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[2005] FCA 287
Federal Court of Australia
2005-03-23
Emmett J
Original judgment source is linked above.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 The applicant is a citizen of Vietnam. He arrived in Australia on 1 July 2003 and on 15 July 2003 lodged an application for a protection (class XA) visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ('the Act'). On 22 October 2003, a delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs ('the Minister'), informed the Applicant of the decision to refuse to grant a protection visa. On 5 November 2003, the applicant applied to the second respondent, the Refugee Review Tribunal ('the Tribunal'), for review of the delegate's decision. On 2 April 2004, the Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant a protection visa. 2 The applicant travelled to Australia by boat with over 50 other individuals, including many members of the applicant's family. Twenty-five separate applications for protection visas, including the applicant's, were lodged in respect of those individuals. All of the applications were refused and applications for review were made to the Tribunal by all of the unsuccessful applicants. The applications were dealt with by three different members of the Tribunal, being Members Jacovides, Griffin and Lincoln. Nine applications, including the present applicant's application, came before the Tribunal constituted by Member Jacovides. Applications for review by the other passengers on the boat came before the Tribunal constituted by Members Griffin and Lincoln. 3 Similar written claims regarding family background, circumstances in Vietnam, political views, involvement with a group known as the Resistance Force ('RF'), the journey to Australia and activities in Australia were made on behalf of all applicants. The applicants were all represented by the same solicitors, who provided essentially generic submissions, indicating that each of the applicants faced much the same risk of harm in Vietnam for much the same reasons. However, after discussing the claims with each of the applicants before him, and obtaining information from each of them concerning their individual circumstances, Member Jacovides concluded that significant differences existed among the applicants, particularly with regard to political opinion. 4 Member Jacovides concluded that two of the nine applicants before him were committed political activists and were at risk of harm by the authorities in Vietnam. Decisions were made that those applicants should be granted protection visas. However, Member Jacovides concluded that the other seven applicants, including the present applicant, are neither committed political activists nor persons at risk of harm by the authorities in Vietnam. Accordingly, the decisions of the Minister's delegate in those matters were affirmed. The Tribunal, differently constituted, also affirmed most of the other decisions not to grant protection visas. 5 Some 22 separate proceedings, seeking Constitutional writ relief in relation to the decisions of the Tribunal, were subsequently commenced in the Federal Court of Australia by unsuccessful applicants, including the present proceeding. Having regard to the similarity in the factual and procedural background to those 22 separate proceedings, all matters came before me for directions as list judge. Each of the applicants was represented by the same solicitors and counsel. The Minister was represented in each case by the Australian Government Solicitor. By consent, directions were given for three of the applications to be heard on 7 and 8 February 2005. The other proceedings were concurrently listed for directions, since it was thought that the decisions in those three matters might give some guidance as to the further conduct of the other proceedings. 6 However, on 7 February 2005 the Court was informed that 15 of the proceedings, including two of those fixed for hearing, had been resolved. None of those proceedings had been dealt with by Member Jacovides. By consent, the Court made orders quashing the decisions of the Tribunal in each of those 15 proceedings and remitting the matters to the Tribunal for further consideration according to law. Another proceeding was adjourned, by consent, to enable an application to be made under s 417 of the Act for a more favourable decision to be substituted by the Minister. 7 Thus, there remained only one proceeding before me for hearing. The parties agreed that the remaining six proceedings determined by Member Jacovides be adjourned pending determination of the present proceeding.
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 8 Section 29(1) of the Act provides that the Minister may grant a non-citizen permission, to be known as a visa, to do either or both of the following:
Under s 31(1) of the Act, there are to be prescribed classes of visas. Under s 31(2), as well as the prescribed classes, there are the classes provided for in the succeeding sections of the Act, including s 36. Section 36(1) provides that there is to be a class of visas to be known as protection visas. Under s 36(2), a criterion for a protection visa is that the application is a non-citizen in Australia, to whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees protocol (as both terms are defined in the Act), or is a non-citizen in Australia who is the spouse or a dependant of such a person, who holds a protection visa. 9 The Refugees Convention provides, in effect, that Australia, as a Contracting Party, has protection obligations to a person if that person is a refugee, as that term is defined in Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention. Relevantly, that means a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. 10 However, s 91R(1) of the Act provides that, for the purposes of the application of the Act to a particular person, Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention does not apply in relation to persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in Article 1A unless: (a) that reason is the essential and significant reason, or those reasons are the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and (b) the persecution involves serious harm to the person; and (c) the persecution involves systematic and discriminatory conduct. Section 91R(2) then provides that, without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of s 91R(1)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that provision:
(c) significant physical ill-treatment of the person;
(d) significant economic hardship that threatens the person's capacity to subsist;
(e) denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person's capacity to subsist;
(f) denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person's capacity to subsist.
THE APPLICANT'S CLAIMS AND THE TRIBUNAL'S DECISION 11 The applicant claimed that, due to his involvement with the RF, his association with and support of, the former government of South Vietnam, his family background, the illegal departure from Vietnam in 2003, his activities in Australia, as well as widespread publicity in Australia regarding the circumstances and activities of persons on the boat, he would be considered a dissident by the government of Vietnam and subjected to harm amounting to persecution, including imprisonment, harassment, and denial of ho khau, or household registration. He also claimed that his family are known anti-communists and that he would be subject to circumstances amounting to persecution because he is a known anti-communist. 12 The solicitors said that the family backgrounds of the various applicants are generally classed as 'bad', according to Communist Party of Vietnam classifications, and that the Vietnamese government has a history of stigmatising and blacklisting families over generations for political and religious expression, as well as for class affiliations. The applicant claimed, in particular, that, because his family were known to be extreme anti-communists, the government did not give him a licence for a bigger fishing boat, or financial assistance to get one. He claimed that, because of his family background, he was of interest and concern to the authorities and was not able to attend school. 13 The applicant and his solicitors referred on a number of occasions to the cancellation of ho khau, or household registration. The Tribunal cited the following 'overview' of the ho khau system in Vietnam: 'To buy a house or land, to get married, to be employed, to register for a training course, to borrow from a bank, to register your child's birth, to get a motorbike licence, to go abroad, or to install a phone line if you are Vietnamese, you need a residential book. The book also contains a person's ho. Under Vietnamese laws, ho is official certification that defines the residential place of a citizen - a crucial component of citizenship. Residential registration has other ramifications. In Hanoi, for example, employment by a city agency usually requires candidates to have a city ho khau.' 14 The solicitors' submissions asserted that mistreatment included denial of ho khau. The solicitors asserted that denial of ho khau seriously affects livelihood and welfare, and that, without ho khau, a person would not be able to get legal employment, apply for a business licence, file for a legal marriage certificate or send his children to regular schools. The submissions emphasised the disabilities that flowed from lack of ho khau. Both the applicant and his solicitors characterised the loss of ho khau as the loss of citizenship rights. The applicant claimed that his ho khau was cancelled by the authorities on 18 September 2003, after he had departed Vietnam. 15 The Tribunal accepted a number of the applicant's claims as follows:
THE APPLICANT'S CLAIMS IN THE FEDERAL COURT 20 In this proceeding, the applicant claims a writ of certiorari removing the Tribunal's decision of 2 April 2004 into the Court to be quashed, an order quashing the Tribunal's decision and a writ of mandamus directing the Tribunal to reconsider and redetermine the application for a protection visa according to law. The applicant also claims an order restraining the Minister from acting upon or giving effect to the Tribunal's decision. 21 Section 474(1) of the Act provides that a privative clause decision:
The term 'privative clause decision' is defined in s 474(2) as meaning, relevantly, a decision of an administrative character made under the Act. The Minister contends that the decision of the Tribunal is a privative clause decision within the meaning of s 474(2). However, a decision of the Tribunal affected by jurisdictional error is not a decision made under the Act (see Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2). The applicant, by his further amended application, filed with consent on 7 February 2005, raises four grounds upon which he contends that the Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error, as follows: 1. The Tribunal based its decision upon a jurisdictional fact that did not exist or was not reasonably open. 2. The Tribunal failed to consider a critical claim by the applicant and material submitted in support of that claim. 3. The Tribunal failed to ask itself the correct question. 4. The Tribunal misapplied the definition of persecution in the Refugees Convention by misconstruing s 91R(2) of the Act. 22 The first two grounds are closely related and it is convenient to deal with those two grounds together. I shall deal separately with each of the third and fourth grounds.
CONCLUSION 56 I do not consider that there was any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. The decision of 2 April 2004 was a privative clause decision within the meaning of s 474 of the Act. It follows that the application should be dismissed with costs.
I certify that the preceding fifty-six (56) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Emmett.
Counsel for the Applicant: Stephen Lloyd and Leonard Karp
Solicitor for the Applicant: Craddock Murray Neumann Solicitors
Counsel for the Respondent: Neil Williams SC and Robert Beech-Jones
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
NBFP
Minister of Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
(1997) 190 CLR 225