Contracts Review Act
106So far as Mr and Mrs Menzies' claim under the Contracts Review Act 1980, s 7 reads:
"7(1) Where the Court finds a contract or a provision of a contract to have been unjust in the circumstances relating to the contract at the time it was made, the Court may, if it considers it just to do so, and for the purpose of avoiding as far as practicable an unjust consequence or result, do any one or more of the following:
(a) it may decide to refuse to enforce any or all of the provisions of the contract,
(b) it may make an order declaring the contract void, in whole or in part,
(c) it may make an order varying, in whole or in part, any provision of the contract,
(d) it may, in relation to a land instrument, make an order for or with respect to requiring the execution of an instrument that:
(i) varies, or has the effect of varying, the provisions of the land instrument, or
(ii) terminates or otherwise affects, or has the effect of terminating or otherwise affecting, the operation or effect of the land instrument.
(2) Where the Court makes an order under subsection (1) (b) or (c), the declaration or variation shall have effect as from the time when the contract was made or (as to the whole or any part or parts of the contract) from some other time or times as specified in the order.
(3) The operation of this section is subject to the provisions of section 19."
107Assistance in ascertaining the intended content of "unjust" is derived from s 9. It relevantly reads:
"9(1) In determining whether a contract or a provision of a contract is unjust in the circumstances relating to the contract at the time it was made, the Court shall have regard to the public interest and to all the circumstances of the case, including such consequences or results as those arising in the event of:
(a) compliance with any or all of the provisions of the contract, or
(b) non-compliance with, or contravention of, any or all of the provisions of the contract.
(2) Without in any way affecting the generality of subsection (1), the matters to which the Court shall have regard shall, to the extent that they are relevant to the circumstances, include the following:
(a) whether or not there was any material inequality in bargaining power between the parties to the contract,
(b) whether or not prior to or at the time the contract was made its provisions were the subject of negotiation,
(c) whether or not it was reasonably practicable for the party seeking relief under this Act to negotiate for the alteration of or to reject any of the provisions of the contract,
(d) whether or not any provisions of the contract impose conditions which are unreasonably difficult to comply with or not reasonably necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of any party to the contract,
(e) whether or not:
(i) any party to the contract (other than a corporation) was not reasonably able to protect his or her interests, or
...
(f) the relative economic circumstances, educational background and literacy of:
(i) the parties to the contract (other than a corporation), and
(ii) any person who represented any of the parties to the contract,
(g) where the contract is wholly or partly in writing, the physical form of the contract, and the intelligibility of the language in which it is expressed,
(h) whether or not and when independent legal or other expert advice was obtained by the party seeking relief under this Act,
(i) the extent (if any) to which the provisions of the contract and their legal and practical effect were accurately explained by any person to the party seeking relief under this Act, and whether or not that party understood the provisions and their effect,
(j) whether any undue influence, unfair pressure or unfair tactics were exerted on or used against the party seeking relief under this Act:
(i) by any other party to the contract,
(ii) by any person acting or appearing or purporting to act for or on behalf of any other party to the contract, or
(iii) by any person to the knowledge (at the time the contract was made) of any other party to the contract or of any person acting or appearing or purporting to act for or on behalf of any other party to the contract,
(k) the conduct of the parties to the proceedings in relation to similar contracts or courses of dealing to which any of them has been a party, and
(I) the commercial or other setting, purpose and effect of the contract.
...
(4) In determining whether a contract or a provision of a contract is unjust, the Court shall not have regard to any injustice arising from circumstances that were not reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract was made.
(5) In determining whether it is just to grant relief in respect of a contract or a provision of a contract that is found to be unjust, the Court may have regard to the conduct of the parties to the proceedings in relation to the performance of the contract since it was made."
108The Menzies relied upon s 9(2)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g) and (h). Additionally, Mr Menzies claims that Jeff Penter did not explain what he was signing; they did not read the pages; they were not given any opportunity by Jeff Penter to read the pages; they did not know the effect of the pages he had signed; Jeff Penter did not inform them that Paccar was obtaining any kind of security in the trucks or the trailers; they did not believe the pages they signed formed part of a formal agreement with Paccar; they had not previously been given a copy of any of the pages that he signed; they did not date or write their name on any of the pages that they signed; they did not have any opportunity to obtain legal or financial advice about the pages or any agreement with Paccar; and they did not see Jeff Penter sign or write on any of the pages that they had signed. These assertions are disputed by Paccar.
109In Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd v Khoshaba [2006] NSWCA 41, Handley JA stated at [99] that consideration of a claim under the Contracts Review Act involves a three stage process. They are:
"... the making of findings of primary fact where these are disputed, the formation of an evaluative judgment as to whether or not the contract is unjust, and why, and then, if necessary, the exercise of the Court's discretionary power to grant relief and determine its extent."
110In Mr and Mrs Menzies' favour, I do accept that neither Mr Menzies nor Mrs Menzies was advised by Mr Penter to seek independent legal or financial advice prior to signing the documents. Most of the issues raised in the Menzies' Contracts Review Act claim raise the same issues as before. I do not accept Mr Menzies' assertions that: he did not read the pages; he was not given any opportunity by Mr Penter to read them; he did not know the effect of the pages he had signed; Jeff Penter did not inform him that Paccar was obtaining any kind of security in the trucks or the trailers; he did not believe the pages he signed formed part of a formal agreement with Paccar Financial; he had not previously been given a copy of any of the pages that he signed; he did not date or write his name on any of the pages that he signed; he did not see Jeff Penter sign or write on any of the pages that he had signed.
111So far as the Menzies' assertion, that Jeff Penter did not explain to them what they were signing and that they were unsophisticated persons running a small family freight forwarding business whereas Paccar was a corporation conducting a finance business in Australia as a wholly owned subsidiary of a foreign multi-national corporation, it is difficult to accept that Mr Menzies did not know what he was signing in the light of his prior business experience.
112Between 1984 and 2004, Mr and Mrs Menzies had their own successful business, Chittaway Plant Hire and then Menzies Excavations. Mr Menzies had purchased a 40 acre property at Wyong and another at Marborough, Queensland. By 2004, Mr Menzies had completely paid back his loans to the CBA and other finance companies from the proceeds of hiring out the machinery he had purchased and the sale of part of the Wyong property. This leads me to conclude that Mr Menzies was a reasonably experienced businessman and did understand the terms of the documents he signed.
113So far as Mrs Menzies is concerned there is no evidence that establishes her claim under the Contracts Review Act. It appears that she was involved in the business to a lesser extent. She made arrangements for payments to Paccar. She has not raised different issues to that of her husband under the Contracts Review Act. They were represented by the same solicitor when the amended defence and amended cross claim was filed.
114Further, counsel for Paccar relied on s 6 of the Contracts Review Act to submit that the Menzies were not entitled to be granted relief under the Act as the Menzies were carrying on a trucking business. Section 6 of the Contracts Review Act relevantly reads:
"6 Certain restrictions on grant of relief
...
(2) A person may not be granted relief under this Act in relation to a contract so far as the contract was entered into in the course of or for the purpose of a trade, business or profession carried on by the person or proposed to be carried on by the person, other than a farming undertaking (including, but not limited to, an agricultural, pastoral, horticultural, orcharding or viticultural undertaking) carried on by the person or proposed to be carried on by the person wholly or principally in New South Wales."
115On 2 May 2006, Menzies Haulage was incorporated and Mr and Mrs Menzies were the two directors and joint owners of the company. The trucks and trailers were purchased in the name of the company Menzies Haulage Pty Limited and were required to pick up and deliver loads to and from Sydney and Brisbane. One of the trucks would load in Sydney and the other in Brisbane every day. The two trucks did five round trips per week between them. Hence, as the trucks were constantly travelling between Sydney and Brisbane it is not clear whether the business was carried on by the Menzies wholly or principally in New South Wales.
116After considering the matters outlined in s 9(2) of the Act, it is my view that the contracts were not unjust, nor are the Menzies entitled to relief under the Contracts Review Act.
117As the Menzies' claims for relief have failed I dismiss the amended cross claim.
118It is now necessary to deal with a further issue raised in the amended statement of claim. Paccar seeks an order pursuant to s 568F of the Corporations Act 2001. It reads:
"568F Court may dispose of disclaimed property
(1) The Court may order that disclaimed property vest in, or be delivered to:
(a) a person entitled to the property; or
(b) a person in or to whom it seems to the Court appropriate that the property be vested or delivered; or
(c) a person as trustee for a person of a kind referred to in paragraph (a) or (b).
(2) The Court may make an order under subsection (1):
(a) on the application of a person who claims an interest in the property, or is under a liability in respect of the property that this Act has not discharged; and
(b) after hearing such persons as it thinks appropriate.
(3) Subject to subsection (4), where an order is made under subsection (1) vesting property, the property vests immediately, for the purposes of the order, without any conveyance, transfer or assignment.
(4) Where:
(a) a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory requires the transfer of property vested by an order under subsection (1) to be registered; and
(b) that law enables the order to be registered;
the property vests in equity because of the order but does not vest at law until that law has been complied with."
119On 7 May 2009, Paccar served a statutory demand for payment of debt. On 3 September 2009, Menzies Haulage was placed into liquidation and wound up by order of the Federal Court. On 11 October 2010, the liquidator of Menzies Haulage disclaimed all interest in and to the equipment. As the liquidator of Menzies Haulage has disclaimed all interest in and to the equipment, namely the property referred to in [4] of this judgment, I make an order that Paccar is entitled to that property pursuant to s 568F(1)(a).