Even if found, these irregularities would not affect the result
69 This brings me to s 206(5) of the Act, which is set out at [8] above. There is ample authority in this Court that the question whether the result of the election may have been affected has to be assessed as a matter of "real not merely theoretical possibilities": see Re Ferguson; Re Inquiry into Election in the Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union, WA Branch (1986) 17 IR 208 ("Ferguson") at 210 per Toohey J, and the cases cited by Gray J in Bailey at 22 and by Weinberg J in Jacomb at [54]. However, Mr Nimmo contended that there was also an accepted principle that where the losing margin is small, as in this case, it is not appropriate to take into account voting patterns. He relied upon the decisions of Keely J in Re Noack; re Vehicle Builders Employees' Federation of Australia SA Branch (1987) 18 IR 100; [1987] FCA 195 ("Noack") and Wilcox J in Re Transport Union of Australia, NSW Branch; Ex parte Edwards (1990) 33 IR 436 ("Edwards"). Mr Clisby responded that there was no such principle and he pointed to the fact that in Jacomb, Weinberg J took into account voting patterns to find that the irregularity in that case would not have affected the result of that election.
70 In Noack, Keely J followed the decision of Toohey J in Ferguson and applied the "real not merely theoretical possibilities" test (at 104). However, since the losing margin in that case was 27 and the total number of votes affected by the irregularities was 67, his Honour concluded that he should not take into account the participation rate in the election of 30% in assessing whether there was a real possibility that the result of the election was affected by the irregularities (at 103).
71 In Edwards, Wilcox J referred to what Keely J had said in Noack (at 457-8) and observed that it was understandable that Keely J had not taken into account the participation rate when the winning margin was "very small". However, immediately after making that observation, his Honour went on to say this:
It is one thing to reject reliance upon evidence of the general participation rate in that situation, but it is another thing to say that, when much greater numbers are involved, the Court should shut its eyes to evidence of the participation rate and assume that, against all the probabilities, that a substantial number of members wrongly denied ballot papers would have voted in substantially greater numbers than the members as a whole.
72 Significantly, Wilcox J then observed that Keely J had not propounded any such view in Noack, but, to the contrary, he had followed the "real not merely theoretical possibilities" test described by Toohey J in Ferguson. Accordingly, Wilcox J proceeded to take account of both participation rates and voting patterns in relation to the various facets of the election in that case (see at 459-460).
73 Wilcox J returned to this issue in Parker v Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners of Australia (1992) 43 IR 248; [1992] FCA 538 ("Parker"). While that case involved an amalgamation ballot, the relevant statutory provisions are similar and the same principles apply. His Honour reviewed some earlier decisions of the High Court and various Federal Court decisions, including Ferguson and Noack (at 252-3). In relation to the decision of Toohey J in Ferguson, his Honour observed that:
Of course, in that case, for the election of even the candidates with the lowest margin to have been affected by the irregularity, not only would the ineligible voters have had to participate at a rate markedly above the overall average; they would have needed to have voted overwhelmingly for the unsuccessful candidates having the greatest number of votes.
74 His Honour noted that in Noack, Keely J had applied the test stated by Toohey J in Ferguson "but with a different result". He referred to a decision of Gray J in Re Patterson; Re Association of Railway Professional Officers of Australia (1987) 19 IR 373 and his own decision in Edwards where the "real and not merely theoretical possibilities" test was applied. His Honour then made a number of observations about the countervailing factors involved in applying that test. He said:
The application of Toohey J's test to the facts of a particular case involves, not merely a mathematical calculation, but the making of a judgment in the light of a number of factors. The most important factor will always be the relationship between the winning margin and the number of votes infected by irregularity. But the participation rate and the pattern of voting, so far as this may appear from the evidence, will always be material. As it seems to me, the smaller the number of irregular votes, the greater the difficulty in a court feeling confident that the relevant factors acted, or would have acted, in line with the total electorate. The smaller the margin, the greater the difficulty in assuming that it would not have been bridged by atypical voting.
75 Wilcox J added that a further factor to be considered was whether the votes excluded by the irregularity could be said to be typical of the whole voting population, or were atypical in relation to, for example, a particular allegiance, or geographical factor.
76 In addition to these cases, I note that participation rates, or voting patterns, or both, were taken into account in applying the "real and not merely theoretical possibilities" test in the following cases: Re Carter; Re Federated Clerks Union of Australia, Victorian Branch (No 2) (1989) 32 IR 30 at 34 per Gray J; Re Australian Timber and Allied Industries Union; Ex parte Black (1991) 39 IR 106 at 120 per Ryan J (this was an amalgamation ballot but, as I have noted above, the relevant statutory provisions are similar and the principles are the same); and, as Mr Clisby pointed out, in Jacomb per Weinberg J at [54].
77 Based on these decisions, I consider that, among other things, I should take into account the participation rate and voting patterns disclosed by the evidence in applying the "real and not merely theoretical possibilities" test. However, in doing so, I should not slavishly apply mere mathematical calculations, but I should make a judgment whether, in the light of all the evidence, there was a real possibility that this election result was affected by any irregularity. Finally, in considering the votes excluded by any irregularity, I should look to see if they are typical of the membership as a whole such that the participation rate and/or voting patterns of the broader membership could be fairly applied to them.
78 It follows that my next task in dealing with this issue is to make an assessment as to the number of votes that may have been affected by any irregularity and to consider whether those members are typical of the membership as a whole. For the purposes of this exercise, I shall assume, contrary to the equivocal position I have outlined above, that Mr Nimmo has established the second and third alleged irregularities.
79 At the outset it is convenient to record that 483 members out of a total eligible membership of 1,904 participated in this election. This equates to a participation rate of slightly more than 25%.
80 On the first aspect, viz the numbers of votes affected, the third irregularity is relatively straightforward. Ms Tilbury's evidence shows it involved approximately 20 members.
81 However, on this first aspect, the second irregularity is more complicated. Ms Roper has provided a list of the names and addresses of the 31 members whose ballot papers were received after the ballot closed on 11 August 2010. The vast majority of those members have addresses in the main centres of the Northern Territory: Darwin (14), Alice Springs (3), Tennant Creek (3) and Jabiru (1). While most of these votes would be incidentally included if the election period had been longer, I do not consider their tardiness was brought about by this irregularity. For this reason I do not consider they should be included in the votes affected by it. However, 10 of the 31 members on this list do have addresses which suggest they live in remote parts of the Northern Territory. There are also the eight members Mr Nimmo has identified as having been affected by this irregularity. However, in relation to them, three of them also appear on the list of late received ballot papers. So, excluding this duplication, the total number of votes affected by the second irregularity is approximately 15.
82 Included in this group is Mr Nimmo. As I have already mentioned, he lives in Alice Springs. He is included because his ballot paper was sent to another member in error and he was therefore forced to obtain a replacement ballot paper and he received it too late to cast a ballot. He said in his affidavit that when he became aware his ballot paper had gone astray, "I contacted the AEC, and advised that I had not received my ballot paper. The AEC issued me a 'duplicate' ballot paper, however by the time I received that ballot paper it was too late for me to vote in the Branch Secretary election. If I had been able to vote I would have voted." Nonetheless, as Mr Clisby points out, Ms Roper's evidence discloses that the replacement ballot paper was sent to Mr Nimmo on 30 July 2010 and he therefore had 12 days to receive it, complete it and return it to Ms Roper before the ballot closed. He obviously did not do that, because his name does not appear on the list of late received ballot papers. Despite the fact that Mr Nimmo has filed an affidavit and a statement in the inquiry, he has not given any further explanation as to what happened to his vote. However, in the circumstances of this inquiry, I am willing to infer that his vote was affected by this assumed irregularity.
83 On the second aspect, viz whether the votes affected are typical of the membership as a whole, this second irregularity is less complicated. I know from the list of late received ballot papers that 10 members with addresses indicating they live in remote areas of the Northern Territory did, in fact, submit a vote. I am also willing to accept that the five members identified by Mr Nimmo that are not on that list (including himself) would have submitted a vote if they had received their ballot papers. I therefore conclude that all of this group would have voted if they had received their ballot papers. It necessarily follows that this group is not typical of the 25% participation rate in the membership as a whole.
84 On this second aspect, the third irregularity involves a group of members that is also atypical - it is atypical in the opposite sense. This is so because, despite the fact this irregularity involved a breach of the Union rules, I cannot ignore Ms Tilbury's evidence that she removed those 20 members from the membership roll of the Union because she did not have a current address for them. At least two things follow from this. The first is obvious: it would have been particularly difficult to effect delivery of the ballot papers upon most, if not all, of those 20 members, if their names had remained on the membership roll. Secondly, the fact that those 20 members had not provided current addresses to Ms Tilbury suggests a level of disinterest towards their union membership rights and, therefore, a higher probability that, even if they had received a ballot paper, they would not have cast a vote in this election.
85 If this group of 20 members was typical of the membership as a whole, the 25% participation rate in this election would suggest that five of the group would have voted in this election. However, given the factors I have mentioned above, I consider it is likely that much fewer than five of them would, in fact, have voted.
86 Finally, taking into account the numbers and factors I have outlined above, I need to consider what effect, if any, each of these irregularities may have had on the result of this election. I will do that separately, and then together.
87 First, assuming approximately 15 members were affected by the second irregularity, and assuming that all of them would most probably have cast a vote in this election, given that the winning margin was 22 votes, it is axiomatic that, considered alone, this irregularity could not, even as a theoretical possibility, have affected the result of this election.
88 Secondly, as to the third category considered alone, even if, contrary to the factors I have mentioned above, I were to apply the general participation rate of 25% to the 20 members (approximately) concerned, it is also axiomatic that the five votes involved could not have affected the result of this election, even as a theoretical possibility.
89 Finally, if I were to assume that both irregularities applied together, and making the same assumptions as above, it is also axiomatic that the 20 votes involved still could not have affected the result of this election, even as a theoretical possibility.
90 For these reasons, I do not consider the second and third irregularities, even if it is assumed they affected the votes of certain members of the Union, whether considered separately, or together, could have affected the result of this election as a real possibility.
91 As a postscript, I should add two things. First, because Mr Clisby was due to take office on 17 January 2011 and because various factors, including the flooding in Brisbane, prevented me from finalising these reasons before that date, I reconvened this inquiry on Tuesday, 11 January 2011 and made an order terminating this inquiry. At that time I advised the parties that I would publish my reasons for that order as soon as possible after the Court term commenced on 31 January 2011. Secondly, at the same time, the parties agreed that when I did publish these reasons, in the interests of protecting their privacy, I should not include the names of any of the various members who were involved in this election except, of course, those persons who were parties to this inquiry and/or who gave evidence.
I certify that the preceding ninety-one (91) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Reeves.