Consideration
70The defendant did not file a defence within the prescribed time, and accordingly, the plaintiff obtained default judgment in accordance with Part 16 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules. There is no suggestion of any irregularity in this respect. Further, there is no suggestion that there was any delay by the defendant in making this application (the Notice of Motion being filed some 7 days after default judgment was entered).
71The question for consideration, in accordance with the relevant principles, is therefore whether the defendant has any bona fide defence and whether there is any arguable or triable issue.
72It is well-established that where an application is made to set aside a default judgment, in order for a defence dependent on facts to be advanced, the applicant must lead some evidence of the facts on which the defence will be established on the merits: National Australia Bank v Priestley (No 3) [2012] NSWSC 1171 at [10].
73In Magnate Projects Pty Ltd v Youma Constructions (No 2) Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 331, Hodgson JA (with whom Campbell AJA agreed), considered that the circumstances require "a reasonably clear case of merits to be shown". His Honour observed that:
"52. If that defence depends on facts, then there should be some evidence of those facts; and the circumstances may be relevant to the quality of the evidence that is required to show a defence on the merits in particular cases. Among such circumstances could be the degree of the applicant's default, and hardship to the respondent.
...
55. Assertions in the affidavit of Mr Nassif that was read, to the effect that he believed that the defence and cross-claim 'have merit' or that the cross-claim is 'valid', do not in my opinion appropriately support any assertions of fact so as to amount to evidence supporting a defence on the merits or a cross-claim."
74In National Australia Bank Ltd v McCann [2010] NSWSC 766, Davies J, citing Magnate Projects, supra, held that an affidavit verifying a Defence is not sufficient evidence on an application to set aside default judgment:
"In my opinion, it is quite insufficient for Ms McCann in the present case simply to swear that she believes the facts in the Defence are true to show, in the circumstances of this case, that there is a Defence on the merits to the claim. An affidavit verifying a Defence where the deponent swears to a belief that the allegations of fact in the Defence are true is not sufficient." (at [43])
75It has been held that where a defence sought to be advanced involved oral representations on which the defendant relied to his or her detriment, what is required, at least, is some evidence as to the conversations in which the alleged representations were made: National Australia Bank v Priestley (No 3) [2012] NSWSC 1171 at [11].
76As noted above at [ REF _Ref406503765 \r \h 27], the affidavit of Mr McCarthy does not include any reference to the discussions he alleges he had with Mr Weingarth, in which Mr Weingarth purportedly advised that the defendant did not need to make any repayments during the term of the loan on the condition he had sufficient equity in the security property to cover any capitalised interest. Nor was any other evidence adduced by the defendant in support of this assertion, save for the affidavit of Mr Parisi. However, as the authorities make clear, Mr Parisi's supporting affidavit in insufficient in this regard. What is needed is evidence from the defendant himself that the representations were made.
77To the contrary, the plaintiff on this application has relied upon the affidavits of Mr Weingarth and Ms Bains, both of whom swear that no representations were made to the effect asserted by the defendant.
78There is no suggestion that the defendant did not have sufficient time to prepare and serve a Defence. The affidavit of Mr Parisi indicates that he received the plaintiff's solicitor's letter of 8 January 2014 advising that proceedings had been commenced on the same date. Further, that on that same date he received instructions from his client to file a Defence and Statement of Cross-Claim: at [28]. Accordingly, his office closure over the Christmas period in no way impeded his ability to communicate with the plaintiff or his client.
79Mr Parisi stated that he did not prepare the draft Defence until 6 February 2013, and that it was not finalised until on or about 20 February 2014 as a consequence of his other commitments which precluded him from being able to discuss outstanding matters with his client.
80It is unfortunate that the defendant, now self-represented, may have been disadvantaged by his solicitor's delay in drafting the proposed Defence. However, the delay is not a critical issue to the outcome of the present application to set aside the default judgment. The critical issue has been discussed above and involves an absence of evidence in support of the proposed Defence. Notwithstanding, I am not satisfied that the asserted defence has any evidentiary foundation. Further, I am not satisfied that the relevant loan agreement was affected by any fraud, illegality, or anything of that nature.
81It is well-accepted that allegations of fraud (see [ REF _Ref406660668 \r \h 26] above) involve such serious issues that it is incumbent upon the person invoking them to adduce evidence by which the cogency of such allegations may be dteremined (that is, evidence that is appropriate to an application such as the present): see Dunwoodie v Teachers Mutual Bank Ltd, supra at [44], extracted at [ REF _Ref406660940 \r \h 12] above. It is sufficient to record that there was no evidence adduced in the present application in relation to the allegations of fraud raised in the proposed Defence.
82Similarly, in relation to allegations of "duress" there is both an absence of specificity in relation to the same and an absence of evidence.
83In the circumstances, I must dismiss the application to set aside default judgment.