of the Crimes Act: [42] (Bathurst CJ); [57] (Beazley P); [58] (Leeming JA). Precision Data Holdings Ltd v Wills [1991] HCA 58; 173 CLR 167; Attorney-General (Cth) v Breckler [1999] HCA 28; 197 CLR 83; Australian Communications and Media Authority v Today FM (Sydney) Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 7; 89 ALJR 382 (iv) The making of an order under s 3ZQZB(4) of the Crimes Act does not involve the exercise of judicial power as first, there is no determination of existing rights and duties, as distinct from exercising a discretion to deprive a person of rights on the satisfaction of a precondition to jurisdiction. Second, the power to order forfeiture can be validly conferred on either judicial or administrative bodies. Third, the fact that the exercise of the power requires the formation of an opinion that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the property is likely to be used in the commission of a serious offence, does not mean that the power can only be exercised judicially. Fourth, the magistrate has no power to enforce any order that he or she may make and any decision is subject to judicial review and collateral challenge in proceedings for return of the goods: [43]-[46] (Bathurst CJ); [57] (Beazley P); [58] (Leeming JA). Attorney-General (Cth) v Alinta Ltd [2008] HCA 2; 233 CLR 542; The Queen v The Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd [1970] HCA 8; 123 CLR 361; Rola Co (Australia) Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [1944] HCA 17; 69 CLR 185; Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1995] HCA 10; 183 CLR 245 2 Was there an acquisition other than on just terms (i) An order under s 3ZQZB(4)(d) of the Crimes Act does not involve an acquisition under s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution as no interest in property, however slight, is acquired by the Commonwealth or any other person as a result of the order: [52] (Bathurst CJ); [57] (Beazley P); [58] (Leeming JA). Commonwealth v Tasmania (the Tasmanian Dam Case) [1983] HCA 21; 158 CLR 1; JT International SA v The Commonwealth [2012] HCA 43; 250 CLR 1; ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [2009] HCA 51; 240 CLR 140

Judgment

1. BATHURST CJ: The facts in this matter are uncontroversial. Paphos Providores Pty Ltd (the appellant) conducted a retail business selling clothing and accessories. On 15 August 2012, the first respondent, a Constable of police, in company with employees of the Trade Mark Investigation Service and other police officers, executed a search warrant on the appellant's premises at Bankstown. A number of items, including clothing, handbags, watches and jewellery, were seized. Officers of the NSW Police Force seized similar items in the execution of a search warrant at the appellant's premises at Punchbowl.
2. The basis on which the warrants were said to be issued was that, either the sale by the appellant or the possession of the goods by it, constituted a contravention of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth).
3. On 19 September 2012, the appellant requested the return of the items. On 24 October 2012, it commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court seeking return of the items and damages.
4. On 28 March 2013, a decision was made not to prosecute the appellant for offences under the Trade Marks Act.
5. On 8 April 2013, the first respondent applied to a magistrate for an order pursuant to s 3ZQZB(4)(d) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) (the Act) for the seized items to be destroyed. I have set out the relevant provisions of the Act below. The basis of the application was that there were reasonable grounds to suspect that if the seized items were returned to the appellant, it was likely that they would be used in the commission of a serious offence, namely, an offence under s 148 of the Trade Marks Act.
6. The primary judge recorded that the Court was informed that the application before the magistrate had been stood over and the Supreme Court proceedings had been adjourned pending the outcome of these proceedings.
7. By summons filed on 22 October 2013, the appellant sought a declaration that s 3CA of the Act was invalid, to the extent that it referred to an order to be made under s 3ZQZB(3)(b) and s 3ZQZB(4)(d) of the Act. The appellant also sought a declaration that s 3ZQZB of the Act was invalid, to the extent that it authorised a magistrate to make an order under s 3ZQZB(3)(b) and s 3ZQZB(4)(d) of the Act.

The relevant legislation

1. Section 148 of the Trade Marks Act was in the following terms: "148 Goods with false trade marks Indictable offence (1) A person commits an offence if: (a) the person: (i) sells goods; or (ii) exposes goods for sale; or (iii) possesses goods for the purpose of trade or manufacture; or (iv) imports goods into Australia for the purpose of trade or manufacture; and (b) any of the following applies: (i) there is a registered trade mark on the goods; (ii) there is a mark or sign on the goods that is substantially identical to a registered trade mark; (iii) a registered trade mark on the goods has been altered, defaced, added to, wholly or partly removed, erased or obliterated; and (c) the registered trade mark, or mark or sign, was applied, altered, defaced, added to, wholly or partly removed, erased or obliterated, as the case requires, without: (i) the permission of the registered owner, or an authorised user, of the trade mark; or (ii) the application being required or authorised by this Act, a direction of the Registrar or an order of a court. Penalty: Imprisonment for 5 years or 550 penalty units, or both. Summary offence (2) A person commits an offence if: (a) the person: (i) sells goods; or (ii) exposes goods for sale; or (iii) possesses goods for the purpose of trade or manufacture; or (iv) imports goods into Australia for the purpose of trade or manufacture; and (b) any of the following applies: (i) there is a registered trade mark applied to the goods; (ii) there is a mark or sign applied to the goods that is substantially identical to a registered trade mark; (iii) a registered trade mark applied to the goods has been altered, defaced, added to, wholly or partly removed, erased or obliterated; and (c) the registered trade mark, or mark or sign, was applied, altered, defaced, added to, wholly or partly removed, erased or obliterated, as the case requires, without: (i) the permission of the registered owner, or an authorised user, of the trade mark; or (ii) the application being required or authorised by this Act, a direction of the Registrar or an order of a court. Penalty: Imprisonment for 12 months or 60 penalty units, or both. (3) The fault element for paragraphs (2)(b) and (c) is negligence. Note 1: For registered trade mark see section 6. Note 2: For applied to goods see section 9. Note 3: International trade marks may be protected under the regulations: see Part 17A."

The historical background to the legislation

1. Some reliance was placed by the appellant on the historical background to the legislation in question.
2. Section 3CA was introduced into the Act in 1994 by the Law and Justice Legislation Amendment Act (No 2) 1994 (Cth) at the same time as Pt 1AA was inserted into the Act by the Crimes (Search Warrants and Powers of Arrest) Amendment Act 1994 (Cth). Section 3CA, as inserted by the former Act, provided that a magistrate, in making an order under s 3ZI, s3ZJ, s 3ZK, s 3ZN or s 3ZW of the Act, was acting in a personal capacity and not as a court. The sections in which such powers were conferred related to orders in respect of strip searches, taking fingerprints or samples, destruction of identification material where proceedings were discontinued or the person charged with the offence was acquitted, orders in relation to identification parades for persons under 18 years of age and orders to retain material seized for the purpose of an investigation or to enable evidence to be secured for the purpose of a prosecution. At the time, there was no equivalent to s 3ZQZB.
3. It should be noted that Pt 1AA, as originally enacted, conferred powers to make orders under s 3ZI, s 3ZJ, s 3ZK, s 3ZN and s 3ZW on a court. However, those provisions were amended by the Law and Justice Legislation Amendment Act (No 2) to confer power on a magistrate acting in a personal capacity.
4. Section 3CA, as originally enacted, was held to confer power on a magistrate as persona designata and not on a court: Price v Fitzgerald [2000] FCA 134; 97 FCR 227 at [32]. It was not contended in that case that the powers conferred on the magistrate were judicial powers of the Commonwealth.
5. An equivalent provision to that contained in s 3ZQZB was introduced into the Act by the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth). That section referred to things likely to be used in the commission of a terrorist act or serious offences, but did not include an express power to order destruction of the thing in question. There was no amendment to s 3CA.
6. In 2010, s 3ZQZB was introduced into the Act by the Crimes Legislation Amendment (Serious and Organised Crimes) Act (No 2) 2010 (Cth). As enacted, it did not expressly provide for the destruction of things or documents. Further, s 3CA was not amended to incorporate within it the powers and functions of making orders under s 3ZQZB.

The proceedings below

1. As is apparent from the declarations sought in the summons, the appellant asserted that the conferral of power on magistrates by s 3ZQZB to order the destruction of seized things and documents was invalid. It submitted that this was for three reasons. First, the conferral of power on the magistrate in a personal capacity was an invalid conferral of the judicial power of the Commonwealth: R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia [1956] HCA 10; 94 CLR 254 (Boilermakers'). Second, the challenged sections did not involve a valid exercise of the trade mark power for the purpose of s 51(xviii) of the Constitution. Third, the destruction involved an acquisition of property other than on just terms, contrary to s 51 (xxxi) of the Constitution.
2. The primary judge rejected each of these contentions. He held that first, the power exercised by magistrates under the relevant provisions was administrative not judicial. Second, he held that there was a sufficient connection with the trade mark power as s 51(xviii) authorised laws that provide for the enforcement of intellectual property rights in trade marks. Third, he held that there was no acquisition of property and, even if there was, a purpose of forfeiting or destroying property to prevent its use in further crimes was incongruous with the notion of acquisition of property on just terms.

The appeal

1. The appellant sought leave to appeal, seeking to raise the same matters raised in the hearing before the primary judge. Prior to the hearing, it abandoned the contention that s 3ZQZB(3)(b) and s 3ZQZB(4)(d) were not supported by the power conferred by s 51(xviii) of the Constitution.
2. However, prior to the hearing, the appellant sought leave to raise a further ground. The appellant contended that if the power conferred on the magistrate to make an order under s 3ZQZB(3) and (4) was not an exercise of judicial power, it was "incompatible with the magistrate's performance of his or her judicial functions or with the proper discharge by the judiciary of its responsibilities as an institution exercising judicial power" (the amended ground).
3. Leave to raise the amended ground was refused. It was not disputed by the appellant that if leave was to be given, it would be necessary to postpone the hearing of at least that part of the proceedings until notice of the new constitutional issue had been given to the Attorneys General under s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). Therefore, leave would have resulted in either an adjournment of the proceedings, which had been ongoing for a considerable period of time, or an undesirable bifurcation of the proceedings. Both of these results would be contrary to the overriding purpose of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), stated in s 56. The new ground had not been raised at first instance.
4. Further, although hearing of the argument on this point was not able to be embarked upon, it is difficult to see how the conferral of a power on a magistrate as persona designata, to order destruction of a thing or document if he or she was satisfied that there were grounds to suspect that the thing or document was likely to be used in the commission of an offence, is incompatible with the exercise of judicial functions by the magistrate or with the proper discharge by the judiciary of its responsibility. Counsel for the appellant stated that his client's contention was supported by what was said in Grollo v Palmer [1995] HCA 26; 184 CLR 348 at 362-365. There does not appear to be anything in the passages cited to support the appellant's contention.
5. For these reasons, I joined in a refusal to grant leave to raise this ground of appeal.
6. As I indicated, the appellant sought leave to appeal. The grant of leave was not opposed insofar as it was sought to raise the points taken before the primary judge.

Was there an invalid conferral of judicial power on the magistrate

(a) The parties' submissions

1. The appellant referred to the history of the legislation, which I have set out above, and submitted that the functions conferred by s 3ZQZB were "distinctly judicial when it was introduced in its original form" and "the legislative intention evidenced by the 2011 amendment … cannot displace that distinctiveness".
2. The appellant submitted that the appropriate characterisation of the law, identified by the Court below, had two elements. First, "an intention to prevent unlawful conduct in the future, and the second an essence of protection". In regard to the first element, it submitted that there was already a body of law which dealt with this issue, namely, the issue of the power in a court to grant an injunction to restrain an actual or threatened breach of the criminal law. It submitted that the powers granted to the executive (in this case the magistrate in a personal capacity) in the relevant provisions went far beyond that body of law as there was no requirement that the circumstances be exceptional, no requirement that a civil standard of proof be imposed and there were a range of options going well beyond an injunction. It submitted, in these circumstances, that the "attempt to place another much less rigorous path into the executive fails".
3. Counsel for the appellant referred to the citation by Gleeson CJ in Thomas v Mowbray [2007] HCA 33; 233 CLR 307 at [16]-[17] of W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, (1769), Bk IV, p 248, dealing with what was described as preventative justice. He also referred to the Chief Justice's conclusion in that case that the control orders under challenge were not incompatible with judicial functions. He submitted that it followed that incapacitation for the purpose of prevention and making a public announcement of suspected criminality directed to a particular person, was "wholly within the bounds of the criminal courts".
4. Counsel for the appellant stated that the particular pre-condition to an order for destruction being made, namely, the determination that it was reasonable to suspect that the thing was likely to be used in the commission of a serious offence, gave the function a special compelling factor which placed its exercise in the realm of judicial power: The Queen v The Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd [1970] HCA 8; 123 CLR 361 (Tasmanian Breweries) at 374. In reply, he acknowledged that, having regard to Australian Communications and Media Authority v Today FM (Sydney) Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 7; 89 ALJR 382 (Today FM) at [33]-[34], it is not offensive to principle for an administrative body to be empowered to determine whether a person is engaged in conduct which constitutes a criminal offence, as a step in a decision to take action. However, he said that the compelling feature in the present case was the fact that the magistrate was required to determine whether there was a reasonable suspicion that this would occur in the future.

(b) Consideration

1. It is well established and not in dispute that the judicial power of the Commonwealth can only be conferred on a court created by s 71 of the Constitution or brought into existence by a State: Boilermakers' at 270. It is equally well established that the concept of judicial power is incapable of precise definition. In Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead [1909] HCA 36; 8 CLR 330, Griffith CJ described the concept of judicial power, as used in s 71 of the Constitution, in the following terms (at 357): "Apart from these considerations, I am of opinion that the words 'judicial power' as used in sec. 71 of the Constitution mean the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property. The exercise of this power does not begin until some tribunal which has power to give a binding and authoritative decision (whether subject to appeal or not) is called upon to take action."
2. In Tasmanian Breweries, Kitto J, while emphasising (at 373) that it was not possible to frame an exhaustive definition of judicial power and that there was "a borderland in which judicial and administrative functions overlap", made the following remarks (at 374-375): "Thus a judicial power involves, as a general rule, a decision settling for the future, as between defined persons or classes of persons, a question as to the existence of a right or obligation, so that an exercise of the power create a new charter by reference to which that question is in future to be decided as between those persons or classes of persons. In other words, the process to be followed must generally be an inquiry concerning the law as it is and the facts as they are, followed by an application of the law as determined to the facts as determined; and the end to be reached must be an act which, so long as it stands, entitles and obliges the persons between whom it intervenes, to observance of the rights and obligations that the application of law to facts has shown to exist. It is right, I think, to conclude from the cases on the subject that a power which does not involve such a process and lead to such an end needs to possess some special compelling feature if its inclusion in the category of judicial power is to be justified."
3. Each of the passages which I have cited emphasise that the exercise of judicial power generally involves the determination of controversies between parties as to the existence of rights or obligations according to law. It is significant, but not conclusive, in the present case, that the exercise of the power in question does not involve settlement of a controversy between parties or a determination of existing rights and duties.

(a) The parties' submissions

1. The appellant submitted that the legislation conferred a power of election on the magistrate, including a power to order that the property in question be forfeited to the Commonwealth. It submitted that this was a law with respect to the acquisition of property within s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution. It submitted that there was no evidence to justify the primary judge's acceptance of the submission that a destruction order was "the only realistic order". With respect, this seems to me to be somewhat irrelevant. The question involved is whether an order that property be destroyed constituted an acquisition of property for the purpose of s 51(xxxi).
2. The appellant submitted that the incongruity principle (see, for example, Theophanous v The Commonwealth [2006] HCA 18; 225 CLR 101) does not extend to crimes which are suspected to be committed in the future.
3. The second and third respondents submitted that a complete answer to the appellant's case on this issue was that neither the Commonwealth, nor any other party, acquired an interest of a proprietary nature. They referred to the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Tran v The Commonwealth [2010] FCAFC 80; 187 FCR 54 at [234], which held, in the context of a forfeiture order under the Customs Act 1901 (Cth), that the Commonwealth obtained no interest in property which, when seized, was destroyed.
4. The second and third respondents also submitted that the incongruity principle applied. They submitted that it was applicable where property was destroyed, in circumstances where there was a risk that it would be used in the commission of a crime in the future. The second respondent also submitted that it was not open to challenge the validity of the power to order destruction of the seized goods on the basis that it was one of a number of orders which could be made, including forfeiture to the Commonwealth. It submitted that the only challenge was to the provision empowering the magistrate to order destruction of the goods in question and the argument based on the election between various remedies, including forfeiture to the Commonwealth, should be rejected.

(b) Consideration

1. In my opinion, an order for destruction of property under s 3ZQZB(4)(d) does not involve an acquisition by the Commonwealth or any other person such that s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution has application. As was stated by Mason J in Commonwealth v Tasmania (the Tasmanian Dam Case) [1983] HCA 21; 158 CLR 1 at 145, "it is not enough that legislation adversely affects or terminates a pre-existing right that an owner enjoys … there must be an acquisition … however slight or insubstantial": see also JT International SA v The Commonwealth [2012] HCA 43; 250 CLR 1 at [42], [118], [144]-[148] [169]; ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [2009] HCA 51; 240 CLR 140 at [82]-[84], [130]-[141]. In the present case, no interest in the property, however slight, was acquired by the Commonwealth or any other person as a result of the order for destruction. The character of other subsections within s 3ZQZB(4) is irrelevant to the position.
2. The second and third respondents also sought to rely on what has been described as the incongruity principle. As was stated by the plurality in Theophanous at [60], exactions by way of forfeiture are a regular feature of the law of the Commonwealth and the imposition of just terms would be incompatible with the very nature of exactions: see also Re Director of Public Prosecutions; Ex parte Lawler [1994] HCA 10; 179 CLR 270 at 289.
3. The appellants submitted that the incongruity principle did not apply because the forfeiture was in respect of a suspected future offence and not in respect of crimes found to have been committed. Because of the view I have taken on the question of acquisition, it is unnecessary to finally determine whether the requirement of just terms in those circumstances would be inconsistent or incongruous with an acquisition for the purpose of preventing suspected future offences against the Commonwealth: see Theophanous at [71] but cf the dissenting judgment of Gageler J in Emmerson at [134].

Conclusion

1. In the result, I am of the opinion that the following orders should be made: 1. To the extent necessary, grant the appellant leave to appeal. 2. Appeal dismissed.
2. If either of the second or third respondents seek an order for costs, they may apply under the Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW).
3. BEAZLEY P: I have had the advantage of reading in draft the reasons of the Chief Justice. I agree with his Honour's reasons and the orders he proposes.
4. LEEMING JA: I agree with the reasons of Bathurst CJ and the orders proposed by him.

Amendments 01 December 2015 - [17] "Law and Justice Amendment Act" to "Law and Justice Legislation Amendment Act" [19] "Anti-Terrorist Act" to "Anti-Terrorism Act" [36] "affect" to "effect" [39] "right of obligation" to "right or obligation" DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 01 December 2015