Prejudice any person's legitimate business, commercial, professional or financial interests
180It is not in dispute that the redacted information concerns the Second and Third Respondents' business, commercial or financial interests.
181In order to satisfy the other element of this consideration, it is necessary for the Respondents to establish that those interests will suffer prejudice if the information redacted from the Agreements were disclosed. This is a question of fact.
182The Second and Third Respondents contend that in the circumstances of this case, there is no relevant distinction between their business, commercial or financial interests.
183They say that it is not necessary for them to establish that they will suffer prejudice as a matter of certainty. Rather it is sufficient that there is a reasonable risk of such prejudice occurring: Watt v Forests NSW at [120]-[125].
184They submit that the prejudice which disclosure is likely to cause is that referred to above.
185Disclosure would allow the customers and competitors of the Second and Third Respondents to obtain information beyond that which they would usually be aware of in ordinary competitive market conditions. For example, they contend that purchasers of unprocessed timber would essentially be able to find out the cost price paid for the product by the Second Respondent.
186They submit that disclosure would subject persons who contract with the First Respondent to prejudice that they would not suffer if the Agreements had been entered into with a private sector competitor of the First Respondent. They contend that the GIPA Act incorporates and promotes the principles of competitive neutrality whereby a state entity should not be disadvantaged in comparison with its private sector competitors. In considering the commercial prejudice created by disclosure, it is therefore legitimate for the Tribunal to consider whether disclosure would create an additional burden to the purchasers of timber from the First Respondent, which would not be faced by persons who contracted with private sector timber suppliers.
187The Second and Third Respondents further contend that the commercial prejudice they suffer is no less significant because they are part of a large corporate group.
188The word "prejudice" has been found in cases decided under Freedom of Information legislation to have its ordinary meaning: "to cause detriment or disadvantage": Re: Maher and the Attorney General's Department (No 2) (1986) 4 AAR 266 or to "impede or derogate from": Sobh v Victoria Police (1994) 1 VR 41. In SOBH v Police Force of Victoria [1994] 1 VR 41, at 55, Nathan J stated:
Prejudice is not a term of legal art. It means to impede or derogate from. Its content is governed by the matters which may be impeded or derogated from, which in this case is the administration of the law.
189I accept that this adequately summarises the decisions on the meaning of 'prejudice' under Freedom of Information legislation. In my view it is equally applicable in the context of the GIPA Act.
190The Applicant submits that release of the information could not reasonably be expected to prejudice the Second and Third Respondents' business, commercial or financial interests.
191Again, the Applicant submits that to the extent that information is already in the public arena, and is the sort of information placed in the public arena by the government, it is unlikely to be the sort of information that would prejudice legitimate business, commercial or financial interests. The Applicant relies on the evidence of Professor Walker in the following way:
a. Regarding price, that the cost of certain inputs may assist prospective customers to understand why suppliers may seek to vary prices, but would not in itself adversely affect a supplier's negotiating position. That is, it would not affect the sawmill companies when seeking to negotiate prices for their finished products.
b. Regarding the allocation of timber, Professor Walker is of the opinion that it is highly likely that competitors would already have a good idea of the volume and mix of species available at different sites in NSW. This is consistent with the fact that volumes have been released by government agencies and Ministers from time to time. Professor Walker also points out that tenders by the First Respondent currently disclose information about volumes.
192With respect to the take or pay provisions, the Applicant relies on the critique of Ms Flint regarding the impact of releasing such provisions. It is submitted that the adversarial nature of business suggested by Mr Davidson would not, in fact be likely, and in the absence of that and specific information about how much timber a sawmill company was taking at any one time, which would not be generally available information, the release of this information could not prejudice the affairs of those companies.
193With regard to the term of contracts, the Applicant notes that the prejudice suggested by Mr Davidson is very specific to the Pulpwood supply contract. Nevertheless, the general information about terms of contract, and the fact that they follow on from the signing of the Regional Forest Agreements would allow competitors to estimate when to time negotiations regarding new contracts (if that did happen to be part of their strategy), whether or not the exact date were known. In that regard, the Applicant submits that there is no more than a mere concern about or worry of prejudice to Boral's affairs. The Applicant submits that there would not be a reasonable likelihood of prejudice to the affairs of sawmill companies by release of the terms of agreement.
194The Applicant further submits that any prejudice to the First Respondent's affairs is not evident in the circumstances. In all the circumstances of this case, the Applicant submits that any prejudice to the First Respondent is speculative.
195I accept that the redacted material concerns the Second and Third Respondents' business, commercial or financial interests. I also accept that there is some risk that those interests might be prejudiced if the information has not been released already were disclosed. However, in my view there is also considerable doubt in regard to the extent of that risk. While I am not satisfied that the release would certainly result in prejudice to the Second and Third Respondents' business, commercial or financial interests, I accept that there is a possibility that it might occur. In the circumstances I therefore accept that this is a consideration against disclosure.