[48] It is not infrequent that, where the offences arise out of one criminal enterprise, concurrent sentences will be imposed - but this is not an inflexible rule: Wilkins (1988) 38 A Crim R 445 (per Lee CJ at CL and Carruthers J, Allen J dissenting). The practice should not be followed where wholly concurrent sentences would fail to take account of differences in conduct, the subject of punishment on each count: Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610 at 624 (see also 621 to 622)."
33 In Cahyahi v The Queen (2007) 168 A Crim R 41 Howie J, with the concurrence of the other members of the court, said at 47 (27):-
"In any event there is no general rule that determines whether sentences ought to be imposed concurrently or consecutively. The issue is determined by the application of the principle of totality of criminality: can the sentence for one offence comprehend and reflect the criminality for the other offence? If it can, the sentences ought to be concurrent otherwise there is a risk that the combined sentences will exceed that which is warranted to reflect the total criminality of the two offences. If not, the sentences should be at least partly cumulative otherwise there is a risk that the total sentence will fail to reflect the total criminality of the two offences. This is so regardless of whether the two offences represent two discrete acts of criminality or can be regarded as part of a single episode of criminality. Of course it is more likely that, where the offences are discrete and independent criminal acts, the sentence for one offence cannot comprehend the criminality of the other. Similarly, where they are part of a single episode of criminality with common factors, it is more likely that the sentence for one of the offences will reflect the criminality of both."
34 In the present case I do not consider that the offences committed on different days, even though only a very few days apart, should be regarded as a single discrete episode of criminality, although it remains relevant that all the offences were committed within a very short period. As the authorities I have quoted indicate, whether offences are regarded as discrete acts of criminality or as forming part of a single episode of criminality is not decisive of whether sentences should be concurrent or cumulative or of the extent to which they should be concurrent or cumulative.
35 The fundamental question to be determined in the present case is whether it was within the sentencing judge's discretion to regard the aggregate of the sentences he was imposing, that is head sentences totalling 12 years, as justly reflecting the total criminality of the applicant or whether the aggregate sentence exceeded the upper limit of the range of total sentences within his Honour's discretion.
36 The total criminality of the applicant was considerable. He had committed six separate offences of either armed robbery, assault with intent to rob whilst armed or robbery in company. The applicant had been armed with what would have appeared to the victims to be a handgun. In sentencing for each of two of the offences the sentencing judge was to take into account two further offences of armed robbery, or assault with intent to rob. All told, there were 10 victims of the applicant's offences.
37 I have, nevertheless, come to the conclusion that the aggregate of the sentences was manifestly excessive, particularly having regard to the circumstances that the offences, even if not regarded as forming a single discrete episode of criminality, were committed within a few days of each other, that the offences were opportunistic rather than planned, that the applicant was only 21 years old at the time of committing the offences, that he had no previous criminal history and that he was a person of low intelligence with impaired cognitive capacity. I am conscious of the caution with which statistics of sentences should be used but the statistics of sentences for offences under s 97 which were provided to the Court do lend some support to the submission made on behalf of the applicant that the sentences imposed by the sentencing judge were extremely severe.
38 As I am of the opinion that the appeal should be allowed, it is necessary to re-sentence the applicant. I would not alter the head sentences set by the sentencing judge, which, considered in isolation, were not the subject of any criticism on the appeal. In my opinion, an appropriate total sentence to reflect the total criminality of the applicant would be 10 years. The total of the non-parole periods should bear the same proportion to the total of the head sentences as that determined by his Honour, that is the total of the non-parole periods should be two-thirds of the total of the head sentences, that is six years eight months.
39 To achieve this result and to make the sentences reasonably harmonious, I would alter the commencement date of the sentences for counts 4 and 5 to 30 November 2007. I would alter the commencement date of the sentence for the committal offence to 30 November 2008. I would make the sentence for count 1 a head sentence of six years commencing on 30 November 2010 and expiring on 29 November 2016, with a non-parole period of two years eight months commencing on 30 November 2010 and expiring on 29 July 2013 and a parole period of three years four months commencing on 30 July 2013 and expiring on 29 November 2016.
40 I would propose the following orders:-