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[2020] NSWCATAD 88
defendant. Leave for the complaint to proceed was refused under s 96(1) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW).
The Tribunal decided that the complaint could not proceed without leave and that leave should not be granted. It accepted that an employer's medical-information requests could be a detriment in some circumstances, but found the particular requests were not reasonably arguable as a detriment because Woolworths still arranged rosters to accommodate the health-related request and did not take further adverse action over the employee's refusal to provide consent or attend an examination. The Tribunal also found no demonstrated entitlement to a fourth break on a nine-hour shift and no supporting material for the claim that the roster caused a real loss of weekend penalty rates. On victimisation, it found no basis in the material to infer a connection between the disciplinary steps and the complainant's allegations under the Act. It therefore refused leave under s 96(1).
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2,578 words · generated 01/10/2026
2 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
In Najmitdinov v Woolworths Group Limited [2020] NSWCATAD 88, the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal considered whether a complaint declined by the President of the Anti-Discrimination Board could proceed with the Tribunal’s leave. Principal Member A Britton refused leave under s 96(1) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW).
The complainant, a former customer service officer, had lodged a complaint alleging disability discrimination and victimisation. The President declined it as “lacking in substance” under s 92(1)(a)(i), then referred it to the Tribunal after the complainant requested referral under s 93A. The decision was therefore not a final hearing of the discrimination and victimisation claims. It determined whether the complaint should be permitted to proceed.
The disability complaint concerned roster arrangements. On 6 June 2018, the complainant asked for morning shifts and for Wednesdays and Thursdays off, citing health problems. His GP’s letter referred to the benefit of a regular shift schedule for managing blood pressure, breathing and sleep issues. Woolworths asked for further medical information and sought consent to contact his GP. It also directed him to attend an independent medical examination after he did not provide the requested consent. He did not attend the examination.
Despite that, Woolworths introduced a First Fixed Roster and then a Second Fixed Roster. The latter provided morning shifts, with Tuesdays and Wednesdays off, and varied shift lengths across the week. The complainant later described the pattern as punishing and argued that the shift lengths and distribution left him with fewer breaks and less weekend penalty income than comparable full-time staff.
The second allegation was victimisation. The complainant relied on a final written warning and a show-cause letter, dated 14 September 2018 and 11 February 2019, respectively, and said they were connected to his allegations under the Act. The Tribunal reviewed the material that had been before the President and found no basis to depart from an earlier interim decision’s conclusion that there was almost no basis for inferring the required connection.
The reasons supplied do not display numbered paragraphs for this decision. Accordingly, paragraph references below are to the paragraph numbers of cited authorities only where those are expressly given in the judgment. The facts and reasoning are identified by topic and sequence in the reasons rather than by invented paragraph numbers.
The Tribunal’s approach had two stages. First, it identified the governing discretion under s 96(1). Second, it examined whether the complaint’s allegations had enough substance to justify allowing the proceedings to go forward.
The Tribunal described the s 96(1) discretion as “unfettered”, but not unstructured. It said the discretion had to be exercised having regard to the purpose of the Act, and guided by the fact that refusing leave would finally determine the complainant’s rights under the statutory scheme. Drawing on Jones v Ekermawi [2009] NSWCA 388 at [57], [58] and [60], and Ekermawi [2009] NSWSC 143 at [25], [32], [36] and [37], it identified the question as whether granting or refusing leave would be “fair and just” in the circumstances.
For the disability allegation, the Tribunal focused on the statutory elements rather than deciding whether the employer’s conduct was preferable or ideal. It said the complainant had to show conduct within s 49D(2), relevantly a denial or limitation of access to an employment benefit or subjection to a detriment. The Act did not define “detriment”. The Tribunal adopted the approach in Sivananthan v Commissioner of Police [2001] NSWADT 44 at [40]-[41], Burns v Sunol (No 2) [2017] NSWCATAD 236 at [75] and Bonella v Wollongong City Council [2001] NSWADT 194 at [50]: detriment is assessed objectively and must amount to real, non-trivial loss, damage or injury.
The first claimed detriment was Woolworths’ request to contact the treating GP and direction to attend an independent medical examination. The Tribunal did not hold that such employer requests can never be a detriment. It expressly recognised that they might be in some circumstances. Its assessment was contextual: the employee had sought a change to his working conditions for health reasons, supplied limited medical evidence, and Woolworths nevertheless implemented fixed rosters accommodating the request. The Tribunal also noted that Woolworths took no further disciplinary or other adverse action when he did not consent to GP contact or attend the examination. On those facts, it was not reasonably arguable that the requests or direction were objectively a detriment.
The alleged fourth-break denial failed for a different reason. The Tribunal examined clauses 22.2, 22.3, 22.4 and 23.1(a) of the Salmat Enterprise Agreement. It concluded that the agreement did not provide a fourth-break entitlement for a nine-hour shift, and said there was no material suggesting a custom or practice of providing one. Without an arguable entitlement or established practice, the claimed denial could not support an arguable denial of an employment benefit or detriment.
The roster-pattern allegation concerned the balance of weekday and weekend work and the resulting penalty rates. The Tribunal accepted that there could have been different ways to roster the requested 38 hours while preserving morning shifts and two weekdays off. But the complainant had not pointed to material showing that he regularly earned less than before, or that most comparable employees regularly earned more. The asserted detriment depended on an unsupported assumption that he was entitled to more regular weekend work than he received.
There is an internal numerical inconsistency in the reasons that should be noticed when reading this point. The Tribunal described the Second Fixed Roster as 27 weekday hours and 11 weekend hours, which totals 38 hours. Later, it referred to an assumed allocation of “12 hours per week” of weekend work. The roster details earlier in the reasons specify seven Saturday hours and four Sunday hours, totalling 11. The judgment’s central finding was that no supporting material established an entitlement to more weekend hours, but the numerical inconsistency is present in the text.
On victimisation, the Tribunal applied the causal requirement in s 50. The existence of an alleged detriment, such as threatened termination, would not by itself establish victimisation: the alleged detriment had to be imposed on the ground that the complainant had alleged a contravention of the Act. The Tribunal referred to the earlier interim decision, Najmitdinov v Woolworths Group Limited [2019] NSWCATAD 51 at [22], and noted that the appeal was dismissed in Najmitdinov v Woolworths Group Limited [2020] NSWCATAP 15. It then reviewed additional material in the President’s report and found no basis to depart from the earlier assessment.
The decision applied, rather than purported to reform, the principles governing leave under s 96(1). Before this decision, the authorities cited in the reasons had established that the discretion was broad, that the statutory scheme and final effect of refusal mattered, and that the decision-maker should ask what is fair and just in the circumstances. The Tribunal used Jones and Ekermawi for those propositions.
The judgment also applied the established “lacking in substance” and “not reasonably arguable” language. It cited Langley v Niland & Anor (1981) 2 NSWLR 104 at 107 and Chalker v Murrays Australia Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCATAD 282 at [22] for the proposition that a complaint is lacking in substance where there is no factual basis for the allegations or they are not reasonably arguable.
For detriment, the Tribunal adopted an objective test requiring real and non-trivial loss, damage or injury, relying on the earlier tribunal authorities it cited. It did not announce a new definition or establish that medical inquiries, roster changes, or shift allocations invariably fall on one side of that test.
After the decision, its specific contribution in the text available is an application of those principles to the particular evidence. It illustrates the difference between identifying an upsetting or contested workplace event and providing material capable of making out an arguable statutory detriment or causal connection. The decision does not establish that an employer’s medical-information requests will always be permissible, that a roster accommodating a health request can never be discriminatory, or that an employee has no possible claim to weekend work. Its conclusions were tied to the material and allegations before the Tribunal.
The judgment itself records that the complainant’s appeal from the earlier interim decision was dismissed in 2020. It does not discuss any later treatment of the present decision. No claim about subsequent judicial or tribunal acceptance, criticism or modification can therefore be made from this judgment alone.
The Tribunal stated that leave involved evaluating whether it was “fair and just” to grant or refuse it. In plain English, the Tribunal was not required simply to repeat the President’s decision, but had to use its own discretion in the context of the statutory process and the consequences of refusing leave.
In discussing detriment, the Tribunal said it adopted the meaning of something that objectively amounts to “loss, damage or injury that is real and not trivial”. In plain English, subjective dissatisfaction alone did not establish detriment. The question was whether the evidence could support a real, objectively assessable disadvantage.
On the medical-information issue, the Tribunal acknowledged that an employer’s request to contact a GP or direction to attend an independent examination “could amount to a detriment” in some circumstances. It then distinguished the facts before it: Woolworths accommodated the roster request and did not take further adverse action over the refusal to cooperate. The passage is important because it is qualified, not categorical.
On the roster, the Tribunal said the complainant had not provided or identified material supporting his assertion that he was regularly earning less or that most employees were regularly earning more. In plain English, the allegation relied on an asserted comparison that the available material did not substantiate.
For victimisation, the Tribunal said it saw “no basis for departing” from the earlier conclusion that there was almost no basis for inferring a connection between threatened termination and the complainant’s allegations. In plain English, the Tribunal considered the required link between the protected allegation and the alleged detriment unsupported on the material it reviewed.
Finally, it concluded that it was “not fair and just to permit the Complaint to proceed”. That conclusion explains the procedural order: refusal of leave, rather than a determination after a full hearing of all possible merits.
The decision is most relevant to the procedural situation in which the Anti-Discrimination Board President declines a complaint as lacking in substance, the complainant requests referral, and leave is then required under s 96(1). It shows the Tribunal considering whether the allegations have a factual basis and are reasonably arguable, while keeping the final effect of refusal in view.
For disability discrimination in employment, the case is relevant where an employee alleges that employer conduct connected with accommodating a medical condition amounted to a detriment or denial of an employment benefit. The judgment indicates that the Tribunal may examine the practical outcome of the employer’s conduct, the employee’s medical material, and whether the claimed disadvantage is objectively supported. Here, accommodation was provided despite outstanding requests for further information, which formed part of the Tribunal’s assessment.
It is also relevant to claimed roster disadvantages. The decision demonstrates that an allegation of reduced penalty-rate income may require some material supporting the asserted comparison or entitlement. The Tribunal did not treat the employee’s belief that others received more weekend shifts as sufficient, by itself, to make the claimed detriment reasonably arguable.
The break allegation is relevant where a claimed employment benefit depends on an enterprise agreement. The Tribunal considered the actual break and overtime clauses and whether practice supported an additional entitlement. The decision does not determine the meaning of other agreements or establish a general break entitlement.
For victimisation, the case is relevant where disciplinary action or threatened termination is alleged to follow a complaint under anti-discrimination legislation. The reasoning underscores that the alleged detriment and the required connection to the protected allegation are distinct questions. In this case, the Tribunal found the causal connection unsupported.
These are not universal outcomes. The judgment’s observations repeatedly depend on the evidence supplied in this particular matter. Different agreement terms, medical evidence, roster records, comparator information or evidence about the reason for disciplinary action could present a different issue for a tribunal to assess.
The supplied judgment does not report any later court or tribunal considering or treating Najmitdinov v Woolworths Group Limited [2020] NSWCATAD 88. It would therefore be unsupported to describe it as followed, distinguished, criticised or applied by later decisions on the basis of this source alone.
The decision does refer to related proceedings involving the same parties. It says the earlier interim decision, Najmitdinov v Woolworths Group Limited [2019] NSWCATAD 51, declined interim orders to prevent termination. The present Tribunal recounted that the earlier decision considered the threat of termination could amount to a detriment but found almost no basis for inferring a connection to the complainant’s allegations. It also records that an appeal from that interim decision was dismissed in Najmitdinov v Woolworths Group Limited [2020] NSWCATAP 15. Those references concern the earlier interim proceedings, not later treatment of the present leave decision.
The judgment’s other citations are authorities used for the legal framework: Jones and Ekermawi for the leave discretion, Langley and Chalker for the lacking-in-substance threshold, and Sivananthan, Burns and Bonella for the meaning of detriment. The reasons say the Tribunal adopted the detriment interpretation and applied the leave principles. This decision does not purport to overrule or replace those authorities.
The judgment leaves open how the s 96(1) discretion would operate on a materially stronger evidentiary record. It does not specify what level or type of comparator evidence would have been enough to support the weekend-work allegation, nor does it decide whether a particular employee had a contractual or customary entitlement to a particular distribution of weekend shifts.
It expressly leaves open the circumstances in which a request to contact an employee’s doctor or a direction to attend an independent medical examination could objectively amount to a detriment. The decision’s conclusion was limited to a setting where the employer implemented roster accommodations and did not take further adverse action over the employee’s refusal.
The judgment does not determine whether the roster arrangements were medically optimal, whether other roster configurations would have been fairer, or whether any alternative arrangement would have complied with other workplace obligations. It considered whether the pleaded discrimination allegation was reasonably arguable on the material before it, not every possible employment-law question raised by rostering.
The victimisation analysis is similarly fact-specific. The reasons do not set out in detail all material in the President’s report or make a final merits finding about the employer’s reasons for the warning and show-cause letter. They conclude only that the material reviewed did not provide a basis to infer the necessary connection for the complaint to proceed.
Finally, the stated weekly weekend hours contain the inconsistency noted above: the specified Saturday and Sunday shifts add to 11 hours, while a later passage refers to 12. The Tribunal’s general point was that the assumed entitlement to more weekend work lacked evidentiary support, but the numerical discrepancy remains in the reasons.
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Background facts
Was Mr Najmitdinov subjected to a detriment or denied or given limited access to a benefit associated with employment?
(1) The direction to attend an independent medical examination and the request that Woolworths be permitted to contact Mr Najmitdinov's treating doctor
(2) The denial of a fourth break when rostered to work a nine hour shift
(3) The pattern of rostering under the Second Fixed Roster
Summary
Allegation 2: victimisation
Conclusion
Order 1. Leave for the complaint to proceed is refused under s 96(1) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW).
I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 23 March 2020
Najmitdinov
Woolworths Group Limited
Statutory framework and principles governing the grant of leave
(1981) 2 NSWLR 104
Leave for the complaint to proceed was refused under s 96(1) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW).