78. Even those offended by the concept of moral relativism must acknowledge that, to some extent at least, morality, like beauty, lies in the eye of the beholder. Whilst some may seek security in glib phrases such as "everyone knows right from wrong", there are undoubtedly many circumstances in which morally conscientious people will differ as to where the path of propriety lies. A deontologist may believe that it leads in a different direction from that which might be taken by a committed teleologist. Yet both may be forced to acknowledge that their conclusions are inevitably influenced by their perceptions of the relevant facts. Furthermore, both may be forced to make value judgments in the context of the circumstances as they perceive them. The deontologist may have to make judgments about the priority of potentially competing moral values such as whether truth should prevail over compassion or loyalty (see, for example, the discussion by W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1930, especially chapters 1-2 and The Foundations of Ethics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1939. See also H. A. Pritchard, Moral Obligation, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1949, especially 'Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake?' at 1-17; and J. R. Searle. 'Prima facie reasons' in Philosophical Subjects, ed Z. van Staaten, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980). The teleologist may have to make judgments about the priority of possible outcomes or competing objectives with a view to pursuing such objectives as the greatest good or the least harm. Indeed, it has been claimed that consequentialism may plunge its adherents into an "incessant practical casuistry" (see F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies (first published 1876), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962, at 107) though at least one ethicist has emphatically rejected the suggestion that any such process would be incessant, noting that "It was never contended or conceived by a sound, orthodox utilitarian, that the lover should kiss his mistress with an eye to the common weal" (see A. J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined [first published 1832], ed by H. L. A. Hart, Weidenfeld, London, 1954, at 108). Yet, it cannot be doubted that teleologists sometimes confront moral dilemmas. It may true that despite ethical reliance on a 'grab bag of philosophical principles, customs, religious admonitions, cultural conventions, casuistical judgments and ad hoc valuations', there is often concurrence as to the moral course in concrete situations (see D. Luban, "Partnership, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann", (1990) 90 Columbia L. Rev. 1004, at 1023; see also C. S. Lewis', The Abolition of Man, 1947, republished by Fount Paperbacks, London, 1978, at 95-121 and P. Singer, "Afterword", in A Companion to Ethics, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1993, 543 at 543). Nonetheless, situations constantly arise in which the propriety of a particular action is hotly debated by protagonists equally convinced of their competing opinions on staunchly held moral grounds.