The intention that the result of the meeting should have force and significance for the purposes of s.510 was thus made plain.
11 The plaintiff seeks the assistance of the court, by way of determination under s.511(1), because of the dissent of one creditor at the meeting of creditors of Sentinel Realty Holdings Pty Limited. As has been noted, the minutes of that meeting record that one creditor voted by proxy against the resolution. This dissent, it is apprehended, may mean that s.510 cannot operate according to its terms to make the particular arrangement between that company and its creditors binding on both the company and the creditors, subject only to the s.510(4) possibility. The doubt or apprehension comes from a passage in the judgment of Young J in Dean-Willcocks v Soluble Solution Hydroponics Pty Ltd (1997) 42 NSWLR 209 at p.215:
"The authorities have held that the court will not confirm an arrangement under s 510 unless it provides that the creditors are to be paid pari passu or unless the unfavoured creditors are sent to it: Re Farmer's Freehold Land Co Ltd (1892) 3 BC (NSW) 39. In the instant case, resolution B does offend against this principle. At the very least the Court could not advise the liquidator to proceed in accordance with it unless the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation who appears to be the only creditor of either company who did not attend the meeting indicated that he had no objection."
12 Later in his judgment, Young J noted that s.510(1)(b), concerning a resolution of creditors, does not deal with the question of the majority required and that the means by which the provisions with respect to meetings in regulations 5.6.11 and following of the Corporations Regulations are made applicable to such a case are not necessarily clear.
13 The gist of the decision in Re The Farmers' Freehold Land Company Ltd (1892) 3 BC (NSW) 39, referred to by Young J in the above extract, is stated in the headnote:
"An arrangement entered into between the liquidator of a company and its creditors, such as is contemplated by the provisions of the Companies Act, must, unless all the creditors agree, provide for the distribution of assets pari passu among the creditors generally, or any particular class of creditors."
14 The statutory provision relevant to that case was s.187 of the Companies Act 1874:
"Any arrangement entered into between a company … in the course of being wound-up voluntarily, and its creditors, shall be binding on the company if sanctioned by an extraordinary resolution and on the creditors if acceded to by three-fourths in number and value of the creditors, subject to such right of appeal as is hereinafter mentioned."
15 Manning J said (at p.40):
"On the face of it this arrangement is one by which a creditor, without her consent being in any way given, is excluded from sharing pari passu with the other creditors. It seems to me that no arrangement can be good within the meaning of the 187th section of the Act unless it is governed by the principle which underlies all laws both of liquidation and bankruptcy - that is, unless it provides that the creditors are to be paid pari passu , or unless the unfavoured creditors assent to it."
16 In Re Switch Telecommunications Pty Ltd (2000) 35 ACSR 172, Santow J traced the history of s.510 and included among principles emerging from case law the following:
"(i) to be binding on non-voting or dissentient creditors, they must be paid pari passu with the voting creditors: Farmers' Freehold ;
(ii) otherwise the non-voting or dissentient creditors need to consent to the arrangement;"
17 It is understandable that, as a matter of principle, s.510 should be subject to these limitations. Unlike s.411 (and Part 5.1 generally), s.510 contains no mechanism for the recognition and protection of classes of creditors and members according to community of interest in relation to the particular proposal. Section 510, according to its terms, would allow a voting majority to dispossess or otherwise prejudice a minority (whether voting or not), leaving it to the minority to resort to positive action under s.510(4) in an attempt to prevent the majority's will becoming binding upon the minority. Such a case should, in the absence of unanimous consent by the members of the minority, be dealt with under Part 5.1 which ensures that an arrangement cannot be binding on a class of creditors or members unless that class, consulting together in its own separate interests, has agreed to the arrangement by the statutory majority and the court has granted its approval: see Re Trix Ltd [1970] 3 All ER 397.
18 Young J's statement in the Soluble Solution Hydroponics case does not mean that s.510 can never cause an arrangement to be binding if there is dissent. What it does mean is that discrimination cannot be imposed through s.510 within the body of creditors or members of a company in the absence of the assent of those against whom the discrimination would operate. For these purposes, discrimination exists where the situation is not one in which, in the words of both Young J and Manning J, "the creditors are to be paid pari passu".
19 Unlike, for example, Re Switch Telecommunications Pty Ltd (above), the present case is not one in which doubt or difficulty attends ascertainment of the separate debts of the several creditors as against the companies of which they are creditors. Each creditor's claim against a particular company is clear. The difficulty which has caused the liquidator to propose a form of pooling relates to determination of the true state of the assets and liabilities (and their values or amounts) as among the several linked companies, in light of inter-company transactions apparently undertaken in such a way as to obscure the true state of relationships. Under the pooling proposal, each creditor of a particular company will maintain his or her appropriate relativity to the other creditors of that company according to the pari passu principle that pays attention to the amounts of the respective debts and claims. But the several groups of creditors, thus constituted and participating, will share in one consolidated fund made up of the totality of the distributable assets of all companies combined. The departure from the ordinary course of administration thus envisaged will not have any impact that upsets the normal relativities, by way of pari passu entitlement, within the body of creditors of any one company. The impact will be as among the several bodies of creditors, in that there may become divisible among the members of any one such body, on the pari passu basis applicable within the body, an aggregate that is greater or less than that which would have been so divisible had the arrangement not been implemented.
20 The arrangement therefore does not exhibit the discriminatory characteristic identified in the Soluble Solution Hydroponics and Switch Telecommunications cases, by reference to Farmers' Freehold Land, which renders the s.510 procedure unavailable.
21 With s.510 in its present form (which, in relation to creditors, no longer requires any special or specified voting majority: compare, for example, s.412(1)(b) of the Companies (New South Wales) Code), the other matters referred to be Young J (see paragraph [13] above) seem to me to be answered in large measure by the definition of "resolution" in s.9. That definition is as follows:
"' resolution' , in relation to creditors or contributories, means a resolution passed at a meeting of the creditors or contributories."
22 Section 510(1)(b), concerning creditors, requires "a resolution of the creditors". There is here, in terms of the s.9 definition just quoted, a reference to "resolution" "in relation to creditors". The definition therefore applies to produce the result that there will be no resolution unless there is "a meeting of the creditors" at which it is "passed". And because the resolution plays a part in machinery created by s.510 (which is within Part 5.5 of the Act), the meeting which is the necessary forum for considering whether the resolution should be passed is properly regarded as "a meeting convened under Part … 5.5 … of the Act" as referred to in regulation 5.6.11(2) of the Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth). It is that provision of the Regulations that brings regulations 5.6.12 to 5.6.57 into operation for the purposes of the meeting in question.
23 The s.9 definition of "resolution" does not identify the number of positive votes required to cause a "resolution" to be passed. In this respect, the definition of "resolution" is to be contrasted with the s.9 definition of "special resolution" which refers to "at least 75% of the votes cast". In the absence of any other specification in the definition of "resolution", the common law rule must prevail. That rule was stated by Lord Hardwicke LC in Attorney General v Davy (1741) 2 Atk 212; 26 ER 531:
"Wherever a certain number are incorporated, a major part of them may do any corporate act; so if all are summoned and part appear, a major part of those that appear may do a corporate act."