Disagreement between the experts
306Many experts were involved.
307The plaintiffs called three Fire Safety Engineers, Mr John DeLorenzo, Mr Per Olsson and Mr Blair Stratton. The plaintiffs also called Mr Peter Hunt, a Dangerous Goods Consultant.
308UTI called Mr Donald Alexander, a Fire Safety Engineer, as well as Dr Green and Mr Schwebel.
309The real issues of disagreement between the experts were as follows: -
(a)Whether combustible goods were stored beyond the height recommended in the applicable standards. Mr Olsson, Mr Stratton and Mr DeLorenzo were of the view that they were, because combustible goods such as linen and plastics were stored at heights of up to 9 metres, well in excess of the restrictions for combustible goods as set out in sprinkler standard AS2118. The maximum allowable storage height for the plastics stored in cartons in the warehouse was 3 metres to 4 metres in racks.
(b)Whether combustible goods were dispersed around the warehouse in accordance with applicable standards. Mr Hunt, Mr Olsson, Mr Stratton and Mr Schwebel were of the view that they were not, because the storage of up to 20 drums of fish oil (a C2 combustible liquid) within one area of the warehouse exceeded the concentration of combustible liquids allowed under sprinkler standard AS1940.
(c)Whether, once the fire started, the excessive height or inadequate dispersal of combustible liquids caused the sprinkler system to be overwhelmed. Modelling in support of this conclusion is set out in the report of Mr Olsson and Mr Stratton dated 10 September 2010. Their conclusion was that the sprinkler system in the warehouse would have been able to contain the fire once started, but for the non-compliant storage adopted by UTI.
310UTI's attack on each component of this expert evidence was indirect at best.
311Dr Green, a chemist, had limited expertise in storage methodology in warehouses. He had not been involved in the investigation of warehouse fires. He did not refer at all in his report or the joint report to the applicable sprinkler standard AS1940 for safe dispersal of C2 combustible liquids. His argument instead focused on storage heights. His opinion was that provided the maximum height of stored goods was 1.2 metres from the roof, storage was compliant with sprinkler standard AS2118.1.
312Dr Green's approach to this issue was at odds with the other experts. The other experts took the sprinkler system in the warehouse as a given, and considered whether UTI's storage methodology of specified goods complied with applicable standards. Dr Green took the storage methodology as a given (based on a bare assertion that "there is nothing unusual about the storage of goods in this warehouse in that storage would have been below 1.2 metres from the roof line in compliance with the BCA and sprinkler standard"), and criticised the design of the sprinkler system (which was outside of UTI's control) as being inadequate for the storage of those goods.
313Mr Olsson commented "whether the sprinkler system should have been re-designed or the storage arrangement complied with is in my opinion a question of law and not a question for a fire engineering expert". Or indeed a chemist. Underlying Dr Green's opinion was agreement with other experts that either the storage methodology or the sprinkler system had to be changed in order for storage to be in compliance with sprinkler standard AS2118.
314Mr Alexander only dealt obliquely with the issue of storage heights. He said that: -
"...reference to excess storage heights throughout the warehouse needs to be moderated by view of the fact that a substantial amount of the stored goods in the warehouse at the time of the fire were extra high hazard category 1 goods. AS2118.1982 for the discharged density of 17.5mm/min has no limitation on the stacking height of category 1 goods, and the governing parameter then becomes maintaining a clearance of 1m below the sprinkler heads. I have therefore concluded that the storage of category 1 goods would have complied with the regulatory requirements."
315Mr Alexander did not dispute the opinion of the plaintiffs' experts as to excessive storage heights of some goods. Rather, his opinion was that because most of the warehouse was compliant, reference to the excess storage heights of the non-compliant parts needed to be "moderated". What Mr Alexander meant by that is not clear to me.
316On the issue of dispersal, UTI's experts were in conflict with each other. Despite opinions expressed in his report, in the expert witness conclave Mr Schwebel agreed with the plaintiffs' experts that storage was in excess of minor storage in sprinkler standard AS1940 for dangerous goods and C2 combustibles.
317Mr Alexander did not dispute this opinion. Rather, his evidence was that the other experts were wrong and had "generalised" in their assumptions as to how the fish oil was stored in the warehouse. He insisted that all the fish oil drums were stored on the bottom tier of the racking and that there were only three pallets in the area. These assumptions have not been made out in the evidence.
318On the question of causation, both Dr Green and Mr Schwebel agreed with the plaintiffs' experts that the types of goods stored and the manner of storage contributed to the spread and intensity of the fire.
319However, both Dr Green and Mr Alexander criticised the modelling undertaken by Mr Olsson and Mr Stratton. However, neither Dr Green nor Mr Alexander provided an alternative model to show how the matters which they say should be taken into account would affect the conclusions derived in the model.
320The evidence of Mr Hunt, Mr Olsson, Mr Stratton and Mr DeLorenzo as to non-compliance of storage methodology and the intensification of the fire as a result of this was neither seriously nor convincingly challenged. I accept their evidence.
321PRI called no evidence as to whether, and how it relied upon the storage compliance representation. It submitted reliance can be inferred.
322That inference is said to arise from the following circumstances: -
(a)PRI's business practice was to pay its logistics provider to receive PRI's goods when they arrived from overseas, warehouse them and arrange delivery of those goods to PRI's customers. PRI had little, if any, direct contact with the goods in this process.
(b)UTI's Chief Financial Officer, Mr Cruceanu, said that UTI operated in an extremely competitive market, and presented itself as a careful, responsible custodian of its customers' goods.
(c)UTI's then National Sales Manager, Ms Joyce Campbell, said that UTI would not "have a differentiator in the market as far as our operational capability" offering "exactly the same" operational capability.
(d)Ms Campbell said that UTI was a "solution-based company where we would talk about solutions rather than price".
323The effect of the evidence of Mr Cruceanu and Ms Campbell was that UTI operated in a highly competitive market where the price, and services offered by competing warehouse operators did not vary greatly.
324I accept PRI's submissions that, in these circumstances, it can be inferred that if a customer, including PRI, knew of any deficiency in UTI's storage compliance which would have endangered the customer's goods, then the customer would have simply moved its goods to another provider.
325As PRI pointed out, such inference may carry more weight than direct evidence of reliance given by a customer, given in hindsight after the loss of the goods.
326I find the representation alleged was made, that it was misleading or deceptive, that PRI relied on it and has suffered damage as a result.