The "associate" question
28 It is against this factual background that I must consider the question posed by the client certificate provision, that is, whether an "associate" of Franklins engaged those Opal casuals who became employed by Forstaff at the Franklins sites at which they had previously been employed by Opal. In other words, is Forstaff properly to be regarded as an "associate" of Franklins within the meaning of the client certificate provision?
29 The purpose of the client certificate provision is not difficult to discern. It is the kind of purpose to which Murphy J referred in Brambles Holdings Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1977) 138 CLR 467 when discussing a statutory export incentive scheme:
"The intention of the Act (to increase Australian exports) could easily have been defeated by arrangements which switched the export business from an established exporter to one not previously engaged in export (for example, to a subsidiary or associated company)."
30 The references in the client certificate provision to "subsidiaries" and "associates" should thus be regarded as an anti-avoidance measure. The primary intention was to cause the fee to become payable if employees of Opal were engaged by Franklins. Because that intention could easily be defeated in the way Murphy J described, it was made clear that employment by a subsidiary or associate, instead of by Franklins itself, would attract the same consequences. The purpose of the clause, as I view it, was to prevent Franklins appropriating to itself, directly or through some contrivance, the benefit of Opal's profit by "cutting out the middle man", as it was put by Mr Clarke of counsel who appeared for Franklins. The meaning of "associates", used in conjunction with "subsidiaries", should be determined by reference to that purpose.
31 For reasons already mentioned in the brief discussion of the meaning of "subsidiaries", it would be inappropriate - even dangerous - to pay very much attention at all to cases in which the term "associate" as used in statutory definitions has been considered. This is because Parliamentary drafters have, over the years, used the "associate" label to denote different concepts in different contexts. In the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1974 (Cth), for example, there is a mix of tests of "associate" status under s. 6, with some being based on structural and relationship factors (such as family membership, employment and the holding of offices within companies) and others depending on what might be termed influence factors (for example, a corporation is an "associate" of a person if its directors are accustomed or under an obligation to act in accordance with the directions, instructions or wishes of the person). The "associated entity" concept in ss.5B and 5C of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) tends more towards the structural or relationship approach. The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) employs a combination of both structural tests and tests based on actions and activities, including some which may be ad hoc. The various forms of Corporations Act associateship are described by Justice Austin in his paper "The Definition of 'Associate' in the Corporations Law", University of Melbourne Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation Research Papers, September 2000, as falling into three broad categories: "automatic associateship", "associateship under a relevant agreement" and "associateship on the facts".
32 The label "associated companies" is typically given, in ordinary parlance, to companies having some common human element. Thus, in Coburg Investment Co Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1960) 104 CLR 650, Windeyer J spoke of the taxpayer company as "one of several associated companies controlled by Edward Samuel Taylor". In Bridge Shipping Pty Ltd v Grand Shipping SA (1991) 173 CLR 231, companies which had the same directors and the same secretary were described by McHugh J as "associated companies". In Australian Food Corporation Pty Ltd v Australian Meat Industry Employees Union [2001] FCA 513, there was reference to two companies being associated "by virtue of their having common directors and shareholders", while in Walker v Wimborne (1976) 137 CLR 1, a company whose obligations were carried out by employees of another company was referred to by Mason J as an "associated company" of the latter. None of this provides any definition of "associated", but it does indicate the kinds of factual circumstances which have caused the "associated" label to be applied as between companies in a general and undefined sense. The theme, it seems to me, is one of lack of arm's length relationship engendered by an established connection whereby the influence of one party is at work upon the will of the other (or the influence of a third party is at work upon the wills of both) or one party prefers the other's interests in its dealings.
33 The same ideas underlie the notion of "associate" which I consider to be the same as "associated company" but without the requirement that the party concerned be a company. Thus, a director of a company would readily be regarded as an "associate" of the company because of the connection constituted by the office held and the nature of that office as one in which the director subordinate his or her own interests to those of the company. Likewise in a case where a bare trustee or nominee holds property for a company, the holding of the position coupled with the duties it entails would warrant a conclusion that the trustee or nominee was an "associate" of the company in the particular context or in relation to the particular subject matter. So too in a case where one company is, say, 40% owned by another: the influence of the latter's will within the former will generally be clear in some form. Some established and ongoing connection producing, to some degree, a susceptibility to influence or a subordination of independent interests or a coalition of interests seems to me to be inherent in the notion of "associate" in its ordinary sense.
34 This notion is borne out by observations of Owen J in Bank of Western Australia Ltd v Ocean Trawlers Pty Ltd (1995) 13 WAR 407 as to the meaning of "associates" for the purposes of a court order prohibiting the sale of certain shares to the defendants or any "related party or associate". Although the term "associate" was defined by reference to Corporations Law provisions, Owen J made certain comments apposite to its general meaning unaffected by any statutory definition:
"The manifest purpose of the variation to the Mareva injunction was to permit the first defendant to sell the shares but to ensure that they were sold at fair market value and that the proceeds of sale were utilised only in reduction of the first defendant's financial commitments. A sale to an 'associate' would cover a sale to a person not necessarily 'related' but none the less reserving to the first defendant or Mr Lombardo some direct or indirect continuing interest in or control over the shares sold. Counsel for the first defendant mentioned voting rights, dividends or other ultimate disposal of the shares as examples of a continuing interest or control that would constitute such a reservation. The existence of such an agreement, arrangement or understanding might reasonably be thought to result in a lower sale price. A sale in those circumstances would therefore be a sale to an 'associate' and would be contrary to the varied order.
In general terms I accept the submission of counsel for the first defendant. I think that the contest compels a purposive approach to the meaning of the word 'associate'. The key is the search for a buyer who would be truly independent."
35 According to this approach, an "associate" is someone who is not "truly independent". The relevant independence is, to my mind, independence of will and interest rather than independence of action. I accept that characteristic as relevant in the present case.
36 It is also pertinent to refer to observations of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Securities Commission v Kiwi Co-operative Dairies Ltd [1995] 3 NZLR 26. That case concerned an exception to a statutory provision forbidding the offering of securities to the public except through a registered prospectus. The exception applied to an offer to any "relatives or close business associates of the issuer". The Court held that "close business associates" (an undefined term) should be construed by reference to both the protective purpose of the statute and its use in conjunction with the term "relatives" (defined to mean various family members). The Court regarded the words "close" and "business" as straightforward. In relation to "associate", it resorted to dictionary definitions and continued:
"Although an issuer and a holder of its securities have a relationship through business, the use of the terms 'close' and 'associate' requires more than this: there must be a degree of intimacy or 'business friendship' in the relationship, though not necessarily a friendship away from business. It must be sufficient to overcome any inequality which might otherwise be present in the relationship."
37 The last sentence is significant. It emphasises that a person will be a "close associate" of a company, for the purpose relevant there, only if there is a connection or relationship which alters the balance which would prevail as between parties in a context lacking the connection or relationship but otherwise identical. In that case, the balance was related to capacity to make an informed investment decision and the inequality of capacity (or imbalance) which exists as between company insiders and company outsiders. In the present case, I suggest, the balance is related to pursuit by each party of its own interests for its own ends uninfluenced by the other; and that it is an upsetting of that balance which is the indicator of "associate" status.
38 In Payne v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1976) 14 ACLR 252, Murray J of the Supreme Court of Victoria considered a situation where two directors of a company contracted to sell their shares to a buyer on the basis that the buyer would make a takeover bid for the remaining shares and that the sellers, as directors, would do all that was proper to impress upon shareholders that the buyer's bid was in their interests. His Honour was not prepared to think that the promise of the sellers to give this positive message to shareholders in relation to the buyer's bid caused those sellers to become "associates" of the buyer within the meaning of s.180A(7)(b) of the Companies Act 1961 (Vic) which employed an "associate" test in these words:
"if he is associated, whether formally or informally, with that other person in relation to the proposed acquisition by that other person of shares in that company otherwise than solely as a holder of shares in that company."
39 Although no reasoning was stated, it may well be that the "so far as proper" qualification to which their promise was subject caused the promisors' independence to remain essentially intact so that they were not subjected in a relevant way to the influence of the buyer.
40 The requirement (if I may put it so high) that there be some ongoing link entailing influence of one over the other or, at all events, some subordinating of independent interests is reinforced in the present case by the fact that the "associates" reference stands as an adjunct to the "subsidiaries" reference in a provision intended to prevent avoidance of the primary purpose directed at engagement by Franklins so that it extends also to engagement by others. It is inconceivable that that extension could catch everyone who has a contractual relationship with Franklins. It would not catch the lessor of its office premises or accountants who provide it with accounting advice or carriers who transport goods for it, where all those services are supplied on ordinary arm's length commercial terms. No one would describe any of these as an "associate" of Franklins. Why, then, should Forstaff be described as such an "associate"?
41 Employment of Opal casuals by Forstaff had no economic consequences for Franklins comparable with those which would have flowed had Franklins employed those persons itself or if they had been employed by a subsidiary of Franklins. In entering into employment contracts with the persons who were previously employed by Opal, Forstaff was not seeking to enhance Franklins' interests. Nor was it subordinating its own interests to those of Franklins or acting under the influence of Franklins. Forstaff was engaging in a sensible commercial activity with an eye solely to what suited it and what would further its own separate commercial interests.
42 It makes no difference, in my assessment, that Franklins facilitated the establishment of contact between Forstaff management personnel and the Opal workforce at the Franklins sites. I am satisfied that Franklins did not thereby seek to obtain for itself the economic benefits flowing from employing persons currently employed by Opal. Forstaff had already assumed a contractual commitment to supply labour to Franklins. Mr Pettitt said in evidence that Forstaff would have supplied the labour necessary for the assignment whether or not the Opal operatives had joined it - if necessary, by "throwing people at it" and redeploying persons placed in warehouses of other Forstaff customers. Forstaff did not know if any of the Opal personnel would join its workforce. Whether anyone did so was, of course, entirely a matter for the individual.
43 I do not accept that a common intention or shared objective is enough to make one party an "associate" of the other in the sense relevant to the interpretation of the client certificate. There must be, as I have said, some relationship of influence or subordinating of separate interests - a "paler version", as it were, of the parent-subsidiary relationship based on control as such.
44 Having eschewed as inappropriate and even dangerous reliance on statutory definitions of "associate", I shall nevertheless refer, by way of check, to the one external definition which might be considered to be of some relevance. I refer to the definition in the Australian Accounting Standards. If commercial people were to refer consciously or unconsciously to any established norm when choosing to use the term "associate" in a context such as the present, it is likely that they would resort to accounting standards since accounting concepts permeate so much of commerce.
45 Australian Accounting Standard AASB 1016 is entitled "Accounting for Investments in Associates". It prescribes the circumstances in which investors must use the equity method of accounting for investments in associates. The term "associate" is defined as follows:
" associate means an investee, not being:
(a) a subsidiary of the investor; or
(b) a partnership of the investor; or
(c) an investment acquired and held exclusively with a view to its disposal in the near future (see paragraphs 9.1.1 and 9.1.2)
over which the investor has significant influence ."
46 The expression "significant influence" is in turn defined:
" significant influence means the capacity of an entity to affect substantially (but not control) either, or both, of the financial and operating policies of another entity (see paragraphs 9.1.3 to 9.1.8)."
47 Analogy with the concepts in this accounting standard supports the view of the general meaning of "associate" I have already outlined.