Conclusion on provisional liquidator
I do not think, particularly in the light of the undertakings offered, that the applicant has established there is a serious risk that assets of the group will be siphoned off in the interests of Mr Stotter. An unsubstantiated view or suspicion that this might occur is not sufficient to justify the appointment of a provisional liquidator. Taking into account all of the circumstances, including the undertakings offered, I would not be prepared to make an order for the appointment of a provisional liquidator, even if I were otherwise satisfied that the applicant had the requisite standing to pursue this application.
Section 1323 Proceedings against the corporate respondents
Section 1323 of the Corporations Law empowers the Court to make a range of orders where paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of s 1323(1) is satisfied, and the Court considers it to be necessary or desirable to make such an order for the purposes of protecting the interests of an aggrieved person (here, Natural Extracts Pty Ltd) to whom the person referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) ("the relevant person") is or may become liable to pay money, or to account for property.
Mr Stotter is a relevant person in terms of para (a), because his conduct is the subject of investigation. Orders could be made under paras (d), (e) and (f) against the corporate respondents prohibiting them from making payments to Mr Stotter or his associates on account of any indebtedness to Mr Stotter, or, if the corporate respondents held any property on behalf of Mr Stotter or his associates, from parting with possession of that property or removing it from the jurisdiction.
However, the undertakings offered to the Court by the corporate respondents are such that there is no occasion for the grant of interlocutory relief to prevent the corporate respondents from making payments to Mr Stotter or dealing with property (if there is any) held on his behalf. No submissions were put that the qualification to the undertakings, so as to exclude from them operation, the payment of directors fees not exceeding $100,000 per annum, called for any special treatment.
The corporate respondents may themselves be a relevant person in as much as they are respondents to the original proceedings, and the original proceedings include claims under the Corporations Law. Mainstar Holdings Pty Ltd may be a relevant person because winding up proceedings have been begun against it. Whether the corporate respondents are a relevant person by virtue of the institution of the original proceedings is a difficult question, having regard to the fact that no relief was obtained against the corporate respondents in those proceedings, and the proceedings are, for all practical purposes, concluded so far as the involvement of the corporate respondents is concerned. It is not necessary to resolve this question because, assuming the corporate respondents are relevant persons, they are not liable to pay money, or to account for property to Natural Extracts. If there is no actual or potential liability in a relevant person to pay money or to account for property to an aggrieved person, then there is no interest of the aggrieved person to be protected by the making of an order against the relevant person. As was pointed out by Drummond J in ASC v Smith & Ors (1998) 28 ACSR 495, the object of s 1323 is essentially protective in character, pending the establishment of legal rights.
Accordingly, a case for interlocutory relief on the s 1323 application has not been made out.
Mareeva injunction against corporate respondents
An injunction is sought restraining the corporate respondents from transferring assets outside the jurisdiction, or disposing of assets within the jurisdiction, subject to a qualification permitting disposition of assets in the ordinary course of the corporate respondents ordinary business.
Alternatively, it is submitted that it should be a condition of the refusal of interlocutory relief that the corporate respondents undertake to the Court to abide by the statement made by Mr Knox in the course of his giving evidence, that the offer which he had made to Mr McIntosh as to access and information would continue even if these proceedings are unsuccessful.
I do not think that it is appropriate to impose a condition to that effect. Offers of information and access have been made prior to the institution of proceedings and repeated afterwards. If it is later denied, that may provide an independent foundation for relief.
The jurisdiction to grant Mareeva injunctions applies not only to cases where there is a danger of removal of assets from the jurisdiction, but also to cases where they will be dissipated within the jurisdiction. Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, Equity Doctrines and Remedies (2185). The source of the jurisdiction rests on the statutory power of the Court to interfere whenever it is "just and convenient" to do so.
The corporate respondents are not liable to account to Natural Extracts Pty Ltd, nor are the corporate respondents liable to transfer any property to Natural Extracts Pty Ltd. However, consistently with LED Builders Pty Ltd v Eagle Homes Pty Ltd (1997) 78 FCR 65, there would be jurisdiction to grant Mareeva relief, if there was evidence of a sufficient risk that the business of the corporate respondents is being conducted so as to frustrate the Court's orders. That would be the case if the business is being conducted so as to diminish the value of the shareholding which Hill J ordered to be transferred to Natural Extracts.
Whilst the apparent decline in the financial fortunes of the corporate respondents is troubling, there is no evidentiary foundation for a conclusion that it is as a result of a desire to frustrate the orders of Hill J by diminishing the value of the shares, the subject of the constructive trust.
Natural Extracts has chosen not to register its shares, not to nominate representatives for appointment to the board of Mainstar, to leave Mainstar under the control of its present board since the decision of Hill J in June 1997, and, more recently, not to pursue overtures on the part of Mr Knox in relation to the provision of information and access to auditors and to records. Factually, this is a different case from LED.
It is true that the Mareeva relief sought does not amount to as severe an intrusion upon the business of the corporate respondents as would be the case if a receiver were to be appointed. But nonetheless, it is an intrusion. In the context to which I have just referred, particularly where no undertaking as to damages is offered (c/f Southern Tableland Insurance Brokers Pty Ltd v Schomberg (1986) 11 ACLR 337), I do not think that it is an intrusion which it would be proper to impose upon the corporate respondents.
Conclusion with respect to the corporate respondents
I note the undertaking by the corporate respondents to the Court, the terms of which are set out above. On that undertaking, the claim for interlocutory relief against those respondents is dismissed.
The accounting respondents
Mr Stotter and the other accounting respondents have a potential pecuniary liability to Natural Extracts Pty Ltd on the account ordered to be taken by Hill J. One of them is the legal owner of the shares the subject of the constructive trust. An undertaking has been given not to deal with these shares in any way which is inconsistent with that trust. I did not understand that the fact that Mainstar Investments Pty Ltd remains as the legal owner of the share the subject of the constructive trust to form the basis of a claim to interlocutory relief.
There is jurisdiction under s 1323 of the Corporations Law to make appropriate orders with respect to Mr Stotter because an investigation is being carried out by ASIC in relation to conduct on his part that might constitute a contravention of the Corporations Law, and because a civil proceeding has been begun against him under the Law. He is a person who is or may become liable to pay money to Natural Extracts Pty Ltd.
The appointment of a receiver of the property of Mr Stotter or the other accounting respondents, whether under s 1323(h) or in aid of a Mareeva injunction is a drastic step not lightly to be taken. A clear case must be made out that such a remedy is necessary for the protection of Natural Extract's legitimate interests, and that a lesser remedy is not appropriate. Beach Petroleum NL & Anor v Johnson & Ors (1992) 9 ACSR 404, 406.
Natural Extracts Pty Ltd is adequately protected by undertakings offered to the Court in relation to:
· The encumbering or disposition of the shares the subject of the constructive trust.
· Quarantining in the hands of the corporate respondents money or property that might otherwise be paid to or for Mr and Mrs Stotter or applied for their benefit.
· The removal of money or assets of the accounting respondents from the jurisdiction.
The question is whether, in addition to that protection, a Receiver should be appointed to the property of the accounting respondents, or an order made prohibiting disposition of assets within the jurisdiction subject to a qualification, in the case of individual accounting respondents, of reasonable living expenses, as in the case of the others, a qualification so as to permit dispositions in the ordinary course of business. There is a prima facie case against the accounting respondents. Is there a real risk of dispersal by these respondents of assets so as to defeat the value of Natural Extract's victory if the account ordered to be taken results in a balance in its favour?
That there is a real risk should, it is submitted, be inferred from the following:
· The conduct which gave rise to the liability to account was undertaken in breach of fiduciary duty, involving covert activities and complex structures.
· The apparent change in the fortunes of the corporate respondents before and after the judgment.
· The apparent deterioration in the financial position of Mr and Mrs Stotter.
· The provision of a dishonest account.
Whatever force might otherwise be inherent in the first proposition is blunted by the fact that no application for Mareeva relief was made on that ground in the 18 months following the judgment of Hill J. As indicated earlier, there is no evidence that the second factor is referable to any intention to defeat or frustrate the orders of the Court. The evidence as to the third factor is sparse. A comparison of the documents earlier referred to does not indicate a disposition of assets. The assets shown in the 1996 document substantially remain in the 1998 document. The principal change in the financial position reflected by the two documents is largely accounted for by the reduction in value of the shares in the Mainstar group to nil, and an increase in liabilities. I would not infer, on the basis of this, that there has been any material disposition of assets, let alone with a view to defeating a judgment. So far as the fourth factor is concerned, any discrepancies between the items mentioned in the account, and the documents, will be dealt with in the proceedings for account. I am not prepared to infer without evidence that the explanation for the differences is dishonesty. That is simply one of a number of possible explanations. That is especially so given that the time by which the accounting respondents are to respond to the charges and errors alleged to exist in relation to the accounts, has not yet been fixed. These differences were collected in an affidavit sworn by the applicant's solicitor in July 1998. If the applicant believed that the nature of the account given by the accounting respondents manifested or evidenced a real risk of dissipation of assets in order to defeat the result of the account, then application for relief on that ground would have been made much earlier.
Accordingly, I do not think that a case has been made out for relief in the nature of a Mareeva injunction having a wider operation than the undertakings referred to above. That conclusion is reinforced by the absence of any undertaking as to damages.
There is power under s 1323 to make an appropriate order, including an interim order, for which an undertaking as to damages is not required (s 1323(4)). Having regard to the various undertakings which have been given, the only meaningful relief which could be granted under s 1323 is the appointment of a receiver to the property of the accounting respondents. The conclusions which I have reached in relation to the grant of a Mareeva injunction have the result that I could not be satisfied that this is a proper case for the appointment of a receiver.
Conclusion with respect to the accounting respondents
I note the undertakings by the accounting respondents to the Court, the terms of which are set out above. On those undertakings, the claim for interlocutory relief against those respondents is dismissed.
I certify that this and the preceding twenty-one (21) pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Hely