Armed robbery 20 years 11
Aggravated B, E & S 20 years SNPP 5years 1
Demand money with menaces 14 years 4
Carried in conveyance 5 years 6
46 Of course those maxima are, in accordance with general sentencing principles, reserved for a worst case falling within the relevant provisions, and their significance is even more attenuated in the case of those offences taken into account rather than charged. Nevertheless, the magnitude of these penalties does help to place the sentence imposed on the Applicant into some perspective.
47 Another criterion is the guideline judgement of this Court in R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346. In that case, at [161-165], the Chief Justice indicated that head sentences for offences and offenders answering the following description should generally fall between 4 and 5 years:-
(i) Young offender with no or little criminal history;
(ii) Weapon like a knife, capable of killing or inflicting serious injury;
(iii) Limited degree of planning;
(iv) Limited, if any, actual violence but a real threat thereof;
(v) Victim in a vulnerable position such as a shopkeeper or taxi driver;
(vi) Small amount taken; and
(vii) Plea of guilty, the significance of which is limited by a strong Crown case.
48 Given his criminal record, the Applicant does not fall within sub-paragraph (i). The number of offenders and earlier stolen vehicles makes clear that the offences did not fall within sub-paragraph (iii). The $600 in cash and $11,000 worth of cigarettes taken in offence 3, and the $430 and $5,800 worth of cigarettes taken in offence 5 preclude those offences falling within sub-paragraph (vi). Although the matter is arguable I would also take the view that the $1,500 obtained in offence 2, the $1,145 taken from the hotel in offence 13 and the $2,503 taken in offence 15 also fall outside the description of a "small amount".
49 In short, all of the Applicant's armed robbery offences, considered individually, fall well above the seriousness of the sort of offence encompassed within the R v Henry guideline and merited significantly, and in some cases substantially, higher sentences. The sentences for 4 of those offences had also to reflect the offences taken into account.
50 Another criterion is to consider the sum of the sentences the Applicant received and none of which individually were, or could reasonably have been, criticised in the appeal. The total of the fixed terms and non-parole period is 23 years and 3 months, with the full term being 27 years. Of course, the principle of totality will operate on these figures but it is important to remember what that principle is. As the Court said in R v Harris [2007] NSWCCA 130; (2007) 171 A Crim R 267 at [44 - 45]:-
Perhaps the leading statement of it is an extract from D A Thomas, "Principles of Sentencing" endorsed in Mill v R (1988) 166 CLR at 59 at 63:-
The effect of the totality principle is to require a sentencer who has passed a series of sentences, each properly calculated in relation to the offence for which it is imposed and each properly made consecutive in accordance with the principles governing consecutive sentences to review the aggregate sentence and consider whether the aggregate sentence is 'just and appropriate'.
Two points may be made. Firstly, the principle is expressed in terms of coming back from the result of a simple aggregation. Secondly, if each individual sentence is appropriate for the criminality of the offence to which it relates, prima facie additional criminality requires an increase in sentence.
51 Yet another criterion is to consider the impact of the degree of concurrency involved in Berman DCJ's sentence. The effect of that concurrency is that the Applicant has been forced to serve:-
(i) Only 1 year of the 2 years fixed term imposed for offence 1 before the sentence for offence 2 commenced;
(ii) Only 1 year of the 4 years fixed term imposed for offence 2 before the sentence for offence 3 commenced;
(iii) Only 2 years of the 4 years fixed term imposed for offence 3 before the sentence for offence 8 commenced;
(iv) Only 2 years of the 6 years fixed term imposed for offence 8 before the sentence for offence 15 commenced;
(v) Only 2 years of the 4 years fixed term imposed for offence 15 before the sentence for offence 13 commenced; and
(vi) The whole of the sentence of 7 years including a non-parole period of 3 years and 3 months for offence 13.
52 While undoubtedly the effective sentence of 15 years including a non-parole period of 11 years and 3 months is severe, so is the reduction from what, judged individually, his offences merited.
53 Judged another way, the 7 year full term for the offence numbered 13 - a term that, when offences 10 to 12 are taken into account, cannot be regarded as other than lenient - would commonly have included a non-parole period of 5 years and 3 months. That period has been extended by merely 6 years for 5 further serious armed robberies. And clearly there had to be some substantial increase for each. The courts have to send a clear message to offenders that, having committed a number of offences, they cannot continue offending with virtual impunity because little or no additional punishment will be imposed.
54 By comparison with any of the criteria to which I have referred, I do not regard the sentence imposed on the Applicant to be excessive, certainly not manifestly so.
55 On behalf of the Applicant, reliance was also placed on a schedule of cases of multiple armed robberies and the Judicial Commission statistics. In that latter connection, the point was made that in the statistics as at May 2009 for offences under s 97(1) of the Crimes Act "Term of Sentence - consecutive and non-consecutive terms" the longest sentence was of 14 years imposed on 1 of 726 offenders and only 6 offenders had sentences of 12 years or more. Attention was drawn to the fact that the sentence imposed on the Applicant thus placed him higher than anyone else. However, as I said in Ma and Pham v R [2007] NSWCCA 240 with the concurrence of McClellan CJ at CL and Hoeben J:-
Subliminal in the reference to the statistics and the observation that the sentences here fall into the highest end of the range is the proposition that that is indicative of error. The proposition must be rejected. As this Court has said on many occasions, the range extends to the maximum penalty set by Parliament and it is against that that an offender's conduct must primarily be judged. Certainly, the statistics may at times inspire further reflection on the sentence in a particular case and perhaps give some limited guidance but, of themselves, they do not demonstrate error. Particularly is this so because, within each category, they provide no details of the cases reflected in them.
56 The fact that the sentence imposed on the Applicant is longer than any other reflected in the statistics is a cause to pause and reflect. However, someone must be at the top of each set of statistics and the fact that the Applicant is does not persuade me in any way that the sentence imposed on him is wrong.
57 Counsel appearing for the Applicant also referred the Court to a schedule of 58 cases where offenders had been sentenced for multiple offences under s 97(1) of the Act. Many of those cases are of no or very limited assistance either because their circumstances are so different from the circumstances here or are simply cases where an appeal to this Court by an offender was dismissed as not manifestly excessive, no issue having arisen as to whether the sentence was inadequate. However, I have included as appendices to these reasons a summary of those that are arguably useful, together with a table summarising the results of them.
58 I do not regard it as necessary to comment on all of these although it is appropriate to refer to a number of them. There are undoubtedly some that argue that the sentence imposed on the Applicant should have been lighter. Included in this group are Cowan, Waqa, Gonzales and Antecki, (although it should be said that the latter's youth and rehabilitation prospects must have encouraged leniency and in R v McIvor at [21], Howie J clearly thought that the sentence in that case was wrong).
59 On the other hand, Cavanagh's offending was broadly comparable to that of the Applicant and his sentence of 14 years including a non-parole period of 10 years was not much less than that of the Applicant. Some of Baghdadi's offences were more serious than the Applicant's but some were less and he did not commit anything like the number of offences that the Applicant did. His sentence was 13 years including 9 years non-parole.
60 Sentencing is not an exact science and certainly when regard is had to the whole collection of cases, including the differences in offending and sentences, they do not indicate that the effective sentence imposed in this case is manifestly excessive. (Another matter that some of the cases do indicate is that the Applicants' offending cannot simply be regarded as one discrete episode of offending - see e.g. Natoli v R [2009] NSWCCA 36 at [34], and R v Rumble [2006] NSWCCA 211at [54].)
61 Before I leave my reference to the statistics and prior cases, I think it desirable to refer to some further remarks of Howie J in R v McIvor at [17-18] and with which Tobias JA agreed, viz:-
17. In support of the third ground of appeal the applicant has called in aid sentencing statistics and they reveal, as is often the case, that the sentences actually imposed do not appear to reflect the statutory maximum penalty of 20 years. The sentencing statistics are frequently being used to displace the maximum penalty so that the sentencing court and this Court are being asked to have regard to the highest sentence that has been imposed in order to determine the appropriate sentence to be imposed in the instant case. The statistics indicate to me that the range of sentences being imposed for multiple armed robbery offences is too low. But the applicant was entitled to be sentenced in accordance with the actual range of sentences being imposed rather than by the range that this Court might think is appropriate.
18 … Some of the sentences on their face seem to me to be manifestly inadequate in light of the large number of offences for which sentence was being imposed or that were being taken into account. …
62 I respectfully agree with his Honour that, "The statistics indicate to me that the range of sentences being imposed for multiple armed robbery offences is too low." However, I do not agree with his further statement that, "But the applicant was entitled to be sentenced in accordance with the actual range of sentences being imposed rather than by the range that this Court might think is appropriate".
63 Such an approach is adopted when a court has to sentence for an offence decades or so old and sentencing standards have changed in the interim. However to adopt it as a general proposition would be to emasculate the role of this Court in ensuring that sentencing levels are appropriate and, if too low, are adjusted upwards. Among the most obvious examples of this are the decisions of this Court in R v Henry and R v Jurisic (1998) 45 NSWLR 209 and although both of those cases were decided by 5 judge benches, such a Court has no more power than does the Court when constituted by 3 judges. Furthermore, it is difficult to reconcile Howie J's remarks with the observations of 5 members of the High Court in Poyner v R (1986) 60 ALJR 616:-
Mr James referred us to the remarks of Bray CJ in R v Barber (1976) 14 SASR 388 at 389-390 where it was said that if the prevailing standard of sentences for a particular offence is too low, 'it can be raised after due warning, but by steps and not by leaps'. Similarly, in Breed v Pryce (1985) 36 NTR 23, Nader J at 33, said that if the view is taken that past penalties have been too light, the position should be corrected by an upward trend in penalties rather than by an abrupt increase. These statements provide useful guidance which should always be kept in mind, but they do not state a binding principle.