operation of section 474
42 Section 474(1) of the Act provides:
"(1) A privative clause decision:
(a) is final and conclusive; and
(b) must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and
(c) is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account."
43 A "privative clause decision" is defined in s 474(2):
(2) In this section:
privative clause decision means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not), other than a decision referred to in subsection (4) or (5)".
44 The decision of the Tribunal currently under review in this case falls within the definition in s 474(2) and is not excluded by subsections (4) or (5).
45 As noted above, the applicant purports to rely on the grounds of review available under the former s 476. She did not address the impact of the amendments to the Act nor the effect of the privative clause in her submissions.
46 As may be expected, counsel for the respondent lodged a notice of objection to competency of the appeal and also made extensive submissions in relation to the operation of the new s 474. It is worth setting out these submissions in some detail. Firstly, the respondent dealt with the issue of the competency of the application for review in these terms:
"3. The grounds of review relied upon by the applicant are no longer available. Part 8 of the Act, including old s 476, was repealed and replaced on 2 October 2001, by the Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth).Accordingly, the Respondent has filed a notice of objection to the competency of the appeal.
…
14. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to s39B of the Judiciary Act, and no jurisdiction is provided for by any other statute: see ss 475A, 477."
47 It would, perhaps be possible to dispose of the matter entirely on this basis. In two recent decisions of this Court, it has been held that where an application for judicial review under the Act is not brought under s 39B of the Judiciary Act, or where such application is outside the prescribed 28 day time period for bringing such application, this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the matter (NACA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 63; and SBBM v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 183). However, as noted above, given the fact that the applicant is a litigant in person and that the matter raises a significant issue of law, I propose to deal in substance with that issue.
48 Despite the literal breadth of the wording of s 474, the respondent acknowledges that the provision cannot operate fully according to those terms. In its written submissions the respondent discusses the effect of the privative clause on the current proceedings in the following terms:
"Privative Clause Decision
13. The decision of the Tribunal is subject to the regime in Part 8 of the Act enacted by the Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001, which commenced on 2 October 2001.
14. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to s39B of the Judiciary Act, and no jurisdiction is provided for by any other statute: see ss 475A, 477.
15. The Tribunal's decision is a privative clause decision within the meaning of s474(2) of the Act. The effect is that s474(1) provides that the decision is final and conclusive, cannot be challenged or reviewed or called in question in any court and is not subject to prohibition mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account.
16. Despite the literal breadth of this provision and its formulation as a clause ousting the jurisdiction of the courts, review may nevertheless take place, albeit in limited circumstances. The scope of such review is limited by the principles enunciated by Dixon J in R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 at 616:
'It is, of course, quite impossible for the Parliament to give power to any judicial or other authority which goes beyond the subject matter of the legislative power conferred by the Constitution. […] It is equally impossible for the legislature to impose limits upon the quasi-judicial authority of a body which it sets up with the intention that any excess of that authority means invalidity, and yet, at the same time, to deprive this court of authority to restrain the invalid action of the court or body by prohibition. But where the legislature confers authority subject to limitations, and at the same time enacts a [privative clause], it becomes a question of interpretation of the whole legislative instrument whether transgression of the limits, so long as done bona fide and bearing on its face every appearance of an attempt to pursue the power, necessarily spells an invalidity. In my opinion, the application of these principles [in this case] means that any decision given by a Local Reference Board which upon its face appears to be within power and is in fact a bona fide attempt to act in the course of its authority, shall not be regarded as invalid.'
17. In R v Murray; Ex parte Proctor (1949) 77 CLR 387, at 399-400, Dixon J elaborated on the principles relevant to a privative clause in the following terms:
'We are familiar with the distinction between provisions that are directory and those that are mandatory. The distinction supplies an analogy which may help to explain the effect of [the relevant privative clause]. For construed in the traditional manner it must be taken to mean that strict compliance with at least some of the provisions [regulating the conduct of the relevant Board] is not an indispensable condition to the jurisdiction of the Board and to its authority to make a valid and binding award, order or determination. There is necessarily an appearance of inconsistency between a provision which defines and restricts the power of a tribunal and prescribes the course it must pursue and a provision which says that the validity of its decrees shall not be challenged or called in question on any account whatsoever.
The apparent inconsistency should be resolved by an attempt to arrive at the true intention of the legislative document containing the two provisions considered as a whole. The first step in such a process of interpretation is to apply to [the privative clause] the traditional or established interpretation which makes the protection it purports to afford inapplicable unless there has been an honest attempt to deal with a subject matter confided to the tribunal and to act in pursuance of the powers of the tribunal in relation to something that might reasonably be regarded as falling within its province. There is nothing artificial in such an interpretation. For it could hardly be supposed, to take perhaps an extreme example, that it was intended that [the relevant privative clause] should give validity and protection to the awards of a tribunal established in relation to one industry when the tribunal intentionally stepped outside its allotted industrial field and proceeded to regulate an entirely different industry. A second step in interpreting the whole legislative instrument must be to consider whether particular limitations on power and specific requirements as to the manner in which the Tribunal shall be constituted or shall exercise its power are so expressed that they may be taken to mean that observance of the limitations and compliance with the requirements are essential to valid action. For a clearly expressed specific intention of this kind can hardly give way to the general intention indicated by [a privative clause]'.
18. For the Applicant to successfully impugn the Tribunal's decision, she must therefore establish one of three conditions. The first, which is clearly not satisfied in the present case, is that the constitutional authority of the Parliament to define the powers of the decision-maker has been overstepped. Alternatively, it must be shown that the exercise of power was unrelated to the subject matter of the legislation. That condition is also clearly not satisfied in this case: the Tribunal was dealing with a review of a decision of a delegate refusing to grant a protection visa. That is clearly related, indeed, integral to the relevant subject matter of the legislation. The third alternative is to show that the decision made was, on its face, beyond power or was not a bona fide attempt to act in the course of the delegate's authority. There is no basis for such a proposition to be put.
19. The 'second step' enunciated by Dixon J in Ex parte Proctor raises an issue of validity. It reflects the terminology often associated with the establishment of 'jurisdictional error' on the part of a tribunal (see for example, Re Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000)74 ALJR 405, McHugh J at [29]-[31]; City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ at [20]; and Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte HB [2001] HCA 34, Kirby J at [10]). In Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 74 ALJR 1348, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Hayne JJ stated, at [31]:
'There would only have been jurisdictional error on the part of the Full Bench if it had misconceived its role or if, in terms used by Jordan CJ in Ex parte Hebburn Ltd; Re Kearsley Shire Council, it 'misunder[stood] the nature of [its] jurisdiction […] or misconceive[d] its duty' or '[failed] to apply itself to the question which [s45 of the Act] prescribes' […] or '[misunderstood] the nature of the opinion which it [was] to form' '. (footnotes omitted)
20. It is, however, misleading to simply adopt statements in relation to jurisdictional error made in the context of applications for constitutional writs or prerogative relief absent any privative clause. The description of an exercise of power as involving jurisdictional error means merely that it is beyond power. In dealing with the effect of a privative clause, the question is much narrower, namely whether, despite the general terms of the privative clause, compliance with the obligation in question must have been intended to be an essential precondition to the exercise of power. In the present case, no failure of compliance with any essential requirement has been identified.
21. …
22. It is submitted that if the Hickman principles are applied to the facts of this case, there is no basis for intervention by the Court."
49 Two significant issues arise in relation to the interpretation of s 474, as they have arisen in relation to similar privative clauses. First, an issue arises as to whether the provision is effective to withdraw from review a decision made by the Tribunal in breach of a statutory provision. Secondly, an issue arises as to whether the provision operates to exclude from review decisions made by the Tribunal in breach of the rules of natural justice.
50 In relation to the first issue, two recent decisions of this Court have dealt extensively with the application of the Hickman principle in the context of s 474: NAAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 263 at [13]-[37]; and Walton v Philip Ruddock, The Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1839 at [20]-[33]. I do not propose to conduct a similar analysis here, except to say that I respectfully agree with principles enunciated in each of these decisions. In relation to the question of whether there is any inconsistency between s 474 and the other provisions of the amended Part 8 of the Act, the manner in which these provisions operate has been dealt with by Merkel J in Walton and also by Mansfield J in SAAA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 101; it is not necessary for me to elaborate on these questions.
51 In relation to the second issue, as to whether s 474 operates to exclude review even in the case of a breach of natural justice by the Tribunal, Gyles J dealt extensively with this question in NAAX.
52 (I should note at this juncture that the decision of Gyles J in NAAX also deals extensively with the question of the constitutional validity of s 474. These arguments have not been raised before me and I do not propose to deal with them here, except to say that I agree, with respect, with the reasons of Gyles J in NAAX on this question.)
53 In NAAX the applicants, NAAX and her husband NAAV, were Burmese nationals who applied for protection visas on the basis of persecution on the grounds of political opinion. Although the Tribunal accepted some of the claims of the applicants, it did not accept the essence of the claim of each to have been a political activist who had suffered persecution on this basis. In coming to its decision and forming an unfavourable opinion adverse to the credibility of the applicants, the Tribunal took into account certain information: information relating to the situation in Burma gathered from sources other than the applicants ("country information"); a particular map of the region; and the military experience of the Tribunal member. None of this information was disclosed to the applicants or their migration agent.
54 In NAAX, the applicants argued that the use by the Tribunal of undisclosed material in a manner which was adverse to them was a breach of the rules of natural justice in that procedural fairness was not afforded, a result said to follow from the High Court decision in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 75 ALJR 889. The applicants argued that a breach of natural justice of this nature constituted a jurisdictional error, relying on the High Court decision in Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2001) 204 CLR 82, and that relief pursuant to s 39B of the Judiciary Act should follow. In addition, it was argued that the privative clause does not prevent this relief, because jurisdictional error of this kind is within the exceptions to the operation of such a clause; and, it was said, in any event, s 474 is invalid, as conferring judicial power upon the Tribunal contrary to Chapter III of the Constitution, or as inconsistent with s 75 of the Constitution (if the clause is construed so as to exclude relief where there has been a breach of natural justice).
55 In NAAX, the Solicitor-General appeared for the respondent and made extensive submissions as to the purpose and effect of the new s 474. It is worth quoting in some detail from the decision of Gyles J as to the submissions made by the Solicitor-General in this matter (at [17] - [18]):
'The Solicitor General submits that s 474(1) is in substantially similar form to the privative clause considered in R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox & Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598, where, in an oft-quoted passage, Dixon J, at 615, said:
'The particular regulation is expressed in a manner that has grown familiar. Both under Commonwealth law, and in jurisdictions where there is a unitary constitution, the interpretation of provisions of the general nature of [the privative clause] is well established. They are not interpreted as meaning to set at large the courts or other juridical bodies to whose decision they relate. Such a clause is interpreted as meaning that no decision which is in fact given by the body concerned shall be invalidated on the ground that it has not conformed to the requirements governing its proceedings or the exercise of its authority or has not confined its acts within the limits laid down by the instrument giving it authority, provided always that its decision is a bona fide attempt to exercise its power, that it relates to the subject matter of the legislation and that it is reasonably capable of reference to the power given to the body.' (emphasis added)
It is submitted that Dixon J succinctly identified three pre-conditions to the valid exercise of decision-making powers to which such a clause applies:
'(a) the decision-maker is required to have made a 'bona fide attempt to exercise its power';
(b) the decision 'relates to the subject matter of the legislation'; and
(c) the decision 'is reasonably capable of reference to the power given to' the decision-maker.'
These three conditions, the Hickman conditions, Hickman grounds of review or Hickman grounds of exclusion have been restated on many occasions in the High Court: eg, R v Coldham; Ex parte Australian Workers' Union (1983) 153 CLR 415; O'Toole v Charles David Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 232; Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Richard Walter Pty Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 168; and Darling Casino Ltd v NSW Casino Control Authority (1997) 191 CLR 602."
56 In NAAX, Gyles J specifically considered the question of whether the Hickman conditions or grounds of review are exclusive categories. In particular, he considered the question of whether a breach of the requirements of natural justice goes to jurisdiction in the sense of founding the prerogative writs, and may therefore provide another potential basis for review under the Hickman conditions.
57 After citing an extensive passage of obiter dicta from Spigelman CJ in Vanmeld Pty Ltd v Fairfield City Council (1999) 46 NSWLR 78 at [141] - [163], in which Spigelman CJ indicated that the categories of Hickman conditions may not be closed, Gyles J stated (at [30]):
"…To conclude that prohibition will go in all cases of jurisdictional error of the type identified in Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 particularly at 179 and all cases of breach of the rules of natural justice would be to ignore the clear distinction drawn in Hickman and render s 474 and like privative clauses virtually devoid of content (see Zines, Constitutional Aspects of Judicial Review of Administrative Action, (1998) 1 Constitutional Law and Policy Review 50 at footnote 41). It should be recalled that in Hickman Dixon J (at 615) expressly referred with approval to a passage precisely in point from the judgment of Starke J in Australian Coal & Shale Employees Federation v Aberfield Coal Mining Co Ltd (1942) 66 CLR 161 at 182:
'In my opinion, reg 17 [the privative clause] excludes any appeal whatever from any award or order of the Conciliation Commissioner in relation to industrial disputes referred to him under s 16 of the Industrial Peace Regulations. Effect can only be given to reg 17 by treating the words, award, order or determination, as meaning acts in fact done by the tribunal in the supposed exercise of the powers entrusted to it. To confine the meaning of those words to acts done lawfully and within the jurisdiction of the tribunal ignores the clear, distinct and unmistakable intent of the regulation. Prohibition at common law was the appropriate remedy for restraining inferior Courts from exceeding their jurisdiction, and yet this remedy is withdrawn by the regulation: See Baxter's Case; Morgan v Ryland Bros (Australia) Ltd; Clancy v Butchers' Shop Employees Union; Colonial Bank of Australasia v Willan.'"
58 In NAAX, Gyles J went on to point out (at [32]) that the argument that Hickman is a rule of statutory construction does nothing to assist an applicant under the Act, where there is no express provision of the Act which is inconsistent with s 474(1). He quoted, with approval (at [33]), from the decision of Latham CJ and Dixon J in R v Commonwealth Rent Controller; Ex parte National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd (1947) 75 CLR 361 (at 369) as follows:
"When Commonwealth legislation confers powers upon an officer a provision such as reg 38 cannot be construed as intended to provide that his powers are absolutely unlimited. Such a construction would raise questions of the validity of the legislation. Such a provision cannot help to give effect to any legislation which it is beyond the power of the Commonwealth Parliament to enact. Further, even where no question of validity arises, the effect of such a provision in a particular case depends upon the construction of the relevant statute taken as a whole. If a legislature gives certain powers and certain powers only to an authority which it creates, a provision taking away prohibition cannot reasonably be construed to mean that the authority is intended to have unlimited powers in respect of all persons, and in respect of all subject matters, and without observance of any conditions which the legislature has attached to the exercise of the powers. Such a provision will operate to prevent prohibition going in cases of procedural deficiencies where the authority whose powers are in question is in substance dealing with the matter in respect of which the power is conferred upon it. But if, upon the construction of the legislation as a whole, it appears that the powers conferred upon the authority are exercisable in certain cases, and definitely that they are not exercisable in other cases, and that any attempt to exercise them was intended to be ineffective, then a provision taking away prohibition will not exclude the jurisdiction of this Court under s 75(v) of the Constitution in a case of the latter description: see R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox." (Emphasis added by Gyles J)
59 After quoting this passage with approval, Gyles J continued (at [34] - [36]):
"Indeed, this analysis supplies the correct approach in the present case. It should be clear that I am considering only that kind of procedural fairness (or lack thereof) which may be involved in the use of the kind of information in question here by the Tribunal. I am not intending to answer an abstract question as to whether a privative clause can exclude natural justice. The Act must be construed as it now stands, including s 474 and including the express prescriptive provisions governing the procedure of the Tribunal in Div 3, Div 4 and Div 5 of Pt 7. In the case of a breach of any of those express provisions, a question of statutory construction would arise as to reconciliation of that provision with s 474.…
… In my opinion, s 474 operates according to its terms, which are inconsistent with the existence of implied duty to afford procedural fairness by supplying information going beyond the requirements of Div 4 of Pt 7 of the Act, no matter upon which theory any such implication would be drawn. This conclusion is reinforced by the passages from the Explanatory Memorandum and Second Reading Speech to which I have referred. In my opinion, it is not legitimate to construe the Act on the basis that s 474 did not exist, particularly in relation to a version of the Act which had radically different judicial review provisions, conclude that a duty to afford natural justice existed and then ask whether s 474 takes away the corresponding right.
The course of High Court decisions has established the Hickman exceptions as authoritative and exhaustive. The principles have been referred to very recently by Gaudron and Gummow JJ in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [[2002] HCA 11] at [47], with whose reasons in this respect McHugh J agreed, and by Gaudron J in Miah at [102]. Even if teased out in the manner favoured by the authors of Aronson & Dyer, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 2nd Ed, at p 691, the exceptions do not include breach of an implied duty to accord procedural fairness of the type that is alleged here. The remark by Dawson J in O'Toole most naturally relates to bias, as at least some, and perhaps all, examples of bias would negate the bona fides of the decision and so fall within the first Hickman exception."
60 In my view, the decision of Gyles J in NAAX is correct. There is no scope for reading into the provisions of Part 7 of the Act as it now stands an implied duty of procedural fairness, breach of which can provide a basis for review on the grounds of jurisdictional error.
61 If there were any doubt on the issue of the intention of Parliament in this regard, reference may be made to the terms of the Migration Legislation Amendment (Procedural Fairness) Bill 2002 (Cth) (the "Procedural Fairness Bill"), currently before Parliament and its Explanatory Memorandum (cf. Grain Elevators Board (Vic) v Dunmunkle Corporation (1946) 73 CLR 70 on the use of a subsequent amending Act as an aid to statutory interpretation).
62 The Procedural Fairness Bill will amend the Act to specifically state that the provisions of the Act constitute a code with respect to the procedural requirements under the Act and that the common law requirements of the natural justice hearing rule do not apply to decisions in relation to visa applications made under the Act. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Procedural Fairness Bill states that:
"1. The Migration Legislation Amendment (Procedural Fairness) Bill 2002 (the Bill) amends the Migration Act 1958 (the Act) to provide a clear legislative statement that specified codes of procedure in the Act are an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule.
2. The codes of procedure, introduced by the Migration Reform Act 1992, were intended to enable decision-makers and tribunals to deal with visa applications, visa cancellations and applications for merits review fairly, efficiently and quickly. It was also intended that these codes would eliminate the legal uncertainties that flow from the non-codified common law principles of natural justice while retaining fair, efficient and legally certain decision-making procedures.
3. In Re MIMA; Ex parte Miah [2001] HCA 22 the High Court held, by a narrow majority, that the code of procedure for dealing fairly, efficiently and quickly with visa applications in Subdivision AB of Division 3 of Part 2 of the Act did not exclude common law natural justice requirements. The majority considered that such exclusion would require a clear legislative intention and that there was no such clear intention in the Act.
4. The purpose of this Bill is to provide a clear legislative statement that the codes of procedure identified in the Bill are an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to the matters they deal with. The amendments in the Bill apply to the codes of procedure in the Act relating to:
visa applications;
visa cancellations under sections 109, 116 or 128 of the Act;
the revocation of certain visa cancellations; and
the review of decisions by the Migration Review Tribunal (the MRT) and the Refugee Review Tribunal (the RRT).
5. The Bill also clarifies the relationship between the amendments relating to the codes of procedure and section 474 of the Act. Section 474 contains the privative clause which has the practical effect of expanding the legal validity of the acts done and decisions made by decision-makers. It is intended that section 474 will be interpreted in accordance with R v Hickman; ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598, such that the only reviewable legal errors are those that are set out in that case.
6. It is also intended that the privative clause should protect from invalidity anything done or omitted to be done in relation to any matter dealt with in any provision taken to be an exhaustive statement of the natural justice hearing rule. That is, there is nothing within this Bill that expands in any way the grounds of review under the privative clause. Any error must still fall within the Hickman grounds in order for it to lead to invalidity.
7. This Bill provides a clear legislative statement that the amendments relating to the codes of procedure do not limit the scope or operation of the privative clause in relation to anything done, or omitted to be done, in relation to any matter dealt with in any provision that is taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule by a section that is inserted into the Act by this Bill."
63 Although the applicant in this case did not formulate her argument specifically in terms of procedural fairness, it may be possible to see her submissions as putting to the Court an argument that the Tribunal should not only have taken into consideration its previous decisions relating to the effect of the 'propiska' system of registration in the Ukraine, but also given her an opportunity to respond to any adverse finding the Tribunal was to make in relation to the question of relocation within the Ukraine. Such an obligation would be clearly unworkable and does not come close to the obligations placed on the Tribunal under the provisions of Part 7 of the Act.
64 As was pointed out by Gyles J in NAAX, the objectives of the Act were to provide a mechanism of merits review that is fair, just, economical, informal and quick (s 420). The role of the Tribunal member is something akin to an expert. There is no adversarial proceeding, but an opportunity for the applicant to present his or her case and persuade the Tribunal that the rights sought by the applicant should be granted.
65 It will be recalled that in NAAX, the applicants argued that if the Tribunal member had put the adverse "country information" to them and granted them an opportunity to respond, they would have been able to provide other information which contradicted the adverse material. In response to this argument, Gyles J stated (at [52]):
"…there are difficulties both in principle and in practice in having the duty to afford natural justice descend to such a level of detail in this statutory context. The difficulty in principle is that an applicant for protection does not have any case to meet. The Tribunal is not a contradictor. There is no adversary proceeding. See, generally, Mason J in Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 587 in a passage cited below; Miah per Gleeson CJ and Hayne J at [31] and [32]; Aala per Gaudron and Gummow JJ at [76]; Abebe per Callinan J at [293]-[295]; Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 per Gummow J at [142]; and Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ at 282. Each applicant had to satisfy the Tribunal that his or her fear of persecution upon return to Burma is genuine and for a Convention reason. Leaving aside matters personal to the individual, and concentrating upon matters pertaining to the circumstances in Burma, the applicant should have the opportunity of presenting all it wishes, both in writing and orally, to corroborate his or her claims. The hearing provided for by s 425 is not an opportunity for confrontation, it is an opportunity for persuasion. The statutory process in Div 4 of Pt 7 of the Act is designed to afford an opportunity to the applicant to produce his or her case, with supporting material, in writing and in person. The case is then considered behind closed doors by the member of the Tribunal performing the function of an administrator. The member of such a tribunal is, or becomes, by way of being an expert in the circumstances of various countries, and must assess what is claimed by the applicant in the light of that knowledge. As such knowledge cannot all be carried in the head, a library of it must be available. Evaluation of the credibility of an account given by an applicant is subjective and depends upon many factors, including observations of an applicant at the hearing, in circumstances where the Tribunal member will usually have considered other cases with a similar claimed history and patterns will often have emerged. There is obviously always a mass of country information available. Much would be taken for granted. Much would be debatable. A selection of that which is relevant to the particular case depends upon the way in which the member views the case. The judgment as to the issues upon which external country information will be relevant is entirely a matter for the Tribunal member. There is no obligation to consider any or any particular country information. Disclosure of particular country information to an applicant is, in essence, to reveal the process of reasoning of the Tribunal."
66 Although the situation in the current case is somewhat different, the same principles apply. The Tribunal is not a court and does not exercise judicial power (SZ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 101 FCR 342, per Branson J at [37]-[41] (with whom Beaumont and Lehane JJ agreed); see also Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510 at [164]). As such, although consistency in decision making is generally desirable, there is no obligation on a Tribunal member to consider every previous decision of the Tribunal and give the weight to each decision that would be given to a judicial precedent. In the current context, it is worth noting that one of the decisions relied upon by the applicant to challenge the decision of the Tribunal, was given only six weeks prior to the applicant's decision. In my opinion, it would be wholly inappropriate and out of keeping with the legislative scheme of the Act to place such an obligation on a Tribunal member.
67 Given the above considerations, the effect of s 474 in this case is to render the decision of the Tribunal final and conclusive, unless it can be shown that one of the three Hickman conditions is satisfied, ie, that: (i) the Tribunal did not make a bona fide attempt to exercise its power or that the decision is, on its face, beyond power; (ii) the decision does not relate to the subject matter of the legislation; or (iii) the decision is not reasonably capable of reference to the power given to the decision-maker.
68 In considering the three Hickman conditions in the current case it is clear, I think, that none are made out. First, there is nothing before the Court to indicate (nor has it been argued by the applicant at any stage in the proceedings) that the decision was not made by the Tribunal as a bona fide exercise of its power under the Act. Secondly, the decision deals with the review of a decision of a delegate of the Minister to refuse an application for a protection visa, and is squarely within the subject matter of the Act. Finally, there is no question that the Tribunal has power under the Act to make such determinations under s 411; and that the decision of the Tribunal in this case is reasonably capable of reference to that power (See also the recent decision of Tamberlin J in NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 281 at [38]).