It seems that the basis of the first category was a group of three cases decided between 1763 and 1766 - Wilkes v. Wood [1] ; Huckle v. Money [2] ; and Benson v. Frederick [3] . In each of these cases the defendant was "a servant of the government" and in each case it was held that an award of exemplary damages was justified. In the first of these cases Lord Chief Justice Pratt stated the principle in the following words: "Notwithstanding what Mr. Solicitor-General has said, I have formerly delivered it as my opinion on another occasion, and I still continue of the same mind, that a jury have it in their power to give damages for more than the injury received. Damages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the action itself" [4] . It will be observed that his Lordship was not purporting to state any new principle. Nor was he stating one the application of which depended upon the official position of the defendant; the principle was stated in general terms as one which had application to a tortious act committed by any person. In the second case the Lord Chief Justice, before dealing with the special facts of the case, again stated in general terms the considerations which should be taken into account in assessing damages for tort though without expressly referring to the term "exemplary damages". He said: "the law has not laid down what shall be the measure of damages in actions of tort; the measure is vague and uncertain, depending upon a vast variety of causes, facts, and circumstances; torts or injuries which may be done by one man to another are infinite; in cases of criminal conversation, battery, imprisonment, slander, malicious prosecutions, etc. the state, degree, quality, trade or profession of the party injured, as well as of the person who did the injury, must be, and generally are, considered by a jury in giving damages" [5] . Again in the third case no point was made that the application of the principle was dependent upon the fact that the defendant occupied an official position; the members of the Court merely agreed that the defendant "had manifestly acted arbitrarily, unjustifiably and unreasonably" and, by inference, maliciously, and that this justified the verdict. Lord Devlin observes that some considerable time elapsed after these cases had been decided "before the principle eo nomine was extended in other directions" and that "six cases, decided in the course of the next century", had been cited to their Lordships. But Tullidge v. Wade [1] , the first of these six cases, was decided in 1769 - a mere three years after Benson v. Frederick [2] . It was an action per quod by a father based upon the seduction of his daughter and the complaint was that the jury's award was excessive. But the Court refused to disturb the verdict and in giving judgment Lord Chief Justice Wilmot said: "Actions of this sort are brought for example's sake; and although the plaintiff's loss in this case may not really amount to the value of twenty shillings, yet the jury have done right in giving liberal damages if much greater damages had been given, we should not have been dissatisfied therewith; the plaintiff having received this insult in his own house; where he had civilly received the defendant, and permitted him to make his addresses to his daughter" [3] . Admittedly, this was not a very precise statement of principle but clearly enough his Lordship was not purporting to introduce any new principle; he was, it seems to me, merely acting upon an established principle which, as far as I can see, was completely in accordance with the three cases previously mentioned. I do not refer to the later English cases which his Lordship mentions other than Bell v. Midland Railway Co. [4] which he explains as an example of the award of exemplary damages where the wrongdoer was seeking to make a profit out of his wrongdoing. It is true that Erle C.J. said: "looking at the conduct of the company, who set up a wharf of their own, and, careless whether they were doing right or wrong, prevented all access to the plaintiff's wharf, for the purpose of extinguishing his trade and advancing their own profit, it is impossible to say the plaintiff was not entitled to ample compensation" [5] and that Willes J. said: "The defendants have committed a grievous wrong with a high hand and in plain violation of an Act of Parliament; and persisted in it for the purpose of destroying the plaintiff's business and securing gain to themselves" [6] . But he prefaced this observation by remarking that "if ever there was a case in which the jury were warranted in awarding damages of an exemplary character, this is that case" [1] . Byles J. stated the principle in more general terms when he said: "I agree also with my brother Willes that, where a wrongful act is accompanied by words of contumely and abuse, the jury are warranted in taking that into their consideration, and giving retributory damages" [2] . I do not find in the judgments any suggestion that as against a private individual exemplary damages may be awarded only where the wrongdoer is seeking to make a profit out of his wrongdoing; the observations of the Chief Justice and Willes J. appear to me to be directed to the facts of the particular case and to amount to no more than statements that proof of those facts was sufficient to justify an award of exemplary damages.