Reasoning in the appeal
26 The central issue in this appeal is whether the Tribunal addressed the case raised by the material advanced by or on behalf of the appellant. It is necessary to refer in a little more detail, to the basis upon which the appellant advanced his application for a protection visa.
27 The application was lodged by migration agents acting on behalf of the appellant in a letter dated 2 November 2000. In the letter reference was made to an attached statutory declaration 'which explain[ed] his predicament and his fears for not returning to Bangladesh'. The statutory declaration (dated 17 November 2000) recounted much of what has already been described in a summary way. However, in particular, the following things were said by the appellant:
· "[coming to Australia] is a very good opportunity to find an alternative to come to a country where human dignity prevails, people applies their democratic rights, professional has right to speak, specially the journalists can express their own views in protest against anything beyond civic interests."
· "The fact is that I am one of the very few outspoken journalists in Bangladesh who work at the risks of their lives. I never hesitate to publish the truth and speak out against corruptions. I never negotiate with those who try to harm the interest of the general people of the country. It is fact the influential persons in the society are related to corruptions in any way or other and they protect themselves with the help of their own gang. As a sports journalist I was able to identify corruptions among the sports officials at different level and publicised in the newspaper. As a result an antagonistic relationship established between these powerful elements of the society and a poor journalists like me."
· "I wish to apply for domestic protection on the belief that I have every chance of being persecuted on my return back to Bangladesh because of my professional responsibilities and political belief. I wish to indicate that I have left my country to residence, Bangladesh, when the situation was completely against me. My honesty forced me to face such a risky situation. I have legitimate fears if I am forced to remain in that country. There is well-founded fear of persecution on my return back to Bangladesh."
· "Since the first day of my job I never slipped a single step from the ethics of the profession i.e. honesty, sincerity, devotion, to speak out against anti-social activities. The political leaders, government official and the people related with the management of different organizations do not like the people me who speaks out against corruptions. I have experienced the same scenario from beginning of my career"
· "Journalists who tell the truth always encounter danger, life is threatened"
· "It is remarkable that during the period of this government the journalists are living a totally helpless and devastated life specially those who do not support their activities and criticise the government."
· "I firmly believe that I have every chance of being persecuted on my return back to Bangladesh. My life will be under threat. I shall be discriminated in every walk of life. It will hard for me to lead a normal life and also with human dignity. I have also well-founded fear of being persecuted for my political belief. There is a very meagre chance of being protected by the government. The opportunity to live me in Australia will give me a secured and peaceful life."
· "However, if I am forced to return to Bangladesh, I shall be placed in a position whereby on return it will be a totally hostile and unforgiving environment, which will serve to discriminate against me."
28 Similar statements were made by the appellant in the completed application form concerning why he left Bangladesh and what he feared might happen to him if he returned. However in response to a question in that form about who would harm him he indicated: 'The influential political and social leader against whom I wrote in the newspaper and flushed to the public regarding the misappropriation of funds, they will harm me on my return back to Bangladesh'.
29 The delegate, in the decision record, summarised what had been claimed in the statutory declaration and application as including:
2. He believes he is an outspoken sports journalist who is unafraid to speak his mind and write the truth. He believes his life is in jeopardy in Bangladesh because of this.
30 In the form applying for review by the Tribunal, the appellant said (in a section inviting explanation as to why the delegate's decision was wrong) that: 'I firmly believe that I have well founded fear of being persecuted on my return back to Bangladesh due to my professional responsibilities I performed during the period of my employment as journalist.' In a written submission by a migration agent (dated 16 November 2001) sent to the Tribunal on behalf of the appellant it was submitted that the appellant would 'experience persecution and lack of protection on his return back to Bangladesh due to his political affiliation and brave commitment to his profession' though the submission concluded by saying that the feared persecution arose from the Convention based ground of the appellant's political activities as a member of the Jatiya party in Bangladesh.
31 In its reasons, the Tribunal recorded the following:
I asked [the appellant] what he feared would happen to him if he returned to Bangladesh. He said that he feared he would be attacked and killed by agents from the Football Club or the Mohammedan Sporting Club if he returned home. He also said that he would not be able to find work as a journalist because he had lost his job when he did not return after reporting on the Paralympics and he was banned from working by the Dhaka Journalist Union as a result of dispute between his paper and the union (sic) the paper's decision to work on a public holiday.
32 During the review by the Tribunal, the appellant's adviser forwarded certain documents to the Tribunal. They included newspaper and Internet articles about violence to particular Bangladeshi journalists or journalists in Bangladesh generally. One, an article from the Dhaka Courier of 4 May 2001, included:
The fourth state of the country has come under violent attack, this time not by the state machinery but by organised gangs. The incidents of assault on press nowadays have risen alarmingly, making journalists the most vulnerable professionals than any other group. In most of the cases the attackers remain at large or under the shelter of powerful groups or in some cases under the umbrella of influential members of the ruling party.
The violence has affected all sections of the media, be it print or broadcast, local or international, public or private, Bangla or English.
Journalists have developed a sense of insecurity due to a sharp rise in the frequency of attacks on the journalists by political activists and police. In the first four months of the current year one reporter was killed and 35 others were injured, two of them still fighting for life in hospital beds.
Killing, attacks, kidnappings, blackmail and death threats to journalist have become an order of the day. Two journalists were killed, more than 45 came under attack, nine arrested and about 20 others were threatened during the year 2000.
33 To similar effect was an undated article from the Internet which included what was described as a "Message from Noted Columnist Abdul Gaffar Choudhury" which commenced by saying:
The journalists in Bangladesh are being repressed in many ways. To call it repression will be an understatement. They are being killed mercilessly. The entire Bangladesh is in grip of terrorism. Journalism is also a victim of it. Black money, party hooligans, professional killers, politics of vengeance and violent fundamentalism today are the biggest enemy of honest journalism. Shamsur Rahman, the journalist from Jessore, had to give his life at the hand of this enemy. Similarly, journalist Tipu Sultan returned from the door step of death. But he is severely injured. If he does not get immediate treatment, he may well be paralysed for life. His life may be threatened.
34 Having regard to this material, it is necessary to identify what was the case raised by the appellant having regard to what he said (both orally and in writing (including in submissions made on his behalf)) and the material he presented to the Tribunal. It is necessary to ensure that this Court does not assess whether the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by reference to a case that was never raised: see generally Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v S152/2003 [2004] HCA 18. Nonetheless, it is well settled that the Tribunal should not limit itself to the case articulated by an applicant where the facts found by it (or not negated by its findings) might support an argument that the applicant is entitled to the protection of the Convention: see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Applicant S (2002) 124 FCR 256 at [1] and [73] per Whitlam and Stone JJ and at [50] per North J (a proposition not put in issue by the High Court when reversing the judgment of the Full Court: [2004] HCA 25) and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v VFAY [2003] FCAFC 191 at [97].
35 The difficult question in this matter is whether on the facts found by the Tribunal (or not negated by its findings), it should have considered whether the appellant was a member of a particular social group and, if so, whether he feared persecution because of his membership of that group and whether that fear was well-founded. A consequential issue is whether if these issues were raised, were they addressed by the Tribunal.
36 The Tribunal found that the appellant had published several articles critical of leading figures in the sporting world in Bangladesh. It did not reject the material furnished by the appellant (mainly, but not exclusively, newspaper articles) which might have supported a conclusion that outspoken journalists in Bangladesh were at risk of harm. It made no findings one way or the other about this material. The Tribunal did not address the question of whether there was a particular social group constituted by outspoken journalists in Bangladesh or a group, differently described, with similar characteristics. That would have been the first step in considering whether the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution by virtue of his membership of any such group.
37 The Tribunal's failure to consider whether there was a particular social group constituted by outspoken, or perhaps truthful, journalists in Bangladesh, has particular significance because of the Tribunal's acceptance that members of the Bangladeshi media were sometimes victims of violence or harassment from the government or powerful individuals or both and its determination that there was no need for Mr Rahman to give evidence. The evidence that Mr Rahman was apparently prepared to give, could have been relevant to the question whether the Bangladeshi media, or a section of it, was an identifiable group by reason of a common characteristic or attribute and thus a particular social group: see Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2004] HCA 25.
38 The Tribunal expressed a conclusion that the appellant had been threatened because the people he had written about wanted to silence him or seek revenge for the statements he had made and not because, inter alia, of his membership of a particular social group. On a narrow view of the case raised by the material provided by the appellant, this provided a sufficient answer to the claims made by the appellant. That is because the appellant, in identifying at various points during the consideration of his application (including its consideration by the Tribunal) the harm he would suffer were he to return to Bangladesh, focused on the harm he would suffer at the hands of those he had written critical articles about immediately before leaving Bangladesh. However the various descriptions by the appellant of himself as an outspoken journalist and the material he furnished about the fate of journalists in Bangladesh, fairly raised a broader case than the case dealt with by the Tribunal. There was no consideration of whether such a group existed, for Convention purposes, whether the appellant was a member of it, and, if so, whether he had a well-founded fear of persecution because of that membership. It was not sufficient for the Tribunal to deal with the question of membership of a particular social group in the summary way just outlined.
39 It may be accepted, as counsel for the Minister submitted, that one should be cautious in characterising an occupational group as a particular social group: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Zamora (1998) 85 FCR 458 at 464, though having regard to the recent judgment of the High Court in Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs it is clear the Full Court took too narrow a view of what may constitute a particular social group. However, even if the view the Full Court expressed was too narrow, their Honours nonetheless recognised (at 464-465):
There will no doubt be cases in which persons who have in common no more than a shared occupation do form a cognisable group in their society. This may well come about, as McHugh J recognised in Applicant A's case, when persons who follow a particular occupation are persecuted by reason of the occupation that they follow. The persecution for following a particular occupation may well create a public perception that those who follow the occupation are a particular social group. Human rights workers in certain nations subject to totalitarian rule come to mind as a possible example.
40 In Nouredine v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 91 FCR 138 Burchett J accepted that beauty workers in Algeria were a particular social group as they were seen by religious extremists as purveyors of immorality and therefore as a group within society that should be eliminated. After referring to Zamora (supra) and Ram v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 57 FCR 565, his Honour said (at [13]):
But in neither case was it denied that an occupational group may, in particular circumstances, also be a social group. In my judgment in Ram at 568 I referred to the situation in Cambodia under Pol Pot, where "teachers, lawyers, doctors and others … were regarded as potentially dangerous to the new order", as a textbook example of persecution for membership of a social group.
41 The passage in Ram referred to by his Honour bears repeating (at 568):
The point can be illustrated from history. In the infamous Reign of Terror during the French Revolution, men, women and children were guillotined because they belonged to a class seen as dangerous to the emerging democratic State. Similarly, in Cambodia under Pol Pot, teachers, lawyers, doctors and others who were seen as having, by their education and status, a capacity to influence public opinion, were regarded as potentially dangerous to the new order, and were therefore eliminated. These were textbook examples of persecution for membership of a social group. In neither case was the motivation what a particular individual possessed or had done. Of course, many of the people murdered did have greater wealth than the average, but others did not. Some probably had greater capacity, if they chose, to act against the State than the average citizen, but many were quite helpless. The fact is that it was the whole class which, in each instance, was attacked. Individuals were not persecuted for what they had done as individuals, nor for what they possessed as individuals.
42 More generally, issues have arisen at least in Canada and the United States about whether journalists may be a particular social group for the purposes of the Convention. Persecution on the basis of membership of a particular social group, namely journalists in a particular country, has been raised together with persecution on the basis of imputed or actual political opinion. These grounds are either framed separately or as persecution on the basis of membership of a particular social group, journalists who speak out against government or particular government policy. As the United States Court of Appeal said in Hussain v Immigration and Naturalization Service 246 F 3d 647, 2000 WL 1523100, 2 (9th Cir. 2000):
Persecution because of an "act that constitutes an overt manifestation of a political opinion" is "persecution because of a political opinion". Journalism is work that overtly manifests a political opinion". (citations omitted)
43 In Canada and the United States courts have not rejected claims advanced on the footing that the asylum seeker was a member of a particular social group constituted in some way by journalists, on the basis that journalists will never form such a group. Ultimately, whether journalists sharing some common characteristic form a "particular social group" will depend on the operation of cultural, social, religious and legal factors within a country: see Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (supra).
44 In the recent United States Court of Appeal case of Agada v Ashcroft 2004 WL 1076426 the petitioner sought relief under the Convention Against Torture and argued the relevant decision makers had failed to analyse his case 'as one involving a "pattern or practice" of persecution of a group…, namely journalists'. He claimed that his case arose as a result of adherence to the Nigerian Union of Journalists principle of objective reporting of news without fear or favour. The petitioner had also expressed political opinion as a journalist. The Immigration Judge noted that journalists were detained and imprisoned and that the government ignored its constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press under Nigeria's then president. However, the Court agreed that country conditions in relation to freedom of the press had changed drastically since the petitioner's departure and denied his petition.
45 It will ultimately be for the Tribunal to determine whether there is a particular social group constituted by outspoken journalists in Bangladesh or a group with similar defining characteristics. However, if the Tribunal does conclude that there is a particular social group of the type just discussed, it will be necessary to consider whether the appellant is a member of that group and also whether, by virtue of that membership, he has a well-founded fear of persecution. These issues were raised by the material presented to the Tribunal and not addressed by it. Issues concerning persecution by the state or by non-state actors uncontrolled by the state may also arise (see, for example, the observations of Kirby J in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v S152/2003 at [100]). The Tribunal did not deal with the case raised by the appellant's material and thereby fell into jurisdictional error: see Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (supra).
46 The appeal should be allowed, the orders of the primary judge should be set aside, a writ of certiorari should issue removing to this Court and quashing the decision of the Tribunal and a writ of mandamus should issue requiring the Tribunal to hear and determine the appellant's application for review. The Minister should be ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the written submissions prepared after the hearing.
I certify that the preceding forty-six (46) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Moore.