COURSE OF DEALINGS BETWEEN NEAT AND AWBI
85 It is apparent that NEAT and the AWB Group had an amicable working relationship, at least until the second half of 1999. On various occasions before 1999 NEAT sought and was granted permits for the bulk export of wheat. On other occasions, NEAT entered into what was described in evidence as a "wash-through" arrangement with AWBI, which effectively enabled it to circumvent the export permit scheme. Under this arrangement, NEAT sold wheat to AWBI but then bought it back at much the same price on an FOB basis. AWBI was technically the shipper, so there was no need for NEAT to obtain an export permit. The evidence indicates that the last of these "wash-through" arrangements between AWBI and NEAT took place in January 1999. NEAT sought on several subsequent occasions to transact with AWBI on a similar basis, but AWBI was not prepared to repeat this arrangement. This was the basis of Mr Howard's complaint in his letter quoted at par [69] above.
86 In the latter of part of 1999 relations became increasingly strained between AWBI and durum growers generally, and between AWBI and NEAT in particular. This is evidenced by the letters contained in the "Tender Bundle" produced at the hearing. Some of this correspondence is highly illuminative of AWBI's policy against approving bulk export permits, and thus bears mention here.
87 The first letter worthy of note was written by AWBI to Mr Howard of NEAT on 23 April 1999. It referred to AWB's "on-going review of internal business processes" and indicated that, as a result of this review, no "concessional arrangements"[ie "wash-through arrangements] would be entered into in future. More significantly for current purposes, the letter contained the following passage:
"In the current market environment, AWB will not issue permits for the shipment of wheat other than in containers and permits will only be issued for the export of wheat in containers at the discretion of AWB Limited."
(both italics and highlights in the original)
88 On 1 July 1999 the 1999 amendments to the Act came into force and the final stage of the restructuring of AWB and its subsidiaries was completed. Shortly afterwards, commencing on 14 July 1999, an interesting line of correspondence took place after Mr Richardson of AWBI mistakenly granted approval for the bulk export of 35,000 tonnes of wheat to India. The applicant on this occasion was not NEAT, and the wheat in question was not durum wheat, but the episode is nevertheless relevant to the issues raised here, as it illustrates the strength of AWBI's policy against approving bulk export permits.
89 The application in question was made by a company called Pars Ram Brothers (Australia) Pty Limited ("Pars Ram"). It was sent to AWBI by the WEA with a number of permit applications for non-bulk exports. Mr Richardson mistakenly believed the application also to be a non-bulk one, and signified AWBI's approval. The WEA had already issued an export permit to Pars Ram when the mistake was discovered a few days later. AWBI's immediate reaction was to inform the WEA that a mistake had been made and that as a result no valid approval had been given. However the WEA, having obtained legal advice on the matter, responded that both AWBI's approval and the WEA's consent to Pars Ram's application were valid. It declined to revoke or vary its consent to this application.
90 On 23 July 1999 the General Manager of AWBI wrote a memorandum to AWBI Board members about the Pars Ram affair. The memorandum contained the following passage:
"This situation has obvious implications for AWB (International) Limited. The existence of a bulk permit is in direct contravention of AWB's current policy not to issue such permits."
91 On 28 July 1999 an internal AWB memorandum discussed the various options available to AWBI as a result of the mistaken Pars Ram approval. They were:
1 do nothing
2 letter to traders
3 media release.
Under the second option, "letter to traders", it was suggested that AWB might write to wheat traders informing them that the Pars Ram permit had been consented to by mistake and did not represent a shift in AWB's policy on bulk permits. The following passage then appeared:
"However, this approach may unnecessarily bring the issue into the spot light and, if passed on to journalists, may draw media attention. Further, by drawing attention to this issue it is possible that the question of why AWB maintains a 'no bulk permit policy' may be raised where it has not been an issue to date."
The memorandum sought comments as to the proposed options.
92 On 26 August 1999 an information paper was prepared relating to the mistaken Pars Ram approval. This contained the following passage:
"This situation has obvious implications for AWB. The existence of a bulk permit is in direct contravention of AWB's current policy not to issue such permits because of the potential impact uncontrolled bulk exports may have on premiums achieved by AWB in these markets and the quality reputation Australian wheat has achieved."
93 The paper went on to note that there had been limited media interest in the matter and to express the view that it would not "do any long term damage to the reputation of AWB (International) Limited or its marketing strategies". It was emphasised that guidelines and protocols should be put in place to ensure that it could not happen again. An annexed document headed "Media Position" set out (or so it appears) AWB's suggested response to any media questions about the matter. One section of the document is in the following terms:
"So what is AWB's policy on bulk exports?
AWB (I)'s current policy on bulk permits is that it opposes them being granted.
The criteria for assessing them is quite simple - we must be satisfied that the issuing of a permit would not jeopardise our overall marketing strategy or affect the net returns received by growers who deliver to the National Pool.
The real competition is beyond our shores - in the US the EU and Canada. The issuing of a bulk permit simply means that Australian wheat in overseas markets which will impact on premiums which can be achieved in these markets and, consequently, the returns to all Australian growers.
[Only if raised] Further, Australia has built its reputation on being able to consistently supply high quality product which meets the customers exacting needs and to back this up with after sales technical service. This reputation will be jeopardised because bulk permit holders are unable to ensure security and consistency of supply and are unable to be backed up the sale with technical assistance."[sic][emphasis in the original]
94 It would seem that this issue then died. The papers contain no further reference to it.
95 In late 1999 increasing tension was developing between AWBI and durum wheat growers. On 24 September 1999 Mr Laskie, the General Manager of AWBI, wrote to the Chairman of the WEA outlining the current position between AWBI and the Australian Durum Producers' Co-operative ("ADPC") regarding the marketing of durum from northern New South Wales. The letter enclosed a document setting out AWB's proposals for co-operation between the ADPC and the AWB Group. There was also a press release put out by the Grain Council of Australia headed "Single Desk Must Stay!" in which the President of the Grain Council was quoted as strongly supporting the maintenance of the single desk export system, and as criticising suggestions by durum growers that AWB should relinquish its single desk policy in relation to durum wheat. In his letter, Mr Laskie described the benefits of the "single desk" in the following terms:
"With the single desk as the preferred system of marketing Australian wheat overseas, AWB seeks to avoid situations where Australian wheat may compete with Australian wheat in an overseas market. If this occurs, premiums which would otherwise be captured by AWB and returned to growers are competed away. It is, therefore, essential that under the single desk, AWB is in a position to prevent this occurring. The preferred position ADPC has taken to date, we believe, has the potential to seriously undermine Australia's marketing strength, jeopardising the continued existence of the single desk. The position adopted by the ADPC to date presents no tangible benefits to the Australian wheat industry as a whole, or even the majority of durum wheat growers.
Although the ADPC has stated on numerous occasions that they do not wish to undermine the integrity of the single desk, we believe that any alternative arrangement to that which we have proposed would do exactly that.
We are hopeful that ADPC will be willing to work with AWB under our current proposal. However, should they decline our offer, then AWB's position remains that we would not be prepared to approve the issuing of a bulk permit. Any decision must be such that we are satisfied that the issuing of a permit would not jeopardise our overall marketing strategy or affect the net returns received by growers who deliver to the National Pool. If a bulk permit was issued, we could not be certain of this. Further, this would also be in conflict with the position of both the GCA and the Minister. Whilst AWB (International) Limited may consider the issuing of container permits (as part of the Wheat Export Authority's consultative process), we believe that such an option is unlikely to satisfy ADPC."
96 On 13 October 1999 Mr Howard of NEAT wrote to Mr Rogers, the Chief Executive Officer of AWB, setting out something of the history of NEAT's dealings with AWB, and seeking advice as to "what position the AWB intends to adopt with NEAT for the 1999/2000 season". Specifically, answers were requested to the following questions:
· whether AWB would grant NEAT export permits if it can obtain better prices for growers than AWB's prices.
· whether AWB would be prepared to buy from and then sell back to NEAT on a FOB basis as an alternative to giving export permits, [ie enter into a "wash-through" arrangement].
97 Mr Rogers answered these questions in a faxed letter dated 29 October 1999. In it he emphasised that, in the current market environment, AWB "will not approve the issue of any bulk permits for the shipment of wheat to any market". Nor, the letter indicated, would any further "concessional" arrangements be entered into. As to bulk exports, the letter continued as follows:
"We have consistently maintained the position of no bulk permits and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. AWB has adopted this position in order to preserve the integrity of the single desk and to ensure that we are able to fulfill our legislative objective to maximise returns to growers. We are mindful of avoiding situations where Australian wheat may compete with Australian wheat in an overseas market, undermining overall returns to growers and potentially damaging the reputation of Australian wheat overseas.
As we have noted to the ADPC and others on occasion, should NEAT consider that they are able to achieve better values in an overseas market than those obtained by AWB then you should contact AWB. In these circumstances and in accordance with the single desk all growers may be able to benefit from these opportunities through the pool. Alternatively of course, NEAT may seek to obtain an export permit from the Wheat Export Authority for containerised or bagged wheat."
98 On 3 November 1999 Mr Howard wrote to Mr Rogers of AWB expressing his disappointment at AWB's stand. The next day, 4 November 1999, NEAT sent to the WEA the first two export applications that we are concerned with in this case.
99 On 7 December 1999 Mr Howard of NEAT wrote to Stuart Richardson of AWBI indicating that NEAT had received bids for ADR Feed and ADR6 which would return higher prices to growers than AWB's cash prices. The letter proposed that there be a "wash-through" arrangement, namely that NEAT should sell the goods to AWB and then buy them back on a FOB basis. On 10 December 1999 Mr Richardson responded, saying that "AWB will not be issuing export permits for bulk wheat shipments, and needing to have a consistent approach to all participants in the industry, the buy and sell arrangements transacted with NEAT during the 1989/99 season, will not be repeated". In the meantime, on 9 December 1999, NEAT had lodged its third and fourth applications for bulk export consent.
100 Thereafter the correspondence, at least that part of it emanating from NEAT, became progressively more curt. On 13 December 1999 Mr Howard wrote to Mr Richardson saying that durum growers were not happy with the way AWB was controlling the industry. Again, on 15 December 1999 a faxed letter from Mr Howard to Mr Richardson expressed NEAT's frustration at the course of events, and claimed that AWBI was "abusing the powers conferred to it under s 57 of the Wheat Marketing Act 1989". On 16 December 1999 Mr Richardson responded to some of the issues raised by Mr Howard. The letter contained the following reference to bulk export permits:
"In terms of the application for export permits for bulk shipment, AWB (International) Limited will respond to any request from the WEA, and each request will be considered on a case by case basis. In the current environment, AWB will not approve the issuance of permits for the shipment of wheat other than in containers and permit applications for containerised wheat will only be consented to for particular export destinations."
101 The correspondence continued in similar vein through much of December 1999. NEAT put AWBI "on notice" that it and its grower clients would hold AWBI responsible "for all costs losses associated with its failure to properly assess NEAT's application for export permits".
102 On 13 January 2000 the fifth of NEAT's application for a bulk export permit was sent to WEA. The correspondence relating to this application is described earlier at pars [73] to [80].
103 On 24 January 2000 a meeting took place at Gunnedah between local durum growers and representatives of NEAT, the WEA and the AWB Group. The meeting was chaired by Mr John Anderson, then Acting Prime Minister. It was addressed by Mr Trevor Flugge, the Chairman of AWB Limited. Mr Richard Heathcote, a durum grower who was present at the meeting, said that Mr Flugge's opening comments were as follows:
"I have two things to say to you, the first is good afternoon and the second is there will be no permits granted for the bulk export of any types of wheat."
He described Mr Flugge as saying words to the effect of "there will be no permits, it is not negotiable, it is not open for discussion, you can forget about permits". Mr Gomersall, who was also present at the meeting, conceded that Mr Flugge made a statement to the effect that "there will be no permits granted for the bulk export of any types of wheat". However Mr Gomersall said that he did not recall Mr Flugge using the words described by Mr Heathcote, "there will be no permits, it is not negotiable, it is not open for discussion". Indeed he said that Mr Flugge qualified his statement that no permits would be granted by saying words to the following effect; "this is in the context of market conditions existing at this time and AWBI's role in serving the market". According to Mr Gomersall, Mr Flugge also said "the issue of granting permits will be reviewed if there is a market failure," a qualification which Mr Heathcote said he did not hear.
104 On 1 February 2000 Mr Flugge wrote to the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Anderson, outlining AWB's position in relation to the export of durum wheat. It was a lengthy letter which I do not propose to reproduce. Certain portions, however, bear repetition. In particular, in relation to the bulk export of wheat, the letter made the following comments:
"The position is that AWB (International) Limited will not approve the issue of a permit for the bulk export of durum, or any other wheat at this time. Consistent with this position, AWB (International) Limited is not prepared to support any concessional arrangements that would allow particular traders preferential treatment to 'wash' grain through the National Pool.
This position is consistent with the need to preserve the single desk for wheat exports. Should there be widespread opposition to this approach, then the appropriate forum for redress is to consider the validity of single desk selling arrangements. This is an issue for debate within the industry and it is their responsibility to approach the Government in this respect. It is unfortunate that AWB has been the target of constant criticism from industry when it is industry structure that is at the centre of the current debate. Any suggestion otherwise is quite simply, fallacious. AWB (International) administers the single desk on behalf of growers. It does not belong to AWB and it is important that growers recognise this.
As I noted and Monday, any concession would result in the destruction of the single desk. You will recall that I was supported in this view by the Chairman of the NSW Grains Board, himself a large durum grower. Despite claims to the contrary, it is simply not possible to quarantine any concession to a select group of northern NSW durum growers. I understand that the permit concerned would result in grain sales for less than 15 growers. AWB is responsible for maximising returns to 45,000 growers and legislation prevents AWB from jeopardising this objective."
105 Mr Flugge noted in the letter that NEAT's key contact in the Italian market was a trader who had recently been hosted by AWB in a tour of Australia. The Italian trader, Mr Flugge said, was using NEAT's position as a potential seller of ADR6 as a "bargaining tool" in his negotiations with AWB. Mr Flugge continued "This is exactly the sort of risk the single desk is designed to avoid - having Australian wheat competing against Australian wheat in an overseas market and eroding premiums to the detriment of Australian growers".
106 The letter then responded to various criticisms of AWB in its handling of durum marketing. It concluded in the following terms:
"As you can see Minister, AWB has treated this entire issue as extremely serious. We have approached it in a diligent and consistent manner in order to preserve the integrity of the single desk. This is our responsibility under legislation."
107 In a document dated 31 March 2000 addressed to the WEA, AWBI commented on "General issues surrounding bulk permit applications". This document is headed "Commercial in Confidence". I am not sure why confidentiality has been claimed. So far as I can see, the document does not raise matters which are not otherwise dealt with in the evidence. Nevertheless, because of its confidential status, I shall be circumspect about quoting from it. However there are portions of the document which elucidate AWBI's insistence on maintaining the single desk in a manner which is relevant here. The document commented on a number of "broader Single Desk issues in relation to the impact of bulk permits" which it said needed to be taken into consideration. It was pointed out that AWBI undertakes an annual export marketing program of many million tonnes. Its marketing programs and strategies are based on being the sole exporter of Australia's wheat crop in order to maximise returns to some 45,000 growers. The issuing of bulk permits, the document said, would lead AWBI to lose control of a number of advantages provided under the single desk system with consequent negative impact on growers who deliver to the National Pool. These advantages were described as follows:
· Strength of Unity - Branding and Product Differentiation
· Strategic Marketing and Price Discrimination
Under this head the document made the following points:
"As the operator of the single desk, AWB(I) maintains control over the export of Australia's entire bulk export program. Because this situation also affords AWB(I) a level of control over the price expectation for Australian wheat in each of our individual markets (by limiting buyers' ability to "shop around" between different suppliers), this allows AWB(I) to price discriminate across markets thereby maximising returns which necessarily are passed onto growers who deliver to the National Pool. The issuing of a bulk permit may breakdown this advantage by allowing other players into the market and reducing the ability of AWB(I) to price discriminate because it cannot be guaranteed of its pricing strategy in other markets."
· Perception of Sole Exporter
Under this head, AWBI commented that the fact that all bulk exports are conducted by the one body removes the ability for buyers to "play" Australian parties off against each other.
· AWBI's Charter to Maximise Return to Growers
Under this head, it was pointed out that issuing of bulk permits would generally run counter to this charter as it would provide returns to a select group of growers to the detriment of those growers who delivered their grain to the national pool.
· Quality Reputation
· AWBI's R & D Investment
Under this head, it was pointed out that AWBI had undertaken significant research and development programs across numerous overseas markets, thereby increasing the market for Australian wheat in those countries. This had been possible only because of AWBI's position as the sole supplier of Australian wheat to these markets.
108 The above material sets out the course of dealings between NEAT and AWBI over the relevant period, and AWBI's stated attitudes towards its single desk policy. Against this background it is relevant to turn to the oral evidence of Mr Gomersall and Mr Richardson, the two AWBI officers who considered NEAT's applications. The reasons given in their affidavits for rejecting the applications were referred to earlier.
109 Each of these witnesses was cross-examined by Mr Hughes QC, who appeared for NEAT, about various aspects of AWBI's operations. Mr Gomersall was asked by Mr Hughes how long it had taken him to consider NEAT's applications. He said that he spent fifteen to twenty minutes considering the first two combined applications, Nos 992652 and 992660. However, he said, there was a "decision-making and a thought process that extended back months that went into the actual forming of the decision". He denied that his refusal of the applications was automatic.
110 Mr Hughes questioned Mr Gomersall about AWB's concern to preserve the single desk marketing system. Mr Gomersall agreed that this was an important factor in his decision-making process, but denied that it was the only one.
111 Mr Hughes asked Mr Gomersall how much information he had about each application when it was referred to him. He answered that he knew the quantity and grade of wheat, the destination, and the proposed date of shipment. He said that he knew nothing about the price at which the wheat was to be sold, and agreed that this would have been a relevant piece of information. Later, however, he pointed out that NEAT was effectively acting as AWBI's competitor in the market and, as he put it, "it is very rare that you would ask your competitor what price he is offering to a customer and expect to get an answer".
112 Mr Gomersall said that between November 1999 and March 2000 there was strong competition in Italy for Australian wheat, with a multiplicity of prospective sellers. He said that the quantity of wheat involved in NEAT's applications would have had a price impact on the Italian market.
113 Mr Hughes questioned Mr Gomersall about his suggestion, in paragraph 25 of his affidavit, that one of his reasons for refusing approval for NEAT's fifth application (No 000254) was his concern about possible unsafe levels of vomitoxin. It was suggested that he could have made testing for vomitoxin a condition of AWBI's approval of this permit. He agreed that this could have been done, and that probably he had been at fault in not seeking that these tests be carried out. Mr Hughes put to him that the question of vomitoxin levels was not a genuine ground for refusing AWBI's refusal. Mr Gomersall said "No, I believed it was a real ground".
114 Mr Gomersall conceded that during his employment with AWBI (he commenced on 13 July 1999) he did not approve one bulk export permit. Nor did he put to paper his reasons for refusing any of the applications referred to him.
115 Mr Gomersall said that he was aware of the Pars Ram fiasco, and of AWBI's policy not to approve bulk export applications in the current environment. The "current environment", he said, included the market environment which was susceptible to change on a daily basis.
116 One final portion of Mr Gomersall's evidence bears mention. Quite early in his cross-examination, the following exchange took place:
"Mr Hughes: Perhaps I can short cut it this way: when you were dealing with these four application was it your belief that applications for bulk export permits could not be assessed against AWB's position on a contract by contract basis but rather must take into consideration the broader objectives of AWB International in maximising the return to growers over the life of the pool and in the longer term?
A: If that means that you have to look, rather than at the individual sale to the overall marketing strategy, then yes, I agree.
If that means what?
A: I agree that the marketing - sorry, can you repeat the question.
At the time when you were dealing the four bulk export applications with which you did deal, did you act on the belief that permits could not be assessed against AWB's position on a contract by contract basis, but rather must take into consideration the broader objectives of AWB International in maximising the return to growers over the life of the pool and in the longer term?
A: Yes, I mean I assess a permit, not on a, specifically relating only to the instances for that, that one sale, but a marketing strategy, and what I have to, how I have to maximise returns over a 12 to 18 month period."
117 Mr Richardson was also cross-examined by Mr Hughes. It was Mr Richardson who had mistakenly signed the bulk export approval in the Pars Ram case. Mr Hughes questioned him about this matter. Mr Richardson conceded that in July 1999 AWBI had a policy against the granting of bulk export permits. Mr Hughes asked Mr Richardson about AWBI's letter dated 23 April 1999 (referred to above at para [87]) which, relevantly, said: "In the current market environment, AWB will not issue permits for the shipment of wheat other than in containers …". Mr Richardson agreed that he knew about this policy and that it did not alter while he was dealing with bulk export permits. He also agreed that it was for his seniors, not himself, to determine whether there had been a change in the current market environment which would justify a departure from AWBI's normal policy. In other words, the policy which prohibited the grant of bulk export permits was to remain in place unless and until Mr Richardson's seniors at AWB "decreed that there had been a change of circumstances to justify departure from the policy". This did not occur during the period between November 1999 and March 2000.
118 Ultimately, Mr Richardson agreed with Mr Hughes that the "real reason" why he rejected both applications was because of the existence of the policy against bulk export permits and the fact that his seniors had not notified a change of market conditions justifying departure from the policy.