Application for adjournment of 29 November hearing
30 The power of the Court to grant an adjournment is discretionary, to be exercised having regard to the objectives in s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth): Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2015] FCAFC 75 at [42] (Collier, Griffiths and Mortimer JJ). In MZAKQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1392, Logan J relevantly stated (at [10]-[11]):
Whether or not to adjourn the hearing of the appeal calls for the exercise of a discretion. It is not only the medical evidence, such as it is, which is relevant in that regard. The Full Court's judgment in Luck at [43]-[46] offers a reminder of this in the references by the Full Court to wider considerations which attend the question of whether or not any adjournment should be granted. These are no new subjects but they are worth repeating.
Any adjournment will necessarily result in an opportunity cost in terms of the public resources invested in the exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth in the hearing of a proceeding. By that I mean, were the case to be adjourned, it would then fall for listing on a day to the exclusion of some other case, which might otherwise have been heard on that day. That such a consideration is relevant was highlighted in Luck in the reference to Sali v SPC Limited (1993) 116 ALR 625 at 629, where Brennan, Deane and McHugh JJ observed that a court is entitled to be conscious of:
… the effect of an adjournment on court resources and the competing claims by litigants in other cases awaiting hearing in the court, as well as the interests of the parties.
31 As discussed above, the only material before the Court in support of the applicant's adjournment application is the applicant's email dated 22 November 2023 and the medical certificate dated 6 November 2023 for Zainab Bibi.
32 To be meaningful, a medical certificate must establish why or how it is that an applicant is unable to attend or participate effectively in the hearing: see eg, BXD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 765 at [35] (Thawley J); Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 216 at [13] (Murphy J). In the present case, the medical certificate provided by the applicant dated 6 November 2023 relates to an unspecified serious medical condition allegedly suffered by Zainab Bibi, who I assume is a relative or family member of the applicant, which is said to require the applicant to remain in Pakistan to provide support. However, the applicant has not provided any details by way of explanation of the nature of the support that he is said to be providing to his family or why this prevents him from attending or participating in the hearing. Further, based on the evidence before the Court, including the evidence of the applicant's entry into and departure from Australia, I cannot be satisfied that the applicant is currently in Pakistan or that he is not currently in Australia.
33 In the circumstances, I am not persuaded to grant an adjournment of the hearing of the application for leave to appeal.
34 On the evidence before the Court, I am not satisfied that the applicant is not in Australia or that he is unable to attend the hearing.
35 Further, in refusing to grant an adjournment, I have taken into account the applicant's prospects of success on the application for leave to appeal.
36 In order to obtain leave to appeal, it would be necessary for the applicant to establish that the decision of Judge Street of 7 June 2021 is attended by sufficient doubt as to warrant reconsideration on appeal, and that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision to be wrong: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398 (Sheppard, Burchett and Heerey JJ).
37 In his application for leave to appeal, the applicant asserts that the primary judge erred by dismissing his application for judicial review without giving consideration "to the fact presented to the AAT", and by dismissing his reinstatement application without "giving [him] an opportunity to present case" as he "was sick at both hearings".
38 As the Minister submits, these grounds do not demonstrate any error in the primary judge's decisions on 5 May 2021 or 7 June 2021. The primary judge was expressly empowered by r 13.03C(1)(c) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules to dismiss the proceeding in default of the applicant's appearance. The primary judge's reasons for judgment dated 7 June 2021 provide an intelligible justification for exercising that power in relation to the reinstatement application, namely that the applicant was on notice of the hearing and that attempts had been made by the Court to contact the applicant by telephone on the day of the hearing. There is nothing to indicate that the exercise of discretion by the primary judge miscarried.
39 Further, as the Minister submits, it was and remains open to the applicant to make an application to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia to set aside the orders of the primary judge of 7 June 2021. Such an application is available pursuant to r 17.05(2)(a) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) and may be regarded as the "proper course" as opposed to seeking leave to appeal from the primary judge's interlocutory decision: Sahib v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 944 at [7] (North J). The applicant's failure to make an application to the Federal Circuit and Family Court to set aside the decision of 7 June 2021 is a relevant consideration in favour of dismissing the application for leave to appeal: Singh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 199 at [35] (Mansfield J); see also Singh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 905 at [20] (Colvin J).
40 Further, in relation to whether substantial injustice would be caused by the refusal of leave to appeal, it may also be relevant that the application for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision arguably lacked any substantive merit, in circumstances where the decision to refuse the visa seems to have been inevitable on the facts as found by the Tribunal, including in particular that the applicant was not enrolled in a course of study at the time of decision as required by clause 500.211 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations.
41 In those circumstances, I am not persuaded that it is in the interests of justice to grant a further adjournment of the hearing of the application for leave to appeal.